in Re Karen Carlisle

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 25, 2005
• Docket: 10-05-00220-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-05-00220-CV

In re Karen Carlisle, et al

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM Opinion

          Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

                                                                   TOM GRAY

                                                                   Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

          Justice Vance, and

          Justice Reyna

(Justice Vance dissenting)*

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed May 25, 2005

[CV06]

          * “(Justice Vance would request a response from the Real Party in Interest.  Tex. R. App. P. 52.4).”

contempt motion is based; insufficiency of the allegations contained in the motion for contempt; and failure of the order to comply with the Family Code. Because we find that the two prior orders are not sufficiently specific, we grant the application.

      The test of the certainty required of an order enforceable by contempt is that it must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms so that the person affected by the order will readily know exactly what obligations are imposed on him. Ex parte Shelton, 582 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1979, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967)).

      The Agreed Decree of Divorce, dated September 3, 1982, provided that Brown shall maintain "in full force and effect the major medical and health insurance coverage that now insures the parties' child through his group plan with his employer." It further provides:

In the event that [Brown] terminates his employment, he is ordered to convert the policy covering the minor child to insurance equal to the present coverage and maintain said insurance until the child reaches the age of 18 or is otherwise emancipated.

Although Brown's employment changed, the parties dispute the meaning of the phrase "terminates his employment"—one contending that it means only a voluntary termination and the other that it means any job change. Using the questions posed by the Dallas court in Shelton, it is apparent that this order fails the test. See id.

      A 1987 modification of the divorce decree provides: "IT IS ORDERED that [Brown] and [Hilbert] shall equally pay all health care expenses not paid by insurance that are incurred by or behalf of the parties' children." Again, posing the questions from Shelton, we find that the order lacks sufficient specificity. See id.

      The application for writ of habeas corpus is granted.

      Brown also complains that the court had no authority to reduce the unpaid sums to judgment. That contention, however, is beyond the scope of our inquiry on an application for writ of habeas corpus, which is limited to a determination of whether the order of commitment is void. See Ex parte Thetford, 369 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. 1963). Thus, we do not address the validity of the order as a judgment for "uninsured health care expenses," "breach of contract," attorney's fees, and costs.

                                                                                 BILL VANCE

                                                                                 Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

          Justice Cummings, and

          Justice Vance

Application for writ of habeas corpus granted

Opinion delivered and filed November 17, 1993

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