in Re John M. O'Quinn & Associates, PLLC D/B/A the O'Quinn Law Firm and Musslewhite & Associates, P.C.
This text of in Re John M. O'Quinn & Associates, PLLC D/B/A the O'Quinn Law Firm and Musslewhite & Associates, P.C. (in Re John M. O'Quinn & Associates, PLLC D/B/A the O'Quinn Law Firm and Musslewhite & Associates, P.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued April 23, 2013
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00076-CV ——————————— IN RE JOHN M. O’QUINN & ASSOCIATES PLLC D/B/A THE O’QUINN LAW FIRM AND MUSSLEWHITE & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Relators
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Injunction/Prohibition1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relators John M. O’Quinn & Associates, PLLC d/b/a The O’Quinn Law
Firm and Musslewhite & Associates, P.C. filed a Petition for Writ of
Injunction/Prohibition seeking an order from this Court enjoining respondents/real
1 There is a related direct appeal pending in this Court as Cause No. 01-12-000984- CV. parties-in-interest 2 from “taking any action whatsoever . . . other than to seek
dismissal with prejudice of their claims” in three judicial proceedings for the
pendency of the direct appeal in Cause No. 01-12-00984-CV. We deny relators’
petition.
BACKGROUND
The parties here have a protracted history of litigation, which relators claim
was finally and completely settled as to all parties and issues by a 2009 mediated
Rule 11 Settlement Agreement. On October 12, 2012, the Harris County 190th
District Court issued a final judgment. In this final judgment, the court found that
the Rule 11 Settlement Agreement was not ambiguous, that “the parties have
settled all matters that were in dispute or could have ever been in dispute between
them,” and that the settlement “was intended to resolve all pending litigation in all
courts involving the parties . . . .” The respondents have appealed that final
judgment to this Court, where it is currently pending as Cause No. 01-12-00984-
CV. According to relators, real-parties-in-interest then filed suits essentially
attacking the district court’s judgment in three other courts, i.e., Harris County
2 Walter L. Boyaki; Miranda & Boyaki; Ruben P. Hernandez; Modesto Fernandez Ramirez, on behalf of Victoria Penasco and the Estate of Angel Fernandez Ramirez; Martha Gonzalez Ramos, individually and as representative of Sheila Reyes Gonzalez; Jose DeJesus Reyes Gonzalez; Paulina Baltizar Ojeda; Maria Ojeda De Baltazar 2 Probate Court No. 2 and El Paso 205th District Court and El Paso 327th District
Court.
Relators assert here that this “Court has dominant jurisdiction over the
lawsuit, to the exclusion of the El Paso courts, and the Harris County Probate
Court.” They argue that an injunction against respondents is necessary because the
continued “prosecution of the El Paso Parallel Litigation and the Parallel Probate
Proceedings will directly interfere with the effectiveness of, and may substantially
moot, any rulings by this Court.”
A. The Probate Court Proceedings
The Executor of John O’Quinn’s estate filed a Plea in Abatement in the
Harris County Probate Court No. 2 on the issue of dominant jurisdiction. The
probate court held a hearing on the motion on February 5, 2013, during which the
respondents argued that the probate court should wait to rule until this Court
resolved relators’ Petition for Writ of Injunction/Prohibition. The probate court
nonetheless issued an “Order of Abatement” of those proceedings pending
conclusion of the direct appeal of the 190th district court’s final judgment.
In light of the probate court’s order, relators in their reply brief concede that
their request for relief with regard to the Harris County Probate Court proceedings
is likely moot.
3 B. The El Paso Court Proceedings
Relators claim that “Real Parties in Interest have shown their intent to
prosecute [the two El Paso District Court cases] by attempting to serve Relator
Musslewhite with citation in those cases, as well as by attempting to serve the, now
dead, John M. O’Quinn by serving Dale Jefferson who represents the estate.” The
record does not reflect any additional activity in the El Paso cases, and the relators
have not requested that the El Paso district courts abate their proceedings.
APPLICABLE LAW
A writ of prohibition in an appellate court is a limited purpose remedy. In re
Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding); TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 22.221(a). The writ is used to protect the subject matter of an
appeal or to prohibit an unlawful interference with enforcement of a superior
court’s judgment. 3 See Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 682
(Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); Sivley v. Sivley, 972 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Tex. App.
—Tyler 1998, orig. proceeding). Prohibition is not appropriate if any other
remedy, such as appeal, is available and adequate. In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd.
P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding).
“Thus, injunctive relief may be granted by this court if a failure to do so
would result in the appeal becoming moot and the subject matter being destroyed.”
3 Similarly, the purpose of a writ of injunction is to enforce or protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction. Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 683. 4 Becker v. Becker, 639 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ). “On the other hand, this court does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction merely for the purpose of preserving the status quo or to prevent loss or
damage to one of the parties to the appeal.” Id.
The supreme court has also admonished that an original proceeding is not
“the appropriate vehicle for resolving a claim of res judicata.” Holloway, 767
S.W.2d at 684.
The power of a court to enforce its jurisdiction does not include an authority to prevent the prosecution of any suit to which a judgment of the court may be an effectual bar, but which . . . makes no attempt to disturb it, or to interfere with its execution. . . . The assumption of such right would invest a court not merely with the control of its own judgments and authority to enforce its jurisdiction, but with a further power to govern other courts in the exercise of their lawful jurisdiction; and the result would be that the issue of the conclusiveness of a judgment upon what is urged as a distinct cause of action could never be determined except by the court that rendered it. Id. Accordingly, the remedy provided by our system, should a trial court fail to
recognize the preclusive effect of a prior judgment, is an appeal. Id.
ANALYSIS
Without considering when, or if, a writ of injunction/prohibition would be
appropriate in this situation, we deny relators’ request because they have not
demonstrated that proceedings in the El Paso district courts pose a current threat to
the subject matter of the direct appeal from the 190th district court’s judgment. “A
writ of prohibition, whose purpose is to prohibit a lower court from unlawfully
5 interfering with the enforcement of a higher court’s judgments and orders, will not
issue until the trial court evidences an intent to disturb or interfere with the higher
court’s judgment.” Jones v. McDonald, 880 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—Waco
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