1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2
3 IN RE: 4 JULIO OSCAR ACEVEDO BARRETO CASE NO. 07-01435 BKT 5 GLORIA ESTHER PEREZ CARDONA CHAPTER 7
6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 10-0064
7 JULIO OSCAR ACEVEDO BARRETO 8 GLORIA ESTHER PEREZ CARDONA d/b/a PANADERIA FAMILIAR 9
10 Plaintiff AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUECTOS Y 11 FILED & ENTERED ON 07/24/2012 ALCANTARILLADOS; CORPORACION 12 DEL FONDO DEL SEGURO DEL 13 ESTADO; DEPARTAMENTO DEL TRABAJO Y RECURSOS HUMANOS; 14 and WIGBERTO LUGO MENDER 15 ,TRUSTEE
16 Defendant(s) 17 OPINION AND ORDER 18
19 20 Before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 21 filed by Julio Oscar Acevedo Barreto and Gloria Esther Pérez 22 Cardona, d/b/a Panaderia Familiar (“Plaintiffs”) as to co-defendant 23 24 Puerto Rico’s Aqueduct and Sewers Authority (“PRASA”) (Dkt. No. 25 111), Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Dkt. No. 111), PRASA’s Opposition to Statements of Uncontested Material Facts (Dkt. No. 125), PRASA’s Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 126) and Plaintiffs’ Reply to Opposition 1 to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 141). For the 2 reasons set forth below Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary 3 Judgment is hereby DENIED. 4 5 6 I. Factual and Procedural Background 7 On March 20, 2007,Plaintiffs filed their Chapter 7 voluntary 8 petition (Dkt No. 1),Case No. 07-01435. On April 4, 2010, 9 10 Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against PRASA, the State 11 Insurance Fund Corporation, the Department of Labor and Human 12 Resources and Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., Chapter 7 Trustee, for 13 14 allegedly violating the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. §362 15 (k)(1) and (2). On February 7, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Partial 16 Motion for Summary Judgment as to the allegations against PRASA(Dkt 17 No. 111). Plaintiffs contend that PRASA received timely and 18 19 sufficient notice of the filing of the bankruptcy case, as 20 evidenced by the Certificate of Service of March 23, 2007 (Dkt No. 21 4).In the bankruptcy case PRASA was an unsecured creditor, as such, 22 23 was included in the schedules and in the CM/ECF creditor mailing 24 matrix. Nevertheless, from February 22, 2008 through February 19, 25 2010, PRASA purportedly continued to assess and collect a claim against Debtors through the continued mailing of written collection notices. Plaintiffs further allege that on July 15, 2010, PRASA 1 acknowledged the fact that the bankruptcy case had been filed. 2 Notwithstanding, PRASA continued to send standard computer 3 generated bills and a termination letter, which Plaintiffs 4 5 characterize as contemptuous, coercive and harassing collection 6 tactics. Plaintiffs assert that PRASA’s actions constituted 7 willful violations of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), 8 as PRASA intended its actions and also failed to take corrective 9 10 action. 11 On the other hand, PRASA alleges that due to unusual and 12 extenuating circumstances it had no knowledge of Plaintiffs’ 13 14 bankruptcy filing and the ensuing automatic stay. PRASA sustains 15 that around the petition date, PRASA’s one employee who receives 16 the bankruptcy notices and codified the accounts was murdered. To 17 that effect, during the turmoil of events immediately following 18 19 such murder, Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy notice was purportedly 20 misplaced. For this reason, PRASA alleges that it had no actual 21 knowledge of Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy case. Therefore, PRASA’s 22 23 computer system continued generating invoices reflecting pre and 24 post-petition charges, and admits seventeen notices were sent to 25 Plaintiffs between February 2008 and February 2010requesting payment. PRASA alleges that it never received any other communications from Plaintiffs. However, PRASA never terminated Plaintiffs’ water 1 service and denies having sent collection letters threatening 2 Plaintiffs with terminating their water service. PRASA argues that 3 the letter sent on July 10, 2012 is not a termination letter, but a 4 5 20-day notice requesting adequate assurance of payment pursuant to 6 11 U.S.C. § 366. Said letter was sent by PRASA after learning of 7 the bankruptcy filing. PRASA sustains that because of the 8 isolated, unusual circumstance of the death of that one employee 9 10 PRASA had no knowledge of the bankruptcy case. Therefore, PRASA 11 asserts that it did not violate the automatic stay. PRASA argues 12 that when it became aware of Plaintiffs bankruptcy case, no further 13 14 action or activity was undertaken by them. Accordingly, PRASA 15 contends that it is immune from liability for stay violations 16 because without the actual knowledge of the filing of plaintiff’s 17 bankruptcy case, its actions were not willful. It is PRASA’s 18 19 positions that the actions undertaken against Plaintiffs were but a 20 result of a clerical mistake, hence, no violation of the automatic 21 stay occurred. 22 23 PRASA requests that Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested 24 Material Facts and exhibits (Dkt. No. 111) be stricken, and the 25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be denied. This request is founded on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Local Civil Rule for the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 56(b) (L.Cv.R. 56(b)(D.P.R. 2009)),which requires that a motion for 1 summary judgment be supported by separate, short, and concise 2 statements of material facts as to which the moving party contends 3 there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, each of 4 5 which must be supported by a record citation. PRASA also contends 6 that Plaintiffs failed to provide record citations in support of 7 paragraphs number 2 and 4 of their statement of uncontested facts 8 violating L.Cv.R. 56(b) (D.P.R. 2009). 9 10 PRASA sustains that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Federal 11 Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A)&(B), because they only cite as 12 supporting evidence the allegations contained in the unsworn Third 13 14 Amendment Complaint (Dkt. No. 33, page 8). The allegations included 15 in said complaint have not been authenticated by a declaration of 16 the Plaintiffs, therefore, PRASA claims that they are insufficient 17 for purposes of summary judgment. According to PRASA, Plaintiffs 18 19 also failed to submit an affidavit or unsworn statement with their 20 motion, thus failing to authenticate their exhibits in violation of 21 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2)&(c)(4), which precludes 22 23 its consideration on a motion for summary judgment. Finally, PRASA 24 argues that Plaintiffs failed to include an English translation of 25 the documents referenced in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested Facts and included as exhibits(Dkt No. 111), as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9070-1(c). II. Discussion 1 A. Summary Judgment Standard 2 3 The Court’s discretion to grant summary Judgment is governed 4 by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in 5 bankruptcy by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056.
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2
3 IN RE: 4 JULIO OSCAR ACEVEDO BARRETO CASE NO. 07-01435 BKT 5 GLORIA ESTHER PEREZ CARDONA CHAPTER 7
6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 10-0064
7 JULIO OSCAR ACEVEDO BARRETO 8 GLORIA ESTHER PEREZ CARDONA d/b/a PANADERIA FAMILIAR 9
10 Plaintiff AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUECTOS Y 11 FILED & ENTERED ON 07/24/2012 ALCANTARILLADOS; CORPORACION 12 DEL FONDO DEL SEGURO DEL 13 ESTADO; DEPARTAMENTO DEL TRABAJO Y RECURSOS HUMANOS; 14 and WIGBERTO LUGO MENDER 15 ,TRUSTEE
16 Defendant(s) 17 OPINION AND ORDER 18
19 20 Before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 21 filed by Julio Oscar Acevedo Barreto and Gloria Esther Pérez 22 Cardona, d/b/a Panaderia Familiar (“Plaintiffs”) as to co-defendant 23 24 Puerto Rico’s Aqueduct and Sewers Authority (“PRASA”) (Dkt. No. 25 111), Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Dkt. No. 111), PRASA’s Opposition to Statements of Uncontested Material Facts (Dkt. No. 125), PRASA’s Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 126) and Plaintiffs’ Reply to Opposition 1 to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 141). For the 2 reasons set forth below Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary 3 Judgment is hereby DENIED. 4 5 6 I. Factual and Procedural Background 7 On March 20, 2007,Plaintiffs filed their Chapter 7 voluntary 8 petition (Dkt No. 1),Case No. 07-01435. On April 4, 2010, 9 10 Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against PRASA, the State 11 Insurance Fund Corporation, the Department of Labor and Human 12 Resources and Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq., Chapter 7 Trustee, for 13 14 allegedly violating the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. §362 15 (k)(1) and (2). On February 7, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Partial 16 Motion for Summary Judgment as to the allegations against PRASA(Dkt 17 No. 111). Plaintiffs contend that PRASA received timely and 18 19 sufficient notice of the filing of the bankruptcy case, as 20 evidenced by the Certificate of Service of March 23, 2007 (Dkt No. 21 4).In the bankruptcy case PRASA was an unsecured creditor, as such, 22 23 was included in the schedules and in the CM/ECF creditor mailing 24 matrix. Nevertheless, from February 22, 2008 through February 19, 25 2010, PRASA purportedly continued to assess and collect a claim against Debtors through the continued mailing of written collection notices. Plaintiffs further allege that on July 15, 2010, PRASA 1 acknowledged the fact that the bankruptcy case had been filed. 2 Notwithstanding, PRASA continued to send standard computer 3 generated bills and a termination letter, which Plaintiffs 4 5 characterize as contemptuous, coercive and harassing collection 6 tactics. Plaintiffs assert that PRASA’s actions constituted 7 willful violations of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), 8 as PRASA intended its actions and also failed to take corrective 9 10 action. 11 On the other hand, PRASA alleges that due to unusual and 12 extenuating circumstances it had no knowledge of Plaintiffs’ 13 14 bankruptcy filing and the ensuing automatic stay. PRASA sustains 15 that around the petition date, PRASA’s one employee who receives 16 the bankruptcy notices and codified the accounts was murdered. To 17 that effect, during the turmoil of events immediately following 18 19 such murder, Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy notice was purportedly 20 misplaced. For this reason, PRASA alleges that it had no actual 21 knowledge of Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy case. Therefore, PRASA’s 22 23 computer system continued generating invoices reflecting pre and 24 post-petition charges, and admits seventeen notices were sent to 25 Plaintiffs between February 2008 and February 2010requesting payment. PRASA alleges that it never received any other communications from Plaintiffs. However, PRASA never terminated Plaintiffs’ water 1 service and denies having sent collection letters threatening 2 Plaintiffs with terminating their water service. PRASA argues that 3 the letter sent on July 10, 2012 is not a termination letter, but a 4 5 20-day notice requesting adequate assurance of payment pursuant to 6 11 U.S.C. § 366. Said letter was sent by PRASA after learning of 7 the bankruptcy filing. PRASA sustains that because of the 8 isolated, unusual circumstance of the death of that one employee 9 10 PRASA had no knowledge of the bankruptcy case. Therefore, PRASA 11 asserts that it did not violate the automatic stay. PRASA argues 12 that when it became aware of Plaintiffs bankruptcy case, no further 13 14 action or activity was undertaken by them. Accordingly, PRASA 15 contends that it is immune from liability for stay violations 16 because without the actual knowledge of the filing of plaintiff’s 17 bankruptcy case, its actions were not willful. It is PRASA’s 18 19 positions that the actions undertaken against Plaintiffs were but a 20 result of a clerical mistake, hence, no violation of the automatic 21 stay occurred. 22 23 PRASA requests that Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested 24 Material Facts and exhibits (Dkt. No. 111) be stricken, and the 25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be denied. This request is founded on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Local Civil Rule for the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 56(b) (L.Cv.R. 56(b)(D.P.R. 2009)),which requires that a motion for 1 summary judgment be supported by separate, short, and concise 2 statements of material facts as to which the moving party contends 3 there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, each of 4 5 which must be supported by a record citation. PRASA also contends 6 that Plaintiffs failed to provide record citations in support of 7 paragraphs number 2 and 4 of their statement of uncontested facts 8 violating L.Cv.R. 56(b) (D.P.R. 2009). 9 10 PRASA sustains that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Federal 11 Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A)&(B), because they only cite as 12 supporting evidence the allegations contained in the unsworn Third 13 14 Amendment Complaint (Dkt. No. 33, page 8). The allegations included 15 in said complaint have not been authenticated by a declaration of 16 the Plaintiffs, therefore, PRASA claims that they are insufficient 17 for purposes of summary judgment. According to PRASA, Plaintiffs 18 19 also failed to submit an affidavit or unsworn statement with their 20 motion, thus failing to authenticate their exhibits in violation of 21 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2)&(c)(4), which precludes 22 23 its consideration on a motion for summary judgment. Finally, PRASA 24 argues that Plaintiffs failed to include an English translation of 25 the documents referenced in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontested Facts and included as exhibits(Dkt No. 111), as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9070-1(c). II. Discussion 1 A. Summary Judgment Standard 2 3 The Court’s discretion to grant summary Judgment is governed 4 by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in 5 bankruptcy by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056. 6 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, 7 8 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 9 the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 10 any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 11 as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. 12 13 v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). The moving party 14 must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome- 15 determinative fact in the record, through definite and competent 16 17 evidence in order to attain its summary judgment. Maldonado–Denis 18 v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). A ‘genuine’ 19 issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a 20 ‘material fact’ is one that has the potential of affecting the 21 22 outcome of the case. Sensing v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, 23 LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 152 (1st Cir.2009), quoting Calero–Cerezo v. 24 U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). 25 When considering a petition for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Roldan, 2012 WL 2221410 (Bankr.D.P.R.June 13, 2012), 1 Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 2 (1962). The moving party will not be successful if any essential 3 element of its claim or defense requires trial. In re Roldan, 4 5 supra. Once the moving party has presented a properly supported 6 motion, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a 7 trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court’s denial of 8 the motion of the summary judgment. Estrada v. Alemañy-Noriega, 9 10 806 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (D.P.R. 2011). A party may not rely upon 11 bare allegations to create a factual dispute but is required to 12 point to specific facts contained in affidavits, depositions and 13 14 other supporting documents which, if established at trial, could 15 lead to a finding for the nonmoving party. In re Roldan, supra, 16 see also Over the Road Drivers, Inc. v. Transport Insurance Co., 17 637 F.2d 816, 818 (1st Cir.1980). Therefore, the moving party has 18 19 the burden to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment and 20 no defense is required where an insufficient showing is made. 21 López v. Corporación Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 22 23 (1st Cir.1991).In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing 24 party may not rest on conclusory allegations, improbable 25 inferences, and unsupported speculation. See Hadfield v. McDonough,407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005). Hence, summary judgment is “inappropriate if inferences are necessary for the judgment and those inferences are not mandated by the record.” In re Edgardo 1 Ryan Rijos & Julia E. Cruz Nieves v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya & 2 Citibank (In re Rijos), 263 B.R. 382, 388 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001). 3 4 5 6 B. Procedural requirements 7 When a party files a motion for summary judgment it must 8 9 comply with the requirements of L.Cv.R. 56 (D.P.R. 2009), and file 10 a statement of facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, and 11 supported by record citations. Hodge v. Roblex Aviation, Inc., CIV. 12 13 09-1445 (SEC), 2010 WL 2852854 (D.P.R. July 20, 2010) 14 reconsideration denied, 09-1445 (SEC), 2010 WL 3363226 (D.P.R. Aug. 15 24, 2010). L.Cv.R. 56(b) (D.P.R. 2009)provides: 16 “A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by a 17 separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, 18 set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact 19 to be tried. Each fact asserted in the statement shall be 20 supported by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule.” 21 L.Cv.R. 56(b) (D.P.R. 2009). 22 These rules “are meant to ease the district court's operose 23 24 task and to prevent parties from unfairly shifting the burdens of 25 litigation to the court.”Cabán–Hernández v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8(1st Cir.2007).The First Circuit has repeatedly held that when the parties ignore the Local Rules, they do so at their peril. SeeRuiz–Rivera v. Riley,209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st 1 Cir.2000). 2 Without the Local Rules “summary judgment practice could too 3 easily become a game of cat-and-mouse.”Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 4 5 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2000). Such rules are designed to function as 6 a means of “focusing a district court’s attention on what is-and 7 what is not-genuinely controverted.”Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 8 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006). Which is why, in order to ease the court’s 9 10 workload by avoiding to find a “pin in a haystack” Local Rule 56 11 (e) specifically requires that “an assertion of fact set forth in a 12 statement of material facts shall be followed by a citation to the 13 14 specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting 15 the assertion”. L.Cv.R. 56 (e) (D.P.R. 2009).Therefore, it is 16 important that Local Rules are complied with. In the event that a 17 party opposing summary judgment fails to act in accordance with the 18 19 rigors that such a rule imposes, the court is free, in the exercise 20 of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party’s facts as 21 stated. Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7-8 22 23 (1st Cir. 2007).Also see Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 24 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.2004); Ruiz Rivera, 209 F.3d at 28. 25 In accordance with summary judgment procedure the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A)&(B) specifies: “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 1 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 2 purposes of the motion only), admissions, 3 interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B)showing that the materials cited do not establish 4 the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that 5 an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 6 7 Therefore, in order to show that the material cited 8 establishes a genuine dispute through a properly supported motion, 9 the documents supporting or opposing summary judgment must be 10 properly authenticated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 11 12 Procedure, Rule 56(e). Failure to authenticate precludes 13 consideration of the supporting documents. Carmona v Toledo, 215 14 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir. 2000).“To be admissible at the summary 15 16 judgment stage, ‘documents must be authenticated by and attached to 17 an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e).’”Orsi v 18 Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting 10A Charles Alan 19 Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & 20 21 Procedure § 2722 at 382 (3d ed.1998)); see also Cummings v Roberts, 22 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.1980) (records attached to affidavit 23 but not certified as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) not properly 24 25 considered by district court). Rule 56(e) requires that the affidavit be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Moreover, “sworn or certified copies of all papers” referred to in the 1 affidavit must be attached. Carmona v Toledo 215 F.3d at 131 (1st 2 Cir. 2000). 3 Plaintiffs cannot “rest upon the mere allegations” of their 4 5 pleadings, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), but need to present proper evidence 6 establishing the allegations set forth in their complaint and 7 request for summary judgment. Allstate Fin. Corp. v Financorp, 8 Inc., 934 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir.1991).If a party failed to submit an 9 10 affidavit or unsworn statement with his or her motion for summary 11 judgment to authenticate his exhibits, this alone suffices to 12 disallow the exhibits insofar as unauthenticated documents do not 13 14 suffice. Lezcano-Bonilla v. Matos-Rodriguez, 07-1453 SEC, 2010 WL 15 3372514 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010); citing Orsiv Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 16 92 (4th Cir. 1993). 17 Additionally, L.Cv.R. 5(g) requires that “all documents not in 18 19 the English language which are presented or filed, whether as 20 evidence or otherwise, must be accompanied by a certified 21 translation into English prepared by an interpreter certified by 22 23 the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.” L.Cv.R.5(g) 24 (D.P.R. 2009).It is also required by Puerto Rico LBR 9070-1(c) 25 which specifically states “all exhibit and documentary evidence in Spanish, or other language, shall be fully translated to the English language by a certified translator.”Thus, the law is clear that any submitted exhibit not directly translated into English or 1 ||provided with a corresponding English translation may b 2 disregarded by the Court. Colon-Fontanez v. Municipality of Sa 3 4 Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 27 (lst Cir. 2011). 5 III. Conclusion 6 The Court finds that PRASA’s allegations as to th insufficiency as to Plaintiffs’ allegations and supporting evidenc
9 valid. Specifically, Plaintiffs failed to correctly provid 10 |irecord citations in their statement of material facts in violatio Mt of L.Cv.R. 56(e) (D.P.R. 2009). Plaintiffs’ failure to authenticat 12 3 allegations which were cited as supporting evidence in thei 14 ||statement of facts, as well as its failure to properly authenticat 15 lltheir exhibits precludes its consideration pursuant to the Federal * Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 56 (e).Additionally, Plaintiffs faile 17 1g include a translation of an exhibit into English as required b 19 |}L.Cv.R. 5(g) and LBR 9070-1(c). 20 WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion fo Summary Judgment as to PRASA shall be, and hereby is, DENIED. 23 SO ORDERED. 24 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 24 day of July, 2012. 25
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge