In re: Jose Raul Rios Quintana and Alma Rosa Ramirez Lopez

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

3 IN RE: 4 JOSE RAUL RIOS QUINTANA CASE NO. 08-00281 BKT 5 ALMA ROSA RAMIREZ LOPEZ CHAPTER 13

6 Debtor(s) ADVERSARY NO. 12-0054

7 JOSE RAUL RIOS QUINTANA 8 ALMA ROSA RAMIREZ LOPEZ

9 Plaintiff

10 MAZA & GREEN ATTORNEYS AND FILED & ENTERED ON 05/08/2012 COUNSELORS AT LAW;et als. 11

12 Defendant(s)

13 ORDER 14

15 This proceeding is before the Court upon Defendants’ motion to 16 17 shorten terms of discovery (Dkt No. 13), and Plaintiffs’ motion for 18 reconsideration (Dkt No. 17) of the Order allowing the limited 19 discovery proposed by Defendants (Dkt No. 15). For the reasons set 20 forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 21 22 I. Procedural background 23 On April 10, 2012, Defendants sought leave of Court to shorten 24 the response period on a limited discovery comprising two (2) 25 interrogatories and two (2) requests for production of documents, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. (Dkt No. 13). Defendants argued that said discovery request was needed to properly answer the complaint. On April 24, 2012, this Court entered an order granting 1 Defendants’ unopposed motion and reducing the period for Plaintiffs 2 to answer the interrogatories to fifteen (15) days. (Dkt No. 15). 3 Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on April 27, 2012 4 5 (Dkt No. 17), stating that Defendants’ request to shorten the 6 period to answer to discovery should’ve been denied as a matter of 7 law. Plaintiffs’ arguments are threefold. First, that Defendants’ 8 cannot use discovery means to answer a complaint, because they are 9 10 to admit or deny statements in the complaint without using 11 extrinsic evidence. Second, that discovery procedures cannot begin 12 until the parties have conferred, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 14 26(d), or otherwise ordered by the court. Finally, that this Court 15 lacks jurisdiction to entertain or rule upon this discovery matter 16 until the parties have addressed the controversy without the 17 Court’s intervention, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26& 37, made 18 19 applicable to this proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026 & 7037. 20 II. Discussion 21 A. Expedited discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) 22 23 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), made applicable to this 24 adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 7026, parties “may obtain 25 discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” The limitation with respect to the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) is that the matter sought to be discovered is not privileged, “[o]ther than that, discovery may 1 be obtained with respect to any matter relevant to the claims or 2 defenses of any party.” 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9020.01(16th 3 ed.). 4 5 Although a party ordinarily may not commence discovery until 6 the parties hold the discovery conference required by Rule 26(f), 7 the parties may engage in discovery earlier, however, if the court 8 has issued an order authorizing the discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 10 26(d)(1). Consequently, a party must obtain leave of court if the 11 party seeks to commence discovery before the time specified in Rule 12 26(d), given the parties have not agreed otherwise. 13 14 The majority of Courts, including within the First Circuit, 15 have applied a “good cause” or “reasonableness” standard when 16 considering request for expedited discovery. See Momenta Pharms., 17 Inc. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. Ltd., 765 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 18 19 (D.Mass.2011); see also 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121 20 (2011).In a “good cause” analysis, a court must examine the 21 discovery request on the entirety of the record and the 22 23 “reasonableness” of the request in light of all the surrounding 24 circumstances. Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 259 F.R.D. 25 385, 386 (E.D. Wis. 2009);St. Louis Group, Inc. v. Metals and Additives Corp., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 236, 239 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Good cause for expedited discovery may be found when the need for the expedited discovery outweighs the prejudice to the responding 1 party. Edgenet, Inc.,259 F.R.D. at 386; Moore's Federal Practice § 2 26.121.The party seeking expedited discovery has the burden of 3 establishing the need for early discovery and the burden of showing 4 5 good cause. St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240, citing Qwest 6 Commc'n Int'l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 7 419 (D. Colo. 2003); Moore's Federal Practice § 26.121. Finally, 8 in allowing expedited discovery, the courts seek that the subject 9 10 matter related to requests for expedited discovery are narrowly 11 tailored in scope. St. Louis Group, Inc., 275 F.R.D. at 240; 12 Monsanto Co. v. Woods, 250 F.R.D. 411, 413 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 13 14 In the present case, Defendants have in fact, narrowly 15 tailored the discovery purportedly needed to answer Plaintiffs’ 16 claims and bring forth their defenses. Once the need for expedited 17 discovery was established by Defendants, and upon Plaintiffs’ 18 19 failure to raise a timely opposition that outweighed Defendants’ 20 request, the Court found good cause to grant Defendants’ reasonable 21 request for the limited expedited discovery. 22 23 With regards to Plaintiffs’ allegations that this Court lacks 24 jurisdiction to entertain this discovery matter because the parties 25 failed to confer, or attempted to confer, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26& 37, this Court finds that nothing in the cited statues precludes this Court from entertaining Defendants’ motion for expedited discovery. Rule 26(c)(1) & Rule 37(a)(1), require that, 1 prior to requesting that the court issue a protective order or an 2 order to compel discovery, the movant must attempt to secure the 3 discovery by making a good faith effort to confer with the 4 5 recalcitrant party. That is not the controversy before this Court. 6 B. Relief from a Judgment or Order 7 8 Plaintiffs’ cite no legal authority for their request for 9 reconsideration. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6o, made applicable to 10 this adversary proceeding by Fed R. Bankr. P. 9024, affords six 11 categories of reasons or grounds on which to base a motion seeking 12 13 relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 60(b) seeks to balance the interest in the stability of 15 judgments with the interest in seeing that judgments not become 16 17 instruments of oppression and fraud. 10 Collier on Bankruptcy 18 ¶9024.03 (15th ed. rev.). “[T]he court may relieve a party . . . 19 from a final judgment, order, or proceedings for . . . mistake, 20 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed R. Civ. P. 21 22 60(b)(1); Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief "for any other reason that 23 justifies relief." Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 24 Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and motions 25 invoking that rule should be granted sparingly. Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002). Such relief is available in our jurisdiction only when exceptional circumstances exist to justify this extraordinary relief. In re Rodriguez Camacho, 361 294 (1st Cir. BAP 2007) (citing Simon v. Navon, 116 F.3d 1, 5 2 (lst Cir.1997)). A party who seeks relief under Rule 60(b) must 3 4 persuade the Court, at a bare minimum, that exceptional 5 |}a¢ircumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if th 6 judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff to mount 7 potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfai 8 9 prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion b 10 ||granted. Rodriguez Camacho, supra (citing Karak v. Bursaw Oil 11 . Corp. 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002)). 12 13 Except for the timeliness of Plaintiffs’ motion for relief, 14 ||none of the above factors have been demonstrated. Plaintiffs’ hav 15 ||failed to allege details showing excusable neglect under a Rul 16 60(b)(1), or “any other reason justifying relief” under a Rul 17 1g OE0(b) (6). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ request fo 19 ||reconsideration is meritless. 20 . . . WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Debtors’ motion for reconsideratio 21 32 shall be, and it hereby is, DENIED. 23 SO ORDERED. a4 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 08 day of May, 2012. 25 Aa

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge