[Cite as In re K.A.P, 2026-Ohio-1710.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
IN THE MATTER OF: THE Case No. 2025 CA 0095 ADOPTION OF K.A.P., J.D.P., V.C.P., 2025 CA 0096 A.E.S.P. 2025 CA 0097 2025 CA 0098
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case Nos. 20245016, 20245017, 20245018, 20245019
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: May 11, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: MICHAEL L. BROWN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants; THOMAS M. MCCASH, for Defendants-Appellees.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellants D.D.P. and M.A.P. appeal the Richland County Probate Court’s
October 20, 2025, Order denying their Civ.R. 60(B) Motion for Relief from the court’s
October 22, 2024, Judgment Entries of Adoption of minor children K.A.P., J.D.P., V.C.P.,
and A.E.S.P. Appellees are M.A.J. and J.E.J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} Appellant D.D.P. is the biological father of minor children K.A.P., J.D.P.,
V.C.P., and A.E.S.J.; appellant M.A.P. is their biological mother. Appellees are the
maternal grandparents of the minor children. On November 29, 2023, the Richland County Juvenile Court designated appellees as the legal custodians of three of the minor
children due to the appellants’ continued struggle with drug use and abuse.
{¶3} On April 4, 2024, the appellees filed a Petition for Adoption of the minor
children with the Richland County Probate Court, which was served upon the appellants
via publication. The probate court scheduled a consent hearing on May 30, 2024, and a
best interest hearing on June 20, 2024. D.D.P. appeared at the consent hearing. Although
paternal grandmother J.B. appeared at the consent hearing, she did not testify on D.D.P.’s
behalf, nor did she move to intervene or otherwise participate in the adoption proceedings
at that time. The probate court issued a Judgment Entry on May 30, 2024, finding that
M.A.P.’s consent was not required because she failed to file an objection to the Petition
for Adoption within 14 days of service of notice of the Petition, and found that D.D.P.’s
consent was not required because he failed without justifiable cause to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor children for a period of at least one year prior to
the date the Petition was filed. D.D.P. appealed the court’s decision, but his appeal was
dismissed by this Court due to D.D.P.’s failure to file an appellate brief. Accordingly, the
appellants’ consent to the appellees’ adoption of the minor children is not at issue.
{¶4} D.D.P. moved for a continuance of the best interest hearing, which the
probate court granted, rescheduling the hearing for September 30, 2024. On September
26, 2024, paternal grandmother J.B. filed a motion to intervene, which the court denied
on September 27, 2024. The best interest hearing proceeded as scheduled. The appellants
both appeared for the best interest hearing and were represented by counsel; paternal
grandmother J.B. was also present in the courtroom. During the hearing, the probate
court stated, on the record, that “[t]hrough discussion, everyone has agreed to the
adoption being granted in all four cases with some matters regarding ongoing visitation with [Paternal Grandmother.]” The parties told the court that they had arrived at a
“gentlemen’s agreement” regarding J.B.’s visitation with the children. The court
determined that adoption was in the best interests of the minor children, issued the final
decrees of adoption on September 30, 2024, and granted the adoption petitions in an
October 11, 2024, Judgment Entry.
{¶5} The appellants appealed the probate court’s September 27, 2024, denial of
paternal grandmother J.B.’s motion to intervene in the adoption matter, and appealed the
court’s October 11, 2024, Judgment Entry granting the adoption petition. This Court
affirmed those decisions in In re Adoption of J.D.P., 2025-Ohio-1565 (5th Dist.), appeal
not accepted, 2025-Ohio-2888, noting that “[w]hile the gentlemen’s agreement regarding
Paternal Grandmother’s visitation may have been a consideration in the probate court’s
ultimate decision to grant the four (4) adoptions, it does not appear to have been a
significant factor, if at all, upon which the probate court relied in making its best interest
determination.” Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶6} On October 10, 2025, the appellants filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), arguing that the appellees failed to honor the
“gentlemen’s agreement” regarding J.B.’s visitation with the minor children, and that said
failure to follow the terms of the “gentlemen’s agreement” constituted fraud,
misrepresentation, and/or misconduct under Civ.R. 60(B)(3). In addition, the appellants
argued that relief was warranted under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) because “the continued
enforcement of the judgment under these circumstances would be unjust and inequitable,
contrary to the child’s best interest.”
{¶7} On October 20, 2025, the probate court issued an Order Denying [M.J. and
D.P.’s] Motions for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), holding that the appellants had failed to show any operative facts demonstrating that they had a
meritorious defense or claim; that they failed to show that they were entitled to relief
under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and, that the Motion was
barred by R.C. 3107.16(B).
{¶8} The appellants filed a timely appeal in which they set forth the following
sole assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. THE PROBATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
APPELLANTS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY DENYING THEIR CIV.R. 60(B) MOTION
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE THE MOTION AND SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVITS ALLEGED OPERATIVE FACTS OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION,
AND COERCION IN THE PROCUREMENT OF THE ADOPTION DECREES.”
{¶10} The appellants argue that the probate court erred when it denied their
Civ.R. 60(B) motion. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} To prevail on a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B), the
movants must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense to present if relief
is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R.
60(B)(1) through (5); and, (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and where
the grounds of relief are Civ. R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment. GTE Automatic Electric Company, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio
St.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus. The GTE factors are “independent and
conjunctive, not disjunctive.” Blaney v. Kerrigan, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7866, *4 (5th
Dist. Aug. 4, 1986). Thus, “failing to meet one is fatal, for all three must be satisfied in
order to gain relief.” Id. at *5. Our standard of review of a court's decision as to whether to grant a Civ. R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. GTE at 148. In order to find an
abuse of discretion, the court must determine that the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
ANALYSIS
{¶12} R.C. 3107.16(B) addresses when an adoption decree can be vacated, and
states:
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[Cite as In re K.A.P, 2026-Ohio-1710.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
IN THE MATTER OF: THE Case No. 2025 CA 0095 ADOPTION OF K.A.P., J.D.P., V.C.P., 2025 CA 0096 A.E.S.P. 2025 CA 0097 2025 CA 0098
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case Nos. 20245016, 20245017, 20245018, 20245019
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: May 11, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: MICHAEL L. BROWN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants; THOMAS M. MCCASH, for Defendants-Appellees.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellants D.D.P. and M.A.P. appeal the Richland County Probate Court’s
October 20, 2025, Order denying their Civ.R. 60(B) Motion for Relief from the court’s
October 22, 2024, Judgment Entries of Adoption of minor children K.A.P., J.D.P., V.C.P.,
and A.E.S.P. Appellees are M.A.J. and J.E.J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} Appellant D.D.P. is the biological father of minor children K.A.P., J.D.P.,
V.C.P., and A.E.S.J.; appellant M.A.P. is their biological mother. Appellees are the
maternal grandparents of the minor children. On November 29, 2023, the Richland County Juvenile Court designated appellees as the legal custodians of three of the minor
children due to the appellants’ continued struggle with drug use and abuse.
{¶3} On April 4, 2024, the appellees filed a Petition for Adoption of the minor
children with the Richland County Probate Court, which was served upon the appellants
via publication. The probate court scheduled a consent hearing on May 30, 2024, and a
best interest hearing on June 20, 2024. D.D.P. appeared at the consent hearing. Although
paternal grandmother J.B. appeared at the consent hearing, she did not testify on D.D.P.’s
behalf, nor did she move to intervene or otherwise participate in the adoption proceedings
at that time. The probate court issued a Judgment Entry on May 30, 2024, finding that
M.A.P.’s consent was not required because she failed to file an objection to the Petition
for Adoption within 14 days of service of notice of the Petition, and found that D.D.P.’s
consent was not required because he failed without justifiable cause to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor children for a period of at least one year prior to
the date the Petition was filed. D.D.P. appealed the court’s decision, but his appeal was
dismissed by this Court due to D.D.P.’s failure to file an appellate brief. Accordingly, the
appellants’ consent to the appellees’ adoption of the minor children is not at issue.
{¶4} D.D.P. moved for a continuance of the best interest hearing, which the
probate court granted, rescheduling the hearing for September 30, 2024. On September
26, 2024, paternal grandmother J.B. filed a motion to intervene, which the court denied
on September 27, 2024. The best interest hearing proceeded as scheduled. The appellants
both appeared for the best interest hearing and were represented by counsel; paternal
grandmother J.B. was also present in the courtroom. During the hearing, the probate
court stated, on the record, that “[t]hrough discussion, everyone has agreed to the
adoption being granted in all four cases with some matters regarding ongoing visitation with [Paternal Grandmother.]” The parties told the court that they had arrived at a
“gentlemen’s agreement” regarding J.B.’s visitation with the children. The court
determined that adoption was in the best interests of the minor children, issued the final
decrees of adoption on September 30, 2024, and granted the adoption petitions in an
October 11, 2024, Judgment Entry.
{¶5} The appellants appealed the probate court’s September 27, 2024, denial of
paternal grandmother J.B.’s motion to intervene in the adoption matter, and appealed the
court’s October 11, 2024, Judgment Entry granting the adoption petition. This Court
affirmed those decisions in In re Adoption of J.D.P., 2025-Ohio-1565 (5th Dist.), appeal
not accepted, 2025-Ohio-2888, noting that “[w]hile the gentlemen’s agreement regarding
Paternal Grandmother’s visitation may have been a consideration in the probate court’s
ultimate decision to grant the four (4) adoptions, it does not appear to have been a
significant factor, if at all, upon which the probate court relied in making its best interest
determination.” Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶6} On October 10, 2025, the appellants filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), arguing that the appellees failed to honor the
“gentlemen’s agreement” regarding J.B.’s visitation with the minor children, and that said
failure to follow the terms of the “gentlemen’s agreement” constituted fraud,
misrepresentation, and/or misconduct under Civ.R. 60(B)(3). In addition, the appellants
argued that relief was warranted under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) because “the continued
enforcement of the judgment under these circumstances would be unjust and inequitable,
contrary to the child’s best interest.”
{¶7} On October 20, 2025, the probate court issued an Order Denying [M.J. and
D.P.’s] Motions for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), holding that the appellants had failed to show any operative facts demonstrating that they had a
meritorious defense or claim; that they failed to show that they were entitled to relief
under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and, that the Motion was
barred by R.C. 3107.16(B).
{¶8} The appellants filed a timely appeal in which they set forth the following
sole assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. THE PROBATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
APPELLANTS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY DENYING THEIR CIV.R. 60(B) MOTION
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE THE MOTION AND SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVITS ALLEGED OPERATIVE FACTS OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION,
AND COERCION IN THE PROCUREMENT OF THE ADOPTION DECREES.”
{¶10} The appellants argue that the probate court erred when it denied their
Civ.R. 60(B) motion. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} To prevail on a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B), the
movants must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense to present if relief
is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R.
60(B)(1) through (5); and, (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and where
the grounds of relief are Civ. R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment. GTE Automatic Electric Company, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio
St.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus. The GTE factors are “independent and
conjunctive, not disjunctive.” Blaney v. Kerrigan, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7866, *4 (5th
Dist. Aug. 4, 1986). Thus, “failing to meet one is fatal, for all three must be satisfied in
order to gain relief.” Id. at *5. Our standard of review of a court's decision as to whether to grant a Civ. R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. GTE at 148. In order to find an
abuse of discretion, the court must determine that the trial court's decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
ANALYSIS
{¶12} R.C. 3107.16(B) addresses when an adoption decree can be vacated, and
states:
(B) Except as provided in division (C) of this section and subject to
the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of six months after an
adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be vacated by the court upon a
motion by any person, including the petitioner, in any manner or upon any
ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required
notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, unless,
in the case of the adoption of a minor, the petitioner has not taken custody
of the minor, or, in the case of the adoption of a minor by a stepparent, the
adoption would not have been granted but for fraud perpetrated by the
petitioner or the petitioner’s spouse, or, in the case of the adoption of an
adult, the adult had no knowledge of the decree within the six-month
period.
In the case sub judice, the adoption decree was issued on October 11, 2024. The appellants
were not only on notice of the proceedings, but were present and represented by counsel
at the final adoption hearing. The six-month period within which the adoption decree
could be vacated had already passed when the appellants filed their October 10, 2025,
Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). As such, the adoption decree could not be vacated on any grounds, and the probate court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the appellants’ motion.1
{¶13} Furthermore, the probate court did not err when it rendered its decision
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. As set forth by this Court in Nat’l City Bank
v. Frazier, 2004-Ohio-5562 (5th Dist.), “… a trial court is not required to hold a hearing
on a motion made pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), unless the material submitted by the movant
contains allegations of operative facts demonstrating relief is warranted.” Id. at ¶16, citing
Gaines & Stern Company, L.P.A. v. Schwarzwald, 70 Ohio App.3d 643, 645 (8th Dist.).
In this case, the appellants’ Motion alleged that the appellees’ failure to comply with the
terms of the so-called “gentlemen’s agreement” constituted fraud, misrepresentation, and
coercion. However, this Court previously determined that the “gentlemen’s agreement”
was not a significant factor, if any factor at all, upon which the probate court relied in
making its best interest determination. The appellants failed to allege operative facts in
their Motion demonstrating that relief was warranted and, as such, the probate court did
not err in denying their motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
1 The appellants argued that the six-month time period was tolled during their various appeals. However, they provide no statutory basis, nor any persuasive case law, in support of said argument. CONCLUSION
{¶14} Based upon the foregoing, we find the appellants’ sole assignment of error
to be without merit. It is therefore overruled, and the decision of the Richland County
Probate Court is hereby affirmed.
{¶15} Costs to appellants.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Popham, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.