In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00051-CR
IN RE JOHN HENRY GARBER
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Henry Garber seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the County Court of Delta
County to rule on several pro se pretrial motions he filed in three misdemeanor cases. 1 The face
of the record Garber presents to this Court reveals reason to deny his petition: Garber contends
that the trial court has failed to rule when Garber himself has failed to appear.
I. Background
Garber’s petition complains of eleven motions across three misdemeanor cases. Garber’s
petition, with attachments, is twenty-eight pages. Meaning that the record Garber brings forward
is scant, especially in light of the broad relief sought.
Included in the record, Garber brings forward the “REGISTER[S] OF ACTIONS” for three
cases in the trial court. The registers indicate the following information below.
Garber was arrested for displaying a fictitious license plate on May 25, 2024. He was
bonded out of jail on that charge on May 27, 2024. On November 14, 2024, new cases were
filed against Garber, and the trial court set a hearing for December 16, 2024. Garber did not
appear at the hearing, resulting in the trial court issuing a warrant for Garber’s arrest. Thereafter,
no entries appear on the registers until a spate of filings, beginning on August 18, 2025. Those
filings are now the subject of Garber’s petition.
The registers for the two other cases (both regarding a charge of unlawfully carrying a
weapon) likewise show that Garber bonded out of jail on May 27, 2024, new charges were filed,
1 Garber’s trial court cause numbers are 24-060-CCCR-0065, 24-060-CCCR-0066, and 24-060-CCCR-0067. 2 the trial court set a hearing (also on December 16, 2024), Garber did not appear, the trial court
issued warrants for Garber’s arrest, and thereafter Garber made numerous filings.
There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that Garber has been re-arrested (or
has voluntarily returned to custody and then bonded out again). Indeed, Garber’s notice and
demand for ruling to the trial court begins by stating that he is “appearing specially[,] and by
paper only.”
II. Standard of Review
In a criminal case, “[m]andamus relief may be granted if a relator shows that: (1) the act
sought to be compelled is purely ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law.” In re
McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). To establish
entitlement to mandamus relief, a relator is required to show that the trial court failed to
complete a ministerial act. See In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (orig. proceeding). An act is considered ministerial “if the relator can show . . . a clear
right to the relief sought.” Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals at Texarkana, 236
S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding)). A clear right to the requested
relief is shown when the facts and circumstances require but “one rational decision ‘under
unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and
clearly controlling legal principles.’” In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting
Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810). “Mandamus is not available to compel a discretionary act as
distinguished from a ministerial act.” State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 899
3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (orig. proceeding). The relator also bears the burden to provide a record
sufficient to establish his entitlement to relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l), 52.7(a); In re Chavez,
62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).
In criminal cases, parties seeking a writ of mandamus for a trial court’s alleged failure to
rule face a presentment requirement (merely filing a motion is not enough, they must ask the trial
court for a ruling on that specific motion) and a reasonable time requirement (the trial court must
be afforded a reasonable time to rule, even after a motion has been filed and presented to the trial
court). In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding);
In re Hardy, No. 03-25-00028-CV, 2025 WL 352167, at *1 (Tex. App. Austin Jan. 31, 2025,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661). The reasonable time
requirement is dependent on the circumstances of each case, and even the trial court’s overall
docket. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 663; In re Hardy, 2025 WL 352167, at *1. A party
seeking mandamus relief has the burden of providing the appellate court with a sufficient record
to establish its right to mandamus relief. Lizcano v. Chatham, 416 S.W.3d 862, 863 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (Alcala, J., concurring).
III. Analysis
Mailing in complaints to a court of appeals while you are on the run from the law is
rarely successful. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993) (“It has been
settled for well over a century that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who
is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.”). Under such circumstances,
dismissal of the appeal does not abridge the constitutional rights of the appellant. See id. at 239–
4 40. “[A]n appellate court may employ dismissal as a sanction when a defendant’s flight operates
as an affront to the dignity of the court’s proceedings.” Id. at 246. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has held to the same effect: “In our view, the dignity of an appellate court is maligned
by an appellant who attempts to access the power of the judicial system to reverse a conviction,
while at the same time treating with contemptuous disregard the authority of the judiciary to
mandate his incarceration.” Luciano v. State, 906 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In a regular appeal, we would be required to dismiss based on an affidavit from the State:
“The appellate court must dismiss an appeal on the State’s motion, supported by affidavit,
showing that the appellant has escaped from custody pending the appeal and that to the affiant’s
knowledge, the appellant has not, within ten days after escaping, voluntarily returned to lawful
custody within the state.” TEX. R. APP. P. 42.4. Were we to consider a regular appeal under such
circumstances, it would be a waste of judicial resources. See Lewis v. State, 698 S.W.3d 264,
265 (Tex. Crim. App.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00051-CR
IN RE JOHN HENRY GARBER
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Henry Garber seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the County Court of Delta
County to rule on several pro se pretrial motions he filed in three misdemeanor cases. 1 The face
of the record Garber presents to this Court reveals reason to deny his petition: Garber contends
that the trial court has failed to rule when Garber himself has failed to appear.
I. Background
Garber’s petition complains of eleven motions across three misdemeanor cases. Garber’s
petition, with attachments, is twenty-eight pages. Meaning that the record Garber brings forward
is scant, especially in light of the broad relief sought.
Included in the record, Garber brings forward the “REGISTER[S] OF ACTIONS” for three
cases in the trial court. The registers indicate the following information below.
Garber was arrested for displaying a fictitious license plate on May 25, 2024. He was
bonded out of jail on that charge on May 27, 2024. On November 14, 2024, new cases were
filed against Garber, and the trial court set a hearing for December 16, 2024. Garber did not
appear at the hearing, resulting in the trial court issuing a warrant for Garber’s arrest. Thereafter,
no entries appear on the registers until a spate of filings, beginning on August 18, 2025. Those
filings are now the subject of Garber’s petition.
The registers for the two other cases (both regarding a charge of unlawfully carrying a
weapon) likewise show that Garber bonded out of jail on May 27, 2024, new charges were filed,
1 Garber’s trial court cause numbers are 24-060-CCCR-0065, 24-060-CCCR-0066, and 24-060-CCCR-0067. 2 the trial court set a hearing (also on December 16, 2024), Garber did not appear, the trial court
issued warrants for Garber’s arrest, and thereafter Garber made numerous filings.
There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that Garber has been re-arrested (or
has voluntarily returned to custody and then bonded out again). Indeed, Garber’s notice and
demand for ruling to the trial court begins by stating that he is “appearing specially[,] and by
paper only.”
II. Standard of Review
In a criminal case, “[m]andamus relief may be granted if a relator shows that: (1) the act
sought to be compelled is purely ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law.” In re
McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). To establish
entitlement to mandamus relief, a relator is required to show that the trial court failed to
complete a ministerial act. See In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (orig. proceeding). An act is considered ministerial “if the relator can show . . . a clear
right to the relief sought.” Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Appeals at Texarkana, 236
S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding)). A clear right to the requested
relief is shown when the facts and circumstances require but “one rational decision ‘under
unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and
clearly controlling legal principles.’” In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting
Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810). “Mandamus is not available to compel a discretionary act as
distinguished from a ministerial act.” State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 899
3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (orig. proceeding). The relator also bears the burden to provide a record
sufficient to establish his entitlement to relief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l), 52.7(a); In re Chavez,
62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).
In criminal cases, parties seeking a writ of mandamus for a trial court’s alleged failure to
rule face a presentment requirement (merely filing a motion is not enough, they must ask the trial
court for a ruling on that specific motion) and a reasonable time requirement (the trial court must
be afforded a reasonable time to rule, even after a motion has been filed and presented to the trial
court). In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding);
In re Hardy, No. 03-25-00028-CV, 2025 WL 352167, at *1 (Tex. App. Austin Jan. 31, 2025,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661). The reasonable time
requirement is dependent on the circumstances of each case, and even the trial court’s overall
docket. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 663; In re Hardy, 2025 WL 352167, at *1. A party
seeking mandamus relief has the burden of providing the appellate court with a sufficient record
to establish its right to mandamus relief. Lizcano v. Chatham, 416 S.W.3d 862, 863 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (Alcala, J., concurring).
III. Analysis
Mailing in complaints to a court of appeals while you are on the run from the law is
rarely successful. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993) (“It has been
settled for well over a century that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who
is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.”). Under such circumstances,
dismissal of the appeal does not abridge the constitutional rights of the appellant. See id. at 239–
4 40. “[A]n appellate court may employ dismissal as a sanction when a defendant’s flight operates
as an affront to the dignity of the court’s proceedings.” Id. at 246. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals has held to the same effect: “In our view, the dignity of an appellate court is maligned
by an appellant who attempts to access the power of the judicial system to reverse a conviction,
while at the same time treating with contemptuous disregard the authority of the judiciary to
mandate his incarceration.” Luciano v. State, 906 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In a regular appeal, we would be required to dismiss based on an affidavit from the State:
“The appellate court must dismiss an appeal on the State’s motion, supported by affidavit,
showing that the appellant has escaped from custody pending the appeal and that to the affiant’s
knowledge, the appellant has not, within ten days after escaping, voluntarily returned to lawful
custody within the state.” TEX. R. APP. P. 42.4. Were we to consider a regular appeal under such
circumstances, it would be a waste of judicial resources. See Lewis v. State, 698 S.W.3d 264,
265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (per curiam) (“order[ing] the court of appeals to withdraw its
opinion” once the State submitted a Rule 42.4 affidavit).
This is not a regular appeal. This is a petition for an extraordinary writ of mandamus.
Garber bears the burden to bring forward a complete record and to show a clear right to relief
based on the record. Based on the registers, Garber’s right to relief is, to put it mildly, unclear.
5 We deny Garber’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
Jeff Rambin Justice
Date Submitted: April 24, 2026 Date Decided: April 27, 2026
Do Not Publish