in Re Joshua Michael Wean

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 31, 2010·No. 03-10-00383-CV·Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00383-CV

In re Joshua Michael Wean

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM COMAL COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This original proceeding involves the trial court’s finding that Joshua (“Josh”)

Michael Wean, the respondent in the underlying divorce proceeding, committed “family violence” as defined in section 71.004(1) of the Texas Family Code against his children, and that family violence was likely to occur in the future. Pursuant to section 85.001 of the family code, the trial court signed a final protective order against Josh based on the finding of family violence. Josh filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court to compel the trial court to vacate its protective order, asserting that the court abused its discretion in making its finding of family violence. We conditionally grant the writ.

Background On July 14, 2009, Sarah Irene Wean—the real party in interest in this mandamus proceeding—filed a petition for divorce from her husband Josh—the relator. Josh and Sarah have three children: their elder son J.W., who was born in 2004; their younger son J.M.W., who was born

in 2006; and their daughter M.E.W., who was born in 2008. Mediation in the divorce proceedings was scheduled for April 27, 2010.

In early April 2010, the Child Protective Services division of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“CPS”) commenced an investigation of alleged physical abuse by Josh against his children. Such investigation began when Sarah provided photographs of scrapes and marks on her children to the court-appointed psychologist, who reported Sarah’s allegations to CPS.

An application for protective order on behalf of the three children against Josh was filed on April 14. Hearings were held on the application in the trial court on four separate days in April, May, and June. On July 1, 2010, the trial court signed a final protective order based on its finding that Josh “has committed family violence against the children” and that “family violence is likely to occur in the future.”1 Josh filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. He argues that the trial court’s finding of family violence is an abuse of discretion, and he seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate its final protective order.

Analysis Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy and is available only in the event of a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992).

1 The application for protective order was filed by the Comal County Criminal District Attorney’s Office. The protective order action was consolidated with the pending divorce action.

Sarah concedes, and we agree, that Josh has no adequate remedy on appeal. See Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 86 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Therefore, our only consideration is whether there has been an abuse of discretion with regard to the trial court’s finding of family violence as defined in family code section 71.004(1).

The general test for abuse of discretion is whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839. With respect to resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, unless the relator establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Even if the reviewing court would have decided the issue differently, it cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 839-40. On the other hand, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Id. at 840. A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the law correctly. In re Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2006).

In issuing the July 1, 2010 protective order, the trial court was required to find that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.001 (West 2008). “Family violence” is defined as:

an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of

imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself.

Id. § 71.004(1) (West 2008).2 In the application for protective order, Josh was accused of both excessive corporal punishment of the children and sexual abuse against M.E.W. Josh alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he committed any act against any of his children that was intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that was a threat which reasonably placed any of his children in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault. We review all the evidence in the record.

During the hearings before the trial court, there was testimony from Debra Sterling, the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”) who conducted an examination of M.E.W. for sexual assault in April 2010. Sterling testified that there was no hymen injury or redness around M.E.W.’s vaginal area. She concluded that sexual assault was neither proved nor disproved, stating that it was “normal to be normal.” She also testified that M.E.W. had immediately assumed a physical position that enabled Sterling to conduct the SANE exam, and that this was “unusual.” However, she did not testify that the position would be more likely in a situation where there was sexual abuse, or that to her knowledge it had ever occurred in a case in which abuse had, in fact,

2 Family violence is also defined to include “abuse” by a member of a family or household toward a child of the family or household, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.004(2) (West 2008), which generally involves substantial harm or continuous sexual abuse, see id. § 261.001(1)(C), (E) (West 2008). However, this definition of family violence is not at issue here.

been confirmed to have taken place. On the contrary, Sterling drew no conclusions from M.E.W.’s position, testifying merely that she had never seen a child act in the same manner as M.E.W.

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Related

Cire v. Cummings
134 S.W.3d 835 (Texas Supreme Court, 2004)
In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of America
148 S.W.3d 124 (Texas Supreme Court, 2004)
In Re Texas Department of Family & Protective Services
210 S.W.3d 609 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
Bilyeu v. Bilyeu
86 S.W.3d 278 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Walker v. Packer
827 S.W.2d 833 (Texas Supreme Court, 1992)
in the Interest of A.S., D.S. and L.A.S
261 S.W.3d 76 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)