TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2022-SC-0426-OA
IN RE: JOSEPH “JS” FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an original action to consider whether Joseph “JS” Flynn should
be removed as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk. After careful consideration and
review of the entirety of the three-day hearing before the Special Commissioner,
we find removal warranted and thus remove Flynn as Pulaski Circuit Court
Clerk and declare that office vacant.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Joseph “JS” Flynn was appointed Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk in 2016
and elected to that office in 2018. One circuit clerk is elected by the citizens in
each Kentucky county, and his or her position involves the important
responsibility of managing the court records, scheduling juries, and receiving
court fines and costs for the Court of Justice. In many counties, this also
entails hiring deputy clerks to assist with these duties. Tabitha Burnett was
hired as a full-time deputy clerk in the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk’s office in
2018, a position she held until voluntarily leaving in February 2023.
On March 23, 2022, Burnett filed a complaint against Flynn with the
Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) alleging several incidents in which
Flynn engaged in inappropriate workplace behavior. While Flynn contested many of Burnett’s allegations, by his own admission he engaged in a brief
sexual relationship with Burnett, his subordinate, in late 2021. Flynn
acknowledges he did not report this relationship and the resulting conflict of
interest as required. Flynn also does not dispute that he physically poked
some of his employees in the office on work time to tease or scare them. He
further acknowledges yelling and cursing at office staff in front of the public in
March of 2022.
There were other allegations brought against Flynn both by Burnett and
a co-worker and deputy clerk, Ashley Haste. Other than the admitted conduct
outlined above, Burnett also alleged that two to three years prior, she went to
lunch with Flynn and another co-worker Hanna Garner. Burnett further
alleged that while riding back from the lunch in Garner’s car, Flynn pulled
Burnett from the front seat into the back seat of the vehicle, forcefully kissed
her on the face and neck, pulled up her shirt and kissed her breast, and
exposed himself, all while Garner and Burnett screamed for him to stop. Flynn
denies the incident occurred, pointing out that he has two fourteen-inch
surgically inserted rods in his back he contends would make it physically
impossible for him to engage in the conduct described by Burnett.
Burnett further alleged in her complaint to AOC that for years, Flynn
would rub her back, hair, and legs in the office. Burnett also alleged that in
one incident, Flynn put his hand up her dress in front of her co-worker Haste
and a bailiff, Junior Fortenberry. Haste has served as an administrative
2 support specialist for the Pulaski District Court for fourteen years. Flynn
denies this incident occurred.
Finally, Burnett also alleged that the day before she filed her complaint,
Flynn pushed her out of an office, slammed the door in her face, slammed the
door in Haste’s face, and then proceeded to curse and yell in Haste’s face,
causing a customer to cry. Burnett stated she was afraid to go to work
because she felt threatened and was verbally and sexually harassed by Flynn.
On March 23, 2022, Haste also filed a complaint against Flynn with
AOC. In her complaint, Haste largely repeated Burnett’s allegation regarding
Flynn screaming and cursing at Haste in front of office staff and the public.
Flynn acknowledges that he yelled and cursed at Haste and that such conduct
was unprofessional. Flynn asserts his conduct was in reaction to Burnett and
Haste repeatedly interrupting an important meeting, Haste telling him that he
was always in a meeting, and Haste accidentally bumping him in the face with
the door.
This Court placed Flynn on paid investigative leave while AOC
investigated the complaints. On June 24, 2022, the AOC Director provided
both the Chief Justice and the Circuit Court Clerks Conduct Commission (the
“Commission”) with a report concluding based upon AOC’s investigation that
Flynn had engaged in unlawful workplace harassment and retaliation and had
3 created a hostile work environment. On September 19, 2022, the Commission
referred the allegations against Flynn to this Court for further proceedings. 1
By Order entered September 26, 2022, this Court instituted removal
proceedings against Flynn. We referred the matter to a Special Commissioner
to hold an evidentiary hearing, develop a full factual record, and make findings
of fact and recommendations. Upon our invitation and request, the Attorney
General served as Special Advocate to represent the interests of the
Commonwealth in those proceedings. We ordered that Flynn be allowed to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence on his behalf, and
to be represented by counsel at all stages.
The Special Commissioner held a three-day evidentiary hearing
beginning on May 10, 2023. The Special Commissioner assigned the burden of
proof to the Special Advocate to show by clear and convincing evidence that
Flynn’s removal from office is warranted. Both the Special Advocate and Flynn
presented numerous witnesses and documentary evidence during the course of
the evidentiary hearing, the record and proceedings of which we have reviewed
in full.
On July 7, 2023, the Special Commissioner filed her Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations with this Court. The Special
Commissioner concluded that Flynn created a hostile work environment by
1 The Commission has authority to recommend disciplinary actions and remedial
measures for circuit court clerks to the Chief Justice. Administrative Procedures of the Court of Justice, Part XVI, § 6. However, the Commission does not have authority to impose such actions or measures itself. 4 physically assaulting Burnett in the vehicle incident, reaching under her dress
in the workplace, otherwise flirting with and touching her in the office against
her wishes, and making sexual comments to her. The Special Commissioner
found that Flynn also created a hostile work environment by pinching other
female employees on the back below their bra while making statements such as
“let daddy feel your bacon” and asking them to call him “daddy.” Flynn
acknowledges pinching employees to “scare” them but denies making reference
to “bacon.”
The Special Commissioner further found that Flynn engaged in acts of
quid pro quo harassment because although Flynn and Burnett had a brief
sexual relationship, Flynn’s conduct toward Burnett changed markedly after
she told him she was uninterested in a relationship. More particularly, the
Special Commissioner found that Flynn became angry with Burnett, gave her
the “cold shoulder,” assigned supervision of her to a chief deputy clerk to avoid
contact with her, and referred to her in numerous derogatory terms in front of
employees and courthouse personnel.
The Special Commissioner also found that Flynn violated his duty to act
with courtesy and respect when he screamed at Haste in front of office staff
and the public and more generally by his periodic outbursts of anger when
employees would make mistakes. Finally, the Special Commissioner concluded
Flynn violated policy when he failed to report the conflict of interest that arose
from the relationship he formed with his subordinate employee Burnett.
5 Flynn and the Special Advocate have now filed briefs with this Court.
Following careful review of the briefs, the entirety of the three-day evidentiary
hearing conducted by the Special Commissioner, and the record, we conclude
Flynn’s removal from the office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is warranted.
ANALYSIS
I. Proceedings For Removal of A Circuit Court Clerk.
The Kentucky Constitution vests authority for removal of a circuit court
clerk with this Court: “The clerks of the Circuit Court shall be removable from
office by the Supreme Court upon good cause shown.” Ky. Const. § 114(3).
When duty requires us to consider exercising this authority, we proceed in an
original action in which we serve as the ultimate finder of fact and adjudicator.
See In re Overstreet, 851 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Ky. 1993). Our practice is to
appoint a Special Commissioner to conduct any evidentiary hearings required
for resolution of an original action for removal of a circuit court clerk. See id.
Additionally, our practice is to appoint a Special Advocate to represent the
interests of the Commonwealth in such proceedings. In this case, we
appointed retired Judge Jean Chenault Logue to serve as Special
Commissioner, and the Attorney General’s office to serve as Special Advocate.
Before Commissioner Logue, Flynn and the Special Advocate disputed
who should bear the burden of proof. Flynn asserted the burden was on the
Special Advocate to show good cause for his removal, while the Special
Advocate asserted the burden was on Flynn to show good cause why he should
6 not be removed. Commissioner Logue concluded the Special Advocate bears
the burden of proof to show good cause for Flynn’s removal. We agree.
The language of the Kentucky Constitution is plain: we may remove a
circuit court clerk for “good cause shown.” Though this phrasing is passive
and thus does not specify who must show good cause, the circuit court clerk
would of course have no interest in showing good cause for his removal.
Rather, the only logical reading of the provision is that the party seeking
removal, e.g., the Special Advocate, bears the burden of showing good cause for
the clerk’s removal. Moreover, this allocation of the burden of proof to the
party seeking removal of an elected official properly recognizes the gravity of
such proceedings. Requiring the Special Advocate to show good cause is also
consistent with the rules applicable to civil actions more generally. See CR 2
43.01(2) (“The burden of proof in the whole action lies on the party who would
be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.”).
As such, in original actions to consider removal of a circuit court clerk
pursuant to Section 114 of the Kentucky Constitution, the burden of proof is
on the Special Advocate to show good cause for removal of the clerk. That is,
the Special Advocate must show “a legal cause which affects the ability and
fitness” of the clerk “to perform the duties of the office.” Nicholson v. Jud. Ret.
& Removal Comm’n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1978). The circuit court clerk of
course must also be afforded an opportunity to rebut such a showing once it is
made. See Overstreet, 851 S.W.2d at 460 (finding removal of circuit court
2 Rule of Civil Procedure.
7 clerk warranted where clerk had “not provided a reasonable explanation” for
deficiencies in discharging the duties of his office).
In the proceedings before Commissioner Logue, the parties also disputed
the evidentiary standard applicable to circuit court clerk removal proceedings.
Flynn argued that good cause for removal must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence, while the Special Advocate asserted the evidentiary
standard is a preponderance of the evidence (assuming the Special Advocate
bears any burden at all). Commissioner Logue concluded the Special Advocate
must show good cause for removal by clear and convincing evidence, and again
we agree.
A useful analogy is found in proceedings for removal of a sitting judge.
In such cases, our Supreme Court Rules specifically dictate that “proof shall be
by clear and convincing evidence.” SCR 3 4.160. As we have explained, this
higher evidentiary standard serves as a “safeguard[] . . . built in to protect a
judge’s rights.” Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n, 612 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Ky.
2020). We see no reason to apply a lower evidentiary standard in proceedings
for removal of a circuit court clerk. Circuit court clerks, like judges, are elected
by the people to serve in public office. Actions for removal of such officials are
matters of significant gravity requiring serious and careful consideration of
whether removal of the elected official is required. As such, we conclude a
higher evidentiary standard is warranted, and thus the Special Advocate must
show good cause for removal of a circuit court clerk by clear and convincing
3 Supreme Court Rule.
8 evidence. Of course, “[c]lear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean
uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a probative and
substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince
ordinarily prudent-minded people[.]” Id. at 846 (quoting Commonwealth,
Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. V. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010)).
In their briefing to this Court, the parties also dispute what deference we
should afford to the Special Commissioner’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations. Flynn urges that we should conduct a de novo
review, while the Special Advocate contends we should defer to the factual
findings of the Special Commissioner and afford her determinations “great
weight.”
As noted above, consideration of removal of a circuit court clerk proceeds
in this Court as an original action. Ky. Const. § 114 (“The clerks of the Circuit
Court shall be removable from office by the Supreme Court upon good cause
shown.”) (emphasis added). In such matters, we thus do not exercise appellate
jurisdiction, but rather original jurisdiction in which we serve as the ultimate
finder of fact and adjudicator in determining whether good cause is shown for
removal of the circuit court clerk. We name the Special Commissioner to
receive evidence and render recommendations on behalf of the Court.
However, because we serve as the final finder of fact and adjudicator (and not
in an appellate capacity), we do not defer to the findings of fact, conclusions of
9 law, or recommendations of the Special Commissioner. In other words, our
review is entirely de novo. 4
In sum, proceedings to consider removal of a circuit court clerk proceed
in this Court as an original action. In such proceedings, the Special Advocate
bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that good cause
exists for removal of the clerk. The circuit court clerk must be afforded an
opportunity to rebut such a showing. We review the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations of a Special Commissioner in a
circuit court clerk removal proceeding de novo.
II. Flynn’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated In The Course Of These Proceedings.
Having described the general contours of an original action for removal of
a circuit court clerk, we turn now to Flynn’s contention that he was denied due
process during the proceedings before the Special Commissioner. We are not
persuaded that Flynn has been denied due process.
First, Flynn contends an order prohibiting him from speaking with AOC
employees denied him due process. However, that order was lifted and did not
prevent Flynn from investigating the claims against him. Second, Flynn
An apt analogy is found in the office of a master commissioner, whose reports 4
a court may adopt, modify, or reject in whole or in part, or remand with further instruction. See CR 53.05(2). A court may also receive further evidence on a matter following a master commissioner’s report. Id. “In sum, the trial court has the broadest possible discretion with respect to the use it makes of reports of . . . commissioners[,]” including “to re-evaluate the evidence and reach a different conclusion than the commissioner.” Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1997). So too with our consideration of a Special Commissioner’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations in an original action to consider removal of a circuit court clerk. 10 complains that AOC employees were represented by an attorney. Again, the
mere fact that AOC employees were represented by counsel did not in any way
inhibit Flynn’s investigation or preparation of a defense. He had the ability to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence on his behalf, and
was represented by counsel at all stages.
Third, Flynn asserts he was denied due process by virtue of an order
prohibiting him from contacting AOC employees unless they agreed in writing
to be contacted. After a thorough review of the various protective orders issued
during the course of these proceedings—some of which were necessitated by
Flynn’s appearance outside the Pulaski County Courthouse in a manner that
some employees found unnerving—we can find no such prohibition. At most,
the record includes an order that allowed AOC employees to state their wish
not to be contacted, but we find no order prohibiting Flynn’s counsel from
contacting employees without written authorization. Moreover, even had such
an order been entered, it would not have been inappropriate given Flynn’s
conduct outside the Pulaski County Courthouse during the course of these
proceedings.
Finally, Flynn complains that actions by the Special Clerk appointed to
serve in his absence violated his due process rights. More particularly, Flynn
contends the Special Clerk made a number of unflattering statements about
Flynn and his counsel to employees of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk’s office—
many of whom were potential witnesses in the case. According to Flynn, the
Special Clerk told the employees in large meetings that they should not speak
11 with Flynn’s counsel because his attorneys were not “on their side,” that Flynn
was enjoying a huge vacation and living the dream by being on paid
administrative leave, and that Flynn was unethical. Allegedly, the Special
Clerk also instructed employees on methods to avoid service of subpoenas from
Flynn’s counsel.
However, we have already considered and rejected Flynn’s argument that
this conduct rises to the level of a due process violation. Indeed, Flynn moved
to dismiss this case when he learned of the Special Clerk’s conduct. We
concluded that the conduct could be “appropriately addressed through
examination of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing” and that the “issues
raised may affect the weight and credibility of the witness testimony but do not
support dismissal of this action.” Nothing in the post-hearing briefing leads us
to a different conclusion, and thus we again do not find the conduct
complained of to rise to a due process violation. As such, we find no due
process violations in the proceedings conducted by the Special Commissioner.
III. Good Cause Exists to Remove Flynn from Office.
We now turn to the merits of whether Flynn should be removed as
Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk. After careful consideration, and with due regard
for the gravity attendant to proceedings for removal of an elected official, we
conclude Flynn’s removal as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is warranted.
A. Flynn Created a Hostile Work Environment.
This Court has promulgated by administrative order a Circuit Court
Clerk Code of Conduct binding on each of the Commonwealth’s circuit court
12 clerks. Supreme Court Order 2014-12 (“Circuit Court Clerk Code”). This Code
requires that circuit court clerks comply with, among other things, the
Workplace Policies set forth in Part III of the Court of Justice’s Administrative
Procedures (“Workplace Policies”). Id. §§ 1-2.
The Workplace Policies in turn mandate a “work environment free of
unlawful harassment or retaliation based on” a number of protected bases,
including sex. Workplace Policies § 3.03(1)(a). Thus, the Workplace Policies
prohibit “unlawful workplace harassment,” defined to include “unwelcome or
unsolicited speech or conduct based upon . . . sex . . . that creates a hostile
work environment.” Id. § 3.03(2)(a). The determination of whether a work
environment is hostile requires consideration of
all of the circumstances including, but not limited to: (1) the frequency of the alleged harassing conduct; (2) the severity of the alleged harassing conduct; (3) whether the alleged harassing conduct was physically threatening or humiliating; and (4) whether the alleged harassing conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an employee’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.
Id. § 3.03(2)(b).
A circuit court clerk’s creation of a hostile work environment violates the
Workplace Policies and the Circuit Court Clerk Code, and thus constitutes “a
legal cause which affects the ability and fitness” of the clerk “to perform the
duties of the office.” Nicholson, 562 S.W.2d at 308. That is, creation of a
hostile work environment is “good cause” for removal of circuit court clerk. See
id. Here, we find by clear and convincing evidence that Flynn created a hostile
work environment by 1) sexually assaulting Burnett in Garner’s vehicle,
13 2) placing his hand up Burnett’s dress in the workplace, 3) engaging in
unwanted touching of and flirtation with Burnett, 4) physically touching other
co-workers, asking them to call him “daddy,” and referring to parts of their
bodies as “bacon,” and 5) intimidating female staff, including by screaming and
cursing at his employees in front of other staff and the public and by referring
to female staff and customers in derogatory and sexualized ways.
First, we find the testimony outlining the events that occurred during the
incident in Garner’s vehicle highly credible. Burnett unequivocally testified
that Flynn pulled her from the front seat to the back seat, kissed her, lifted her
shirt, kissed her chest, and exposed himself, all against her will. While Flynn
testified the events alleged by Burnett were physically impossible given the rods
in his back, Burnett explained she did not physically resist Flynn pulling her
and was not wearing a seatbelt. In her testimony, Garner corroborated
Burnett’s testimony that Flynn pulled Burnett into the back seat, that both
women had to scream before Flynn stopped, and that Flynn apologized when
he exited the vehicle. In addition, two other employees testified Burnett told
them about the incident immediately after it occurred, while a third testified
she told him about it later. And while Burnett waited a significant amount of
time to report the incident, she explained she delayed for fear of losing her job
because she had seen Flynn fire another employee who had filed a complaint
against him. Finally, while Flynn presented a number of witnesses who
testified that Burnett generally could be manipulative or dishonest, we do not
find that testimony—even crediting it as true—to significantly undermine the
14 credibility of Burnett regarding the particular allegations in this case. As such,
and in considering the entirety of the record, we find by clear and convincing
evidence that the incident in Garner’s vehicle occurred as reported by Burnett.
Flynn’s blatant sexual assault of Burnett alone is sufficient grounds for
his removal, given its physical, threatening, offensive, intimidating, and severe
nature. But unfortunately, it was not an isolated incident. Similar in severity
was Flynn’s placing of his hand up Burnett’s dress in the workplace, which
was not only reported in testimony by Burnett but also by two additional
employee eyewitnesses who observed the conduct themselves. Further
troubling is Flynn’s unwanted physical touching of Burnett’s back, hair, and
legs, which another eyewitness testified to observing as being uncomfortable for
Burnett. Given the frequency and severity of the sexual and physical assaults
endured by Burnett, we conclude without question that Flynn created a hostile
work environment as to her.
In addition, Flynn’s conduct created a hostile work environment not only
as to Burnett, but also as to numerous other female employees in the office.
Those employees testified that Flynn engaged in repeated unwanted physical
touching of female employees, referred to himself and asked others to refer to
him as “daddy,” made crude sexual comments regarding women’s body parts
and his own sex life, and referred to women’s body parts as “bacon.” Moreover,
the photographic evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing further
suggests Flynn permitted, if not encouraged, an inappropriately sexualized
workplace. Indeed, photographs of one office costume party depict Flynn
15 surrounded by female employees wearing fishnet stockings, knee-high leather
boots, tops with plunging necklines, and extremely short dresses—one
apparently part of a cheerleader costume with “PLAYBOY” written in large
letters on the front. Finally, Flynn’s inappropriate conduct also extended to
intimidation of his female staff by screaming, cursing, and derogatory and
sexualized comments that subjected them to humiliation not only in front of
their fellow co-workers but also the public more generally.
In sum, the overwhelming weight of the testimony and evidence
presented at the hearing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
Flynn created a hostile work environment. Certainly, Flynn’s sexual assault of
Burnett in Garner’s vehicle satisfies that standard. Moreover, in considering
the entirety of Flynn’s conduct as whole, it is plain he frequently engaged in
severe and physically humiliating sexual harassment of Burnett and other
female employees that unreasonably interfered with the functioning of the
workplace and created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment. On
this basis alone we would find the admittedly severe sanction of Flynn’s
removal from office warranted.
B. Flynn Engaged In Quid Pro Quo Harassment.
We also find by clear and convincing evidence that Flynn engaged in quid
pro quo harassment. The Workplace Policies prohibit such harassment,
defined as
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct when submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, or submission to or rejection of such 16 conduct by an individual is used as the basis for an employment decision affecting the individual.
Workplace Policies § 3.03(2)(c). Here, the testimony established that Flynn and
Burnett both briefly pursued at least a sexual relationship that Burnett
terminated after approximately two weeks. The testimony further established
that after Burnett ended the relationship, Flynn refused to supervise her and
instead assigned a Chief Deputy Clerk to perform that role. In other words,
Flynn engaged in quid pro quo harassment by making an employment decision
affecting Burnett after she ended their relationship.
The clear and convincing evidence further established that Flynn also
engaged in a number of other forms of harassment against Burnett after she
ended the relationship that materially changed the conditions of her
employment. Burnett testified Flynn refused to speak to her, was angry with
her, gave her the “cold shoulder,” and referred to her by numerous derogatory
terms, including “ho,” “badge bunny,” and someone needing to go to the health
department for STD 5 treatment. At least one other employee also testified to
overhearing Flynn call Burnett a “bitch.” As such, we also conclude that Flynn
engaged in quid pro quo harassment by making employment decisions and
negatively affecting Burnett’s conditions of employment after she ended their
relationship, all in violation of the Workplace Policies.
5 Sexually Transmitted Disease.
17 C. Flynn Failed to Perform His Duties With Courtesy And Respect.
The Circuit Court Clerk Code also requires clerks to perform their duties
“[w]ith courtesy and respect for the public, litigants, lawyers, subordinate
employees, and all others with whom the clerk interacts as a part of his or her
official duties[.]” Circuit Court Clerk Code § 4(2)(a). Failure to do so may result
in disciplinary action and/or remedial measures. Id. § 8(1).
Flynn violated the mandate to perform his duties with courtesy and
respect when he physically pursued Haste while yelling and cursing at her, all
in front of his staff and members of the public. Flynn acknowledges the
incident occurred, and we conclude it was unquestionably a blatant violation of
his obligation to perform his duties with courtesy and respect. His failure to do
so reflected poorly not only on himself, but also unfortunately on the judiciary
he was elected to serve. While perhaps insufficient alone to warrant the severe
sanction of removal, when considered together with Flynn’s other conduct at
issue in this case it nonetheless further supports our conclusion that removal
is required.
In sum, after reviewing the entirety of the three-day evidentiary hearing
conducted by Commissioner Logue and the record as whole, we find by clear
and convincing evidence that Flynn created a hostile work environment by
sexually assaulting Burnett in Garner’s vehicle, placing his hand up Burnett’s
dress in the office, and engaging in unwanted touching of and flirtation with
Burnett. We also find that Flynn created a hostile work environment as to
other female employees by engaging in frequent and offensive unwanted
18 physical touching, asking them to call him “daddy,” and referring to parts of
their bodies as “bacon.” We further find that Flynn also engaged in quid pro
quo harassment by changing Burnett’s supervisor and referring to her in
numerous derogatory ways after she ended their relationship. Finally, we also
conclude Flynn violated his obligation to perform his duties with courtesy and
respect when he chased, yelled, and cursed at Haste in front of his staff and
members of the public.
While we acknowledge the gravity of removal of an elected official from
office, and the severity of such a sanction, we nonetheless find removal
warranted here. As such, we hereby remove Flynn from the office of the
Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk for the remainder of his term. The Office of the
Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is declared vacant. Flynn must pay the costs of
these proceedings.
VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., sitting.
VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J.,
concurs in result only. Lambert, J., not sitting.
ENTERED: March 14, 2024
______________________________________ CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER
19 COUNSEL FOR SPECIAL ADVOCATE:
Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky
Aaron J. Silletto Assistant Attorney General
Marc Manley Assistant Attorney General
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
Joseph E. Lambert Lambert & Lambert, PLLC
Jason M. Nemes Commonwealth Counsel Group, PLLC
SPECIAL COMMISSIONER:
Judge Jean Chenault Logue (Ret.)