2024 IL App (1st) 231947-U Order filed April 11, 2024
FIRST DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION
No. 1-23-1947
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re J.R., a Minor, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Appellee, ) Cook County. ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) No. 18 JA 1099 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 18 JA 1100 ) 18 JA 1101 v. ) ) Jasmine M., ) Honorable ) Kimberly D. Lewis, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hoffman and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment finding the respondent mother unfit and terminating her parental rights.
¶2 Jasmine M. (the mother) appeals the orders of the circuit court that found her unfit to parent
her daughters Jaz. R., born August 2, 2011, and Jat. R., born November 24, 2009, and son B.P.,
born August 23, 2013 (together, children) and terminating her parental rights. The death of the
mother’s younger son A.R., born on January 31, 2017, gave rise to these proceedings. We affirm. No. 1-23-1947
¶3 The fathers are not parties to this appeal. We will restrict our recitation of the factual
background to the mother.
¶4 On November 16, 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging that
the children were neglected and abused based on an environment injurious to their welfare and
creating a substantial risk of physical injury under sections 2-3(1)(b) and 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2018)). In
support, the State alleged that the mother had one prior indicated report for inadequate supervision
and:
“On November 2, 2018 [A.R.] was found unresponsive in the family’s home that
had no heat. [A.R.] was transported to the hospital and pronounced dead upon arrival.
Mother states she is primary caregiver for [A.R.]. Per the medical examiner, [A.R.’s] cause
of death was multiple injuries due to child abuse and the manner was homicide. [A.R.] had
acute and chronic rib fractures. “
¶5 The State attached an affidavit of Halema Townsend, an investigator for the Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that supported these factual allegations and added that
there were “multiple unexplained injuries” to A.R., including the rib fractures and “increased liver
enzymes indicative to blunt force trauma to the abdomen.”
¶6 The circuit court on that day granted the State’s motions for temporary custody of the
children and appointed the Cook County Public Guardian as their guardian ad litem (GAL). On
the motion of the GAL, the court entered an order directing that the mother’s visitations with the
children be supervised, noting that the family is in need of services and there was an ongoing police
investigation as to A.R.’s death.
-2- No. 1-23-1947
¶7 On September 16, 2019, the court entered a permanency order finding that DCFS had made
reasonable efforts in providing services and set the matter for an adjudication hearing on November
19, 2019.
¶8 In separate orders on that date, the court granted the State’s motion to amend the petitions.
The State amended each of the petitions to add allegations as to the injurious environment claims
that there was “a history of domestic violence between the mother and paramour.” Additionally,
the State added an allegation to the petition of Jaz. R. as to the injurious environment claim that
she “ was observed to have marks upon her body.” The petition of Jet.R. was amended to add a
claim of physical abuse under section 2-3(2)(i) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-
3(2)(i)(West 2018)) with allegations that she was “observed with burns, loop marks and patterned
scars” that medical professionals believed were consistent with physical abuse. The petition for
B.P. was amended to add a claim for physical abuse with allegations that he “was observed with
multiple scars upon his body” that medical personnel believed were “suspicious for child abuse.”
¶9 Prior to the adjudication hearing on November 19, 2019, the court entered orders allowing
the State to further amend all three petitions as to the children to reflect allegations of neglect for
a lack of care under section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3-1(a)(West
2018)) because the children’s teeth were decayed. The State also added allegations of excessive
corporal punishment as to the injurious environment claims, and withdrew the claims of physical
abuse without prejudice.
¶ 10 The evidence at the adjudication hearing included the parties’ stipulation of facts.
According to the stipulation, the mother was custodial and the fathers were non-custodial at all
-3- No. 1-23-1947
times relevant to the petitions. The mother has one other child who is not in her care. In 2013, there
was a prior indicated case against the mother for inadequate supervision.
¶ 11 The petitions involving the children originated with a hotline call on November 2, 2018,
when the mother found A.R. unresponsive. At that time, A.R. was in the care of the mother and
her boyfriend, T.P., who was living with the mother. The medical examiner found that A.R. had
both new and healing rib fractures, his death was caused by multiple injuries due to child abuse
and the manner of his death was homicide. Both the mother and T.P. were indicated for A.R.’s
death; the mother was indicated for risk of injury and an injurious environment as to the children.
T.P. died of a self-inflicted gun-shot wound on November 5.
¶ 12 The mother told Townsend that on November 2, A.R. and B. P. were sleeping in the middle
of the bed and she and T.P. were on either side. Jaz. R. and Jat. R. were with their maternal
grandmother. At 4 a.m., the mother woke and found A.R. nonresponsive.
¶ 13 On November 14, medical personnel at HealthWorks examined the children and found
scars and marks on all of them. The mother told Townsend that she did not know how the children
received those injuries.
¶ 14 Detective Neals, who was assigned to investigate the death of A.R., visited the mother’s
apartment on November 2. The apartment was being heated only by a stove. At the hospital, he
observed that A.R. had bruises on his chest and back and a scratch on his face; there was dried
vomit in his jacket hood.
¶ 15 Detective Redd interviewed the mother as part of his investigation into the death of T.P.
The mother explained that she had been dating T.P. for seven months and he had lived with her
-4- No. 1-23-1947
for three months. On two to three occasions, when the children were not present, T.P. had hit her
with his fists and left bruises.
¶ 16 The mother also spoke to Redd about the circumstances surrounding A.R.’s death. On
November 1, she and T.P. cooked dinner; A.R. threw most of the food on the floor. The mother
gave A.R. a bottle and put him down on a pellet on the living room floor because she knew that
T.P. would be smoking marijuana in the only bedroom. About 7:45 p.m., the mother left the
apartment with a friend “to go steal items from a mall in Indiana.” T.P. volunteered to watch A.R.
and B.P. The mother returned to the apartment about 12:30 a.m. A.R. and B.P. slept on the floor
in the living room and not in the bed as she first reported.
¶ 17 On November 5, T.P. overheard a phone conversation between the mother and her aunt
who told the mother that police were looking for T.P. as to the murder of A.R. The mother then
heard T.P. say “I am sorry” followed by the sound of a gun being fired. The mother found T.P. on
the floor with a gunshot wound to his head.
¶ 18 Detective Gilleran spoke to the mother on April 3, 2019. The mother informed the detective
that T.P. had hit her five times between August and September 2018 because he believed she was
cheating on him and once threatened to kill her with a gun. T.P. took pills that caused him to
“hallucinate, sweat and make him have a hard time to stop moving.” When she returned to the
apartment on the night of November 1, she believed T.P. “was high on something.”
¶ 19 The court entered written adjudication orders finding that the children were abused or
neglected based on a lack of care, injurious environment and a substantial risk of physical injury.
The orders included findings that the mother was a victim of domestic violence, “the children had
marks on them due to child maltreatment” and A.R. had died due to child abuse.
-5- No. 1-23-1947
¶ 20 The mother on February 11, 2020, filed a motion requesting that she be granted
unsupervised day visits with the children and noticed the motion for hearing on February 20. She
asserted that she had been participating in weekly supervised visits and services.
¶ 21 On February 20, 2020, the court entered disposition orders adjudging the children wards
of the court. The court found that the mother was unable for some reason other than financial
circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline the children, reasonable efforts had been
made to prevent their removal, appropriate services had been unsuccessful, and that it was in the
children’s best interest to remove them from the custody of the mother. The children were placed
in the guardianship of the DCFS guardianship administrator. The court also entered permanency
orders setting the goal of return home within 12 months because the mother was in need of services
including a psychiatric and parenting assessment.
¶ 22 The court did not decide the mother’s motion for unsupervised visits. However, on August
20, 2020, in a written order, the court referred the case to the Cook County Juvenile Court Clinic
(CCJCC) “for a response consistent with the attached Request for Clinical Information-Child
Protection Division (RCI).” In its January 12, 2021, response (CCJCC report), the CCJCC
explained that the court, in the RCI, had ordered an assessment “to assist the court with deciding
[the mother’s] motion for unsupervised day visits and the permanency goal.”
¶ 23 On May 26, 2021, the court entered permanency orders changing the goal for the children
to substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights (TPR). The orders
noted that the children were in pre-adoptive foster homes and the mother “has not completed
individual therapy and has not taken responsibility for why the case came into the system.” Similar
permanency orders were entered on December 7, 2021.
-6- No. 1-23-1947
¶ 24 On June 23, 2022, the State filed motions for the appointment of a guardian with the right
to consent to adoption for each of the children. The motions alleged that the mother was unfit
under section 1D of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D (West 2022)) and section 2-29 of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2022)) based on a failure to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the children (750 ILCS 50/1D (b) (West 2022))
(ground b), protect the children from conditions in their environment that were injurious to their
welfare (id. 50/1D(g)) (ground g), and make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were
the basis of the children’s removal during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglect
or abuse (id. 50/1D(m)) (ground m). The motion further alleged that it was in the children’s best
interests that a guardian be appointed with the right to consent to their adoption.
¶ 25 The court held a fitness hearing on July 7 and September 21, 2023. The State called the
only witnesses: Daniel Chandler, who previously worked for ChildLink, the monitoring entity, and
served as the supervisor of the family’s case from 2020 until January 2022 and Karisma Tillis,
who was assigned by ChildLink as the family caseworker in December 2021. The court took
judicial notice of the adjudication.
¶ 26 Before testimony was presented, the State moved for the admission of the CCJCC report
as a business record under section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act ( 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a)
(West 2022)). The mother opposed the motion, arguing that the State and the GAL had requested
the CCJCC report when she moved for unsupervised day visits and therefore it was made in
anticipation of litigation and inadmissible as a business record. The court allowed the admission
of the CCJCC report.
-7- No. 1-23-1947
¶ 27 The State informed the court and the parties that it was limiting the ground m claim to two
nine-month periods: August 19, 2020, to May 19, 2021, and May 19, 2021, to February 19, 2022.
¶ 28 Chandler testified that as a matter of practice, Child Link will send minors who have been
placed in temporary custody to HealthWorks for medical examinations and will receive the
HealthWorks records pertaining to those medical examinations in the normal course of business.
That practice was followed here and the children were examined by HealthWorks on November
14, 2018. The children’s Healthwork records were admitted during Chandler’s direct testimony.
According to these records, the examinations revealed that the children’s teeth were in decay and
they were in need of dental intervention and the children all had multiple scars and marks on the
fronts and backs and many levels of their bodies. The medical conclusion for Jaz.R. was probable
for abuse. She was described as very shy and at risk of delay. The conclusions for Jat.R. and B.P.
were that they were victims of child abuse. Jat.R. had loop marks and “scars and old burns [were]
in a distribution consistent with physical abuse.” Healthwork referred Jat.R. to psychological
services after finding that she was very guarded and “at risk for psychological/emotional” issues.
B.P. had not yet attended school and had developmental and behavioral problems. The
examination revealed “obvious signs of physical trauma,” multiple lesions and “scars in a
distribution inconsistent with child play and injuries from fall.”
¶ 29 When Chandler became involved in the case in April 2020, the mother had outstanding
required services; she had not completed a psychiatric assessment, domestic violence services, and
individual therapy. The mother was not allowed unsupervised visits with the children based on an
agency staffing, her inconsistent participation in supervised visitations and services and the
findings in the CCJCC report, including a finding that she did not understand how her actions
-8- No. 1-23-1947
harmed the children. Chandler could not find the mother from August through November 2020;
she did not participate in visitations during this period of time.
¶ 30 Chandler concluded that the goal should change to TPR after reviewing the CCJCC report.
Chandler was concerned that the mother had not acknowledged the reasons for the case or
recognized that her actions caused severe harm to the children.
¶ 31 In the fall of 2021, at an in-person meeting, he reviewed the CCJCC report with the mother.
He notified her that the agency was recommending the change in the goal and as a result, the
agency would no longer provide services. The mother was informed that she still needed to engage
in domestic violence services, to continue individual therapy, and to complete the psychiatric
assessment.
¶ 32 On cross-examination by the GAL, Chandler stated that at his meeting with the mother, he
informed her that she would have to redo some of the services that she had already completed
because, according to the CCJCC report, she had failed to understand or learn from the services.
¶ 33 On cross-examination by the mother, Chandler said he told her that she would need to
pursue community-based services after the goal change. During the time the mother was missing,
she gave birth to a child who was in the care of that child’s father. When Chandler supervised
some of the mother’s visits with the daughters, he found her behavior was safe and appropriate.
¶ 34 Tillis testified that since her assignment as the family caseworker in December 2021 she
has attempted to communicate with the mother by text or phone almost monthly with little success.
In June of 2022, the mother texted Tillis to ask about the status of the case. Tillis told her that the
goal had been changed to TPR “which led to a brief debacle back and forth” and the mother
asserting she would not do any more services. Tillis had no further contact with the mother. The
-9- No. 1-23-1947
mother communicated only with the case aide who transported the children for visits. The mother
has not informed Tillis that she has completed any additional services.
¶ 35 On examination by the GAL, Tillis said that she completed four service plans for the
family. The mother was rated unsatisfactory for visitation in the last service plan in March 2023.
¶ 36 On examination by the mother, Tillis testified that she did not refer the mother to any
services because the goal was TPR. She had not observed any of the mother’s visits with the
daughters. The case notes, which were admitted into evidence, indicated that the mother had visits
with her daughters on June 3, August 5, and September 2, 2022, which were found to be
appropriate. The daughters never voiced any concerns about their visits with the mother. The
agency suspended the mother’s visitations with the daughters in August 2023. Tillis never offered
the mother visits with B.P.
¶ 37 On redirect examination, Tillis explained that when the goal is TPR, DCFS does not have
an obligation to provide services; the parent has the responsibility to pursue community-based
services. In June 2022, the mother refused to do any more services. The mother’s visitations were
found unsatisfactory in the March 2023 service plan because she missed four of the monthly visits
in the time-period covered by the report.
¶ 38 The court orally found that the mother was unfit on grounds b, g and m and explained its
findings. A.R.’s manner of death was homicide and B.P. was present at the time. The children
were found to have multiple scars, lesions and burn and loop marks. The mother failed to protect
the children and did not recognize that they had been abused. Additionally, the mother’s
participation in supervised visitations with the daughters was found unsatisfactory and she was
- 10 - No. 1-23-1947
never offered unsupervised visits. The mother did not communicate with the caseworker and
refused to do community-based services.
¶ 39 The court then proceeded with a best interests hearing, after which the court found that it
was in the children’s best interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights. We need not recite
the testimony at the hearing as the mother makes no arguments on appeal regarding the best
interests finding and therefore has forfeited review thereof. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule
341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 40 The court entered written orders consistent with its oral rulings after the fitness and best
interests hearing. In one order, the court granted the State’s motion for the appointment of a
guardian with the right to consent to adoption of the children. In termination hearing orders, the
court found that the mother was unfit on grounds b (lack of responsibility), g (failure to protect),
and m (lack of progress), terminated her parental rights after finding it was in the best interests of
the children, and appointed a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. In permanency orders,
the court entered a goal of adoption for the children.
¶ 41 On appeal, the mother argues that the findings of unfitness were not supported by the
evidence.
¶ 42 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process to involuntarily terminate a parent’s
rights. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. First, the State must prove that a parent is unfit pursuant
to one of the grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2022); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022). After a court finds a parent unfit, it determines whether it
is in the minor’s best interest to terminate that parent’s rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022).
- 11 - No. 1-23-1947
¶ 43 The State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is
unfit under a ground contained in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476,
494-95 (2002). Any single ground, properly established, is sufficient for a finding of unfitness. Id.
at 495. “Because the circuit court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, a
reviewing court may reverse a circuit court’s finding of unfitness only where it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] A finding is against the manifest weight of the
evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re Deandre D., 405 Ill. App. 3d
945, 952 (2010). A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
regarding credibility of witnesses, the proper weight to be accorded the evidence, or the inferences
to be drawn therefrom. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 499.
¶ 44 First, we consider whether the court’s finding of unfitness on ground m(ii) is sufficiently
supported by the evidence. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides that a parent can be
found unfit when she fails to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child during any
nine-month period after an adjudication of neglect or abuse. In re H.S., 2016 IL App (1st) 161589,
¶ 24 (citing 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)) (West 2014)). Failure to make reasonable progress toward
the return of the child is judged on an objective standard, focusing on the steps the parent has taken
toward reunification. Id. ¶ 27 (citing In re D.F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 112, 125 (2002)). Reasonable
progress is made if the court can conclude that it will be able to order the minor returned to parental
custody in the near future. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006). At a minimum,
the parent must make demonstrable movement toward the goal of returning the child home. In re
Je.A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Failure to comply with an imposed service plan and
- 12 - No. 1-23-1947
infrequent or irregular visitation with the minor may support a finding of unfitness under section
(m). In re Jeanette L., 2017 IL App (1st) 161944, ¶ 18.
¶ 45 The trial court adjudicated the children as abused or neglected on November 19, 2019.
After the fitness hearing, the court in its termination orders found in part that the mother was unfit
under ground m(ii) for failure to make reasonable progress during the two nine-month periods
from: August 19, 2020, to May 19, 2021, and May 19, 2021, to February 19, 2022. If the manifest
weight of the evidence pertaining to these two periods (In re J.L, 236 Ill 2d 329, 341 (2010)),
supports a finding that the mother did not make reasonable progress during that time, we may
affirm the court’s finding as to ground m(ii). D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 495.
¶ 46 The question of whether the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that the mother was
unfit under ground m(ii) must be answered within the context of the reasons for the children being
placed with DCFS and the recommended steps for the mother to achieve reunification with the
children. This matter was precipitated by the death of A. R., while the mother was the custodial
parent and living with T.P. There was a history of domestic violence in the mother’s relationship
with T.P. The medical examiner’s report relating to A.R.’s death included findings of external
signs of trauma (abrasions, contusions and hemorrhages) to his head, neck, thorax and abdomen.
Additionally, A.R. suffered internal injuries (fractures to several ribs, lacerations to the liver and
mesentery, hemorrhages and blood within the peritoneal cavity). The medical examiner concluded
that A.R.’s manner of death was homicide. Upon DCFS taking temporary custody of the children,
they were examined by Healthwork and found to have multiple marks, burns and scars that were
indicative of abuse and their teeth were in decay. The mother underwent an integrated assessment
that recommended certain services.
- 13 - No. 1-23-1947
¶ 47 The State submitted the testimony of Chandler and Tillis and the pertinent service plans as
to the mother’s failure to make reasonable progress toward reunification from August 19, 2020, to
February 19, 2022. On appeal, the mother does not claim error in the admission of this evidence,
including the references to the CCJCC report in the service plans and the testimony.
¶ 48 First as to visitation, Chandler and Tillis testified that during the entirely of these nine-
month periods, although there were no concerns when the mother did visit with the daughters under
supervision, her participation in those visits was inconsistent. From August through November
2020, the mother was pregnant and there were medical issues. Chandler described the mother as
“missing” and not visiting with the daughters at all during this time. During the relevant nine-
month periods, the mother did not achieve unsupervised visits with the daughters due to her
inconsistency in supervised visits and failure to acknowledge the harm that had been inflicted on
the children. She was not offered any visits with B.P. as his therapist recommended against visits
with her.
¶ 49 Additionally, as to services, Chandler testified that when he was assigned to the family in
April 2020, the mother still needed to do a psychiatric evaluation, domestic violence services and
individual therapy as recommended by her integrated assessment (IA). These services were still
outstanding in the fall of 2021 when Chandler informed the mother of the results of the CCJCC
report and the recommended goal change. He also told her she would need to redo some of the
services that she had completed. The reengagement in services was required because the mother
did not yet have an understanding of the significance of the events that brought the family to DCFS
and how her actions affected the well-being of the children. She also had not yet developed factors
that were necessary for her to protect the children. When Tillis was assigned to the case in
- 14 - No. 1-23-1947
December 2021, the mother did not communicate with her during the time-period at issue. The
court, in permanency orders entered during these nine-month periods (May 26 and December 7,
2021), found the mother had not completed individual therapy and had not taken responsibility for
the removal of the children from her care.
¶ 50 The admitted service plans were supportive of the testimony. In the November 2020 service
plan, the mother’s overall progress was rated unsatisfactory. The mother was participating in
individual therapy and the CCJCC evaluation. The mother had not scheduled a psychiatric
evaluation. She was found unsatisfactory for domestic violence and parenting services and was
inconsistent with supervised visitations.
¶ 51 The service plan of May 2021 stated that the mother has not discussed the reasons for the
“case opening.” According to the plan, the mother has had “limited progress.” The mother was
participating in individual therapy and mental health and domestic violence services and had been
referred to parenting classes. She still had not undergone a psychiatric evaluation. This plan
included observations that the mother “has completed services throughout the life of this case but
has failed to grasp the ideas and concepts of these services according to the findings in the CCJCC
report. She continues to struggle with completing her random drops.” The CCJCC report
recommended that she reengage in services because of her failure to fully grasp concepts and to
develop protective factors for the children. Although the mother missed some supervised visits
with the daughters, visits “overall” were consistent. B.P.’s therapist recommended that the mother
not visit with him “due to his behavior afterwards.”
¶ 52 The November 14, 2021, service plan noted that because the mother had not made
reasonable progress in services, there was a goal change to TPR. The agency had no knowledge of
- 15 - No. 1-23-1947
whether the mother was currently engaged in any services. This plan rated the mother
unsatisfactory in progress as to individual therapy, a psychiatric evaluation, and mental health,
parenting, and domestic violence services. She had a satisfactory finding in supervised visits with
the daughters but she was still not visiting with B.P. “due to a clinical recommendation.”
¶ 53 On this record, the circuit court’s finding that the mother was unfit under ground m(ii) for
failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during the nine-month periods
from August 19, 2020, to May 19, 2021, and from May 19, 2021, to February 19, 2022, was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court’s finding was supported by the mother’s
inconsistent visits with the children coupled with her repeated failures during the relevant nine-
month periods to complete various services required of her in the aftermath of A.R.’s murder and
the discovery that the children had been physically abused. Viewed objectively, the mother’s
inconsistent visits and her repeated failures to complete the services and to show an understanding
of how to prevent her children from being the victims of domestic violence indicates to us that the
circuit court would not have been able to order their return to her custody in the near future.
Accordingly, the circuit court correctly found the mother unfit under ground m(ii) because she did
not make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-month periods. See In re Daphnie E., 368
Ill. App. 3d at 1067.
¶ 54 Further, the circuit court’s additional finding that the mother was unfit under ground g for
failing to protect the children from conditions in their environment that were injurious to their
welfare was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence in support of a ground g
unfitness finding focuses on the children’s environment and the parent’s failure to protect them
before their removal. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 214-15 (2002). The evidence here shows that
- 16 - No. 1-23-1947
while the children were living with the mother, she was involved in a physically abusive
relationship with T.P., who repeatedly hit her, leaving her with bruises. A.R. ultimately was beaten
to death. The medical examiner found 12 contusions on A.R.’s head, neck, thorax and abdomen.
After the other children were removed, their medical examinations showed that Jaz. R. had marks
and scars on her head, torso, arms, back, and the front and back of her legs, Jat. R. had burns and
loop marks on her body consistent with physical abuse, and B.P. had obvious signs of physical
trauma and multiple scars in an unusual pattern all over his body. The mother claims she was
unaware of the children’s physical abuse, but the prevalence and multiplicity of scars, marks, and
bruises on their bodies belies her claim and supports the finding that she failed to protect her
children from an injurious environment prior to their removal.
¶ 55 Similarly, the circuit court’s finding that the mother was unfit under ground b for failing to
maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility toward the children was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. A parent is not fit simply because she has shown some interest in or
affection for the children. In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225, ¶ 50. Rather, the interest, concern,
and responsibility must be objectively reasonable. Id. The evidence concerning the physical abuse
suffered by the children while living with the mother objectively shows that she did not maintain
a reasonable degree of responsibility as to their welfare. Further, the mother’s noncompliance with
her service plans and infrequent or irregular visitation with the children are also sufficient to
warrant a finding of unfitness under ground b. See In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶
24.
¶ 56 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s finding of unfitness. The mother
argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting the CCJCC report at the fitness hearing
- 17 - No. 1-23-1947
because it was made in anticipation of the litigation. We need not address this issue, as the mother’s
unfitness finding is supported by sufficient unchallenged evidence. See In re M.H., 2020 IL App
(3d) 190731, ¶ 21 (remand is unnecessary where evidence is erroneously admitted but there is
sufficient other evidence for a finding of unfitness); In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971,
¶ 106 (evidentiary error does not require reversal so long as there is sufficient competent evidence
to support the judgment).
¶ 57 Affirmed.
- 18 -