2025 IL App (5th) 250398-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 09/24/25. This order was filed The text of this decision NOS. 5-25-0398, 5-25-0399, 5-25-0400, 5-25-0401, 5-25-0402 cons. under Supreme Court may be changed or Rule 23 and is not corrected prior to the precedent except in the IN THE filing of a Petition for limited circumstances Rehearing or the allowed under Rule disposition of the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 23(e)(1).
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re KAIDEN G., HAYLEE G., LYDIA G., ) Appeal from the HENRY G., and OLIVER G., Minors ) Circuit Court of ) Marion County. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 22-JA-22, 22-JA-23, 22-JA-24, ) 22-JA-25, 22-JA-51 Shawn G., ) ) Honorable Ericka A. Sanders, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McHaney and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s findings that the respondent father was an unfit parent and that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 The respondent, Shawn G. (Father), appeals the circuit court’s order terminating his
parental rights to his five children. 1 He argues that both the circuit court’s finding of unfitness and
its finding that termination of his rights was in the children’s best interest were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
1 Father filed separate appeals in the cases involving each of his five children. This court ordered the appeals consolidated under the case number assigned to Kaiden’s case (No. 5-25-0398). 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 12, 2022, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship and motions for
temporary custody as to Father’s four oldest children, Haylee (born May 27, 2015), Kaiden (born
June 7, 2016), Henry (born November 28, 2018), and Lydia (born October 5, 2020). The petitions
named both Father and his wife, Anna G. (Mother), as respondents. 2 The State alleged that the
children were neglected due to an environment injurious to their welfare because (1) Kaiden
alleged that Father “bites [his] pee pee”; (2) Haylee alleged that Father “humps” her; (3) Mother
and Father failed to obtain medical treatment for Haylee, who suffered frequent urinary tract
infections, allegedly caused by placing toys in her genitals; and (4) Father and Mother failed to
arrange academic assistance for Kaiden despite being contacted by his school with concerns. The
circuit court held a shelter care hearing that day, after which it entered orders for temporary
custody, finding that the parents “refused to cooperate with a safety plan and/or intact services.”
¶5 The youngest child, Oliver, was born on October 1, 2022. Two days later, the State filed a
petition for adjudication of wardship and a motion for temporary custody. The petition alleged that
Oliver was neglected due to an environment injurious to his welfare because his four siblings were
wards of the court and the conditions leading to their removal had not been corrected. After a
shelter care hearing that same day, the circuit court entered an order for temporary custody, finding
that Father and Mother had not complied with the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) service plans relating to their four older children.
¶6 On October 11, 2022, the State filed amended petitions for adjudication of wardship. The
State alleged that the children were neglected due to an injurious environment because (1) both
Kaiden and Haylee alleged they did not feel safe at home, (2) Kaiden alleged that Father hurt him
2 Mother appealed the circuit court’s ruling separately and is not a party to this appeal. 2 and sexually abused him and his siblings, and (3) Haylee alleged that Father “humped” her and
stuck his finger in her butt.
¶7 The adjudicatory hearing took place over two days on December 13, 2022, and March 7,
2023. At the end of the hearing, the circuit court found the children to be neglected. On April 3,
2023, the circuit court entered written adjudicatory orders finding the children to be neglected due
to an environment injurious to their welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). The
dispositional hearing occurred on April 17, 2023. At the end of the hearing, the circuit court found
that it was in the children’s best interests to remain in the care and custody of DCFS. The court
noted that both parents refused to attend counseling sessions or communicate with their
caseworker. The circuit court entered dispositional orders making the children wards of the court
on April 25, 2023.
¶8 In September 2023, the family’s caseworker arranged for supervised visitation with the
children after the parents began engaging with services. On November 27, 2023, the circuit court
ordered that Mother and Father were to have no further contact with the three oldest children,
Haylee, Kaiden, and Henry. In a docket entry, the court stated that these children had “extreme
trauma responses” to a visit with their parents and that during the visit, Father threatened to
“whoop” one of the children. The court further noted that the agency arranged the visits without
first consulting with the children’s counselors.
¶9 In a May 22, 2024, docket entry, the circuit court suspended Father and Mother’s visits
with the two youngest children, Lydia and Oliver. The court explained that its ruling was due to
the children’s “clear traumatic responses” following visits.
¶ 10 On December 16, 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate both parents’ parental rights
to all five children. The petitions alleged that both Father and Mother were unfit on two statutory
3 grounds: (1) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to the children’s
removal during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i)
(West 2024)), and (2) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during
any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(ii) (West 2024)).
The State identified three nine-month periods for both failure to make reasonable efforts and failure
to make reasonable progress: (1) March 8, 2023, to December 8, 2023; (2) December 9, 2023, to
September 9, 2023; and (3) March 15, 2024, to December 15, 2024.
¶ 11 The matter came for hearing on the petition to terminate on February 12, 2025. At the
outset, the assistant state’s attorney informed the circuit court that the State intended to present
evidence concerning only the latter two of the nine-month periods identified in the petition to
terminate.
¶ 12 The State’s primary witness was Dollie Vogler, an employee of Caritas Family Solutions,
a contract agency with DCFS. Vogler served as the family’s caseworker from December 2023 to
November 2024. Vogler testified that the first steps she took upon receiving the case were to
conduct an integrated assessment of both parents and refer them for parenting capacity assessments
and psychological evaluations. She indicated Father did not complete his psychological evaluation.
¶ 13 Vogler identified two service plans she had developed for the family dated July 22, 2024,
and October 1, 2024, which were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 3 and 4, respectively. She
explained that ordinarily, she developed a new service plan every six months. In this case,
however, she created an updated plan in July 2024 to include services recommended in
psychosexual evaluations performed in May 2024. Vogler testified that she created a service plan
for the family in April 2024 as well; however, that plan was not entered into evidence. When asked
about the ratings of the parents’ progress contained in the service plans, Vogler explained that the
4 ratings are based upon evaluations of their progress over the six months preceding each new
service plan.
¶ 14 Vogler explained that her usual practice was to meet with parents to review their new
service plans. After this review occurs, she normally asks the parents to sign the plan. Vogler
acknowledged that this did not occur for the July 2024 and October 2024 service plans. She
explained that at the time she developed these two plans, she did not have in-person contact with
Father and Mother as visits with the children had ended in May 2024, and it was at these visits that
she was able to meet with them in person. The only time Vogler met with Father or Mother to
discuss a service plan was when she was first assigned their case, and that would have been in
regard to a prior service plan.
¶ 15 Vogler testified at length concerning the limits to her in-person contact with Father and
Mother and the reasons for those limits. She stated that Father verbally threatened her and other
social service workers via text messages. Vogler explained that, because of these threats, she and
other agency employees only met with Father and Mother during their supervised visits with the
children. Vogler was able to review their service plans with them at these meetings; however, she
had no in-person contact with them after visits with the youngest children stopped in May 2024.
Instead, Vogler attempted to communicate with Father and Mother through email and text
messages, but they usually did not respond. Vogler acknowledged that in July 2024, she changed
her phone number and did not initially provide the new number to Father and Mother after she
received “very mean” messages from Father. She was not asked to elaborate. Vogler testified that
her supervisor decided that all communications would be by email and that Father and Mother’s
attorneys would be included in the chain. Vogler eventually provided Father and Mother with her
new phone number.
5 ¶ 16 Vogler testified that she sent copies of the July 2024 service plan to Father and Mother and
their respective attorneys by email. She testified that she reviewed the recommendations in the
service plan with Mother over the phone; however, she did not indicate that she had any similar
discussions with Father. Although Vogler could not recall whether she sent copies of the October
2024 service plan by email, she knew Mother and Father received a copy because they sent her a
photograph of it. She explained that she mailed a copy of the service plan and, although it went to
the wrong address, Mother and Father received it because it was delivered to “the brother’s house.”
¶ 17 Vogler testified that the goals for Father in both service plans included a mental health
assessment, a substance abuse assessment, a psychological assessment, parenting classes, and
treatment with a licensed sex offender treatment provider. The overall rating for Father’s progress
on these goals was unsatisfactory. Vogler emphasized that both parents refused to acknowledge or
take responsibility for “the reason the children came into care.”
¶ 18 On cross-examination, Father’s attorney questioned Vogler about a psychological
assessment scheduled for April 29, 2024, that Father did not attend. When asked why he did not
attend the assessment, Vogler explained that she offered to drive Father to the appointment, but
when he later threatened an investigator who attempted to visit the family’s home, her supervisor
instructed her not to go to the family’s home. Vogler informed Father on April 12, 2024, that she
would not be able to drive him to the April 29 appointment. She testified that in response, he told
her he would not be able to get there on his own, and at this point, she offered to provide him with
a $40 gas card. On April 27, Vogler informed Father that she could provide him with an Uber to
take him to the assessment, but he told her to “keep it” because his attorney had arranged a different
psychological assessment for him.
6 ¶ 19 Vogler’s supervisor, Krystal Foley, also testified for the State. When Vogler left her
position in November 2024, Foley briefly acted as the family’s caseworker from November 15,
2024, to January 6, 2025. When asked if Father made any progress during this period, Foley
replied, “Not to my knowledge, no.” On cross-examination, she acknowledged that she did not
speak with any service providers during her brief tenure as caseworker.
¶ 20 The circuit court also considered Exhibits 3 and 4, the service plans. Each plan contained
the same nine goals for Father, along with evaluations rating his progress on those goals prior to
the date of the plan. We note that most of the ratings included in the July 2024 service plan were
based on evaluations conducted in April 2024 and reflect Father’s progress between October 2023
and March 2024. The ratings in the October 2024 service plan all reflect his progress between
April and September 2024.
¶ 21 The first four goals were originally established in May 2022, shortly after the children were
removed from the home. Father’s first goal was to complete an integrated assessment and follow
all recommendations. Father completed the assessment with Vogler on January 8, 2024. Vogler
rated his progress on this goal as satisfactory in April 2024. In the October 2024 evaluation,
however, she rated his progress as unsatisfactory because he did not follow through on the
recommendations consistently.
¶ 22 Father’s second goal was to complete a parenting capacity assessment and follow all
recommendations. Father completed the assessment itself on February 22, 2024. Vogler rated his
progress on this goal as satisfactory in an April 2024 evaluation; however, she rated his progress
as unsatisfactory in her October 2024 evaluation.
¶ 23 The third goal was to complete a psychological assessment and follow the assessor’s
recommendations. As discussed previously, Father missed a scheduled appointment for this
7 assessment on April 29, 2024. Vogler rated Father’s progress toward this goal as unsatisfactory in
both the April and October evaluations. In the October evaluation, she noted that as of that time,
Father still had not completed the assessment.
¶ 24 The fourth goal for Father was to complete a psychosexual assessment and follow the
assessor’s recommendations. Father participated in the assessment on February 1, 2022; however,
he did not engage in treatment with a licensed sex offender treatment provider, as recommended.
Vogler therefore rated Father’s progress toward this goal as unsatisfactory in both the April 2024
evaluation and the October 2024 evaluation.
¶ 25 Father’s fifth goal, added in May 2024, was to engage in counseling with a licensed sex
offender treatment provider. Vogler rated Father’s progress toward this goal as unsatisfactory in a
July 23, 2024, evaluation, noting that as of that date, she had been unable to reach Father to discuss
this recommendation with him. In an October 2, 2024, evaluation, she again rated Father’s progress
as unsatisfactory for the same reason.
¶ 26 The sixth goal for Father (established in May 2022) was to complete a mental health
assessment. Father completed the assessment on March 7, 2024. Vogler rated his progress as
satisfactory in the April 2024 evaluation, but she rated his progress as unsatisfactory in the October
2024 evaluation, noting that he did not consistently follow through with recommended services.
¶ 27 Father’s seventh goal was to participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow all
recommendations. Vogler rated his progress as satisfactory on both service plans, noting that he
completed the assessment prior to April 1, 2024, and the assessor did not recommend additional
services.
¶ 28 The eighth goal for Father was to take parenting classes. This goal was added in October
2023 due to concerns that arose during one of his supervised visits with the children when he
8 threatened to “whoop” one of his children if the child continued to act out. Vogler rated Father’s
progress as unsatisfactory in her April 2024 evaluation. However, Father began taking parenting
classes in August 2024 and was rated as satisfactory in Vogler’s October 2024 evaluation.
¶ 29 Father’s final goal, established for him in April 2024, was to provide proof of stable income
and housing. Vogler rated his progress on this goal as unsatisfactory in both evaluations, noting in
each that Father must provide proof of his income and allow an investigator to visit the family’s
home for a safety check.
¶ 30 In ruling from the bench, the circuit court first addressed the question of whether Father
made reasonable efforts. The court found that Father completed parenting classes and engaged in
the parenting capacity assessment, but he refused to attend the psychological evaluation, did not
communicate consistently with the caseworker, and was “verbally abusive and threatening” when
he did communicate. The circuit court further found as follows: “[Father] has taken no
responsibility for the reasons why the children were brought into care and has shown absolutely
no behavior change.” In conclusion, the court found that the State had met its burden of finding
Father unfit. The court made similar findings with respect to Mother.
¶ 31 The circuit court held a best interest hearing on April 2, 2025. Azamatdzhan Spindler,
Kaiden’s foster father, testified that he and his wife loved Kaiden and wanted to adopt him.
Spindler noted that Kaiden was related to his wife, although he did not specify how they were
related. Henry’s foster father, Harold Akers, a widower with grown children, likewise testified that
he loved Henry and wanted to adopt him.
¶ 32 The children’s maternal grandmother, Donna Head, is Haylee’s foster mother. Head
testified that she loved Haylee and wanted to adopt her. On cross-examination, she was asked
about Haylee’s relationship with her disabled adult son, Joe, who suffered from multiple sclerosis.
9 She testified that while she was at work, Haylee attended daycare. Asked if this was because of
Joe’s medical condition, Head replied in the negative and explained that she wanted Haylee to be
around other children.
¶ 33 Lydia’s foster mother, Alicia Hodgins, is Mother’s first cousin. She testified that she loves
Lydia and wants to adopt her. Hodgins acknowledged on cross-examination that she was initially
hesitant to commit to adopting Lydia. She explained that Lydia had some behavior that was
concerning, and she wanted to be certain that, as a single mother, she would be able to handle
Lydia’s needs. She testified that she now felt confident that Lydia would benefit from counseling
and possibly medication. Hodgins has a 10-year-old daughter who lives with her half the time. She
said that adding Lydia to the family was “an adjustment” for her daughter, but the children are
“like normal siblings” in that they quarrel at times, but they love each other.
¶ 34 Oliver’s foster father, Mark Collins Jr., testified that Oliver had lived with him and his wife
since he was only three days old. They also have a one-year-old daughter, Johanna. Collins testified
that he, his wife, and their daughter all love Oliver. Collins confirmed that he wanted to adopt
Oliver.
¶ 35 All five foster parents also testified concerning where the children attended school and
church. With the exception of Akers and Henry, the families all attended the same church, and
some of the children attended the same school.
¶ 36 Foster care supervisor Krystal Foley was the State’s final witness. She testified that she
visited all five foster homes and had no concerns about any of the foster families adopting the
children. The children’s court-appointed guardian ad litem questioned Foley about the decision to
place the five children in separate homes. Foley acknowledged that DCFS policy is to place
siblings together when possible. In this case, however, she believed that separate placements were
10 in the children’s best interests. She explained, “With some of the behaviors that they have, they
could very well be triggering each other if they’re placed together. There’s concerns of them
perpetrating sexual abuse on one another if placed together, so this is the best way to keep
everybody safe.” Foley testified that the decision to separate the children was based on consultation
with people in “DCFS Clinical.” Foley further testified that the children attended sibling visitation
sessions and continued to have a bond with each other.
¶ 37 Mother testified that she had been married to Father for 11 years and they had lived in the
same house for 10 years. She further testified that they ran their own business together selling
tractor parts and “stuff like that.” Mother believed the children should be placed together because
they loved each other and missed each other. Finally, she testified that when the older children
were in the care of her mother, Donna Head, various problems arose. 3 According to Mother, both
Haylee and Kaiden asked to return home and the children smelled bad during visits. She asserted
that despite Head’s claim to the contrary, she often left the children in the care of Joe or their
grandfather for short periods of time. (Head was widowed at the time of the best interests hearing.)
¶ 38 Father did not testify at the hearing. The circuit court took matters under advisement.
¶ 39 On April 23, 2025, the circuit court entered a written order terminating Mother and Father’s
parental rights. The court first found as follows: “As the Court found in the fitness phase of this
proceeding, [Mother and Father] do not acknowledge that their children were abused or neglected.
They do not acknowledge that their children experience symptoms and behaviors related to
trauma.” In addition, the court found that all of the children’s foster families provide for their
physical and emotional needs and that all of the children feel safe in their foster homes. The court
3 We note that, although not directly pertinent to this appeal, Mother expressed a great deal of hostility to Head. She believed that Head was responsible for fabricating allegations of sexual abuse in an effort to obtain custody of the children, and when asked to describe three wishes during the psychosexual assessment, one of Mother’s wishes was to stay as far away from Head as possible. 11 further found that the foster parents all ensured that the children attended sibling visits and
maintained their bond, something that would continue as long as it was in the best interests of the
children. The circuit court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best
interests. Father subsequently filed this timely appeal.
¶ 40 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 41 Father argues that the circuit court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the
evidence with respect to both his unfitness and the children’s best interests. We disagree.
¶ 42 A. Standard of Review
¶ 43 Termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First, the State must prove that
the respondent parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th)
241427, ¶ 62. This heightened standard is required because the termination of parental rights
results in “a permanent and complete severance of the parent-child relationship” (In re C.N., 196
Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001)), thereby curtailing a fundamental liberty interest (see In re C.N., 196 Ill.
2d at 216). If the circuit court finds a parent unfit, the proceedings move to the second step, at
which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the children’s
best interests. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 73.
¶ 44 We give great deference to the circuit court’s finding of unfitness because that court had
the opportunity to observe and evaluate the parties and their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.
App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). As such, we will not reverse the circuit court’s finding of unfitness
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427,
¶ 63. A finding of unfitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident from our review of the record. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at
1064. We apply the same standard in reviewing the circuit court’s best interest determination. In re
12 Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 74. With these principles in mind, we turn our attention
to Father’s arguments.
¶ 45 B. Unfitness
¶ 46 A parent may be found unfit if the State proves any one of the statutory grounds for
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 63; see
also 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024) (providing that, “The grounds of unfitness are any one or
more of the following” (emphasis added)). As such, we may affirm the circuit court’s decision if
the evidence supports its finding of unfitness on any one of the grounds alleged. In re Baby Boy,
2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 64.
¶ 47 In this case, the State alleged two grounds for unfitness: failure to make reasonable efforts
to correct the conditions that led to the children’s removal during any nine-month period following
the adjudication of neglect or abuse (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2024)) and failure to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children during any nine-month period following the
adjudication of neglect or abuse (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)). The nine-month periods
at issue for both reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are December 9, 2023, to September
9, 2024, and March 15, 2024, to December 15, 2024.
¶ 48 Failure to make reasonable efforts and failure to make reasonable progress are two distinct
grounds for parental unfitness. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1066. We assess a parent’s
reasonable efforts by a subjective standard based on the amount of effort that is reasonable for the
particular parent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1066-67. By contrast, we measure
reasonable progress by an objective standard. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. “At a
minimum, reasonable progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of
reunification.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. A parent has made reasonable progress
13 toward the return of the child when the circuit court, “in the near future, will be able to order the
child returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461
(1991).
¶ 49 Father first argues that many of the requirements in his service plans were “not reasonably
related to the reasons the children were brought into the care and custody of DCFS.” In support of
his contention that this was improper, Father cites section 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act. That statute governs service plans and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “No
service plan shall compel any child or parent to engage in any activity or refrain from any activity
which is not reasonably related to remedying a condition or conditions that gave rise or which
could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.” (Emphasis added.) 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West
2024). We reject this argument for two reasons.
¶ 50 First, the prohibition contained in the statute is not as broad as Father’s argument suggests.
By its express terms, the statute does not preclude service plan goals related to problems that arise
or come to light after the children are taken into care, such as the requirement that Father take
parenting classes. As the Illinois Supreme Court explained, “the condition resulting in removal of
the child may not be the only, or even the most severe, condition which must be addressed before
custody of the child can be returned to the parent.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216. A finding of
unfitness should never be based on a parent’s failure “to comply with administrative directives
unrelated to remedying a condition which would prevent return of the child.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.
2d at 215. However, we measure a parent’s reasonable progress in terms of compliance with
service plan requirements and court orders “in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal
of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent
the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17.
14 ¶ 51 Second, Father does not specify which requirements were not reasonably related to
conditions he needed to correct before the children could be returned to his care. His failure to
explain the reasons for his argument that the services required of him were improper results in
forfeiture of that claim on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 52 Next, Father asserts that he “made satisfactory progress with all services aside from proof
of income *** and stable housing.” As we explained earlier, his unsatisfactory ratings on this goal
stem from his refusal to provide proof of income and allow a home safety check. Father argues
that this should not serve as a basis for finding him unfit because (1) the service plans indicate he
reported being self-employed, and providing proof of income is difficult for a self-employed
individual; (2) having a low income is not a proper basis for a finding of unfitness; and (3) it was
not his fault the caseworkers “chose” not to inspect his home. We note that Father’s claim that
caseworkers simply “chose” not to conduct the home safety check is contradicted by the record.
However, we need not consider Father’s arguments concerning the propriety of the unsatisfactory
ratings he received toward this goal because, contrary to Father’s assertion, proof of income and
housing was far from the only goal on which he failed to make reasonable efforts or progress.
¶ 53 In October 2024, Vogler rated Father’s progress on seven of his nine service plan goals as
unsatisfactory. He questions the propriety of two of those ratings. First, he contends that his
caseworker “purposely set [him] up for failure” on the goal of participating in a psychological
assessment because she offered him a ride to the scheduled assessment and then withdrew the
offer. As we discussed previously, however, Vogler offered to provide Father with an Uber to take
him to the psychological assessment, but he turned down that offer. Second, Father argues that he
cannot be rated as unsatisfactory for failing to engage in counseling with a licensed sex offender
treatment provider where the caseworker “cannot confirm” his participation. However, Vogler
15 testified that she was unable to obtain signed release forms from both parents that would have
enabled her to verify their participation in services. A parent’s refusal to sign release forms is a
valid reason to find their progress unsatisfactory. See In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427,
¶ 66. Moreover, Father does not address the remaining services where his progress was likewise
rated as unsatisfactory.
¶ 54 Finally, Father argues that the evidence “suggests that Father may not have been fully
apprised of his recommended services.” He contends that he cannot be found unfit for failing to
engage in services he did not know were required. In support of his argument, Father cites this
court’s recent decision in In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U. 4 We find that case
distinguishable.
¶ 55 There, the respondent father completed nearly all required services. In re Charlie V., 2025
IL App (5th) 241085-U, ¶ 27. His home was safe, he was employed, and he demonstrated good
parenting skills during his visits with the children. In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U,
¶ 27. The caseworker’s lone concern regarding his parenting skills was his need to learn how to
set boundaries with the children’s mother. In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U, ¶ 27.
The caseworker also indicated that returning the children to the father would have been appropriate
if he took “decisive action” in response to the risks posed to the children by their mother’s new
romantic relationship. In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U, ¶ 26. However, the father’s
service plan contained no indication of what “decisive action” he was required to take or what
boundaries he should set with the mother. In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U, ¶¶ 26-
27. It was in this context that we held that the father’s “failure to take an unknown ‘decisive action’
4 Cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025). 16 or set boundaries of an unknown nature[ ] cannot be the basis for finding of unfitness for failure
to make reasonable progress.” In re Charlie V., 2025 IL App (5th) 241085-U, ¶ 28.
¶ 56 Here, by contrast, Father made unsatisfactory progress on nearly every goal in his service
plan, and the only indication he might not have been fully apprised of any task required of him
was evidence that Vogler had been unable to reach him to review the requirement that he engage
in counseling with a licensed sex offender treatment provider. Vogler’s inability to contact Father
to review this requirement was largely due to his own refusal to communicate with her and his
pattern of belligerence toward social service workers. Additionally, although Vogler was unable
to discuss the requirement with Father, the evidence indicates he was aware that the requirement
existed. Vogler testified that Father or Mother sent her a picture of the October 1, 2024, service
plan, which included that requirement. Moreover, in view of Father’s unsatisfactory progress on
other services, the finding of unfitness for failure to make reasonable progress was not based solely
on a failure to comply with this task, even assuming Vogler failed to fully apprise him of the
requirement.
¶ 57 Most importantly, Father was unwilling to acknowledge that the abuse occurred or to
recognize the trauma responses of his children, as Vogler noted both in her testimony and in her
evaluations of his progress in the service plans. Due in large part to these deficits, Father was not
allowed to have even supervised visitation with any of his children at the time the unfitness hearing
occurred, thereby making it extremely unlikely the children could be returned to his care anytime
soon. See In re Ka. F., 2023 IL App (4th) 230496-U, ¶ 39 (upholding a finding that a father failed
to make reasonable progress where he “never progressed to unsupervised visits and his ability to
have the children in his custody in the near future was questionable”). 5 Reasonable progress toward
5 Cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025). 17 the return of the child requires compliance with service plans and court orders that “is sufficiently
demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child
returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in the original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461. This
evidence provides ample support for the circuit court’s finding of unfitness based on failure to
make reasonable progress. Because we may affirm the circuit court’s decision if the evidence
supports even one statutory ground for unfitness (In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 64),
we need not consider whether the evidence likewise supports a finding of unfitness based on failure
to make reasonable efforts.
¶ 58 C. Best Interests
¶ 59 Once a parent has been found unfit, the focus shifts from the parent to the child. In re Baby
Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 73. During the best interest phase, the parent’s interest in
maintaining a relationship with the child “must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home
life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004).
¶ 60 In deciding whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the circuit
court must consider several statutory factors, including (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare;
(2) the child’s sense of attachment; (3) the need for permanence and stability and the continuity of
the child’s relationships with parental figures, siblings, and other family members; and (4) the
preferences of the individuals available to provide care. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). The
circuit court may also consider the likelihood of the child being adopted. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App
(4th) 220793, ¶ 54. Although the circuit court must consider all applicable statutory factors, it is
not required to refer to each individual factor in rendering its decision. In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL
App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.
18 ¶ 61 In support of his claim that the circuit court’s best interest finding was against the manifest
weight of the evidence, Father points out that neither party asked the circuit court to take judicial
notice of the unfitness hearing. As such, he contends, the court was limited to considering the
evidence presented at the best interests hearing. However, Father does not point to any evidence
he believes the court considered improperly. Thus, he has forfeited consideration of any such
claim. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (providing that points not argued in an
appellant’s brief are forfeited).
¶ 62 The remainder of Father’s argument concerning the children’s best interests focuses on the
children’s placement in separate foster homes. He argues as follows: “Each sibling was separated
and therefore upon adoption, none of these children would legally be siblings. How can it be in
the best interest of a child to separate him or her from one’s biological siblings? It is not best.” We
are not persuaded.
¶ 63 Although Father cites no authority in support of his position, we recognize that there is
authority for the proposition that maintaining siblings’ relationships with each other is in their best
interests. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(g) (West 2024). Here, however, there was evidence that
separate placements were in the children’s best interests due to behaviors they triggered in each
other resulting from the sexual abuse they experienced. In addition, there was ample evidence that
their sibling bond would be preserved after adoption. The children continued to attend scheduled
sibling visitations. See In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 67 (finding support for a circuit
court’s best interest determination, in part, from evidence that the foster parents were facilitating
contact between the separately placed siblings). In addition, many of them attended the same
school and the same church, and three of the children were placed with relatives. Most importantly,
the evidence established that all the children were happy and well-adjusted in their foster homes.
19 In view of this, we conclude that the circuit court’s finding that termination of Father’s rights was
in the children’s best interest was supported by the evidence.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 66 Affirmed.