FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #009
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of March, 2026 are as follows:
BY Griffin, J.:
2025-O-01449 IN RE: JUDGE SHEVA SIMS
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE OPINION.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons. McCallum, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons. Penzato, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2025-O-01449
IN RE: JUDGE SHEVA SIMS
Judiciary Commission of Louisiana
GRIFFIN, J.
This matter arises from the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of
Louisiana (“the Commission”) that Judge Sheva Sims be suspended without pay for
one year for acting in an impatient and condescending manner towards a litigant,
misusing a court-owned vehicle, improperly advocating for a party during an
eviction proceeding, and engaging in a pattern of failing to follow the law. After
considering the facts, circumstances, and applicable law, we reject the
recommendation of the Commission and impose a suspension of nine months
without pay.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Judge Sims became a judge of the Shreveport City Court, Parish of Caddo,
effective December 2011.1 An investigation arose from numerous complaints filed
by litigants, anonymous complainants, and retired Justice E. Joseph Bleich in his
capacity as supernumerary judge pro tempore of Shreveport City Court. The
Commission’s Notice of Hearing alleges that Judge Sims violated Canons 1, 2, 2(A),
2(B), 3(A)(1), 3(A)(2), 3(A)(3), 3(A)(4), 3(A)(6), and 3(B)(1) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, as well as Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution based on the
following counts: (1) was rude and disrespectful towards a property manager in an
Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed as Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District. 1 Judge Sims was previously suspended in 2015 for improperly holding a prosecutor in contempt for conduct that was not contemptuous and sua sponte impermissibly dismissing fifteen criminal cases without the legal authority to do so. See In re Sims, 14-2515 (La. 3/7/15), 159 So.3d 1040. eviction proceeding and improperly denied the eviction; (2) failed to be patient and
courteous to a property manager in another eviction proceeding; (3) used a court-
owned vehicle for her personal commute for several weeks and twice had city
marshals buy gasoline for the vehicle; (4) independently obtained documents relative
to an eviction proceeding, introduced them into evidence, and used the documents
to question and discredit a witness thereby creating an appearance of advocacy; (5)
failed to follow the Code of Criminal Procedure by ordering that defendants charged
with crimes of violence be released on their own recognizance, granted a defendant
credit for time he had served prior to the date of the offense, and issued a bond order
which did not include a mandatory condition of release; and (6) exhibited rude,
abrasive, and demeaning behavior towards litigants, court staff, and colleagues and
failed to cooperate with other court officials in the administration of court business.
The Hearing Officer found misconduct by Judge Sims on Counts (1), (3), (4),
(5), and paragraph three of Count (6). The Commission agreed except as to the
Hearing Officer’s finding of misconduct in part on Count (6) and found Judge Sims
to be in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Article V, §25(C) of the
Louisiana Constitution as to Counts (1), (3), (4), and (5).2 The matter was set on this
Court’s docket for oral argument under LASC Rule XXIII, § 14.
The following facts were presented to the Commission:
DEMEANOR
Judge Sims presided over an eviction hearing in Monarch Realty &
Management v. Jermaine O’Neal. Megan Everett, who is not a lawyer, appeared in
her capacity as the property manager for Monarch Realty. Ms. Everett stated Mr.
O’Neal was late paying rent, had an unauthorized pet, and also owed “court fines”
the realty company had to pay due to the condition of the property. Judge Sims cut
2 As the Commission found Counts (2) and (6) unproven, the Commissioners did not address those counts in their briefing. 2 Ms. Everett off while she was speaking and asked what she meant by “court fines.”
Ms. Everett explained the fines were imposed by Shreveport Environmental Court,
and Judge Sims, on multiple occasions, distinguished the Shreveport Environmental
Court from the Shreveport City Court. Ms. Everett further explained a notice to
vacate was given despite the lease agreement containing a waiver provision. After
some back and forth between Mr. O’Neal and Ms. Everett about whether a pet
deposit was received, Judge Sims interrupted to point out the notice to vacate did
not list each alleged lease violation. While Ms. Everett was trying to explain a
second page was stapled to the notice, Judge Sims again cut her off in a
condescending manner3 and at the conclusion of which remarked, “You[’re] making
3 Judge Sims: “Hold on one second. Hold on one second. On the notice that you all provided, according to you all on April the 21st, it doesn’t denote which lease violations were alleged to have been committed.”
Ms. Everett: “I have copies of each violation that has been given to him.”
Judge Sims: “Did you hear what I said?”
Ms. Everett: “Ma’am?”
Ms. Everett: “It didn’t say –”
Judge Sims: “Were you listening to me?”
Ms. Everett: “Yes ma’am. You said I didn’t specifically write down on the notice to vacate of the lease violations he received.”
Judge Sims: “Right. On your notice it has lease violations where it is marked, there’s an X in the box. And then underneath, there’s an explanation where you’re supposed to list specifically what the violations are so the tenant would know.”
Ms. Everett: “Yes, ma’am, I did –”
Judge Sims: “– but was that –”
Ms. Everett: “– staple the lease violation to the notice to vacate when it was given to him.”
Judge Sims: “You going to answer what you want to answer, or are you going to answer my questions? Ma’am? Ma’am?”
Ms. Everett: “Yes ma’am.”
Judge Sims: “On the lease five-day notice you have dated April 21st of this year, you did not list the violations on there, correct?”
Ms. Everett: “No, ma’am.” 3 this longer than it needs to be. Everybody here has somewhere to go. As a matter
of fact, have a seat. Let me take the next case.”
After hearing approximately twenty other cases on the docket, Judge Sims
called the O’Neal case back up and resumed her questioning including, whether the
issues on the property were resolved as to the Shreveport Environmental Court fines.
Ms. Everett explained she did not attend the Environmental Court proceeding
because she was in City Court for an eviction instead. Judge Sims asked why Ms.
Everett did not call Environmental Court to say she had an obligation in City Court
to which Ms. Everett responded she had the dates confused. Judge Sims clarified
that Ms. Everett did not go to Environmental Court because she was unaware that
she needed to be there instead of City Court. After Ms. Everett confirmed this, Judge
Sims tersely stated, “Eviction denied. Next case.”
As Ms. Everett was leaving, Mr. O’Neal asked Judge Sims if he needed to pay
the outstanding rent for May, and Judge Sims yelled for Ms. Everett to return to the
courtroom. Ms. Everett responded that Mr. O’Neal could still pay the rent, and
Judge Sims told Mr. O’Neal, “She said she’ll accept it. Give it to her now.” Ms.
Everett explained that, per company policy, she was not allowed to receive rent
payments outside of the office. Judge Sims cut her off and stated, “The order of the
court is for him to tender it to you now.” When Ms. Everett asked if the payment
included late fees, Judge Sims responded, “I don’t know. I’m not looking at it,” and
insisted Ms. Everett take the money and figure it out later.
Judge Sims: “What was the ledger –”
Ms. Everett: “But it was stapled with –”
Judge Sims: “I heard you the first time. I don’t have a hearing problem. Would you like to say it one more time, ma’am?”
Ms. Everett: “No.” 4 MISUSE OF COURT VEHICLE
Shreveport City Court purchased a vehicle for use by court personnel. There
was no written policy governing the use of the vehicle but there was a general
understanding that the vehicle was to be used by judges and employees of the Clerk
of Court’s Office for court-related business4 – not personal use. The vehicle was
typically kept in a parking spot at the courthouse. The customary policy was for a
judge or employee to retrieve the keys and sign a log indicating who had checked
out the vehicle, the time of check out, where driven, and the time returned. Judge
Sims used this vehicle for several weeks, commuting between her home and the
courthouse, as her own vehicle was being repaired and she did not have other
transportation. Judge Sims parked the vehicle in her parking spot while at the
courthouse and drove the vehicle home overnight and on weekends.
A Fuelman card is assigned to each City of Shreveport-owned vehicle and is
used to procure gasoline from pumps accessible only to city workers. Officers with
the Shreveport City Marshal’s Office used Fuelman cards assigned to the marshal’s
office to procure gasoline for the court-owned vehicle on two occasions. The vehicle
had no gasoline in it when Judge Sims first used it, so she called then-Chief Deputy
Marshal James Jefferson for assistance. Deputy Jarvis Armington was sent to assist
Judge Sims and met her at the city gas pumps. When the Fuelman card for the
vehicle could not be located,5 Chief Deputy Jefferson authorized Deputy Armington
to use his Fuelman card to fill up the vehicle. At this time, Judge Sims offered to
pay for the gasoline, but Chief Deputy Jefferson said it was too difficult to determine
the equivalent dollar amount as the fuel in the city pumps was purchased in bulk. He
4 This included picking up supplies, making deposits at the bank, and judges occasionally using the vehicle to attend meetings or conferences. 5 Chief Deputy Jefferson testified he later discovered the vehicle had a Fuelman card associated with it but wasn’t aware of why it wasn’t located in the vehicle itself. 5 recalled other occasions where Judge Sims offered to pay but told her it wasn’t
necessary again citing the difficulty in calculating the dollar amount. Subsequently,
Judge Sims later asked Deputy Troy Jackson to fill up the vehicle using a Fuelman
card of the Marshal’s Office. Judge Sims claimed that Chief Deputy Jefferson
authorized Deputy Jackson to fill up the vehicle, but Chief Deputy Jefferson testified
he was only aware of the earlier occasion involving Deputy Armington.
Approximately seventeen days after Judge Sims began using the vehicle, the
Marshal’s Office notified the Shreveport City Court that it would no longer
accommodate any future requests for use of the Fuelman cards of that office.
IMPROPER ADVOCACY
Judge Sims presided over an eviction hearing in TTA Capital, LLC v. Sch-
keiry Williams, wherein plaintiff property owner sought to evict defendant lessee,
Ms. Williams, for nonpayment of rent. The lease-to-own agreement at issue
included provisions making the lessee financially responsible for any and all
necessary repairs. Despite these provisions, Ms. Williams (representing herself pro
se) stopped making rent payments because a tree had fallen on the house. Ms.
Williams claimed she told an employee of the property owner, Lynette Maxfield,
about this incident. Ms. Williams also claimed that the Shreveport Department of
Property Standards (“Property Standards”) spoke to Ms. Maxfield about the fallen
tree, but plaintiff’s counsel said he was not aware of such contact. Judge Sims
continued the hearing to allow plaintiff’s counsel to obtain additional information
but further stated on the record: “I know you all can contact Property Standards. If
not, I’ll have my office do it.”
At the subsequent hearing, Judge Sims heard testimony from Ms. Maxfield
and Ms. Williams. Judge Sims then referred to photographs of the property taken
by Property Standards and said she had acquired them herself. She instructed the
deputy marshal to show them to the parties and clarified, “And for the record, so the
6 record is clear, I’ve acquired those on my own from the Property Standards
Division.”6 She then admitted the photographs into evidence. After hearing
testimony, Judge Sims brought Ms. Maxfield back on the stand and questioned her
in an attempt to impeach her prior testimony with documents from Property
Standards that do not appear in the record and which neither Ms. Williams nor
plaintiff’s counsel had ever seen. Judge Sims eventually remarked, “I provided the
pictures. I provided the document….” Ultimately, Judge Sims ruled against Ms.
Williams.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE LAW
The Notice of Hearing alleges Judge Sims failed to follow three specified
provisions of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
A defendant who has been arrested for a crime of violence or domestic abuse
battery “shall not be released on his personal undertaking or with an unsecured
personal surety.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 321(C)(1) and (5). Notwithstanding this clear
provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Judge Sims ordered that ten defendants
arrested for crimes of violence7 be released on their own recognizance (“ROR”)
between 2018 through 2019.
“No defendant shall receive credit for any time served prior to the commission
of the crime.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 880(C). Nevertheless, Judge Sims granted a
defendant who pled guilty to certain traffic offenses credit for time he served before
the date of those offenses. When the prosecutor attempted to bring this error to Judge
Sims’ attention by stating the tickets were issued after the defendant’s incarceration,
6 The header of the printed pages of the photographs show they were printed from MyPermitNow.org on July 5, 2022, at 1:16 p.m., which would have been directly after the court’s morning session during which the first hearing took place. 7 A crime of violence “means an offense that has, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, and that, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense or an offense that involves the possession or use of a dangerous weapon.” La. R.S. 14:2 7 Judge Sims simply responded, “I understand. I see that. Thank you.”
Approximately one week later, Judge Sims became aware of the improper sentence,
vacated it, and entered a new sentence.
A court is required to include as condition of release on bail that a person
charged with a second or subsequent DWI offense shall “install an ignition interlock
device on any vehicle which he operates.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 320(C). Judge Sims
issued a bond order for such a defendant which did not include an order to install an
ignition interlock system. When the error was brought to Judge Sims’ attention, she
corrected it.
DISCUSSION
The issue before this Court is whether we should accept the recommendation
of the Commission and suspend Judge Sims for one year without pay. Article V
Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution vests this Court with exclusive and
original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings and provides substantive
grounds for disciplinary actions against a judge. This Court “therefore has the power
to make determinations of fact based on the evidence in the record and is not bound
by, nor required to give any weight to, the findings and recommendations of the
Judiciary Commission.” In re Benge, 09-1617, pp. 26-27 (La. 11/6/09), 24 So.3d
822, 838. The Court has adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, which supplements
the grounds for disciplinary actions involving judges. Before discipline can be
imposed, charges against a judge must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Hunter, 02-1975 p.3 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So.2d 325, 328.
The Commission determined that Judge Sims, in haste to get through a busy
docket, was unnecessarily condescending and exhibited a lack of patience with Ms.
Everett, who remained respectful throughout the proceeding. Judge Sims’
explanation for her actions was that Ms. Everett was nonresponsive to her questions,
8 and Judge Sims wanted to be efficient with her docket. Judge Sims elaborated that
she thought it best to handle other cases first and allow Ms. Everett an opportunity
to view other litigants but eventually conceded she could have handled the matter
better. Judge Sims stated her reason for denying the eviction was based on Ms.
Everett making inconsistent statements throughout her testimony, however, the
Commission found these after-the-fact attempts to justify her demeanor and ruling
were not supported by the record.8 We agree.
Judge Sims failed to maintain “high standards of conduct so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary may be preserved,” “respect and comply with the
law … in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary,” and “be patient, dignified, and courteous to all litigants” with
whom she interacts in an official capacity in violations of Canons 1, 2(A), and
3(A)(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See also La. Const. art. V, § 25(C)
(discipline may be imposed to sanction “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute”). “While
a judge may be forceful and stern, he or she must remain respectful and in control of
his or her temper – hostile, demeaning or humiliating language is never warranted.”
In re Bowers, 98-1735, p. 14 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So.2d 875, 884. Notwithstanding
that “a judge’s patience is tested when simultaneously confronted with crowded
dockets to be managed and countless difficult decisions to make,” “judges must
strive to be patient in the face of these challenges.” In re Ellender, 09-0736, p. 12
(La. 7/1/09), 16 So.3d 351, 358.
8 Judge Sims refused to admit she ordered Ms. Everett to accept the rent payment from Mr. O’Neal instead contending that she “ordered the defendant to tender the payment,” but Ms. Everett “doesn’t have to accept it.” The Commission found this assertion disingenuous in light of Judge Sims’ position of authority and the words directed to the parties. 9 MISUSE OF COURT VEHICLE
The Commission determined that Judge Sims’ use of the court-owned vehicle
for several weeks to commute to and from work, retention of the vehicle in the
evenings and on weekends, and her acquisition of fuel through the Marshal’s Office
constituted an impermissible personal use of public assets. See Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 1, 2(A), 2(B), 3(B)(1); La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Judge Sims agreed
the vehicle should only be used for court business but maintained that because she
did not have alternate transportation, her extended use of it to commute was “in
connection with the discharge of [her] judicial function.” She believed her only
other alternative was to walk which, she had done before, but she was told by the
deputy marshals it was not safe as she had prior security issues of people
approaching her on the street. Judge Sims further asserted she did not use the vehicle
for personal errands when she drove it home on evenings and weekends. However,
the Commission found that Judge Sims gave inconsistent testimony at first
responding she did not purchase fuel for the vehicle but later claimed she did. The
Commission rejected what it considered a false dichotomy presented by Judge Sims
based on the incorrect premise that the commute is a judicial function. It further
characterized Judge Sims’ appeal to the serious security risks faced by judges as a
belated and gratuitous attempt to justify her personal use of the vehicle. The
Commission concluded Judge Sims abused her judicial position by using the court-
owned vehicle and having the Marshal’s Office supply the fuel. We disagree.
Judge Sims testified she only started using the court-owned vehicle after
deputy marshals advised her against walking to court given she was previously
accosted on her commute. Chief Deputy Jefferson confirmed that Judge Sims
offered reimbursement for the gasoline she procured through use of deputy
marshals’ Fuelman cards and that he declined this reimbursement. Under these
unique circumstances, we therefore find Count (3) unproven.
10 IMPROPER ADVOCACY
The Commission determined that Judge Sims directly requested the
documents from Property Standards or directed someone to obtain them on her
behalf and that the totality of her actions reflected improper advocacy. See Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 1, 2(A), 2(B), 3(A)(4), and 3(A)(6); La. Const. art. V,
§25(C). Despite the multiple statements Judge Sims made on the record at the
hearing that she was responsible for obtaining the photographs and documents from
Property Standards (which she also confirmed in her initial response to the
anonymous complaints filed against her contending she took judicial notice of them),
she asserted at the Commission hearing that she did nothing to obtain them herself,
stating, “I don’t recall doing anything specifically … I didn’t ask for them.” She
asserted the Property Standards documents simply appeared in her office in an
envelope her assistant gave her. Judge Sims attempted to clarify her comments on
the record at the eviction hearing by stating she meant she provided them “from the
packet that was delivered to [her] office” and “obtained them [herself] from [her]
assistant.” When asked why she felt it proper to introduce and use documents that
had simply appeared in her office from an unknown source, Judge Sims gave circular
and evasive responses. Judge Sims also testified to the Commission there was a
cover letter with the documents indicating they were from Property Standards, yet
no such letter is in the record. The Commission did not find this testimony credible.
The Commission concluded that Judge Sims went too far in attempting to assess Ms.
Maxfield’s credibility by using evidence she obtained herself to conduct a cross-
examination thus appearing to act as an advocate for the defendant, Ms. Williams.
The Commission further found the fact that Judge Sims ultimately ruled against Ms.
Williams is of no moment. We agree.
Judge Sims failed to perform her duties as an unbiased and neutral arbiter
undermining the integrity of the judicial system. See In re Fiffie, 24-0976, pp. 16-
11 17 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 738, 749; In re Foret, 14-0526, pp. 6-7 (La. 5/23/14),
144 So.3d 1028, 1032. Her after-the-fact explanations to the Commission are wholly
lacking in credibility when weighed against the evidence before us. Judges must
consider the evidence that the parties present to them, not that they have acquired on
their own.
The Commission determined Judge Sims’ release of several defendants
charged with domestic abuse battery or violent crimes on their own recognizance
was in derogation of the clear language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 321(C). Judge Sims
offered various justifications that these defendants were released due to medical
issues, issues with the jail, or because the prosecutor had reached an agreement with
defense counsel to dismiss the charges upon completion of a diversion or probation
program.9 When asked why the minutes do not reflect these circumstances, Judge
Sims asserted the minutes were frequently incorrect or inaccurately recorded. It was
Judge Sims’ interpretation that so long as a bond is initially set, it is not a violation
of La. C.Cr.P. art. 321(C) if there is a subsequent ROR. The Commission concluded
Judge Sims’ justifications to be irrelevant as the plain language of the statute does
not support such an interpretation.
The Commission determined that Judge Sims’ granting credit for time a
defendant served before the date of his instant charged offenses was in derogation
of the clear language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 880(C). Judge Sims claimed she did not
hear the prosecutor’s attempt to bring this error to her attention as others present
were talking over each other and giving her documents to sign. The Commission
noted the recording of the proceeding does not bear this out and points to Judge
9 Jasmine Cooper, a lawyer who previously worked in the Shreveport prosecutor’s office, testified about the apparent common practice in Shreveport City Court wherein once a bond was initially set, sometimes defense counsel and the prosecutor would come to an agreement if, for example, the prosecutor found a case did not have the requisite probable cause. Nonetheless, this common practice is not a defense to failure to follow clear statutory law. See In re Elloie, infra. 12 Sims’ remarking, “I understand. I see that. Thank you.” Judge Sims could not recall
how she later learned the sentence was improper and when she corrected it, her
method of doing so did not appear in the minutes. Again, Judge Sims suggested the
minutes might not be correct.
The Commission determined Judge Sims’ failure to issue a bond order for the
installation of an ignition interlock system for a defendant charged with a second
DWI was in derogation of the clear language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 320(C). The
Commission concluded that Judge Sims merely blamed the error on the failure of
her new judicial assistant to draft the order properly. Rather than take full
responsibility, Judge Sims stated: “I just do it myself. So it requires me to do extra
stuff that falls under the purview of her job….”
Judge Sims demonstrated a repeated practice of failing to follow the clear
language of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 321(C), 880(C), and 320(C). “A judge may be found
to have violated La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 25 by a legal ruling or action made contrary
to clear and determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its
interpretation and where this legal error was egregious, made in bad faith, or made
as part of a pattern or practice of legal error.” In re Quirk, 97-1143, pp. 11-12 (La.
12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172, 180-81. “[A] pattern of repeated legal error (although not
necessarily the same error) over a period of time can constitute judicial misconduct,
regardless of whether the errors were made in bad faith or were egregious in nature.”
Id., 97-1143, p. 8, 705 So.2d at 178. “The defense that a long-standing procedure
was utilized cannot prevail when that procedure is in direct contravention to express
written statutory law, about which there can be no misunderstanding or confusion.”
In re Elloie, 05-1499, pp. 26-27 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 882, 900.
DISCIPLINE
Based on these violations, discipline is required. In imposing discipline, we
are guided by the following: (a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or
13 evidences a pattern of misconduct; (b) the nature, extent, and frequency of
occurrence of the acts of the misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or
out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official
capacity or in her private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized
that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or
modify her conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have
been prior complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the
integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge
exploited her position to satisfy his personal desires. In re: Chaisson, 549 So.2d
259, 266 (La. 1989).
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidences a pattern of misconduct and (b) the nature, extent, and frequency of occurrence of the acts of the misconduct
The nature of the misconduct in this proceeding evidences a wide range of
frequent and persistent overreach and excess in continuation of the same type of
indifference towards the limits of judicial authority for which Judge Sims was
previously disciplined.
(c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom and (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in her private life
All of the misconduct at issue occurred in Judge Sims’ official capacity as a
judge occurring in or adjacent to the courtroom in course of handling criminal and
eviction matters.
(e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred and (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify her conduct
Judge Sims displayed a consistent reluctance to accept or recognize her
misconduct responding to Commission questioning with after-the-fact justifications
and rationalizations, often shifting blame on to others. Her testimony revealed a lack
of credibility in light of the record evidence. We further agree with the Commission
that Judge Sims offered halfhearted acknowledgement of her misconduct
14 unconducive to a true appreciation of why her actions were improper in a way that
will ensure there is no future recurrence. See In re Free, 16-0434, p. 53 (La.
6/29/16), 199 So.3d 571, 603; In re Sassone, 07-0651, pp. 28-33 (La. 6/29/07). 959
So.2d 859, 880; In re Lee, 06-0454, p. 19, 933 So.2d at 748.
(g) the length of service on the bench
Judge Sims has served as a judge since December 2011. This prolonged
tenure is now an aggravating factor in light of her prior complaints and discipline.
(h) whether there have been prior complaints about this judge
This Court suspended Judge Sims for thirty days without pay in 2015 for
improperly holding a prosecutor in contempt for conduct that was not contemptuous
and impermissibly dismissing fifteen criminal cases without the legal authority to do
so. See In re Sims, 14-2515 (La. 3/7/15), 159 So.3d 1040. At the time Judge Sims
had been on the bench for less than one year yet already started to display misconduct
similar to the instant proceeding. The following year Judge Sims entered into a
Deferred Recommendation of Discipline Agreement with the Commission wherein
she was admonished for habitually arriving late to court and management issues with
the Marshal’s Office.
(i) the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary
The cumulative effect of Judge Sims’ misconduct had a significant negative
impact on the integrity of and respect for the judicial system. Judge Sims exhibited
impatience and condescension towards a litigant who remained respectful and
rendered a ruling that appeared to be against the weight of the evidence implicating
issues of impartiality. See In re Bowers, 98-1735, p. 14 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So.2d
875, 884 (“an appearance in [a judge’s] courtroom may be a litigant’s or witness’
only exposure to the judicial system” such that demeaning or humiliating language
by a judge “reflects poorly on the image of our system of justice”); In re Cresap, 06-
1242, pp. 25-26 (La. 10/17/06), 940 So.2d 624, 639-40. Judge Sims abandoned her
15 role as a neutral arbiter when she engaged in an independent fact-finding
investigation, obtained and introduced evidence not provided by the parties, and
created an appearance of bias in favor of the defendant when questioning the
credibility of a witness on an inconsequential issue. See Williams v. Pennsylvania,
579 U.S 1, 15-16 (2016) (“An insistence on the appearance of neutrality is not some
artificial attempt to mask imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an essential
means of ensuring the reality of a fair adjudication. Both the appearance and reality
of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial
pronouncements[.]”); In re Fiffie, 24-0976, pp. 16-17, 395 So.3d at 749. Judge Sims
engaged in a pattern of failing to apply clear and determined provisions of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Most seriously, she granted ROR to
defendants charged with domestic abuse battery or crimes of violence. The failure
to follow and apply clear statutory law “can only cast the judiciary as a whole into
disrepute.” In re Sassone, 07-0651, p. 29, 959 So.2d at 879.
(j) the extent to which the judge exploited her position to satisfy her personal desires
We find the evidence does not support Judge Sims exploited her position for
personal gain.
“[T]he discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the
seriousness of the offenses involved, considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.” In re Ellender, 04-2123, p. 13 (La. 12/13/04), 889 So.2d
225, 233. Given the varied forms of misconduct in this matter, a direct comparison
to past disciplinary cases is difficult. A common thread which runs through the
gamut of Judge Sims’ violations is a persistent lapse into informalities, overreach,
and lack of decorum ostensibly rooted in her frustrations with managing a sizeable
docket. Nonetheless, a judge must unflinchingly adhere to the high standards of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Sims’ repeated failure to do so – and her
16 subsequent responses seeking to evade, rationalize, or obfuscate the issues –
undermined the integrity of the judicial system and violated the public trust. See In
re Best, 15-2096, p. 14 (La. 6/29/16), 195 So.2d 460, 468 (“the primary purpose of
the Code of Judicial Conduct is the protection of the public rather than to simply
discipline judges”). Even were we to conclude Judge Sims did not act wholly in bad
faith, this would not absolve her misconduct. See In re Hunter, 02-1975, p. 16, 823
So.2d at 336 (“a judge may also, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to
bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to
bring the judicial office into disrepute”); see also Chaisson, 549 So.2d at 267
(“‘good faith’ is a mitigating factor, not an affirmative defense”) (citing Matter of
Laster, 404 Mich. 449, 274 N.W.2d 742 (1979)). Accordingly, this Court imposes
a suspension of nine months without pay and reimbursement of costs to the
Commission in the amount of $5,801.28.10
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that Judge Sims shall be suspended
from office without salary for nine months. Judge Sims is also ordered to pay the
Commission $5,801.28 in hard costs.
SUSPENSION IMPOSED
10 We reduce the Commission’s request for reimbursement of $5,801.28 in hard costs proportional to the three of the six counts we determine were proven. 17 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
IN RE SHEVA SIMS
WEIMER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I agree with the analysis and majority opinion that Judge Sims’ violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct warrant discipline.1 However, I dissent from the
discipline imposed as too lenient. I would adopt a one-year period of discipline as
recommended by the Judiciary Commission.
This case involves numerous incidents of misconduct by an experienced judge.
Most troubling is that, as in her prior discipline case, Judge Sims again demonstrated
1 I part company with my learned colleagues’ failure to find Judge Sims abused her judicial position in the use of the court-owned vehicle for her personal use and in having the vehicle fueled and refueled by the Marshall’s Office. See In re Lee, 06-0454, p. 20 (La. 7/6/06), 933 So.2d 736, 748 (“no amount of judicial experience whatsoever is needed to know” a judge’s obligations with regard to public versus personal funds); Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B) (“judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interest of the judge”); see also In re Alford, 07-1893, p. 14 (La. 2/15/08), 977 So.2d 811, 820 (“using court employees paid with public funds for personal tasks is a failure to maintain standards of conduct that preserve the integrity of the judiciary”). As observed by the Commission, Judge Sims appeared disingenuous in asserting she had no choice but to risk her safety or use a publicly funded asset because she could not afford a rental car due to the exorbitantly expensive repairs to her luxury vehicle, whereas most average citizens, including other state and court employees, must arrange for their own transportation in commuting to work. When asked by the Commission whether she agreed it was reasonable to conclude that she “intentionally or unintentionally employed the prestige associated with [her] position as a judge to get the benefit of [the] vehicle,” Judge Sims responded, “I understand that some may perceive that and some may not perceive it that way. I understand that is a possibility.”
As the Judiciary Commission noted:
Most average taxpaying citizens, including other state and court employees and those who earn much less than a judge, must arrange and pay for their own transportation to and from work in all variety of challenging situations. When asked whether, from the perspective of the average citizen, it is fair or reasonable to use the court vehicle for her commute for serveral weeks, Judge Sims stated she is “concerned about the citizens and their perspective on the judges for us to be fair and utilize anything for the court for court purposes ...[a]nd that is not something at this juncture that I would do again.” ....
While the fact that the court lacked a clear policy regarding the use of the vehicle mitigates the sanction, the behavior cannot be excused. a lack of credibility before the Commission, evidencing an unwillingness or inability
to recognize her misconduct in any meaningful manner. While every judge accused
of misconduct is entitled to provide a vigorous defense, that defense must be truthful,
logical, rational, and consistent. As aptly noted by a dissenting member of the
Commission:
[T]hroughout the extant disciplinary proceedings, Judge Sims has at best been evasive in her vain, obtuse attempts to either justify her misconduct, or present mitigating circumstances. Indeed, she has often been outright untruthful. [ ] This action alone demonstrates a contrived reluctance and/or outright inability to accept any responsibility for her authoritarian misconduct, neither of which does her credit.
This matter does not address a single act, an isolated instance of a lapse in judgment, or a good faith misapplication of law by one with little experience or legal training. Judge Sims has been on the bench since December of 2011, and prior to that time she was a practicing attorney for seventeen years. Simply put–she knew better but did not care.
Discipline must address the significance of Respondent’s transgressions and
lack of forthrightness toward the Commission during its investigation. In re
Foxworth-Roberts, 25-01127, p. 18 (La. 12/11/25), 424 So.3d 650, 662, reh’g
denied, 25-01127 (La. 1/29/26), 425 So.3d 120. The Judiciary Commission serves
as the eyes and ears of this court in disciplinary cases, listening to witnesses’
testimony and watching those who testify–including the Respondent Judge. Because
the Judiciary Commission members listen to and watch the live testimony, they are
better able to assess nuances and credibility that are not reflected in a written
transcript. I would adopt the Commission’s recommendation to impose a one-year
suspension without pay; therefore, I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed
by the majority.
2 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
MCCALLUM, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
I join with Chief Justice Weimer and Justice Penzato and would adopt their
reasons as my own, except I would have imposed a harsher sanction than even they
suggest. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
PENZATO, Justice Pro Tempore, dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Count (3), relative to misuse of
the court-owned vehicle, was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. It is
undisputed that Judge Sims used a court-owned vehicle for several weeks to
commute to and from work, and had the Marshal’s Office use Fuelman cards
assigned to it to fill the car with gas. I find this was an impermissible personal use
of public assets and abuse of her judicial position. For this and the other misconduct,
which I agree with the majority was proven, I would accept the recommendation of
the Judiciary Commission and suspend Judge Sims without salary for a period of
one year. I would order Judge Sims to reimburse the Commission $7,735.04, based
on the allegations I find were proven by clear and convincing evidence.