In Re: Kansas City v. State of MO

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: January 4, 1996
• Docket: 94-4035
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 94-4035

In re: Kansas City Star * Company, * Petition for Writ of Mandamus * Petitioner. *

Submitted: February 1, 1995

Filed: January 4, 1996

Before MCMILLIAN, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The United States District Court for the Western District of

Missouri held that the Missouri Sunshine Law does not prevent the

Kansas City, Missouri School District Board of Directors from

appearing before the district court's Desegregation Monitoring

Committee in closed session. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus

instructing the district court to hold its order in abeyance. We

deny the writ of mandamus, but remand the case for further

tailoring of the district court's order in consideration of ideals

of comity and the underlying concerns of state law. BACKGROUND

In 1986, the United States District Court created a

Desegregation Monitoring Committee (DMC), consisting of citizens

and experts, to "oversee implementation of the court's orders by

conducting evaluations, collecting information, and recommending

modifications in the orders" regarding the implementation of the

desegregation remedy. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 41-43 (1986). This court confirmed the propriety of the DMC. Jenkins v.

Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816

(1987). In effect, the DMC serves as a buffer among the various

parties in the Jenkins litigation: parties are required to submit

their disputes to the DMC, which then attempts to find a resolution

without formal litigation. Any DMC action is subject to de novo

review by the district court. At the DMC's request, the Kansas

City, Missouri School District Board of Directors (the Board)

attended occasional closed-door meetings with the DMC Executive

Committee.

Following one such meeting on June 20, 1994, a representative

of the Kansas City Star Company (the Star) contacted the Board to

complain that the closed meetings violated the Missouri Sunshine

Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. ch. 610 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (the Act).

Specifically, the Star asserted that the meetings in question were

"public meetings" as defined by § 610.010(5) of the Act, and

therefore, the meetings violated the Act's prohibition on closed

2 sessions unless the meetings were limited to the Act's designated

exclusions. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 610.021.

On July 18, 1994, the Board's general counsel advised the DMC

of the dispute and the Board's conclusion that the Act prevented it

from attending closed meetings. On September 7, 1994, the DMC

Executive Committee notified the Board that matters relating to the

desegregation litigation compelled the DMC to exercise its power to

meet in closed session with litigant parties; moreover, it

considered the closed meetings to be "consistent with areas of

exception under the [Act] and reasonable in view of the DMC's

responsibility to the Federal District Court." (Letter from

Eubanks, DMC Chair, to Dittmeier, the Board's general counsel, of

9/7/94, at 2). It then informed the Board that its presence was

required at a September 19th closed-door meeting. The meeting's

agenda was to include 1) the Board's intended direction in

complying with the district court's August 15, 1994 order regarding

status reports and the Long-Range Magnet Renewal Process ("LRMRP"),

2) the parameters of future discussions regarding the LRMRP, 3) the

type of information that the DMC would be requesting during the

renewal process and the intended dissemination of such material,

and 4) the qualifications and selection process for the Director of

Traditional Schools and principals for King and Nowlin middle

schools.

3 A separate letter to the President of the Board, Dr. Julia H.

Hill, officially advised Board members that their presence was

required. After learning of the DMC's position, the Star advised

the Board that it would file suit if Board members met behind

closed doors. In a letter dated September 9, 1994, Hill informed

the DMC that the Board did not feel at liberty to attend the closed

session scheduled for September 19th without a judicial resolution

of the dispute. Board members did not attend the meeting.

On September 20, 1994, the DMC's Executive Committee voted to

take exception to the Board's failure to appear. It further

directed the Board to attend a meeting scheduled for October 17,

1994. On September 29, 1994, the Board appealed the DMC's

September 20th resolution to the district court. The Star was

permitted to file an amicus curie brief. On November 2, 1994, the

district court entered an order denying the Board's appeal. In the

order, the district court expressly authorized the DMC to require

members of the Board, either individually or jointly, to attend

closed session with the DMC for the purpose of discussing any issue

relevant to the implementation of the remedial plan.

The district court found that the closed meetings between the

DMC and the litigants had resulted in "candid discussion about the

issues involved with implementing the remedial plan which, in turn,

[decreased] the amount of time, energy, and expense required by the

great number of appeals." As the basis for its decision, the

4 district court found that 1) the DMC was not a "public governmental

body" as defined by the Act, but rather an arm of the court; and 2)

the proposed meetings were not "public meetings" of the Board,

which neither convenes nor takes official action at such meetings,

but were DMC meetings at which the Board's attendance was required.

On November 19, 1994 the Board met in a closed session with

the DMC to discuss the agenda items of the September 19th meeting.

No public notice was posted, nor a reason for the closed meeting

provided. The Star petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus

directing the district court to hold its order in abeyance. On

January 13, 1995, this court ordered the DMC Executive Committee to

refrain from holding closed meetings until further instruction was

given from this court.

The only issue before this court is the application of the Act

to the DMC Executive Committee closed-door meetings at which the

Board appears; a First Amendment challenge to the district court's

order has not been raised and is not considered.

DISCUSSION

I. Writ of Mandamus

Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that is appropriate

only under exceptional circumstances where a judicial usurpation of

5 power is established. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). To avoid placing the district court in the

place of a litigant and creating piecemeal appellate litigation,

the Supreme Court has required that a party seeking issuance of a

writ of mandamus must have no other adequate means to attain relief

and must demonstrate that its right to issuance of the writ is

"clear and indisputable". Id.; accord In re Burlington Northern,

Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1982).

In determining whether to grant mandamus relief, the following

factors are relevant considerations: 1) the party seeking the writ

has no other adequate means to attain relief; 2) the petitioner

will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal;

3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of

law; 4) the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or

manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and 5) the

district court's order raises new and important problems or issues

of law of first impression. In re Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 993 (8th

Cir. 1994) (adopting Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d

650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)).

As a threshold issue, we focus on the third factor: Was the

district court's decision that the closed-door meetings are not

subject to the Act clearly erroneous as a matter of law?

6 First, the district court determined that the DMC was not

covered by the Act. On appeal, the Star argues that the DMC is a

public governmental body, citing language of the Act regarding

"judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity,"

§ 610.010(4). Yet reading the statute as a whole, including the

definition of a public governmental body, leads us to the

conclusion that the statute is aimed at state-created bodies.

Specifically, the Act defines public governmental bodies as

entities "created by the constitution or statutes of this state, by

order or ordinance of any political subdivision or district,

judicial entities when operating in an administrative capacity, or

by executive order." § 610.010(4). The Star's argument fails to

recognize the important distinction between federal and state

governmental bodies by ignoring the fact that the DMC was created

by a federal court to monitor the implementation of a remedy for

constitutional violations. The Star would read the phrase

"judicial entities" without any limitation to those created by the

state constitution or statutes. Thus, according to its

interpretation, any governmental body created by any federal court,

such as the case here, or even one created by the President of the

United States through executive order would be subject to the

limitations imposed by this state statute. This cannot be

accurate. The Star's interpretation would permit the Missouri

State Legislature to subject the federal government to all state

regulations, including those found in the Act. Reference to the

Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution is sufficient to

7 refute this claim. Therefore, the district court's holding that

the DMC, as an arm of the federal court, falls outside the scope of

the Act is correct.1

Second, the district court found that the Board was a public

governmental body as defined by the Act, and therefore its meetings

were subject to the requirements imposed by the Act. There is no

disagreement on this point.

Finally, the district court held that the closed-door meetings

in question were DMC meetings, called and controlled by the DMC, in

which the Board neither formally convenes nor takes official

action. It therefore concluded that the meetings did not trigger

the Act's provisions. The Star disagrees: it argues that the Act

prevents the Board, as a public governmental body, from meeting

behind closed doors in any context except for those instances

expressly provided by the Act. Consistent with this position, the

Star claimed at oral argument that if a state governmental body

appeared as a party at a settlement conference ordered by a federal

district court, such a conference could not be closed without

violating the Act. We reject this argument. The Supreme Court has

unequivocally stated that a "state-law prohibition against

compliance with [a federal] district court's decree cannot survive

1 The Attorney General of the State of Missouri supports this construction of the Act. (Br. of Attorney Gen. at 9). While the representations of the Attorney General are not binding on the state courts or legislature, we assume that they are authoritative within the executive branch.

8 the command of the Supremacy Clause." Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.

1 (1958)).

In this case, the district court has determined that DMC

meetings with the litigants are necessary to the implementation of

the desegregation remedy. Thus, rather than accepting the Star's

interpretation of the Act, which would conflict with the

functioning of federal governmental bodies, we believe it is

abundantly clear and hold that the Act does not cover official

meetings of federal governmental bodies, even where state

governmental bodies appear at such meetings for the purpose of

federal concerns. Therefore, the district court's decision is not

clearly erroneous as a matter of law. As such, a writ of mandamus

cannot be justified.

II. Supervisory Power

While our interpretation of the Act suggests no error in the

district court's decision, there is another overarching federalism

concern that must be addressed--comity. Although the district

court's order does not violate the Act by ordering the Board to

appear before it or the DMC in closed session, the extent to which

such action imposes on the policies that underlie the Act must be

considered.

9 In ascertaining the scope of the Act, we interpret Missouri

law as would a Missouri state court. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). State courts have held that the Act's affirmative

provisions should be interpreted broadly and its exceptions

narrowly. Kansas City Star v. Fulson, 859 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1993). With this in mind, as well as the Act's triggering

provision, which includes "all matters which relate in any way to

the performance of the public governmental body's functions or the

conduct of its business," Mo. Ann. Stat. § 610.010(3), we must

delineate where the Act's underlying concerns are present.

Even though the Act is binding on the Board, the statute is

not without limitations. If only a few members of the Board attend

a closed-door meeting, the Act would not be triggered. If the

Board meets in closed session, but does not discuss public

business, then concerns of infringing upon the Act's objectives

disappear. Thus, if Board members merely were to provide the DMC

with information, receive the DMC's views, or even discuss subjects

other than its public business, such as improving communication,

see Fulson, 859 S.W.2d at 940 ("Matters of public business are not

synonymous with matters of public interest."), no conflict with the

policies of the Act would occur.2

2 We take note that the Attorney General of Missouri supports this interpretation of the Act. (Br. of Attorney Gen. at 9.)

10 As the Board is bound by the Act, subject to these

limitations, we think it is desirable as a matter of comity that

the district court give careful attention to the restrictions under

which the Board acts. While under the Supremacy Clause, the

district court can, under appropriate circumstances, order the

Board to attend closed meetings, it is a power that the court

should use sparingly and with full consideration of the principles

of comity.

While we acknowledge the district court's finding that closed-

door meetings increase the efficiency and efficacy of

implementation, these benefits must be weighed against the concerns

of comity for state law. The authority of the DMC, as an arm of

the court, must be strictly monitored and carefully tailored to

match the requirements of its mission: implementation of the

remedy. The district court's order, however, provides no

limitation or guidelines for exercising the authority it granted

the DMC to close its sessions. Therefore, on the basis of our

supervisory powers, see In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1337 (8th

Cir. 1986), we advise the district court to tailor its order.

Specifically, the district court should provide that 1) in

instances in which the prohibitions of the Act might be

contravened, the DMC seek a court order stating that such a closed

meeting is necessary for remedy implementation; 2) in other

instances, the meeting's agenda be controlled so as not to infringe

on the policies regarding discussion of public business; and 3) in

11 all cases, the agenda of DMC meetings be limited to only those

areas clearly within the mission of remedy implementation.

Clearly, the DMC remains unhampered to call closed meeting with the

Board or its members in cases which do not fall within the

parameters of the Act, as set forth above.

The case is remanded to the district court for action

consistent with this decision.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.