In re Jones Petition No. 14

11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 241, 21 Ohio Dec. 647, 1911 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 36
CourtCuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
DecidedJanuary 30, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 241 (In re Jones Petition No. 14) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Jones Petition No. 14, 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 241, 21 Ohio Dec. 647, 1911 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 36 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1911).

Opinion

Collister, J.

There is no contest made on any questions involved in the hearing, except on the sufficiency of the description of the residence district, and the validity of certain signatures to the petition.

On the petition there appear the names of 437 signers. At the municipal election last before the filing of the petition there were cast, in the district, 680 votes. Therefore, to make this petition valid, so far as the number of names, theréon is concerned, it must contain at least 341 valid signatures. Of the [242]*242names on the petition, there are 274 about the validity of which there is no contest, and by consent these names are properly counted in favor of the petition. Of the names on the petition, theré are forty-four which it is conceded should not be counted, because, for various reasons, they are invalid. Of the signatures on the petition, there are seventy-eight which are contested on one ground only. It is conceded that the persons making such signatures were, at the time they signed the petition and at the time the petition was filed, made citizens of the United States, residents of Ohio and of Cuyahoga county for more than one year prior to the date of their respective signatures, and were residents of their respective precincts, which were in the residence district under consideration, for more than four months prior to the dates of their respective signatures, and were such residents at the date of the filing of the petition.

It is' also conceded that, at the times said signatures were placed on said petition, and at the date of the filing thereof, none of said seventy-eight persons were “registered voters.”

There are contests on other names, but the court does not deem it important to óonsider those, for the reason that, should the court decide in favor of the validity of said seventy-eight names, then the petition would contain a'sufficient number of names; and should the court decide against the validity of said seventy-eight names, there would not be sufficient names remaining to make' a majority, even though all said other disputed names should be counted as valid.

The foregoing facts raise the question, should said seventy-eight names be counted? The determination of this question requires a construction of Section 6067 of the General Code, which reads as follows:

“The phrase ‘qualified elector,’ as used in this chapter when relating to petitions in a residence district of a municipal corporation, means a registered male voter in a municipal corporation which has registration or a male voter entitled to register therein, or a male voter in a municipal corporation which does not have 'registration, provided that in each such' qualified elector has been a bona 'fide resident of such residence district for four months before the filing of-the-petition-upon which his name appears. ’ ’

[243]*243That section, before the adoption of the General Code, read as follows:

The term ‘ qualified elector, ’ as used in this act, means registered male voters in all municipal corporations which have registration, and all other male voters entitled to register, who have been bona fide residents of the district for four months- before such petition is filed with the mayor or judge. In municipalities which do not have registration, such male voter or male qualified elector must be .a bona fide resident of the district for four months before such petition is filed with the mayor or judge.” 98 O. L. ,

In the opinion of the court, the right to vote has its source in the Constitution of the state and the statutes, Outside of the statutes requiring registration.

Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution reads as follows:

‘1 Every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county, township, or ward, in which he resides, such time as may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector, and be entitled to vote at all elections.”

Sections 4861 and 4863 of the General Code read as follows':

“Section 4861. Every male citizen of the United States, who is of the .age of twenty-one years or over, and possesses the .qualifications in regard to residence hereinafter provided, shall be entitled to vote at all elections.
“Section 4863. No person shall be permitted to vote at any election unless he shall have been a resident of the state for one year, resident of the county for thirty days, and, except as provided in the next section, resident of the township, village or ward of a city or village for twenty days next preceding the election at which he offers to vote.”

The registration acts are merely regulations of the “exercise” of the right to vote, to the end that fraud be not committed, or, if committed, be more easily detected.

The Century Dictionary gives this definition of “Registration of voters or electors”:

“The Registration of Voters or Electors. In the United States, a system for the prevention of .frauds in the -exércise- of [244]*244the suffrage, by requiring voters to cause their names to be registered in books provided for the purpose in each election district, with appropriate particulars of residence, age, etc., to enable investigation to be made, and the right of the voter to east the ballot to be challenged, if there be occasion.”

In Lewis Bergiwin v. Curtz, 127 Cal., 86, the court says:

“Registration is not a ‘qualification’ of an elector, and can. not add to qualification fixed by the Constitution; but it is to be regarded as a reasonable regulation by the Legislature for the purpose of ascertaining who 'are qualified electors, and of having their names enrolled upon an authenticated list in order to prevent'illegal voting. ”

In White v. Regan, 25 Ark., 629, the court says:

“By the term ‘qualified elector,’ we do not mean simply a registered voter; for we can conceive that one may be a qualified elector entitled to hold office, sit on a jury, etc., and yet not be entitled to vote under the law for want of a certificate of registration. A qualified elector is one wrho is not embraced in any of the six subdivisions of Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution; and a certificate of registration is evidence thereof, the want of which is not conclusive as to the right of a claimant to office.-”■ -. i

The act as orginally passed has been twice construed: once by Mayor Dempsey, of Cincinnati, who was an able lawyer,' and had been at one time a judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati. His decision is reported in the 5th Ohio Law Reporter on page 517. I quote so much of his opinion as is pertinent, from page 518: ' - .

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Related

State v. Barger
616 N.E.2d 1176 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)

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11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 241, 21 Ohio Dec. 647, 1911 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jones-petition-no-14-ohctcomplcuyaho-1911.