In Re Jones

348 B.R. 715, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1261, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1951, 2006 WL 2422718
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedAugust 4, 2006
Docket05-14343
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 348 B.R. 715 (In Re Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Jones, 348 B.R. 715, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1261, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1951, 2006 WL 2422718 (Va. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM 'OPINION ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF DISCHARGE INJUNCTION

STEPHEN S. MITCHELL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the court in response to a request from the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, Virginia — which this court has treated for procedural purposes as a motion by the debtor — to determine the effect of the discharge injunction on a personal injury suit brought against the debtor by Elana Byer. A hearing was held on August 2, 2006, at which counsel for the debtor and for Ms. Byer were present. The question to be decided is whether the discharge injunction requires that the prayer for damages be limited to the amount of available insurance coverage. Under the specific facts of this case, the court concludes that it does not.

Background

Carrie Rebecca Jones (“the debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in this court on October 9, 2005, and received a discharge of her dischargeable debts on January 27, 2006. The trustee having in the interim filed a report of no distribution, the case was closed on February 2, 2006. While the case was open, Elana Byer brought a motion for relief from the automatic stay in order to prosecute a pending personal injury action against the debtor in the Circuit Court of Loudoun *717 County, Virginia. 1 The motion, after reciting the existence both of liability insurance and under-insured coverage, represented that Ms. Byer did not, “[a]t this point in time ... seek to have a money judgment entered against Debtor for purposes of enforcement of the judgment against her,” but that she reserved the right to file an adversary proceeding “to have any such judgment declared non-dischargeable.” Motion, ¶ 8. The motion concluded with the prayer that Ms. Byer be granted relief from the automatic stay “so that she might pursue the pending lawsuit ... and have the issues of liability and damages determined, and that she might enforce her right to compensation from Debtor’s insurance carrier and Movant’s insurance carrier.” Motion, ¶ 9. The motion was resolved by a consent order entered January 9, 2006, granting relief from the automatic stay

to pursue an action in the Loudoun County Circuit Court and to have the issues of liability and damages determined, so that [Ms. Byer] might enforce her right to compensation from Debtor’s insurance carrier and Movant’s insurance earrier[.]

The order additionally stated that “nothing herein precludes Movant from filing an adversary proceeding pursuant to 11 USC Sec. 523(a)(9).”

The state court lawsuit, which had been stayed as a result of the bankruptcy filing, was placed back on the docket. The debt- or then filed a motion in the state court to reduce Ms. Byer’s ad damnum to the amount of the available insurance coverage. The state court, after hearing the argument of the parties, issued an order on April 13, 2006, requesting an opinion from this court whether the order granting relief from the automatic stay “limits any damage award to the amount of the available insurance coverage or is Plaintiff entitled to pursue this action without any limitation or restriction on the amount of any judgment up to the amount sued upon in the Motion for Judgment.” Order Seeking Opinion From U.S. Bankruptcy Court at 3. A certified copy of that order was filed with the clerk of this court on July 14, 2006. In response, this court entered an order on July 18, 2006, reopening the debt- or’s case and treating the state court order (because it was issued in response to the debtor’s motion to reduce the ad dam-num) as the equivalent of a motion by the debtor for clarification of the discharge injunction.

Discussion

I.

Although the question as formulated by the state court focuses on the order granting relief from the automatic stay, the real issue is not the automatic stay, but rather the discharge injunction. The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of a broad range of creditor activity, including “the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial ... action or proceeding against the debtor that would or could have been commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case ... or to recover a claim against the debt- or that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). With certain exceptions not relevant here, the automatic stay applies to all civil suits against the debtor, regardless of whether the underlying liability is dischargeable or nondischargeable. This is consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay, which is to give the debtor a *718 breathing spell and to prevent a race by creditors against the debtor’s assets until such time as the bankruptcy court can sort out the respective interests of the debtor, the bankruptcy estate, and creditors. The automatic stay, however, is not permanent. On motion of an affected party, it may be terminated, annulled, modified, or conditioned. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). But even in the absence of such relief, the automatic stay terminates, as to actions against the debtor or property of the debtor, when the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, and, as to actions against property of the bankruptcy estate, when such property is no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). With respect to dis-chargeable debts, however, the automatic stay is replaced by the discharge injunction. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a). Specifically, a discharge “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). The discharge also voids any judgment— whether obtained before or after the discharge — “to the extent that the judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to a debt discharged[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).

II.

The question, then, is what debts are discharged. In a chapter 7 case filed by an individual debtor “all” debts that arose before the date of the bankruptcy petition are discharged except for the debts specified in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). The discharge order does not list the specific debts that are discharged or excluded from discharge. A determination of whether a particular debt is excluded from discharge is made in a separate proceeding, either in the bankruptcy court or, in some cases, by the court having jurisdiction over the underlying claim.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
348 B.R. 715, 56 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1261, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1951, 2006 WL 2422718, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jones-vaeb-2006.