An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-696
Filed 15 April 2026
Cabarrus County, No. 24JA000030-120
IN THE MATTER OF: J.R.T.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 8 April 2025 by Judge S.E. Street in
Cabarrus County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2026.
Hooks Law, P.C., by Laura G. Hooks, for Respondent–Appellant Mother.
Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by Kimberly B. Kisner, for Petitioner–Appellee Cabarrus County Department of Social Services.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by N.C. Guardian ad Litem Appellate Counsel Matthew D. Wunsche, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Mother appeals from a permanency-planning order eliminating
reunification as a permanent plan for her minor child, J.R.T. (Jayden),1 and changing
the permanent plan to legal guardianship. For the reasons below, this Court affirms
the trial court’s order.
1 In accordance with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), we refer to the minor child by a pseudonym to protect his identity. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE J.R.T.
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Mother gave birth to Jayden in February of 2024 at the home of her niece in
Cabarrus County, North Carolina. Immediately afterwards, EMS transferred Jayden
to the hospital due to neonatal health complications. That same day, the Cabarrus
County Department of Social Services (CCDSS) received a Child Protective Services
report alleging that Mother had refused medical treatment for the infant at the
hospital despite medical professionals’ concerns about his tremors and shaking.
When CCDSS spoke with Mother, “it became clear that [she] was suffering from a
delusional episode.” Mother was involuntarily committed for her mental health
without having set a plan of care for Jayden. CCDSS immediately filed a juvenile
petition for Jayden alleging neglect and dependency, and the trial court granted
CCDSS nonsecure custody.
The trial court held a pre-adjudication hearing the following week, at which
Mother was not present but was represented by provisional counsel. Following the
hearing, the trial court placed Jayden in the care and custody of Mother’s niece and
ordered him to have CCDSS-supervised visitation with Mother. The trial court set
the next pre-adjudication hearing for 21 March 2024 and appointed Jayden a
guardian ad litem (GAL). Following that next hearing, the trial court ordered legal
custody of Jayden to remain with CCDSS in his current placement with Mother’s
niece and allowed Mother one hour of supervised weekly visitation.
Following adjudication and disposition hearings on 13 June 2024, the trial
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court adjudicated Jayden neglected and dependent and concluded that returning him
to Mother’s care and custody would be contrary to his best interests. The trial court
adopted the recommended CCDSS case plan, requiring Mother to complete
psychological evaluations, report any prescribed medication to CCDSS, attend
approved parenting courses, obtain suitable housing and sufficient income to care for
Jayden, follow a visitation plan, and update the assigned CCDSS social worker
biweekly on her case-plan progress. The trial court also ordered a primary plan of
reunification with a secondary plan of legal guardianship.
Upon reviewing the matter at a permanency-planning hearing on 8 August
2024, the trial court concluded that Mother had not made adequate progress on the
case plan. The trial court found that she had failed to schedule psychological
evaluations, completed only two out of twelve required parenting classes, had not
obtained housing or employment, and did not contact CCDSS biweekly as required.
As a result, the trial court ordered Jayden to remain in the care of Mother’s niece
under CCDSS custody and maintained the primary plan of reunification and
secondary plan of guardianship.
On 13 March 2025, the trial court held a permanency-planning hearing, at
which Mother’s assigned CCDSS social worker testified to Mother’s continued
insufficient progress on the case plan. She claimed that Mother informed CCDSS that
she had moved to New York City in the autumn of 2024, which caused her to miss
scheduled appointments for psychological assessments and parenting evaluations.
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The social worker explained that, because Mother took a five-month “break” from
therapy due to her move, her mental-health service provider had recommended that
Mother “re-engage” and “complete additional services,” which she had not done.
Although Mother had “sent over pay stubs from her job,” the social worker had been
unable to “review them fully” due to Mother’s providing them “[r]ight before court.”
The social worker further testified that Mother “wouldn’t give [the social worker] the
information of where she [wa]s living,” though Mother “did state . . . [it wa]s not
suitable for children.” Mother testified to living in a New York City shelter, working
as a substitute teacher on an “as-needed” basis, and relying on others for
transportation.
Mother’s niece testified that she had cared for Jayden for over a year, fulfilling
his medical, dental, and transportation needs. She also testified to the two other
children in her care and her consistent employment with a consulting agency for over
three years. She called Jayden “a joy to have” in her home and testified to completing
a financial affidavit that “fairly and accurately represent[ed her] . . . income and
expenses”; she further testified to “underst[anding] the legal significance of being the
guardian for [Jayden].” The trial court also considered the report of Jayden’s GAL,
which documented Jayden’s “loving bond” with Mother’s niece and recommended that
the trial court grant her legal guardianship of him.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order making detailed
findings regarding Mother’s very limited progress on her case plan and the suitability
4 IN RE J.R.T.
of her niece to serve as guardian for Jayden. Specifically, the trial court found that
Mother completed only nine of the ten required mental-health therapy sessions and
failed to “follow[ ] through” with resuming sessions after the service provider
recommended additional sessions. The trial court further found that Mother’s current
housing was “not suitable for any of her children,” that she “refuses to inform CCDSS
on where she is currently staying,” and that she “has not provided CCDSS with the
name of [her] employer or a paystub to confirm employment when requested.” Finally,
the trial court found that Mother had pending termination actions for her other
“children in the custody of [New York] state” and incorporated into its order the report
of Jayden’s GAL, which references these out-of-state termination actions. As a result,
the trial court ceased reunification efforts and granted guardianship of Jayden to
Mother’s niece. Mother timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s order
because it “eliminat[es] reunification . . . as a permanent plan” for the juvenile.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(4) (2025).
III. Analysis
On appeal, Mother claims that the trial court erred by failing to support its
elimination of reunification as a permanent plan for Jayden with sufficient findings
and by appointing her niece as his legal guardian without proper verification. We
review a permanency-planning order solely to determine “whether there is competent
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evidence in the record to support the findings and whether the findings support the
conclusions of law.” In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 41 (2010). We consider the trial
court’s findings of fact “conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent
evidence, even if the evidence could sustain contrary findings.” In re Norris, 65 N.C.
App. 269, 275 (1983). Uncontested findings are binding on appeal. See In re A.P.W.,
378 N.C. 405, 410 (2021). For the reasons below, we hold that the trial court made
sufficient findings to support cessation of reunification efforts with Mother and to
appoint Mother’s niece as Jayden’s legal guardian.
A. Cessation of Reunification Efforts
First, Mother argues that the trial court erred both by reaching Findings of
Fact (FoFs) 10, 12, 22–24, and 26–30 and by failing to document certain other findings
required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2. As discussed below, we disagree on both counts.
1. Challenged Findings
Mother argues that the trial court erred by ceasing reunification efforts
without sufficient findings of her progress on the CCDSS case plan and challenges
the trial court’s FoFs 10, 12, and 23 as unsupported by the evidence. We disagree.
a. Insufficient Progress
Mother challenges the portion of FoF 10 that her case-plan progress
“insufficient[ly] . . . assured” the trial court “that the juvenile could safely return to
her care” and its three identified instances of insufficient progress regarding mental
health services, housing, and employment. Mother’s case plan had required her to
6 IN RE J.R.T.
“obtain and maintain suitable housing for the placement of [Jayden] for at least 6
months” and “provide CCDSS with a copy of her lease.” The case plan also required
Mother to “contact the assigned social worker every other week” regarding her case
plan progress and to “complete a psychological . . . [and] psychiatric evaluation with
a CCDSS[-]approved provider to determine her need for medication.” As to mental
health services, Mother argues that she completed “all 10 of the recommended
individual [therapy] sessions” instead of “9 out of the 10 individual therapy sessions”
as the trial court found. As to housing, Mother argues that her testimony of “staying
at a shelter in NYC” for lodging does not support the trial court’s finding of her
“refus[al] to inform CCDSS on where she is currently staying.” In contrast to the trial
court’s finding to the contrary, Mother also contends that she “provid[ed] paystubs”
to CCDSS to confirm her employment.
At the permanency-planning hearing, the CCDSS social worker testified to
Mother’s completion of all ten of the required mental-health therapy sessions.
However, the social worker also testified that Mother needed to “re-engage” in her
therapy,” “ha[d] not done her psychological” evaluation, and that Mother’s “mental
health [wa]s still in question” due to her failure to re-engage in therapy. In the
unchallenged portion of FoF 10, the trial court found that Mother “ha[d] not followed
through” with reengagement in therapy after CCDSS “referred [her] to . . . additional
assistance with finding services to address her mental health.” The unchallenged
findings also indicate Mother’s lack of progress with medication management and
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failure to sign releases of mental-health information to keep CCDSS informed of her
progress. Thus, competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Mother’s
insufficient progress regarding mental health.
As to employment, the trial court found that Mother reported employment at
a New York school but failed to provide CCDSS with her employer’s name or a
paystub to confirm her employment “when requested.” The social worker testified
that Mother had “sent over pay stubs from her job” “[r]ight before court” despite a
CCDSS request for the pay stubs some weeks prior. Due to the imminent hearing,
the social worker “ha[d] not been able to review them fully.” This testimony supports
the trial court’s finding that Mother had not provided the required employment
confirmation “when requested.” As to housing, Mother had failed to “immediately”
inform her social worker of changes in address as required by her case plan. The social
worker testified that Mother had changed her housing and would not provide further
information beyond admitting its unsuitability for children.
Overall, competent evidence supports the challenged portions of FoF
10:Mother’s failure to re-engage in mental health services; find permanent, stable
housing; and timely update CCDSS regarding her employment and her medication
management. Except for the portion of FoF 10 that Mother had only attended nine of
the ten required therapy sessions, the trial court properly found that Mother failed
to make sufficient progress in nine of the ten areas addressed by her case plan.
Mother also challenges FoF 23, in which the trial court found her progress
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“insufficient” for Jayden to “safely return” to her care. Mother argues that competent
evidence does not support FoF 23 due to her “complet[ion of] her mental health
services”; her consistent visitation with Jayden when she was in North Carolina; and
her lack of completed psychological evaluations being due to the provider’s delay in
responding to her. Mother also argues there was no testimonial or documentary
evidence regarding a pending termination of parental rights action in New York. But
the trial court’s unchallenged findings support FoF 23. The evidence notes Mother’s
“incomplete assessments and evaluations” and failure to complete mental-health
services, and it documents her inconsistent contact with Jayden and the parental
termination actions pending against her in New York regarding her other “children
in the custody of [New York] state.” Thus, competent evidence supports the trial
court’s finding of Mother’s insufficient progress in FoF 23.
b. Conclusions of Law
Mother also challenges FoFs 22, 24, and 26–30, arguing that they are
conclusions of law which this Court must review de novo. These findings relate to the
trial court’s determination that guardianship with Mother’s niece would further
Jayden’s best interests, that reunification with Mother would be inappropriate and
contrary to his best interests, and that Mother “abdicated her parental role and
responsibilities” by leaving Jayden in CCDSS custody. Mother makes no specific
argument regarding these findings beyond characterizing them as conclusions of law
that warrant de novo review. Thus, we need not address them further. See N.C. R.
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App. P. 28(b)(6). To the extent that these findings are conclusions of law, the trial
court’s findings of fact fully support them.
2. Statutory Findings
Next, Mother contends that the trial court failed to make required findings
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2 regarding the four “designated considerations” for
cessation of parental reunification efforts. To eliminate reunification as a juvenile’s
primary or secondary permanent plan, a trial court must “make[ ] written findings
that reunification efforts clearly would be unsuccessful or . . . inconsistent with the
juvenile’s health or safety . . . at any permanency planning hearing.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-906.2(b). More specifically, the trial court must document its consideration of
the following factors: whether the parent is (1) “making adequate progress within a
reasonable period of time under the [case] plan”; (2) “actively participating in or
cooperating with the [case] plan,” DSS, and the juvenile’s GAL; (3) making herself
“available to the court,” DSS, and the juvenile’s GAL; and (4) “acting in a manner
inconsistent with the [juvenile’s] health or safety.” Id. § 7B-906.2(d). “While the
findings need not track the statutory language, they must make clear that the trial
court considered the evidence in light of whether reunification would be . . .
inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home
within a reasonable period of time.” A.P.W., 378 N.C. at 415 (quotation omitted).
Here, the trial court made findings relating to each of the factors in N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-906.2(d). These findings address the required statutory findings and expressly
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“consider[ ] the evidence in light of whether reunification would be . . . inconsistent”
with Jayden’s safety, welfare, and need for permanence. Id.; see N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-906.2(d). Thus, we reject Mother’s argument to the contrary and hold that the
trial court’s findings met the statutory requirement for cessation of reunification.
B. Guardianship Appointment
Finally, Mother claims that the trial court erred by appointing her niece as
Jayden’s legal guardian without first properly verifying her “understand[ing of] the
legal significance” of the guardianship appointment or her “adequate resources to
care appropriately” for Jayden. N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(j). Upon appointing a juvenile
guardian, the trial court must “verify” that the appointed guardian “understands the
legal significance of the appointment and will have adequate resources to care
appropriately for the juvenile.” Id. § 7B-600(c). The verification process does not
“require that the court make any specific findings” but allows it to consider factors
such as a potential guardian’s past childrearing experience, income and financial
situation, physical health, and DSS documentation regarding these factors. In re J.E.,
182 N.C. App. 612, 616–17 (2007). In addition, “[t]he fact that the prospective
guardian has provided a stable placement for the juvenile for at least six consecutive
months is evidence that the person has adequate resources.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(c).
Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly verified that Mother’s niece
understood the legal significance of guardianship and had appropriate resources to
care for Jayden.
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The trial court’s unchallenged FoF 25 found that Mother’s niece “underst[ood]
the legal significance of the placement of [Jayden] in her home and that she has
adequate resources to care for the child appropriately”; it also documents the trial
court’s review of her financial affidavit. The trial court also made unchallenged
findings that Jayden had been in her care since birth, that Jayden’s placement with
her was stable and in his best interests, and that Jayden was “attached” to her as
his caregiver and “thriving” in her care. Because Mother does not specifically
challenge these findings as unsupported by the evidence, they are binding on appeal.
Further, even without the trial court’s review of the financial affidavit of Mother’s
niece, her care for Jayden for over six months would be sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding as to her resources. See id. § 7B-600(c).
Mother argues that the trial court did not adequately verify her niece’s
understanding of her legal responsibility as a guardian. In support, she cites to In re
J.M., 271 N.C. App. 186 (2020), in which this Court inquired of a proposed guardian
regarding her understanding of her right to represent the child in legal matters,
enroll in school, and consent to medical care, among other aspects. But the trial court
need not ask these exact questions; they merely constitute examples of possible
questioning of a potential guardian. Indeed, this Court has held that sufficient
evidence showed a guardian’s understanding of the legal significance of her
appointment even when a trial court did not “expressly ask[ ] about her
understanding of her legal obligations.” In re K.B., 290 N.C. App. 61, 64 (2023), aff’d,
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386 N.C. 68 (2024). In so holding, this Court noted the evidence that the children had
been living with the guardian for three years and the guardian’s care for them showed
that she understood her obligations. Id.
Here, Mother’s niece testified to her consistent care for Jayden since birth, to
completing a financial affidavit related to his care, and to “understand[ing] the legal
significance of being the guardian for [Jayden].” The trial court’s order shows
appropriate consideration of her previous childrearing experience for her own two
children, her stable employment and financial history, and her ongoing care of Jayden
during the pendency of this matter. The trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that
it properly verified her understanding of guardianship.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, this Court affirms the trial court’s order
eliminating reunification as a permanent plan for Jayden and appointing Mother’s
niece as his legal guardian.
AFFIRMED.
Panel consisting of Judges STROUD, GRIFFIN, and MURRY.
Judge STROUD concurs in result only by separate opinion.
Report per Rule 30(e).
13 No. COA25-696 – In re: J.R.T.
STROUD, Judge, concurring in result only.
I concur only in the result.2 I write separately to note my belief that no court
or party should rely on this unpublished opinion under Rule 30(e)(3) of the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. See N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3) (“If a party
believes . . . that an unpublished opinion has precedential value to a material issue
in the case and that there is no published opinion that would serve as well, the party
may cite the unpublished opinion . . . .”). In the interest of protecting this Court’s
jurisprudence and preventing potential confusion among trial judges and litigants, I
write briefly to explain why.
The per curiam majority opinion is unpublished and thus nonprecedential.
“Unpublished” is a term of art. Under our appellate rules, it means that a decision is
not “controlling legal authority.” Id. Citing unpublished opinions is generally
“disfavored”3 unless “a party believes . . . that an unpublished opinion has
2 A judge who “concurs in result only” agrees with the case’s outcome but “disagree[s] with the
majority’s reasoning.” Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 182 (2016). A judge may also concur in result where she has broader concerns about how the opinion presents the case. See, e.g., Inscoe v. Ishee, 298 N.C. App. 358, 381, 915 S.E.2d 448, 463 (2025) (Hampson, J., concurring); Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Triple S Mktg. Grp., 213 N.C. App. 425, 714 S.E.2d 274 (2011) (Ervin, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part). That’s my position here. I decline to detail my specific concerns. Concurring opinions have been called “legal clutter” that may create confusion and encourage litigation, Meg Penrose, Legal Clutter: How Concurring Opinions Create Unnecessary Confusion and Encourage Litigation, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. F. 65 (2023), and I do not wish to add to that problem. For that reason, I limit this concurrence to a single point: why I discourage reliance on this unpublished opinion.
3 Our Rules of Appellate Procedure explicitly allow a party to cite an unpublished opinion to establish “claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or the law of the case.” N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3). IN RE: J.R.T.
Stroud, J., concurring in result only
precedential value to a material issue in the case and that there is no published
opinion that would serve as well.” Id. Even then, the party must “indicate the
opinion’s unpublished status”—usually by placing an (unpublished) parenthetical at
the end of a citation—and serve a copy “on all other parties” and “on the court.” Id.
Most of this Court’s opinions are unpublished. Based on our court’s internal
statistics, only about one-third of our cases have been published over the last ten
years. Given that volume, it is not surprising that litigants, attorneys, and trial
courts regularly rely on unpublished opinions. And the bar for doing so is low—a
party need only “believe[ ]” that the opinion has “precedential value to a material
issue in the case” and that no published case “serves as well.” Id. Against that
background, however, I strongly discourage such reliance here.
There are several reasons for this admonition. For one thing, cases go
unpublished for reasons beyond those stated in Rule 30(e)(1). The rule allows a panel
to “direct that no opinion be published” if it determines the case “involves no new
legal principles” and “would have no value as a precedent.” Id. at 30(e)(1). But the
reality is more nuanced. Judges often consider a range of other factors when deciding
whether to publish a decision. See Hon. Donna S. Stroud, The Bottom of the Iceberg:
Unpublished Opinions, 37 Campbell L. Rev. 333, 352-54, 356 (2015) (outlining some
thirteen factors a judge may consider in deciding whether to publish a decision). An
unpublished opinion may therefore be unworthy of future citation for reasons
unrelated to Rule 30(e)(1)’s criteria. And if such an opinion contains legal error,
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misrepresents the facts, or omits material context, there is no guarantee that anyone
relying on it will recognize those problems.
That said, unpublished opinions are often helpful to both trial courts and this
Court. See, e.g., Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 233-34, 763 S.E.2d 755, 764
(2014) (noting that unpublished cases “may be used as persuasive authority at the
appellate level if the case is properly submitted and discussed and there is no
published case on point”). But when an unpublished opinion is flawed in some way,
the ease of citation under Rule 30(e)(3) can produce unintended results. See N.C. R.
App. P. 30(e)(3). When the law does not support a party’s position, no published case
will “serve” that party’s purposes—the precedential cases, by definition, cut the other
way. Id. An unpublished opinion that gets the law wrong or distorts the record, by
contrast, may be the only authority that supports the argument. And because no
published case “serve[s] as well,” Rule 30(e)(3) permits the citation. Id. It is possible
that a flawed unpublished opinion is more likely to be cited to support a position the
precedential cases do not support. The dynamic is self-reinforcing: The law does not
support the position, which means no published case will “serve as well,” which in
turn permits that party to cite the unpublished opinion—even though it supports the
party’s position only because it gets the law wrong. Id.
This Court has cautioned against undue reliance on unpublished authority. In
State ex rel. Moore County Board of Education v. Pelletier, we found that the
“propositions” the party sought to support did not “justif[y] citation to the
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[unpublished] opinion” and “reiterate[d] that citation to unpublished opinions is
intended solely in those instances where the persuasive value of a case is manifestly
superior to any published opinion.” 168 N.C. App. 218, 222, 606 S.E.2d 907, 909
(2005). A judge asked to rely on an unpublished opinion thus bears an additional
burden. She must first determine whether a published case truly does not “serve as
well,” N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3), because precedential authority controls if it exists.
Pelletier, 168 N.C. App. at 222, 606 S.E.2d at 909. And if no published case does, she
must evaluate whether the unpublished opinion itself contains legal error or presents
the case inaccurately. Id. Appellate judges have the staff, resources, and ready
access to briefs and records to conduct that research. Trial judges—the ones most
often asked to rely on unpublished opinions—typically do not.
Of most concern, undue reliance on flawed unpublished opinions can, over
time, erode horizontal stare decisis. Under that doctrine, “[w]here a panel of the
Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent
panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by
a higher court.” In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989). But
when courts rely on an unpublished opinion that gets the law wrong, presents the
case inaccurately, or tells only part of the story, and later courts cite those decisions
in turn, the error compounds—gradually displacing the precedent that should
control.
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One Justice on our Supreme Court recently discussed both horizontal stare
decisis and adherence to Supreme Court precedent in terms that underscore my
concerns:
In a perfect world, [horizontal stare decisis] would provide consistency and stability in the law.
But we have seen a pattern of decisions from the Court of Appeals that conflict not only with prior Court of Appeals opinions but with clear precedent from this Court. The per curiam opinion . . . reminds the Court of Appeals that it is bound to follow our decisions. Such a declaration is so obvious that it need not be made.
But inattentiveness or recalcitrance by the Court of Appeals can have the practical effect of overruling this Court’s precedent, and the Constitution does not give the Court of Appeals this authority.
In re N.M.W., No. 159PA25, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2026) (Berger, J.,
concurring). I concur in the result only and discourage any future citation to this
opinion under Rule 30(e)(3).
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