[Cite as In re Juergensen, 2011-Ohio-5805.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. ELIZABETH INKINEN-JUERGENSEN, Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. Appellee, Case No. 2011CA00102 v.
JOHN JUERGENSEN, OPINION
Appellant.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 2009DR00774
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 7, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee For Appellant
SUSAN PUCCI JOHN L. JUERGENSEN 4429 Fulton Dr. N.W. John L. Juergensen Co., LPA Canton, Ohio 44718 Washington Square Office Park 6545 Market Avenue North North Canton, Ohio 44721 Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant John Juergensen (“Husband”) appeals the April 4, 2011
Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, which denied his post-decree motion for a reduction of spousal
support. Appellee is Elizabeth Inkinen-Juergensen (“Wife”).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶ 2} Husband and Wife were married on July 31, 1993. Two children were
born as issue of said union. Via Judgment Entry/Decree of Divorce, filed August 4,
2009, the trial court granted the parties’ Petition for Dissolution and adopted the parties’
Separation Agreement as part of the Decree.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to the Separation Agreement, Husband was ordered to pay Wife
an amount equal to one-half of his income through a combination of spousal support
and child support. The terms of the Separation Agreement set child support at
$700/month, and spousal support at $1,700/month. With respect to spousal support,
the Separation Agreement provided, “In no event, will the amount of spousal support be
less than [$1,700].” The trial court maintained jurisdiction over the issue of spousal
support, “To effectuate the intent of the parties”, but the trial court did not retain
jurisdiction over “the duration or length of spousal support”.
{¶ 4} On August 23, 2010, Husband filed a motion for modification of spousal
support, seeking to reduce the amount of his monthly spousal support obligation. The
trial court conducted a hearing on Husband’s motion on September 13, 2010. On that
same day, Wife filed a motion to show cause, asking the trial court to find Husband in
contempt for failing to comply with several provisions of the Decree, including non- Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 3
payment of spousal and child support. The trial court continued the hearing at the
parties’ request for additional discovery and briefing.
{¶ 5} Via Judgment Entry filed April 4, 2011, the trial court found it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to reduce Husband’s spousal support obligation below
$1,700/month pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Separation Agreement.
{¶ 6} It is from this Judgment Entry Husband appeals, raising the following
assignment of error:
{¶ 7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING
THAT THE COURT LACKS JURISDCITION TO LOWER APPELLANT’S SPOUSAL
SUPPORT OBLIGATION.”
{¶ 8} Husband submits the Separation Agreement expressly reserved
jurisdiction to the trial court to modify spousal support. The Separation Agreement
provides the reservation of jurisdiction in the trial court was “to effectuate the intent of
the parties”. Husband contends the intent of the parties was for Wife to have one-half of
Husband’s income, and implicit in that intent was the ability of the trial court to increase
or decrease spousal support pursuant to Husband’s gross income. We disagree.
{¶ 9} “Once a separation agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, the
agreement is superseded by the decree and its terms are imposed not by contract, but
by the decree. Greiner v. Greiner (1979), 61 Ohio App.2d 88, 399 N.E.2d 571, citing
Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413; Robrock v. Robrock (1958),
167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421; Newman v. Newman (1954), 161 Ohio St. 247, 118
N.E.2d 649; Law v. Law (1901), 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560.” Lisboa v. Lisboa,
Cuyahoga App. No. 95673, 2011-Ohio-351, at para. 14. Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 4
{¶ 10} In Holloway v. Holloway (1935), 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579, 580, the
Ohio Supreme Court unanimously held, where an agreement is incorporated in a
decree, the agreement is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are
not those imposed by contract but are those imposed by decree and are enforceable as
such.
{¶ 11} Holloway involved a question of alimony. However, the Ohio Supreme
Court in Robrock v. Robrock (1958), 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421, overruled in
part by Nokes v. Nokes (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 174, found the rationale
“equally appropriate to a question involving an agreement relating to minor children”.
Citing Holloway, the Robrock Court stated:
{¶ 12} “ ‘A decree granting divorce and awarding alimony is an order of court in
the enforcement of which the public has a vital interest. An alimony obligor is not
exempt from the operation of the decree by reason of the separation agreement. To
hold otherwise would be to reduce the status of a divorce and alimony decree to that of
a commercial transaction. Marriage, however, is not a matter of commerce, nor is it
merely a contract between the parties. Marriage is a basic social institution of the
highest type and importance, in which society at large has a vital interest.
{¶ 13} “ ‘Where a court, in its divorce decree, adopts the language of a
separation agreement, it does not thereby reduce the status of the decree to that of a
mere contract. While a contract may become a decree of court, a decree of court cannot
assume the status of a mere contract. The right to alimony does not arise from any
business transaction, but from the relation of marriage.’” Id. at 483. Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 5
{¶ 14} In order to modify a spousal support award, a trial court must specifically
reserve jurisdiction in its divorce decree or a separation agreement incorporated into
said decree. R.C. 3105.18(E); Bear v. Bear, Fifth App. Case Nos. 2004AP060042,
0043, 2005-Ohio-1490. The question before us is whether the parties’ separation
agreement earlier gave the trial court jurisdiction to reduce the spousal support award
below $1700/month.
{¶ 15} When parties dispute the meaning of a clause in their separation
agreement, the trial court must first determine whether the clause is ambiguous.
Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550 (citation omitted). However, if the terms of the
separation agreement are unambiguous, a trial court may not clarify or interpret those
terms. Id. “If the language of a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, the
interpretation of the instrument is a matter of law and the court must determine the
intent of the parties using only the language employed.” Woronka v. Woronka, Fifth
District App. No. 2010CA00193, 2010-Ohio-498, at paragraph 19.
{¶ 16} The Separation Agreement at issue herein specifically provides Husband
is to pay Wife a monthly amount equal to one-half of his gross income as spousal
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as In re Juergensen, 2011-Ohio-5805.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. ELIZABETH INKINEN-JUERGENSEN, Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. Appellee, Case No. 2011CA00102 v.
JOHN JUERGENSEN, OPINION
Appellant.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 2009DR00774
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 7, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee For Appellant
SUSAN PUCCI JOHN L. JUERGENSEN 4429 Fulton Dr. N.W. John L. Juergensen Co., LPA Canton, Ohio 44718 Washington Square Office Park 6545 Market Avenue North North Canton, Ohio 44721 Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant John Juergensen (“Husband”) appeals the April 4, 2011
Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, which denied his post-decree motion for a reduction of spousal
support. Appellee is Elizabeth Inkinen-Juergensen (“Wife”).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶ 2} Husband and Wife were married on July 31, 1993. Two children were
born as issue of said union. Via Judgment Entry/Decree of Divorce, filed August 4,
2009, the trial court granted the parties’ Petition for Dissolution and adopted the parties’
Separation Agreement as part of the Decree.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to the Separation Agreement, Husband was ordered to pay Wife
an amount equal to one-half of his income through a combination of spousal support
and child support. The terms of the Separation Agreement set child support at
$700/month, and spousal support at $1,700/month. With respect to spousal support,
the Separation Agreement provided, “In no event, will the amount of spousal support be
less than [$1,700].” The trial court maintained jurisdiction over the issue of spousal
support, “To effectuate the intent of the parties”, but the trial court did not retain
jurisdiction over “the duration or length of spousal support”.
{¶ 4} On August 23, 2010, Husband filed a motion for modification of spousal
support, seeking to reduce the amount of his monthly spousal support obligation. The
trial court conducted a hearing on Husband’s motion on September 13, 2010. On that
same day, Wife filed a motion to show cause, asking the trial court to find Husband in
contempt for failing to comply with several provisions of the Decree, including non- Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 3
payment of spousal and child support. The trial court continued the hearing at the
parties’ request for additional discovery and briefing.
{¶ 5} Via Judgment Entry filed April 4, 2011, the trial court found it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to reduce Husband’s spousal support obligation below
$1,700/month pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Separation Agreement.
{¶ 6} It is from this Judgment Entry Husband appeals, raising the following
assignment of error:
{¶ 7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING
THAT THE COURT LACKS JURISDCITION TO LOWER APPELLANT’S SPOUSAL
SUPPORT OBLIGATION.”
{¶ 8} Husband submits the Separation Agreement expressly reserved
jurisdiction to the trial court to modify spousal support. The Separation Agreement
provides the reservation of jurisdiction in the trial court was “to effectuate the intent of
the parties”. Husband contends the intent of the parties was for Wife to have one-half of
Husband’s income, and implicit in that intent was the ability of the trial court to increase
or decrease spousal support pursuant to Husband’s gross income. We disagree.
{¶ 9} “Once a separation agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, the
agreement is superseded by the decree and its terms are imposed not by contract, but
by the decree. Greiner v. Greiner (1979), 61 Ohio App.2d 88, 399 N.E.2d 571, citing
Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413; Robrock v. Robrock (1958),
167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421; Newman v. Newman (1954), 161 Ohio St. 247, 118
N.E.2d 649; Law v. Law (1901), 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560.” Lisboa v. Lisboa,
Cuyahoga App. No. 95673, 2011-Ohio-351, at para. 14. Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 4
{¶ 10} In Holloway v. Holloway (1935), 130 Ohio St. 214, 198 N.E. 579, 580, the
Ohio Supreme Court unanimously held, where an agreement is incorporated in a
decree, the agreement is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are
not those imposed by contract but are those imposed by decree and are enforceable as
such.
{¶ 11} Holloway involved a question of alimony. However, the Ohio Supreme
Court in Robrock v. Robrock (1958), 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421, overruled in
part by Nokes v. Nokes (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 174, found the rationale
“equally appropriate to a question involving an agreement relating to minor children”.
Citing Holloway, the Robrock Court stated:
{¶ 12} “ ‘A decree granting divorce and awarding alimony is an order of court in
the enforcement of which the public has a vital interest. An alimony obligor is not
exempt from the operation of the decree by reason of the separation agreement. To
hold otherwise would be to reduce the status of a divorce and alimony decree to that of
a commercial transaction. Marriage, however, is not a matter of commerce, nor is it
merely a contract between the parties. Marriage is a basic social institution of the
highest type and importance, in which society at large has a vital interest.
{¶ 13} “ ‘Where a court, in its divorce decree, adopts the language of a
separation agreement, it does not thereby reduce the status of the decree to that of a
mere contract. While a contract may become a decree of court, a decree of court cannot
assume the status of a mere contract. The right to alimony does not arise from any
business transaction, but from the relation of marriage.’” Id. at 483. Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 5
{¶ 14} In order to modify a spousal support award, a trial court must specifically
reserve jurisdiction in its divorce decree or a separation agreement incorporated into
said decree. R.C. 3105.18(E); Bear v. Bear, Fifth App. Case Nos. 2004AP060042,
0043, 2005-Ohio-1490. The question before us is whether the parties’ separation
agreement earlier gave the trial court jurisdiction to reduce the spousal support award
below $1700/month.
{¶ 15} When parties dispute the meaning of a clause in their separation
agreement, the trial court must first determine whether the clause is ambiguous.
Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550 (citation omitted). However, if the terms of the
separation agreement are unambiguous, a trial court may not clarify or interpret those
terms. Id. “If the language of a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, the
interpretation of the instrument is a matter of law and the court must determine the
intent of the parties using only the language employed.” Woronka v. Woronka, Fifth
District App. No. 2010CA00193, 2010-Ohio-498, at paragraph 19.
{¶ 16} The Separation Agreement at issue herein specifically provides Husband
is to pay Wife a monthly amount equal to one-half of his gross income as spousal
support, and less any amount of child support. At the time of the decree, the spousal
support award was $1,700/month, and “In no event, will the amount of spousal support
be less than this.”
{¶ 17} We find the Separation Agreement clearly and unambiguously provides
the parties’ intent was for Wife to have one-half of Husband’s income, at an amount not
less than $1,700/month, less child support. While we find the trial court did, in fact,
reserve jurisdiction over the amount of spousal support, we find it correctly determined Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 6
the agreement unambiguously stated spousal support would not be less than
$1,700/month.
{¶ 18} Husband’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Farmer, J. and
Wise, J. concur
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
s/ John W. Wise _____________________ HON. JOHN W. WISE Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00102 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: : : ELIZABETH INKINEN-JUERGENSEN, : : Appellee, : : v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY : JOHN JUERGENSEN, : : Appellant. : Case No. 2011CA00102
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, The judgment of the Stark
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. Costs
assessed to Appellant.
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ John W. Wise______________________ HON. JOHN W. WISE