In re J.P.

Ohio Court of Appeals

In re J.P.

2022 Ohio 539

Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided February 25, 2022·No. C-210388·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: J.P. : APPEAL NO. C-210388 TRIAL NO. 21-1175

:

: O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 25, 2022

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, Andrew Hakala-Finch, Assistant Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.

ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals the juvenile court’s judgment dismissing an indictment alleging that J.P. was a serious youthful offender (“SYO”). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual Background

{¶2} On April 20, 2021, a complaint was filed against 13-year-old J.P. for murder, a felony of the first or second degree if committed by an adult. The complaint did not request an SYO dispositional sentence, and the state did not file a notice of intent to seek an SYO dispositional sentence within 20 days of J.P.’s first hearing.

{¶3} During a pretrial hearing on June 2, 2021, the state indicated that it would be seeking an SYO indictment, and eight days later, the grand jury returned an SYO indictment. J.P. moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the state did not meet the notice or timing requirement under R.C. 2152.13(A)(4) to seek an SYO dispositional sentence. The state argued that, under R.C. 2152.13(A)(1), it may obtain an SYO indictment at any time, and therefore, the requirements of R.C. 2152.13(A)(4) were inapplicable.

{¶4} The juvenile court granted the motion, finding that because the initial complaint did not seek an SYO specification, the state was required to comply with the 20-day written notice requirement set forth in R.C. 2152.13(A)(4). The juvenile court dismissed the indictment reasoning that the state failed to comply with any of the statutory processes set forth in R.C. 2152.13(A)(1)-(4) to seek an SYO dispositional sentence. The state appealed.

{¶5} We ordered supplemental briefing and asked the parties to address: (1)

whether a state’s appeal of right under R.C. 2945.67 from an order dismissing all or part of an indictment, requires the order to comply with the R.C. 2505.02 requirements to be final and (2) whether the order was immediately appealable as a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).

Final Appealable Order

{¶6} The Ohio Constitution grants the courts of appeals “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” to review “final orders” rendered by inferior courts. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). “R.C. 2505.02 helps fill in the ‘provided by law’ part of that jurisdictional grant by setting forth a definition of what constitutes a final order.” State v. Glenn, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3369, ¶ 9. Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), an appellate court has jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, or reverse an “order that grants or denies a provisional remedy” when both of the following circumstances are satisfied:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

{¶7} R.C. 2945.67(A), which outlines the circumstances under which the state may prosecute an appeal in a delinquency matter, states: “A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right * * * any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an

indictment, complaint, or information * * *.” Thus, the state has the right to appeal the order dismissing the SYO indictment.

{¶8} “Whether a state’s appeal as a matter of right must also be taken from an order that is final and appealable has not been consistently answered in Ohio.” In re D.M.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28783, 2020-Ohio-7028, ¶ 13, citing Painter & Pollis, Ohio Appellate Practice, Section 2:25 (2019) (“The extent to which the State must establish that the order on appeal is final under R.C. 2505.02, in addition to meeting the requirements for an appeal as a matter of right under R.C. 2945.67(A), has been the subject of some confusion in the courts.”). As the Second District Court of Appeals articulated, “the law in Ohio appears unsettled as to whether an order that the State may appeal as a matter of right under R.C. 2945.67(A) must also separately meet the definition of a final appealable order in R.C. 2505.02(B).” Id. at ¶ 16. However, the Second District declined to resolve that “interesting jurisdictional quandary” because it determined that the order was a final order as defined by R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Id. We too decline to address the issue because we find that the order dismissing the SYO indictment is a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).

{¶9} We agree with the parties that the dismissal of an SYO indictment is a proceeding that is ancillary to the action because the underlying action is the juvenile adjudication, and the dismissal of the SYO indictment determined the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevented a judgment in the state’s favor. Therefore, we must determine whether the state would be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment in the case.

{¶10} Serious youthful offenders are both entitled and subject to a blend of juvenile and adult court processes and procedures. Once a child is indicted, “the

child is entitled to an open and speedy trial by jury in juvenile court” and “the same right to bail as an adult.” R.C. 2152.13(C)(1). Additionally, “all provisions of Title XXIX of the Revised Code and the Criminal Rules shall apply in the case and to the child.”

{¶11} Juveniles subject to delinquency proceedings are also protected from double jeopardy by both the federal and state constitutions. See In re A.G., 148 Ohio St.3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646, ¶ 9. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Noting that there ‘is little to distinguish’ an adjudicatory hearing in a juvenile- delinquency case from a traditional criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that jeopardy attaches during adjudicatory hearings.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530-531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). “In Breed, the court determined that jeopardy attaches in a delinquency proceeding when the juvenile court begins to hear evidence as the trier of fact.” (Citations omitted.) In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E. 2d 629, ¶ 27.

{¶12} Relying on Breed, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in In re A.J.S., that a juvenile court order denying a motion for mandatory transfer prevents the state from obtaining a meaningful or effective remedy by way of appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings because “double jeopardy attaches once the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency proceedings commences.” Id. at ¶ 28. “Thus, a juvenile court’s decision denying a motion for mandatory bindover satisfies the test for determining whether the denial of a provisional remedy constitutes a final appealable order as set forth in R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).” Id.

{¶13} That rationale applies here. The juvenile court’s order dismissing the SYO indictment prevents the state from a meaningful remedy by an appeal following an adjudication and disposition. See id. Therefore, the order is a final appealable order as set forth in R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).

Standard of Review

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