[Cite as In re Ju.G., 2026-Ohio-2077.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE JU.G., ET AL. : No. 115335 Minor Children :
[Appeal by Mother, Z.G.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD23912123, AD23912124, AD23912125, and AD23912126
Appearances:
Brittany Luarde, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
Z.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s June 2025
judgments granting the motions of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
Family Services (the “agency”) to modify temporary custody of Mother’s four younger children to permanent custody.1 After a thorough review of the facts and
pertinent law, this court affirms.
Procedural and Factual Background
The record demonstrates that Mother’s native language is Spanish.
The juvenile court afforded her a translator for the proceedings.
Mother was initially in a relationship with L.N.-M.,2 and they had a
daughter, Z.N.-G. (“Oldest Child” or “Older Daughter”) born in September 2014.
Oldest Daughter was not a subject of the juvenile court’s decision in this case.
Mother then had relationship with another man and had J.G. (“Younger Daughter”)
born in October 2016. The agency could not confirm the father of the Younger
Daughter, and he is not a party to these proceedings.
In 2019, Mother “fell crazy in love” with J.A., who moved in with
Mother and her daughters about a month after she met him. (Tr. 142, 265.)3 They
had three sons: Jo.A. (Oldest Son) born August 2021, and twins, Je.A. (“Je”) and
Jos.A (“Jo”) born September 2022.
1 Mother is the only appellant; the fathers have not appealed. 2 L.N-M. was recently released from prison and is trying to restore the father-child relationship with Oldest Child with the plan of having custody of his daughter. Oldest Child is not a subject of this appeal. 3 Unless otherwise specified, references to the transcript are from the May 2025 hearings. In early January 2023, Older Daughter was removed from Mother’s
care after the child reported that J.A. was molesting her. J.A. was arrested on
January 6, 2023, and indicted for three counts of rape.
Mother did not believe Older Daughter and said she was lying. She
indicated that J.A. could not have molested the girl because she never left J.A. alone
with the children. (Tr. 143.) The agency returned Older Daughter to Mother in May
2023, pursuant to the case plan; Mother appeared to have believed the accusations.
(1-17-24 tr. 60.)
However, Mother later continued to deny that J.A. had molested
Older Daughter. Mother accused Oldest Daughter of lying and of being jealous of
the relationship Mother had with J.A. Mother told a sex abuse case worker that
Older Daughter had recanted. (1-17-24 tr. 63.) Mother admitted under oath during
the May 2025 hearings that she attempted to get Older Daughter diagnosed with
schizophrenia to discredit her allegations. (Tr. 283, 291.) Similarly, when the
agency confronted Mother with evidence that J.A.’s DNA was found in Older
Daughter’s panties, Mother said those were her underwear that Older Daughter took
and wore. (Tr. 144.) Mother admitted under oath that she prioritized her
relationship with J.A. over her children. (Tr. 283, 291.)
The agency took emergency custody of all five children on October 24,
2023. The agency was concerned about Mother’s ability to protect her children.
Following the removal of the children, the agency developed a case
plan for Mother to promote the permanency plan of reunification. The plan included services to address Mother’s issues with mental health, housing, parenting
education, and the provision of basic needs. The plan further included family
counseling for Mother and Older Daughter and mental-health services for all of the
children.
When the agency took the children, the family was living in maternal
grandmother’s two-room apartment and there was very little room for the children
to walk and play. All the children had had lice for months; Mother’s home-remedies
were ineffective. The three boys were sleeping in pack-and-plays, not beds, and they
were still being bottle-fed. (1-17-24 tr. 104-105; Guardian Ad Litem’s (“GAL”) 1-17-
24 report.) Oldest Son, at two-years old, had developmental delays and poor motor
and verbal skills. He needed multiple referrals for sleep, hearing, tonsils, other ear
nose and throat problems, and eye issues. (1017-24 tr. 106-107.) The twins could
not walk on their own and did not know how to eat other than to keep their mouths
open, nor could they say any words (GAL’s 1-17-24 report.) Younger Daughter had
low vision and reading difficulties. On January 17, 2024, the juvenile court found
Older Daughter to be abused and the other children dependent and granted
temporary custody to the agency.
On October 24, 2023, the grand jury issued a superseding indictment
against J.A. for four counts of rape against Older Daughter. On December 19, 2023,
J.A. pled guilty to two counts of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition. In
February 2024, the trial court sentenced him to 21 to 26.5 years in prison.
Nevertheless, Mother persisted in her relationship with J.A. From February 25, 2024, through August 8, 2024, Mother accepted 277 telephone calls from J.A. in
prison, approximately 90 of which lasted almost a half-hour. (Agency’s exhibit
No. 2.) When the agency confronted her with the calls, she initially stated she either
did not answer them or hung-up immediately. When the agency revealed that it
could get a log of the calls, Mother changed her phone number, and it appeared that
the phone calls from J.A. stopped.
At approximately the same time Mother apparently terminated her
relationship with J.A., she began a relationship with another man, D.O.B., a native
of the Dominican Republic, who entered the United States on a baseball visa.
(Tr. 192.) After a short courtship, Mother married D.O.B. on October 26, 2024.
(Tr. 259, Mother’s Exhibit I.) The agency learned of this development in February
2025 when Mother told the children during a visitation that she would like to bring
her boyfriend to the next visitation. (Tr. 171-172.) After the visitation was over, the
Younger Daughter told her foster mother that she “did not want another man
touching her private parts.” When the agency told Mother that it suspected J.A. had
also molested the Younger Daughter, Mother denied that it happened and indicated
that was not much of a concern. (Tr. 281, 313.)
When the children entered foster care, their problems became
manifest. The three boys are autistic. The twins would often retain food in their
mouths but not swallow. The foster mother had to teach all three boys to eat
properly. (Tr. 16-17, 130-131.) The twins would often exhibit “interesting”
behaviors, like excessive nail biting, age-inappropriate tantrums, and excessive drooling. (Tr. 18-19, 31, 62.) In new settings, like a relative’s home, Je.A. would hide
under a chair. (Tr. 22, 68-70.) The foster parents have sought help for the twins at
Ohio Guidestone, Help Me Grow, Galvin Learning Center, and Hopebridge Autism
Center for mental health therapy, emotional therapy, sensory therapy, and speech
therapy. Moreover, they have developed a day-long routine to accommodate the
autism. (Tr. 29.) The foster parents also have a special sensory room, including
safety features, designed for autistic children, as well as a safety sleeper for the twins,
which was needed because Je.A. would wake up and go to Jo.A.’s bed and scratch
and bite him. (Tr. 27-28, 30.)
Oldest Son needs physical therapy for maintaining balance and
walking and speech therapy. (Tr. 35.) This includes braces for his feet and legs.
(Tr. 73.) The foster parent also noted that he has no “stranger danger” sense; he
would walk off with anyone. (Tr. 34.) He further has therapy for emotional
regulation and will receive Applied Behavior Analysis therapy for developing
positive coping skills for children with autism. He also had services at the
Constipation Clinic at MetroHealth Hospital. (Tr. 72-73.) When Oldest Son entered
foster care, he needed wax removed from his ears and then tubes for his ears. He
needed his tonsils and adenoids removed. (Tr. 88.) Oldest Son also needed glasses.
(Tr. 129-130.) The foster parents were able to accommodate these medical needs.
When Younger Daughter entered foster care, it was discovered that,
although she was in the first grade, she could not read or spell her name. (Tr. 94.)
At the time of trial, Younger Daughter had been in foster care for 19 months, she was not doing well academically and was very behind in the second grade; she had a
kindergarten reading level. (Tr. 104-105.) She had a short-term retention of things
taught or mentioned; the foster mother said that the child was in a disassociated
state. (Tr. 106.) She has sensory processing disorder and will need occupational
therapy. (Tr. 95.)
Mother had weekly two-hour visits with the four younger children.
These generally went well, but the GAL reported that they were often chaotic with
Mother “putting out fires” and the foster parents reported that the children have
poor behaviors and were often ill when they return from the visits. Although the
agency updated Mother on the children’s conditions and services, Mother could not
list the problems and services. (GAL’s April 13, 2025 report.)
The GAL recommended permanent custody of the four younger
children. The GAL explained her recommendation as follows: “The children all
have multiple special needs that require their caregiver to ensure that they receive
services. Mother has historically failed to recognize, acknowledge or follow up on
the children’s needs. Mother is unable to retain information about the children’s
current needs.” (GAL’s April 13, 2025 report.)
Regarding Mother’s progress on her case plan, she completed a
psychological evaluation through the trial court’s diagnostic clinic in early 2024 and
was recommended for further mental health services. Mother claimed to be
involved with mental health services through MetroHealth, but the agency was not able to verify these claims in the year prior to trial and Mother had not invited her
provider to participate in agency discussions as requested.
At trial, Mother testified that she attended counseling twice a week.
However, the case worker testified that she had been unable to determine “what
exactly [Mother] is addressing in her services.” (Tr. 169.) The case worker testified
that she was concerned for Mother’s ongoing mental health and her grasp on reality,
as demonstrated by recent statements Mother made to the children’s caregivers
which were not based in reality, including more than one occasion where Mother
thanked the children’s caregivers “for babysitting her children” and claimed that the
agency was imminently planning to return the children to her care. (Tr. 169-170,
210-211.)
The case worker was further concerned about Mother’s transparency
with the agency. For example, Mother failed to disclose to the agency the fact that
she had gotten married and the case worker learned in February 2025 that Mother
had gotten married in November 2024, just a few months after meeting her then-
current husband, which even by Mother’s own admission was “too short of time to
get married.” (Tr. 258-259.)
According to the agency, Mother had not progressed beyond the
weekly two-hour supervised visits because she had “not displayed any behaviors that
would lead the Agency to believe that the children were safe in her care.” (Tr. 198.)
On June 12 and 13, 2025, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B), the trial court
found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the Agency and that the children could not be placed
with their parents within a reasonable time. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the
children had been in the custody of the Agency for 16 months, satisfying the
provision that they had been placed with an agency for 12 or more months out of a
consecutive 22-month period. Moreover, based on the evidence, the court
concluded that Mother lacked the judgment and the ability to protect her children
and meet their special needs.
Mother’s Assignment of Error
Mother timely appealed and raised five assignments of error:
(1) Mother was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution, (2) The trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the
evidence, (3) The trial court erred in not considering less severe alternatives and the
agency did not make and document reasonable efforts for other alternatives, (4) The
trial court improperly relied too heavily on a criminal plea and caused judicial
prejudgment, and (5) The trial court failed to ensure meaningful language access
and interpretation.
Law and Analysis
Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective
Mother’s first assignment of error is that her trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the judge’s prejudicial statement that it was a given
fact Older Daughter had been molested, by failing to cross-examine the GAL, the failure to address interpreter and comprehension issues, and not allowing Mother
to “speak her truth” because trial counsel used too many leading questions.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Mother must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced her defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989); and State v. Reed, 74 Ohio
St.3d 534 (1996).
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial
scrutiny of an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court noted that it is
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his or her lawyer after conviction
and that it would be all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in
hindsight, to conclude that a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a
court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [claimant] must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955); see also In re Riley, 2003-Ohio-4109, ¶ 18- 19 (4th Dist.).
Moreover, even if Mother establishes that an error by her lawyer was
professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, she must
further establish prejudice; that is, but for the unreasonable error, there is a
reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland at 694. A court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining prejudice suffered by the asserting
party as a result of alleged deficiencies. Bradley at 143.
Mother’s first argument appears to be that her trial counsel should
have objected to the judge’s unwillingness to consider the possibility that Older
Daughter had made up the claims of sexual abuse. This is not well-founded because
J.A. pled guilty to the charges of rape and gross sexual imposition. A guilty plea is a
complete admission of the defendant’s guilt and the charge. State v. Griggs, 2004-
Ohio-4415, ¶ 10, and Lenard v. Russo, 2012-Ohio-4236 (8th Dist.).
Mother next argues that trial counsel should have cross-examined the
GAL or called her or other family members as witnesses. However, failing to
question witnesses on cross-examination and choosing not to present witnesses fall
within the realm of trial strategy and tactics. Debatable tactics do not establish
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 146, and In
re Riley, 2003-Ohio-4109, at ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).
Moreover, trial counsel’s strategy was obvious. He called Mother as
a witness and had her acknowledge and recant her prior statements about calling
Older Daughter a liar. He then showed that she had a job, a house with bedrooms
and beds for her children, and a husband and relatives who would help with children
and their needs. He had her affirm her willingness and ability to believe, protect,
and care for her children. Thus, he argued that Mother should have custody of her
children. His examination of Mother made this position very clear. Mother’s last objection is that trial counsel made no record as to
whether she fully understood the interpreter’s translations. However, with no
record, the court is left with only speculation as to whether Mother understood.
Speculation is not a sufficient foundation upon which to base a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In re Riley, at ¶ 21.
The court further notes that at the end of trial the judge thanked the
attorneys “for their zealous and careful advocacy in this matter.” (Tr. 323.)
Finally, Mother has not established prejudice. The arguments do not
undermine this court’s confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.
In recommending permanent custody to the agency the GAL stated the following:
“The children all have multiple special needs that require their caregiver to ensure
that they receive services. Mother has historically failed to recognize, acknowledge
or follow up on the children’s needs. Mother is unable to retain information about
the children’s current needs.” Mother was unable to refute those conclusions.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
Permanent Custody Determination Supported by Manifest Weight of the Evidence
In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the decision
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review and Permanent Custody Statute
The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the custody
of any child not a ward of another court of this state. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). “It is well recognized that the right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re
Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157
(1990). Thus, “the overriding principle in custody cases between a parent and
nonparent is that [biological] parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children.” Hockstok v. Hockstok, 2002-Ohio-
7208, ¶ 16, quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). “This interest is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and by Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.” Hockstok at id., citing Santosky at id., and In re Shaeffer Children,
85 Ohio App.3d 683, 689-690 (3d Dist.1993). A parent’s interest, however, is
“‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.’” In re M.J.M., 2010-Ohio-1674,
¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting In re B.L., 2005-Ohio-1151, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).
A trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be
reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record contains
competent, credible evidence by which the court could have found that the essential
statutory elements for an award of permanent custody have been established by
clear and convincing evidence. In re B.P., 2019-Ohio-2919, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.). The
Supreme Court of Ohio recently clarified this standard in In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-
4703.
“When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
Id. at ¶ 14.
“Clear and convincing evidence” is that “measure or degree of proof”
that “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph
three of the syllabus. “It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance,
but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as
in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.” Id. at 477.
R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by a
juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. Under the statute,
the juvenile court is authorized to grant permanent custody of a child to the agency
if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any
of the five factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) exists and that permanent
custody is in the best interest of the child under the factors enumerated
in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) governs the first step in an agency’s motion for
permanent custody and contains five factors. In re R.H., 2022-Ohio-3765, ¶ 21 (8th
Dist.). The trial court here made two of the findings. First,
under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the trial court found that the children had been in the
agency’s custody from October 23, 2023, to September 23, 2024, when the agency moved to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. Thus, they had been in
the agency’s custody for less than 12 months. Nevertheless, the court found that the
children “cannot be placed with either of [their] parents within a reasonable time or
should not be placed with [their] parents.” “A trial court’s finding that it cannot or
should not place a child with a parent precludes the court from considering
returning the child to Mother’s custody.” In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-827, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.).
In determining whether a child cannot be placed with one of the
child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent,
the juvenile court must consider “all relevant evidence,” including specific factors
enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E). If the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to
each of the child’s parents, the juvenile court must find that the child cannot be
placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
either parent. R.C. 2151.414(E).
The court found that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(10), the father of
Younger Daughter had abandoned her. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), (5), (7),
(12), (14), and (15), the father of the boys was incarcerated for the rape of their older
sister and could not provide for them.
Relative to Mother, the trial court ruled that the testimony clearly and
convincingly established that the risk of harm to the children is too great to justify
reunification. The boys have extreme special needs. They will need extensive help
to manage issues concerning food, speech, sensory and emotional regulation, and behavior to counter their autism. The evidence clearly showed that Mother had
difficulty caring for and working toward the development of the boys when they were
in her care. Similarly, Mother’s lack of care and attention put Younger Daughter
way behind in her development. Furthermore, Mother minimized the special needs
of her children.
Instead of caring for her children, Mother prioritized her relationship
with a man who pled guilty to molesting her daughter. She did not believe Older
Daughter and tried to get her diagnosed as schizophrenic to discredit her testimony.
Mother made incredible statements about Older Daughter being jealous of her
relationship with J.A. and wearing Mother’s semen-stained underwear. Mother
continued her relationship with the molester after he was in prison by continually
talking to him in phone conversations that stopped only after the agency told her it
could get a log of those calls. Mother did not believe Younger Daughter’s accusation
that J.A. also molested her. Mother showed questionable judgment by marrying a
new boyfriend just two months after apparently ending her relationship with the
molester. Furthermore, she seemed less than candid with her new husband about
her children’s situation.
In regard to the best interest of the children, the record shows that
the juvenile court considered all relevant best-interest factors, including the
enumerated factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). The juvenile court included
several findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) in its judgment. Relative to Mother, the
court found (1) a failure to remedy the situation that caused her children to be removed from the home (R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)); (2) a lack of commitment to the
children (R.C. 2141.414(E)(4)); and (3) an unwillingness to provide basic necessities
for the children and to prevent them from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual
abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect (R.C. 2151.414(E)(14)). The juvenile
court concluded that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest, stating,
The testimony clearly and convincingly established that the risk of harm to all five children is too great to justify reunification. The Court finds that extending temporary custody for any of the four youngest children is not an option because the mother does not believe she needs further services to protect and care for her children. She has shown this through her actions, her testimony, and her arguments to the court [demonstrate] that a further extension of temporary custody will not accomplish reunification. And this is not the case where the mother is asking for more time to complete the case plan. The mother’s testimony did not persuade the court that reunification was in the children’s best interest.
The trial court’s ruling that permanent custody of the children to
agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment
of error is overruled.
Less Severe Alternatives Considered and Reasonable Efforts Made
In her third assignment of error Mother argues that less severe
alternatives were not considered and the agency did not make reasonable efforts to
effect reunification. R.C. 2151.419(A) requires the agency to make reasonable efforts
to prevent the removal of the children from the home or to make it possible to return
the children to the home.
The trial court’s opinion addresses that issue and concludes that such
efforts would be futile. For the reasons quoted above in addressing the best interest of the children, the juvenile court found that Mother’s failure to recognize the
children’s severe specialized needs would put them at great risk if returned to her.
Simply, Mother was unable to provide the protection her children need.
On this record, the third assignment of error is without merit and
overruled.
No Error Committed by Treating J.A.’s Criminal Plea as Conclusive Evidence
Mother’s fourth assignment of error that the juvenile court erred in
accepting J.A.’s guilty plea as conclusive proof of the molestation and not conducting
an independent examination on the molestation issue is not well-founded. A guilty
plea is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt and the charge. Griggs, 2004-
Ohio-4415, at ¶ 10, and Russo, 2012-Ohio-4236, at ¶ 1 ( 8th Dist.).
The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
The Trial Court Ensured Meaningful Language Access and Interpretation
Mother states that she is primarily fluent in Spanish and has only a
limited proficiency in English. She argues that the proceedings were unfair because
the evidence concerned technical diagnoses and treatments and complex questions
posed to the witnesses, including herself. Thus, Mother contends, it should be
concluded that the translation services were necessarily inadequate. Furthermore,
the GAL report was furnished only in English. According to Mother, she was
prevented from being able to respond to it in any meaningful way. This argument is unpersuasive. Pursuant to Sup.R. 48.06(A)(2), the
GAL properly served his report on Mother’s attorney, not Mother herself.
As discussed earlier, Mother’s attorney’s strategy was to demonstrate through
Mother’s testimony that she was ready and able to care for her children again and
thus counter the GAL report. Moreover, the juvenile court provided interpreters,
often two, throughout the proceedings for Mother. The trial judge advised people in
the court of the need to speak slowly and clearly for the interpreters (tr. 5) and took
care to make sure the interpreter was in position to fulfill the job’s duties. (Tr. 245-
246.) During the May hearing, the interpreter asked several times for people to slow
down (tr. 161, 176-177) or to repeat something (tr. 144, 254, 260, and 262).
Moreover, a review of the transcript shows no indication that Mother did not
understand the proceedings.
The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Judgments affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR