In Re Kaiser Steel Corp.

74 B.R. 885, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 920
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado
DecidedJune 10, 1987
Docket14-15140
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 74 B.R. 885 (In Re Kaiser Steel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Kaiser Steel Corp., 74 B.R. 885, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 920 (Colo. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF FEES AND EXPENSES

CHARLES E. MATHESON, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter was initiated by the filing of motions by the Debtor and by the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee for Kaiser Steel Corporation (“Committee”), each seeking the entry of an order framing a special procedure to be used in these complex cases for allowing and paying professional fees and for the reimbursement of expenses to the members of the Committee. Additionally, the committee in the jointly administered case for Kaiser Coal (“Coal Committee”) has sought approval to employ Arapahoe Energy Consultants and has similarly sought approval of a procedural order to provide for the allowance and payment of the fees and expenses of the consultant. The motion filed by the Debtor specifies procedures to be used for the allowance and payment of interim compensation to professionals pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 331, but contains *887 no provision for the reimbursement of expenses of members of the Committee. Similarly, the Committee’s proposed order deals only with the right and ability of the Committee members to seek reimbursement for expenses.

The Debtor has objected to the proposed order of the Committee arguing that the interim reimbursement of expenses of the Committee is not allowable under the Code. In addition, the Chase Manhattan Bank, Banque Baribas, Mellon Bank and the Royal Bank of Canada (all of whom are secured lenders in the Kaiser Coal case) have filed objections to the Coal Committee’s application to hire the consultant and to the Debt- or’s proposal for the payment of professional fees. In part, the objections of the Banks are based on arguments that the relief sought is not allowable under the Code, and in part on the argument that the Debtor should not be permitted to utilize cash collateral to make any such payments, at least as requested. The cash collateral issue raised by the Banks is not presently before the Court. Thus, this opinion will deal with the issue of the procedures to be utilized for the allowance of fees and the reimbursement of expenses and the authority of the Debtor to pay any such allowed fees and/or expenses. The ability of the Debtor to pay any such allowed fees and expenses, whether from cash collateral or otherwise, is another issue to be addressed at another time or at a cash collateral hearing.

At the hearing that was held to consider the proposals, the Court addressed on the record the question of whether interim fee allowances to professionals under Section 331 of the Code should be limited to 75% of the fees sought. The Court is aware of cases holding that interim fee applications should be allowed at some reduced percentage of what has been sought. See, e.g., In re General Coffee Corporation, 39 B.R. 7 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1984). However, the Court disagrees with such holdings.

The legislative history underlying the Bankruptcy Code makes it clear that professionals authorized to be employed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327 to provide services are to be compensated at a rate consistent with that applicable to normal commercial transactions. The concept of penury for professionals espoused in the case of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.1968), was expressly overruled by the legislature, and the concept of notions of economy of the estate in fixing fees was declared to have no place in proceedings under the Code. See, 124 Cong.Rec. H11047-117 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Sen. Edwards). Complex bankruptcy cases such as these consolidated proceedings cannot function without the serious and dedicated efforts of qualified professionals. The result of such efforts is significant fee requests to be paid out of the estate. Requiring professionals, who must look to the estate for payment of their fees, to finance the administration of the estate by carrying 25% or more of their fees for the term of the bankruptcy case is manifestly unreasonable. Timely payment of billings is an inherent aspect of providing services. Certainly creditors’ counsel would rebel at a partial payment arrangement with their clients, and limitations of this nature should not be imposed on those seeking compensation from the estate.

There is a further reason for not imposing an automatic hold-back on fee allowances. This is commonly done as a hedge pending final hearings on fee requests at the close of the estate. The concept is that it protects the estate from having paid excess fee awards and allows the Court to examine the total compensation to be paid professionals at the close of the estate. In part it is used as a vehicle to allow the Court to avoid, on an interim basis, close inspection of fees charged and the reasonableness thereof. However, in cases such as this, if the question of the reasonableness of fees being charged by the professionals is not addressed on a current basis, the Court will soon be facing accumulated fee claims of such a magnitude that it is virtually impossible to assess, on any realistic basis, the reasonableness of the fees. It is far better to consider fully, on a periodic basis, the fees being requested *888 while the evidence of what has been involved, what hearings held and what results achieved are all relatively fresh in the minds of all parties and the Court. For these reasons, the Court will not restrict in advance fee allowances to a fixed percentage of the requested amounts. In re Wilson Foods Corporation, 36 B.R. 317 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1984).

The question of the allowance of the reimbursement of expenses to members of committees appointed pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1102 is more difficult. It is clear that reimbursement of such expenses is not provided for under Sections 330 or 331 of the Code. Those sections deal only with the fees and expenses for professionals appointed pursuant to Section 327. Authority, if any, for the allowance of the reimbursement of such expenses out of the estate must, therefore, be found in Section 503 of the Code.

It has been observed that, historically, reimbursement to a committee or committee members was provided for pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 11-29 of the Bankruptcy Rules adopted under the old Bankruptcy Act. Those rules remained in effect after the adoption by Congress of the Bankruptcy Code. Arguably, nothing in the Code or in the present Bankruptcy Rules deals directly with the allowance of the expenses of a committee appointed pursuant to Section 1102, although the Advisory Committee Notes to Bankruptcy Rule 2016 indicate that the Rule contemplates such allowances.

In considering this issue the initial focus, in many instances, has been on the provisions of Section 503(b)(3)(D) of the Code, which states that there can be allowed as administrative expenses:

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Bluebook (online)
74 B.R. 885, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-kaiser-steel-corp-cob-1987.