In re J.U.

2026 Ohio 34

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 114400
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.U., 2026-Ohio-34.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE J.U. :

A Minor Child : No. 114400 [Appeal by L.U., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 8, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. FA-19108828

Appearances:

L.U., pro se.

Eric M. Levy, for appellees L.H. and J.H.

Cordell | Cordell and Heather L. Early, for appellee J.R.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

{¶ 1} This appeal arises from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which overruled in part and sustained in part

Mother’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision with modifications, awarding limited companionship rights to L.H. and J.H., the paternal grandparents

(“the grandparents”) of the minor child, J.U. (“child”). Appellant L.U. (“Mother”)

challenges the trial court’s September 11, 2024 journal entry. For the reasons that

follow, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} The child is the biological son of Mother and J.R. (“Father”). After

Mother discovered that Father had unconsented, sexually private photos of her

children from a prior relationship, the parents separated. Father was subsequently

convicted of these offenses and sentenced to a one-year prison term on May 25,

2022. On August 5, 2022, while incarcerated, Father voluntarily dismissed his

pending application to establish parental rights and responsibilities for the child.

{¶ 3} On September 7, 2022, the grandparents filed a complaint under R.C.

3109.12 seeking companionship time with the child. The juvenile court held a two-

day hearing beginning April 23, 2024. The grandparents presented evidence of a

prior close relationship with the child that had ceased following Father’s criminal

charges. Mother, representing herself, opposed the motion.

{¶ 4} The magistrate issued a decision on May 7, 2024, awarding the

grandparents biweekly 30-minute virtual or phone contact with the child. Mother

filed timely objections under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b), along with a motion to stay the

visitation order. She subsequently requested leave to supplement her objections

with the trial transcript. On September 11, 2024, the trial court overruled most objections, sustained some in part, and adopted the magistrate’s decision with

minor modifications. Mother filed her notice of appeal on September 24, 2024.

{¶ 5} During the proceedings, Mother filed several additional motions,

including a request to modify companionship time, a motion to dismiss Father’s

later application for custody, a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights, and an

application for sole legal custody. Mother also notified the trial court of a pending

adoption petition in Lorain County Probate Court (Case No. AD2400066). On

November 27, 2024, the trial court denied all pending motions.

{¶ 6} On June 2, 2025, Mother moved to stay enforcement of all juvenile

court orders, including visitation, pending resolution of the adoption case. The trial

court granted the stay on July 2, 2025, concluding that continued visitation was not

in the child’s best interest during the adoption proceedings. Mother appeals raising

three assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court erred when it did not provide Mother with a final appealable order.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court erred when it approved the magistrate’s decision without conducting an independent review as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(4).

Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court abused its discretion when it inappropriately analyzed companionship time pursuant to the factors set forth in division (D) of the Revised Code 3109.051, giving undue weight to the paternal grandparent’s desires over Mother’s concerns and failing to adequately assess potential harm to the minor child from the companionship time granted.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

{¶ 7} Appellate courts in Ohio have jurisdiction to review only final

appealable orders. See Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2); R.C. 2501.02. Whether a

judgment constitutes a final appealable order is a question of law, reviewed de novo.

Rae-Ann Suburban, Inc. v. Wolfe, 2019-Ohio-1451, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); Chef Italiano

Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88 (1989).

{¶ 8} When a party files objections to a magistrate’s decision, the trial court

must conduct a de novo review of the underlying factual and legal issues. In re A.C.,

2019-Ohio-5127, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). The court may not simply defer to the magistrate’s

findings but must conduct its own independent evaluation of the evidence and

applicable law before entering judgment because a magistrate serves as an arm of

the court, not as an independent adjudicator.

{¶ 9} Once the trial court satisfies its obligations under Juv.R. 40(D), its

judgment is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion and will not be reversed

absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). This standard also governs

appellate review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a nonparent’s motion for

companionship rights. E.g., In re Flynn, 2021-Ohio-4456, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.); In re

A.B., 2016-Ohio-2891, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.). IV. ANALYSIS

A. Final Appealable Order

{¶ 10} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court’s September 11, 2024 journal entry, which overruled in part and sustained in

part her objections to the magistrate’s decision, merely adopted the magistrate’s

decision without entering an independent judgment. She argues this court lacks

jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not enter a final appealable order under

R.C. 2505.02.

{¶ 11} Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), a final order includes one that

“affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding.” A “special proceeding” is

defined as “an action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior

to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(2).

{¶ 12} A “substantial right” is one that the United States Constitution, the

Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a

person to enforce or protect. R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). A right is deemed affected only

when immediate appellate review is necessary to preserve it. E.A.K.M. v. M.A.M.,

2025-Ohio-2946, ¶ 13. Parental rights, including the fundamental right to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of one’s child, are substantial

rights protected by law. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990). Since

companionship actions under R.C. 3109.11 and 3109.12 are specially created by

statute and were unknown to common law before 1853, they are considered special

proceedings. See Davis v. Nathaniel, 2022-Ohio-751, ¶ 8. {¶ 13} This case involves a companionship action under R.C. 3109.12, that is

a special proceeding affecting a substantial right. An order that grants, denies, or

limits companionship or visitation necessarily implicates a parent’s constitutionally

protected interest in the care, custody, and control of their child. In re Murray at

¶ 157.

{¶ 14} Visitation and custody are related but distinct legal concepts. State

ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2024-Ohio-135, ¶ 14; In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171

(1991). “Custody resides in the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal

and physical control of a child. Visitation resides in a noncustodial party and

encompasses that party’s right to visit the child.” In re A.M.S., 2019-Ohio-3181,

¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 15} Here, the grandparents sought companionship rights under R.C.

3109.12, and the juvenile court, following a two-day hearing, issued a final judgment

granting them limited biweekly 30-minute virtual or telephonic visitation. The trial

court’s entry fully resolved the grandparents’ request and overruled Mother’s

objections, thereby disposing of the matter. Because the judgment determined the

sole claim before the court and directly affected Mother’s fundamental rights as a

parent, it constitutes a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). See In re

T.S., 2018-Ohio-49, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.).

{¶ 16} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. B. Independent Review

{¶ 17} Mother argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court

failed to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s decision as required by

Juv.R. 40(D)(4). When timely objections are filed, the trial court must

independently review the objected matters and enter its own judgment. The

question is not whether the trial court used particular words, but whether the record

demonstrates that the court exercised independent judgment rather than merely

“rubber-stamping” the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 18} Here, the judgment entry does more than adopt the magistrate’s

decision in conclusory fashion. The entry identifies the magistrate’s decision and

Mother’s objections, states that the court conducted an independent review, and

then overrules the objections in part and sustains them in part while adopting the

magistrate’s decision with modifications. Her objections primarily focused on the

court’s weighing of her concerns as a fit parent and the potential risks visits posed

to the child. Among other concerns, Mother argued that the court did not give the

“special weight” required by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) to her wishes

as a fit parent regarding the child’s care and control. She also challenged the court’s

consideration of Father’s convictions for sexual offenses against the child’s siblings,

who lived in the same household, and the potential harm she believed the

grandparents’ continued relationship with father posed to the child. The trial court

conducted an independent review of the magistrate’s decision and adopted it with

several substantive modifications that addressed concerns raised by Mother. {¶ 19} The primary differences between the magistrate’s May 7, 2024

decision and the trial court’s September 11, 2024 modified order included the

following: 1) The magistrate’s decision granted the grandparents one hour of phone

contact twice a week, every other week, but the trial court reduced this to a single

30-minute session every other week via Zoom or telephone. 2) The magistrate’s

decision focused primarily on the best-interest factors, while the trial court’s order

explicitly incorporated the “special weight” requirement from Troxel,

acknowledging Mother’s constitutional right, as a fit parent, to make decisions

regarding her child’s care and control. 3) The magistrate’s decision did not explicitly

prohibit discussion of Father, but the trial court’s order explicitly prohibited the

grandparents from mentioning or discussing Father during virtual visits. 4) The

magistrate’s decision did not address counseling, but the trial court ordered the

child to be enrolled in individual therapy and stated that the grandparents’

companionship sessions should eventually be transitioned into a therapeutic setting

if recommended by a professional.

{¶ 20} The trial court’s substantive modifications to the magistrate’s

decision demonstrate that it independently evaluated and credited Mother’s

objections, including her constitutionally protected wishes as a fit parent under

Troxel, rather than simply deferring to the magistrate’s conclusions. Moreover, by

staying visitation in light of the pending adoption, the trial court demonstrated a

continued effort to balance the child’s best interests with Mother’s fundamental right to control third-party access to her child, consistent with the constitutional

standards articulated in Troxel.

{¶ 21} The later stay of the companionship time order pending the adoption

proceedings further reflects the trial court’s continuing effort to balance the child’s

best interest with Mother’s wishes and concerns. The stay does not supply the

independent-review requirement retroactively. Rather, it is consistent with what

the September 11, 2024 entry already shows: the court was actively weighing

Mother’s objections and tailoring relief accordingly. On this record, the juvenile

court satisfied its duty under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). Mother’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

C. Companionship Rights

{¶ 22} Mother’s third assignment of error challenges the court’s best-

interest determination and the weight afforded to her wishes as a fit parent. The

court was required to determine whether companionship was in the child’s best

interest under R.C. 3109.12 and to consider relevant factors, including those in R.C.

3109.051(D). In doing so, the court was also required to give special weight to

Mother’s wishes and concerns, while recognizing that the child’s best interest

remains the controlling consideration. Under R.C. 3109.12(A), a court may grant

companionship or visitation rights to a nonparent if it finds that such contact is in

the best interest of the child. In making that determination, the court must consider

all relevant factors, including, but not limited to those enumerated in R.C.

3109.051(D). In re C.W., 2020-Ohio-2660, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.). The court is also required to balance the parent’s wishes and the best interest of the child pursuant to

Troxel, which recognizes a fit parent’s fundamental right to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of their child. Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57 (2000).

{¶ 23} The trial court considered testimony from the grandparents, who had

previously maintained a consistent and positive relationship with the child prior to

Father’s conviction. The court also considered Mother’s objections, including her

concerns about Father’s criminal conduct and the grandparents’ continued

association with him.

{¶ 24} In doing so, the court afforded due deference to Mother’s wishes

regarding third-party visitation, consistent with Troxel, but ultimately concluded

that limited, structured virtual companionship was in the child’s best interest. The

court, therefore, adopted the magistrate’s decision with modifications.

{¶ 25} Because the record supports the trial court’s best-interest

determination and reflects appropriate deference to mother’s constitutional rights,

the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the limited virtual companionship

time.

{¶ 26} We note that subsequent proceedings resulted in a stay of

companionship pending adoption. That later order confirms the court’s continuing

attention to the child’s best interest and Mother’s wishes; however, our disposition

of this assignment of error rests on the propriety of the September 11, 2024

judgment entry and the record supporting it. {¶ 27} On this record and given the discretionary nature of best-interest

determinations, the juvenile court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or

unconscionably in ordering limited companionship. Mother’s third assignment of

{¶ 28} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellant pay the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR