In re: Joanice Jimenez Salgado v. LPP Mortgage, Ltd.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided March 6, 2012·No. 10-00100·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

IN RE: Case No. 09-07166 (MCF)

JOANICE JIMENEZ SALGADO Chapter 13

Debtor(s) FILED & ENTERED ON 03/06/2012

JOANICE JIMENEZ SALGADO Adv. No. 10-00100 (MCF) Plaintiff(s),

v.

LPP MORTGAGE, LTD,

Defendant(s)

DECISION AND ORDER

The instant proceeding involves the determination of whether Defendant, LPP Mortgage, Ltd. (hereafter referred to as "Defendant"), incurred in a violation of the Chapter 7 discharge injunction against Plaintiff/Debtor, Joanice Jimenez Salgado (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff"). The case was submitted to the Court as a matter of law for the preliminary issue of alleged violation of the discharge injunction by joint agreement of the parties at the Pretrial hearing held on November 17, 2011 (Docket No. 22). The issue of sanctions and/or award of damages, if any, has been held in abeyance subject to the 1 Court's resolution of this initial matter. The matter stands submitted based on the argumentation and uncontested facts contained at the parties' joint pretrial report (Docket No. 21) and the Spanish translations of the parties' pretrial exhibits (Docket No. 25). Consequently, the matter is ripe for Court determination.

I. UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The relevant undisputed facts in this case are as follows: 1. Plaintiff and her husband filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 22, 2002 (Docket No. 1 of Case No. 02-01818 (ESL)). 2. On March 12, 2002, Beal Bank (the then holder of the mortgage note at bar) filed Proof of Claim No. 1 in the above- referenced bankruptcy case as a secured creditor for the principal sum of $53,700.00, plus interest, secured by a second mortgage over a real property located in Toa Baja, Puerto Rico (Exhibit 3 of Docket No. 25). 3. Plaintiff and her husband obtained a discharge order on April 15, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Discharge Order"), which was notified to parties in interest, including Beal Bank, by first class mail on April 17, 2003 (Exhibit 1 and 2 of Docket No. 25).

2 4. Defendant, the current holder of the mortgage note, and the successor-in-interest of Beal Bank with regards to the note in question, filed a Complaint to foreclose the aforementioned note before the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Court of First Instance, Toa Alta Section on September 12, 2006, Case No. DC-2006-02670 (hereafter referenced to as the "Local Court Complaint")(Exhibit 7 of Docket No. 25). 5. A collection and foreclosure judgment was entered against Plaintiff and her husband on November 27, 2006 (hereafter referenced to as the "Local Court Judgment") (Exhibit 8 of Docket No. 25). The same included a provision which allows Defendant to collect from Plaintiff any deficiency left in the payment of the loan after the judicial sale of the property is completed. 6. Plaintiff filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 28, 2009 (Docket No. 1 of Case No. 09-07166 (MCF)). 7. Defendant filed Proof of Claim No. 3 in Plaintiff's Chapter 13 case on October 28, 2009 (hereafter referenced to as "POC No. 3"). Defendant's claim was filed as partially secured and partially unsecured for the amount reflected in the Local Court Judgment (Exhibit 9 of Docket No. 25). 8. Plaintiff filed the instant Adversary Proceeding on June 22, 2010 (Docket No. 1). 3 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS One of the mayor cornerstones of our bankruptcy system and the ultimate goal for any individual debtor in bankruptcy is the issuance of a discharge injunction by the Court. The discharge is one of the primordial mechanisms which allows a debtor to obtain a financial "fresh start" as a result of the bankruptcy process. Laboy v. Firstbank P.R. (In re Laboy), Adv. No. 09-00047 (ESL), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 345 (Bankr. D.P.R. Feb. 2, 2010) (Lamoutte, J.); In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). The effects of the discharge injunction are outlined in Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524. Section 524(a) states, in relevant part, that: (a) A discharge in a case under this title--

(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;

(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) & (2).

4 While the bankruptcy discharge has been categorized as "extinguishing or releasing" debt, the truth of the matter is that a discharge does not address the continuing validity of the discharged debt. As such, the true "effect of a discharge is to interpose a permanent prohibition against debt collection rather than to absolve the underlying debt retroactively." 3 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. § 58:2 (3d. ed. 2012) (hereinafter "Norton"). Should a creditor whose debt has been discharged in bankruptcy incur in postdischarge efforts to collect on its debt, it will be liable for violation of the discharge injunction under Section 524(a) of the Code. Section 524(a) ensures that a discharge will be completely effective and will operate as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action or the employment of process to collect or recover a debt as a personal liability of the debtor. Thus, it protects the debtor from a subsequent suit in a state court, or any other act to collect, by a creditor whose claim had been discharged in the title 11 case.

4-524 Collier on Bankruptcy P. 524.02 (2011) (emphasis added) (hereinafter "Collier"). It must be clarified, however, that Section 524(a) is not a blanket prohibition against every and all actions undertaken by creditors after the entry of discharge. In this regard, "[c]reditors are not prevented from postdischarge enforcement of a valid lien on property of the debtor that existed at the time of 5 the entry of the order for relief, if the lien was not avoided under the Code." Id. Particularly, unless the creditor's lien was invalidated during the bankruptcy proceeding, a secured creditor's lien survives and is unaffected by the discharge injunction. Furthermore, the discharge injunction does not prevent the creditor from enforcing its lien, including the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Id.; Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991); Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 6 S.Ct. 917, 29 L.Ed. 1004 (1886); In re Moscoso Villaronga, 111 B.R. 13, 17-18 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1989) (de Jesus, J.). When faced with this type of scenario, it is extremely important to define which enforcement rights are retained by the secured creditors postdischarge, and which actions are prohibited as a result of the entry of the discharge injunction. In the context of a secured creditor's postdischarge remedies for enforcement of its liens, the "[a]ctions to collect against the debtor personally are enjoined. The creditor's action in enforcing a lien is against the property and is an action in rem with no recourse available against the debtor for any deficiency." Norton, supra, § 58:4 (emphasis added). See also In re Smiley, 26 B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. D. Kan.

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