In Re Judy Wood Publishing Corp.

289 B.R. 319, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 2002 WL 32000662
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedNovember 8, 2002
Docket19-30194
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 289 B.R. 319 (In Re Judy Wood Publishing Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Judy Wood Publishing Corp., 289 B.R. 319, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 2002 WL 32000662 (Va. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DOUGLAS O. TICE, Jr, Chief Judge.

Hearing was held on October 10, 2002, on a motion by James River Press, L.L.C. (James River) to allow a late-filed proof of claim as an amendment to a timely, informal proof of claim. Judy W. Wood (Judy Wood), an unsecured creditor, opposed the motion. The chapter 7 trustee, who had earlier filed an objection to the late proof of claim did not oppose the motion to amend. After hearing evidence and argument the court took the motion under advisement.

For the court to determine if James River made an informal proof of claim against the chapter 7 estate of Judy Wood Publishing Corporation, the court must consider whether “sufficient notice of the claim has been given in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding.” Fyne v. Atlas Supply Co. (In re Fyne), 245 F.2d 107, 107 (4th Cir.1957). If an informal proof of claim is established by the evidence then the court must decide if amendment to the informal proof of claim is equitable. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick As socs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

For the reasons stated hereinafter, the court will grant James River’s motion to amend the late-filed proof of claim to an informal proof of claim.

Facts.

On April 13, 2000, debtor corporation filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under chapter 7. Debtor listed James River in its master mailing list of creditors filed with *321 the petition. See Obj. of Judy Wood at 3. James River was a creditor due to unliqui-dated litigation arising from debtor’s failure to pay for paper products, publication information, and business services James River had provided. Further acknowledging the litigation, debtor’s schedules listed a “[counterclaim against James River Press; [of which] collectibility [is] questionable and contingent on a favorable ruling in litigation.” See Debtor’s Schedule B. Debtor valued its counterclaim at $30,000. See id.

On April 14, 2000, Kevin Huennekens was appointed trustee. On April 28, 2000, James River and debtor’s counsel exchanged correspondence, wherein James River’s counsel requested from debtor’s counsel specific information regarding publishing and security agreements of the parties. See Obj. of Judy Wood at 3.

On June 2, 2000, the trustee submitted an amended application to employ Kutak Rock as counsel. In this application the trustee disclosed that “Kutak Rock represented previously the principals of James River [Press], L.L.C. (‘James River’). James River is a creditor herein and is the plaintiff in a suit against the Debtor.” Am. Application to Employ Kutak Rock at 2.

On August 12, 2000, the clerk sent notice to creditors of the need to file a proof of claim and setting a bar date of November 10, 2000.

In addition to the above-listed activities which took place prior to the bar date, James River also attended several § 341 meetings. At these meetings James River’s representatives informed the trustee of corporate entities that may have been omitted from the debtor corporation’s schedules. See Debtor’s Ex. 1. At the initial § 341 meeting, James River’s representatives, Gay, its attorney and Rhodes, its manager, made the trustee aware of the interrelated corporate entities involved with the debtor as James River sought to “pull into the assets of the Debtor the assets of Judy Wood Consulting.” See id. at 3; James River Ex. 1. This effort brought to light the fact that there was no separate consulting entity among Judy Wood’s holdings. This drew the trustee’s attention to Judy Wood, Inc., the owner of Judy Wood Consulting. See id. In addition, at some point prior to the bar date, James River provided the trustee with a copy of its suit filed against the debtor in state court. 1

Also prior to the bar date, in August 2000, the trustee’s counsel asked Rhodes to attend the trustee’s examination of Judy Wood, and to provide help regarding copyright issues on items the debtor published. See Debtor’s Ex. 1A. Trustee’s counsel sent Rhodes transcripts of § 341 meetings he had been unable to attend, to aid in preparation for this examination. See id.

On June 28, 2002, one week after learning that it had failed to file a proof of claim prior to the bar date in 2000, James River untimely filed a late proof of claim in the amount of $177,049.75. Thereafter the trustee objected to James River’s late-filed proof of claim.

Conclusions of Law.

Finding an Informal Proof of Claim

To determine whether James River has made a timely informal proof of claim against the chapter 7 estate of the debtor corporation the court must consider *322 whether “sufficient notice of the claim has been given in the course of the bankruptcy proceeding.” In re Fyne, 245 F.2d 107 (4th Cir.1957). This standard has been expanded upon since the Fyne opinion was rendered in Davis v. Columbia Constr. Co., Inc. (In re Davis), 936 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.1991), and in an unpublished opinion by the Fourth Circuit, Hardgrave v. La Rock (In re Hardgrave), No. 94-1832, 1995 WL 371462, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 15506 (4th Cir. June 21, 1995). In Davis the court held that the creditor, who was the “IRS[,] did nothing that would alert other parties to the presence of its claim.... ” Id. at 776. This resulted in the court finding that “no action by the IRS ... could be construed as a timely filed informal claim which could later be amended.” Id. The court further stated that “[m]ere knowledge of the claim on the part of the trustee is not sufficient notice to permit an amended claim, nor is the listing of the claim in the debtor’s schedule.” Id. Based on that reasoning the court in Davis found that the IRS had not made an informal proof of claim that could be amended.

In Hardgrave the court held that if the creditor “ha[d] taken ‘some affirmative action to constitute sufficient notice that he has a claim against the estate’ ” then its claim should be allowed. Id. at *2, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 15506, at *8 (quoting In re Davis, 936 F.2d. at 775-76). In the Hardgrave opinion the court cited examples of such affirmative actions, including participation in the first § 341 meeting, filing objections to the debtor’s claimed exemptions, filing a complaint to determine dischargeability, or where the creditor’s involvement in the case had increased the value of the debtor’s estate. See Hardgrave at *3, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 15506, at *9 (citing

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
289 B.R. 319, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1655, 2002 WL 32000662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-judy-wood-publishing-corp-vaeb-2002.