J-S08015-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.O., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: D.O., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 2748 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-00013
IN RE: A.O., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: D.O., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 2749 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-00014
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 3, 2025
Appellant, D.O. (“Mother”), appeals from the September 23, 2024
decrees entered in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas that terminated
her parental rights to 13-year-old J.O. and 12-year-old A.O. (collectively,
“Children”). Mother’s counsel, Oressa Campbell, Esq., has filed a petition to
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S08015-25
withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief,1 to which Mother has not filed a
response. Upon review, we grant Attorney Campbell’s petition to withdraw
and affirm.
A.
We glean the relevant factual and procedural history from the trial court
opinion and the certified record. J.O. was born in May 2011, and A.O. was
born in April 2012. Wayne County Children and Youth Services (“the Agency”)
became involved with the family in 2018 and placed Children in the care of
their maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”). 2 In 2020, the trial
court granted Maternal Grandmother Subsidized Permanent Legal Custody of
Children and discharged the case. While Children lived with Maternal
Grandmother, Mother and Maternal Grandmother had privately agreed to
allow Mother to visit with Children. However, there were “times [when] the
police had to be called because [Mother] became unreasonable and [Children]
felt not safe [sic].” N.T. Hr’g, 9/20/24, at 39.
When Maternal Grandmother passed away in 2023, the Agency placed
Children in the care of their maternal aunt and uncle (“Maternal Aunt and
Uncle”), who began residing in Maternal Grandmother’s home.
The privately-arranged visits between Mother and Children stopped
after Maternal Grandmother’s passing but, at some point prior to October of ____________________________________________
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2 The record does not indicate why the Agency originally became involved with
the family.
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2023, Children had “one or two visits with [Mother] therapeutically with Susan
Grierson[3] . . . .and it was deemed that it was not going well[,]” so visits
“w[ere] left to [Children’s] comfort level.” Id. at 11, 40. The current court
order regarding visitation states that it should occur “[w]hen deemed
therapeutically appropriate.” Id. at 11.
In March 2023, the Agency re-established a permanency plan for
Children. Mother’s objectives included obtaining a mental health evaluation
and following all recommendations, having a clinical meeting with the agency
for visitation to resume, appropriately parenting and disciplining Children, and
maintaining appropriate housing. Mother failed to comply with these
objectives.
Crucially, Mother failed to comply with recommended mental health
treatment. She failed to obtain a mental health evaluation until May 2024,
when she had an evaluation with John Seasock, Psy.D., L.P.C. Dr. Seasock
evaluated Mother over four sessions in May and June 2024 and diagnosed her
with Delusional Disorder-persecutory type. He recommended, inter alia, that
Mother maintain stable housing and obtain mental health treatment and that
she only resume being Children’s primary caregiver once she had complied
with these conditions. Ex. 4-Psychological Evaluation at 1 (unpaginated).
Mother failed to comply with Dr. Seasock’s recommendations, and thus,
he never deemed visitation therapeutically appropriate. She also never
3 Ms. Grierson’s title and role are not clear from the record.
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attended a clinical meeting with the agency. Accordingly, subsequent
visitation did not occur. N.T. Hr’g at 11-14, 23.
Mother also failed to maintain appropriate housing. Although Mother
consistently states that she owns and lives at Maternal Grandmother’s former
house, Maternal Aunt and Uncle live in that house with Children. Accordingly,
Mother is not permitted to be there. Mother has pending criminal charges
relating to trespassing at Maternal Grandmother’s house in 2023. Agency
caseworker Shannon Guinard offered Mother assistance in finding housing
through an unnamed program in Wayne County, but Mother refused.
Statement of Reasons, 10/28/24, at 4; N.T. Hr’g at 21.
J.O. continues to live with Maternal Aunt and Uncle and is doing well in
the home. A.O. has attended boarding school since February 2024 but
continues to live with Maternal Aunt and Uncle on school breaks. She has
been doing well both with Maternal Aunt and Uncle and while away at school.
On July 10, 2024, the Agency filed identical petitions to terminate
Mother’s parental rights to each of the Children. The petitions stated that the
Agency placed Children with Maternal Aunt and Uncle because “there
continues to be concerns about [Mother’s] mental health[;]” she was
unsuccessful in facilitating Children’s return home and “has not received any
services at this time[;]” and she “threatened to pick up [Children] from school”
during the dependency proceeding. Petitions for Termination of Parental
Rights, 7/10/24, at ¶ 9. This led the Agency to determine that Mother was
“not a safe and appropriate parent.” Id. The petitions also alleged that
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Mother had remained homeless during “much of the dependency
[proceeding,]” “has not consistently complied with mental health
treatment[,]” “has pending criminal charges related to trespassing to [sic] a
home [in which] she insists she resides[,]” and has not complied with a
Parental Fitness Evaluation. Id. at ¶ 11. Finally, the Agency stated that
Children are “afraid to go out in public for fear of” seeing Mother. Id.
The parties proceeded to a hearing on September 20, 2024. Attorney
Campbell represented Mother, who was present. R.O. (“Father”) failed to
appear, but his counsel was present. Lindsey Collins, Esq. served as both
Children’s legal counsel and Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) after the court
determined there was no conflict in counsel serving in the dual role.
Statement of Reasons at 1, n.1.
The Agency presented testimony from Agency caseworker Shannon
Guinard and Dr. Seasock, and Mother testified on her own behalf. First, Ms.
Guinard testified consistently with the above facts. She also rated Mother’s
compliance with the permanency plan as “minimal” as of July 25, 2023,
October 17, 2023, and January 9, 2024, and “moderate” as of April 9, 2024
and the date of the hearing on September 20, 2024. N.T. Hr’g at 19.
Ms. Guinard also testified that Children are “very uncomfortable in
[Mother’s] presence.” Id. at 12. She further testified that Mother has
observed Children while they were in the community—J.O. while he was at the
park, and A.O. while she and Ms. Guinard met with A.O.’s counselor at a
restaurant. Id. at 23-24. She further testified that, while one of Mother’s
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objectives was to appropriately parent and discipline Children, Mother has not
had a chance to meet that objective because Children had not lived with her
in 6 years.
Ms. Guinard further testified that Children have been in their current
placement for 18 months, and that termination of parental rights is in
Children’s best interest so that they may achieve permanency with Maternal
Aunt and Uncle. She explained that Children are bonded with Maternal Aunt
and Uncle, are not bonded with Mother, and have asked for termination of
Mother’s parental rights. Finally, Ms. Guinard testified that the conditions that
led to their original placement in 2018 have not been resolved.
Dr. Seasock testified that he evaluated Mother in May and June 2024
for the purpose of resuming custody.4 He explained that he diagnosed Mother
with Delusional Disorder, which means that she “has a fixed belief system that
[she] believes is true no matter what evidence or contrary information [is
provided,]” and that her disorder is the “persecutory” type, meaning that
when someone challenges a held belief, the individual perceives persecution
and becomes agitated and “there’s reactionary mood disturbance.” N.T. Hr’g
at 47. Dr. Seasock testified that Mother’s delusions relate to her belief that
she was permitted to be at Maternal Grandmother’s former house, the
delusions persist even though Mother is not permitted to be there, and
4 Dr. Seasock testified that their visits continued into July 2024, but according
to the evaluation, the last session was on June 28, 2024. Ex. 4-Psychological Evaluation at 1 (unpaginated).
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Maternal Aunt and Uncle continue to call the police when she goes there,
resulting in legal trouble for Mother. Id. at 48.
Dr. Seasock further testified that he recommended that Mother maintain
housing for 6 months and get treatment if these delusions persisted. He also
noted that her delusions do not affect Mother’s ability to work. He also
testified that Mother was cooperative when meeting with him, but that he does
not know if she followed his recommendation about mental health treatment.
Regarding Children, Dr. Seasock explained that he met with Children
multiple times during the fall and winter of 2023, prior to Mother’s evaluation.
He testified that he conducted an evaluation to ascertain Children’s
attachment to Mother from which he concluded that Children do not have a
bond with Mother. He further testified that Children do not want to see Mother
and, in fact, the prospect of contact with her makes them anxious. Dr.
Seasock opined that he “can’t force a psychological bond” and attempting to
do so would be detrimental to Children. Id. at 50.
Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf. She explained that she was
employed until February 2024, when she could no longer work because she
no longer had access to a vehicle. She maintained that she initially reached
out to Dr. Seasock in December 2023, but that she has not received a mental
health diagnosis. She also stated that she purchased Maternal Grandmother’s
house and that she currently rents a room in another person’s apartment.
She asserted that she put forth her best effort to comply with the permanency
plan, that she can be an appropriate parent, and that she does not think
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termination of her parental rights is in Children’s best interests. Finally, she
introduced photographs from November 2022 that showed her engaging in
activities with Children while they lived with Maternal Grandmother.
Following the hearing, the court changed Children’s permanency goals
from reunification to adoption, and on September 23, 2024, the court issued
decrees terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. 5
B.
Mother timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On December 16, 2024, Attorney Campbell filed an Anders
brief indicating that, upon review, Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Mother
did not respond.
In the Anders brief, Attorney Campbell indicated that Mother wished to
raise the following issues for our review:
1. Are there any non-frivolous issues preserved for appeal?
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the parental rights of the Appellant mother, D.O., was warranted?
3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the termination of parental rights of the Appellant mother, D.O., would serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the minor child?
Anders Br. at 5.
C.
5 Father is not a party to this appeal.
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As a preliminary matter, we address appellate counsel’s request to
withdraw as counsel. “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may
not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the
request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.
Super. 2010). To withdraw from an appeal pursuant to Anders, our Supreme
Court has determined that counsel must meet the following requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).
Attorney Campbell has complied with the mandated procedure for
withdrawal. Additionally, she confirms that she sent Mother a copy of the
Anders brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter explaining to Mother
that she has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any
additional points. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751-52
(Pa. Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements).
Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, we will address
the substantive issues raised in the Anders brief. We must “make a full
examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide
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whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355
n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190,
1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires the reviewing court
to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with consideration first
of issues raised by counsel.”).
D.
In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, our
review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is
supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,
591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings
of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports
them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings
are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial
court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse “merely because
the record would support a different result.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give
great deference to the “trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
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credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make
decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot
be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent
and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an
undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.”
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n
recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the
moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as
to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts [at] issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which governs
termination of parental rights, requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially, the
focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d
1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated
in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of her parental rights, the court then
engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
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determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree
with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). In its opinion, the court presented
findings that supported termination under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (5). We
concentrate our analysis in this case on Section 2511(a)(2).
Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights where the
petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,
827 (Pa. 2012). The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative
misconduct; “those grounds may [also] include acts of refusal as well as
incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d
1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds
by In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023). “Parents are required to make
diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
duties.” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, a
“parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
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the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
or disingenuous.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
*
The trial court determined that Mother has not provided “essential
parental care, control, and subs[iste]nce necessary for [Children’s] mental
well-being[].” Statement of Reasons at 5. Specifically, it found that Mother’s
progress has been “minimal throughout the dependency period,” noting that
she failed to obtain appropriate housing and refused mental health treatment
despite her diagnosis. Id. at 4-5. It also noted that Children have been with
Maternal Aunt and Uncle for 18 months and that they deserve permanency.
Id. at 5.
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised
its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). Mother failed to comply with the permanency plan, specifically
by failing to attend mental health treatment sessions and acquire stable
housing. Due to her lack of compliance with mental health treatment,
visitation was not therapeutically appropriate, and thus, it never resumed.
She also remains without stable housing. Accordingly, the record supports
the trial court’s conclusion that Mother failed to provide essential parental
care, control, and subsistence to Children. Thus, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2).
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E.
Regarding Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that
terminating the parental bond will have on the children. We review “whether
termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991
A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and
welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the
nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018)
(citation omitted). Moreover, the trial court may consider “intangibles, such
as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the
[adoptive resource].” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of the
child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
The trial court found that Children are doing well with Maternal Aunt and
Uncle, who have been providing for their needs and who are an adoptive
resource. Statement of Reasons at 3, 5. The court also explained that
Children do not have a bond with Mother, they are afraid to see Mother in
public, and they requested to have no visitation with her. Id. at 4-5. Finally,
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the court found that Children have been with Maternal Aunt and Uncle for 18
months and deserve permanency. Id. at 5.
The record supports the trial court’s findings. Notably, Children have
not lived with Mother for over six years. The court heard undisputed testimony
from Ms. Guinard that Children are doing well with Maternal Aunt and Uncle,
who meet all their needs. The court also heard testimony from both Dr.
Seasock and Ms. Guinard that Children have no bond with Mother and, from
Ms. Guinard, that Children are in favor of termination. See N.T. Hr’g at 14,
53. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination
that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of Children.
F.
Following our review of the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief, we
agree with counsel that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights. In addition, our independent review of
the proceedings reveals there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on
appeal. Accordingly, we grant Attorney Campbell’s petition to withdraw as
counsel and affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Decrees affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
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Date: 4/3/2025
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