In Re Joseph J. Turmel
This text of 2003 DNH 139 (In Re Joseph J. Turmel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In Re Joseph J. Turmel CV-03-217-JM 08/06/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
In R e : Joseph J. Turmel and A Certain 2002 Lexus IS 3 0 0 , Vin #JTHBD192920034818 Civil N o . 03-217-JM O p . N o . 2003 DNH 139
O R D E R
The United States moves to dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner objects.
Standard of Review
When a defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. Aversa v . United States, 99 F.3d
1200, 1209 (1st Cir. 1996). I must construe the complaint
liberally, treating all well-pled facts as true and indulging all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1209-
210. The moving party may present, and I may consider, materials
outside of the pleadings that dispute the plaintiff’s
jurisdictional facts. Valentin v . Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d
358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001); 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 at 213 (2d ed.
1990).
Background
On October 1 1 , 2001, petitioner was operating his 2002 Lexus northbound on Interstate 8 9 . With him as a passenger was Patrick
Kelley. After what petitioner describes as a pretextual stop,
the car was searched by New Hampshire State Troopers. In the
trunk the officers found a knapsack belonging to Kelley which
contained $37,975.00 and trace amounts of marijuana. A further
search of the car, aided by a drug detection dog, uncovered the
burnt remnants of a marijuana cigarette in the ashtray.
Petitioner was subsequently charged with and found guilty of the
misdemeanor of Simple Possession of Controlled Substance. He was
fined $250.00 which fine has been stayed pending appeal.
Meanwhile, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in
what petitioner asserts to have been either a thoughtless or
draconian act, proceeded toward forfeiture of the Lexus.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Remission with the DEA which
ultimately issued its Administrative Finding of Forfeiture.
Petitioner inadvertently missed the opportunity for a judicial
determination of the forfeiture claim.
The petitioner challenges neither the statutory authority of
the DEA to make a forfeiture determination nor its process,
procedure, rational or exercise of discretion. The claim,
petitioner states, is a pure Eighth Amendment claim that the
2 amount of the forfeiture is excessive and bears no relationship
to the gravity of the offense.
Discussion
Petitioner’s claim, as plead and as briefed, is premised
solely upon the excessive fine provision of the Eighth Amendment.
Accepting, as I d o , petitioner’s allegations as being true, the
petition must be dismissed nevertheless for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. There can be little doubt that the Supreme
Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment does apply to in
rem civil forfeiture cases and prohibits as an excessive fine a
forfeiture disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. See
Austin v . United States, 509 U.S. 6 0 2 , 621-622 (1993); United
States v . Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 3 2 1 , 324 (1998). On the face of
the petition the forfeiture of a Lexus because the ashtray
contained a few remnants of a marijuana cigarette would appear to demonstrate a gross disproportionality.1
As disproportionate as the forfeiture may seem on the face
of the complaint, the court is constrained to ignore sympathy and
be “bound by the rule of law and the adversary process.” Sarit
1 Limited as the court is to the face of the complaint, no consideration has been given to the specific basis upon which the administrative forfeiture was made.
3 v . U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 987 F.2d 1 0 , 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
The court “cannot come i n , deux ex machina, and save a claim
where notice is constitutionally sufficient and any failures in
its effectiveness should have been corrected by plaintiff’s
counsel.” Id. By failing to pursue his claim in a judicial
forum as provided for by statute petitioner has waived his Eighth
Amendment claim. See Litzenberger v . United States, 89 F.3d 8 1 8 ,
821 (1996); Laconia Savings Bank v . United States, 116 F. Supp.
2d 2 4 8 , 255 (D.N.H. 2000); Walker v . U.S. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 2002 WL 1870131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1 4 , 2002);
Concepcion v . United States, 938 F. Supp. 1 3 4 , 139 (1996).
Except as to the procedural safeguards which are admittedly
not at issue here the court simply has no subject matter
jurisdiction to review the administrative decision. See Laconia
Savings Bank v . United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
The motion to dismiss (document n o . 3 ) is granted.
SO ORDERED.
James R. Muirhead United States Magistrate Judge Date: August 6, 2003
cc: F. Michael Keefe, Esq. Robert J Rabuck, Esq.
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