In re John Liddle Cut Stone Co.

242 F. 691, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 947
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 13, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 242 F. 691 (In re John Liddle Cut Stone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re John Liddle Cut Stone Co., 242 F. 691, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

Opinion

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, District Judge.

This is an application by certain trustees under a will for leave to foreclose a mortgage which they hold upon premises belonging to the alleged bankrupt known as Nos. 402-422 East 107th street, in the borough of Manhattan, New [692]*692York City, and for leave to make the receiver in bankruptcy a party. The mortgage was executed by the alleged bankrupt in 1909, was duly recorded pursuant to the laws of New York, and contained a clause mortgaging, not only these premises, but also specifically the buildings and improvements thereon, together with the machinery, implements, engines, boilers, saws, and other personal property used in the cut stone business of the John Liddle Cut Stone Company thereon. After the making of the mortgage, that company installed upon the premises the following machinery: (1) A traveling crane of steel construction with concrete foundations. The track was upon heavy steel girders resting on steel truss pillars, the bases of which were sunk in concrete and anchored in the concrete by bolts running down a distance of 2% feet below the sunken base of the pillars. (2) A Fuller patent diamond circular saw weighing about 16 tons, consisting of two tracks set in a concrete foundation, two tables mounted on wheels on the tracks, and an overhead track and carriage for the saw and a motor attached to the overhead carriage. The foundation was 8 feet deep, and the concrete pillars in which the two ends of the overhead carriage are fastened ran a few feet deeper. The anchor bolts for the machine were buried in concrete pillars and were 5 feet long, terminating in anchor bolts. (3) A planing machine fastened in concrete foundations about 8 or 9 feet deep, the base of the machine being embedded in the concrete and further secured in the concrete by anchor bolts running down into the foundation. This machine weighed about 20 tons.

It is evident from the foregoing statement, as to which all parties agree, that the machinery is embedded in or annexed to the ground much more substantially than many buildings, and the photographs submitted show that the removal of the pillars and tracks of the traveling crane would materially injure several of the frame buildings on the mortgaged-premises, since these structures have been built around the steel pillars of the crane and lie beneath the track supported by the pillars. It may be doubted, however, whether the injury to the buildings caused by a removal of the steel pillars and tracks would be alone sufficient to determine the character of this structure and constitute it a fixture.

It is unnecessary to discuss at length what would have been the situation if this machinery had been installed by a tenant, or if the mortgagor and mortgagees had agreed that it should remain and be considered personalty after it was affixed. In the first case, the liberal treatment of the courts toward tenants who seek to remove additions to real property which they have installed for the conduct of their business -would probably permit removal during the term. In the second case, I should .probably find no sufficient reason for not holding the mortgagees to their agreement, and, as a result, the mortgage would not in such case cover the machinery added to the premises after the execution of the instrument, and it would consequently be general assets of the bankrupt estate which the receiver would be entitled to hold free from any lien.

[1] Under existing circumstances, however, I see no reason to suppose that the clause in the mortgage specifying machinery used in the [693]*693business of the mortgagor covered future acquired machinery. It specifically covered then existing machinery only, and cati embrace the machinery which has been installed since the mortgage was executed only so far as such machinery has become part of the realty.

A portion of the machinery in question was, I think, so permanently affixed to the realty that it is by the weight of authority part of the land and is covered by the mortgage for that reason. The remaining' articles were adapted for a stonecutting plant, were intended to be permanently used as a part of that plant, and were so annexed to or appurtenant to the land as to become fixtures within the authorities. Triumph Electric Co. v. Patterson, 211 Fed. 244, 127 C. C. A. 612; McRea v. Central National Bank, 66 N. Y. 489; Watts Campbell v. Yuengling, 125 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 1060; In re Welch (D. C.) 108 Fed. 367; Insurance Co. v. Allison, 107 Fed. 179, 46 C. C. A. 229.

[2] The fact that the mortgage in its terms embraced machinery “and other personal property” does not limit it as a mortgage of real estate to the land and buildings. The mortgage in no way attempted to define what constituted fixtures. It covered chattels used in the stonecutting business and ex abundanti cautela mentioned machinery, engines, boilers, and saws, leaving it to the law to determine their status. In McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, supra, even a bill of sale covering the fixtures was regarded as unimportant in determining whether they were real or personal property.

In the case of Insurance Co. v. Allison, supra, Judge Wallace stated the law of New York, which is the law to be applied here, as follows:

“Tlie general rule derived from the decisions of the courts of New York is that, unless the annexation is one of a permanent character, so that the machine or other chattel cannot be removed without substantial injury to the freehold, or unless the annexation is of a machine or chattel especially adapted for use in the particular place where it has been put, the purpose of the annexation and the intention with which it has been made are the most important considerations, and are the determining criterion, whether it is a fixture or a chattel.”

¡ 3, 4] It i.s evident, I think, that the three pieces of machinery in question were in general designed by tile mortgagor for use in a large stonecutting plant, were architecturally and mechanically necessary for such a plant, and, to a large extent at least, could not be removed without injuring the various buildings. They could not he removed to any extent without disintegration of the plant as a complete whole.

The principal question which presents difficulty relates to the cross-girders supporting the hoisting machinejy which are mounted on wheels that travel along the top of the longitudinal girders and the hoisting machinery which travels laterally along the top of the two cross-girders. This structure, though manifestly of great weight, could be lifted off the tracks upon which it runs, and is therefore not in a literal sense physically annexed. The same thing is true of the tables running upon the tracks used in connection with the diamond saw, and these, moreover, do not appear to be o f unusual weight. The belting of some of the planing machinery could likewise be removed.

A careful discussion of the general principles laid down by the New York courts, in determining between vendor and vendee and mortga[694]*694gor and mortgagee what are to be regarded as fixtures, may be found in the case of McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 489. The court there said that:

To create a “fixture” there must be “the union of three requisites: Elrst, actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto. Second, application to the use or purpose to which this part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated.

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242 F. 691, 1916 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 947, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-john-liddle-cut-stone-co-nysd-1916.