In re K.A.

2026 IL App (4th) 251186-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-1186
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 251186-U NOTICE This Order was filed under NO. 4-25-1186 FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 26, 2026 not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS Court, IL

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re K.A., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Logan County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA17 v. ) Dennis A., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Jonathan C. Wright, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 Respondent, Dennis A., appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental

rights to his child, K.A. (born in December 2014). (K.A.’s mother voluntarily surrendered her

parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.) Respondent argues the court’s determination he

was unfit based on his repeated incarceration was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

He does not challenge the court’s best-interest finding. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In April 2023, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of K.A.,

alleging that the minor was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of

1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) due to being in an environment injurious to her welfare. The State alleged K.A. had not been adequately protected where

(1) respondent was a suspect in a sexual abuse investigation by the Illinois Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS) and (2) respondent had contact with K.A. in violation of a

safety plan implemented by DCFS. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order placing

temporary custody of the minor with DCFS.

¶5 In October 2023, the trial court adjudicated K.A. neglected. The court entered a

dispositional order finding respondent unfit to care for the minor, making the minor a ward of the

court, and granting guardianship and custody to DCFS.

¶6 In March 2025, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights

as to K.A. The petition alleged respondent was unfit on several grounds. Specifically, the State

alleged respondent was unfit due to his (1) extreme or repeated cruelty (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(e)

(West 2024)); (2) depravity (id. § 1(D)(i)); (3) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct

conditions that caused the minor to come into care (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); (4) failure to make

reasonable progress toward the return of the minor (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii); and (5) repeated

incarceration (id. § 1(D)(s)). The State ultimately proceeded on two allegations: (1) respondent

was depraved (id. § 1(D)(i)) and (2) respondent had been repeatedly incarcerated as a result of

criminal convictions and his repeated incarceration prevented him from discharging parental

responsibilities (id. § 1(D)(s)).

¶7 A. Fitness Hearing

¶8 On September 4, 2025, the trial court held respondent’s fitness hearing. The court

admitted two exhibits into evidence: (1) respondent’s sentencing order committing him to the

Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) for 40 years for his December 2018 conviction for

predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and (2) the inmate status record showing respondent

-2- was in custody of DOC with a projected parole date of October 15, 2057. No testimony was

presented at the hearing. Following arguments from counsel, the court found respondent unfit by

clear and convincing evidence on the grounds that (1) respondent was depraved based upon his

sexual assault conviction and (2) respondent’s incarceration prevented him from fulfilling his

parental duties.

¶9 B. Best-Interest Hearing

¶ 10 On October 9, 2025, the trial court held the best-interest hearing. The court

indicated it considered the best-interest report and the evidence admitted at the fitness hearing.

¶ 11 The guardian ad litem proffered that in his conversation with K.A. about her

wishes, K.A. “made it very abundantly clear that [her] foster parent was her desired choice” to

continue living with and raising her. No other testimony was presented.

¶ 12 Following argument, the trial court stated it considered the evidence presented

and the statutory best-interest factors set forth in section 1-3 (4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act

(705 ILCS 405 4/1-3 (4.05) (West 2024)). The court noted the minor’s strong attachment and ties

to her community; the security of her foster home; her desire to be adopted by her foster mother,

who she considered to be her mother; and her need for permanency. The court found the State

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate

respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s determination of unfitness based on

his repeated incarceration (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) (West 2024)) was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. We note, respondent expressly “does not challenge the [trial] court’s

-3- finding that he was unfit under section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act based on depravity” (see id.

§ 1(D)(i)). Specifically, in his brief, respondent “acknowledges that his conviction for predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child gives rise to a statutory presumption of depravity and that the

[trial] court’s finding under that subsection was supported by the record.” Respondent also does

not challenge the court’s best-interest finding.

¶ 16 The involuntary termination of parental rights occurs through a two-stage process

as set forth under the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024). At the first stage,

the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is unfit under one or more

grounds as defined by section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024)). In re

J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. If the State proves unfitness, the matter then proceeds to

the second stage, where the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination

of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20; In re D.T., 212

Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004). A trial court’s finding of unfitness will not be reversed on appeal unless

it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68.

¶ 17 At the unfitness stage, “sufficient evidence of one statutory ground *** [is]

enough to support a [court’s] finding that someone [is] an unfit person.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83; see In re D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296

(2004) (“A parent’s rights may be terminated if a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported

by clear and convincing evidence.”).

¶ 18 Here, respondent “does not challenge the [trial] court’s finding that he was unfit

under section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act based on depravity.” Respondent acknowledges the

court’s depravity finding was “supported by the record.” Indeed, our review of the record shows

the depravity finding was well-supported by the evidence. As such, we accept respondent’s

-4- concession. Because respondent concedes sufficient evidence of one statutory ground exists, we

need not consider the challenge to the additional statutory ground raised on appeal. See In re

J.W., 2024 IL App (1st) 231918, ¶ 20 (“[A]ny one ground, if properly proven, is sufficient to

support a finding of parental unfitness.”). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s finding of

unfitness.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 21 Affirmed.

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