IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-1105
Filed 5 November 2024
Surry County, Nos. 21 JT 51-52
IN THE MATTER OF: J.M.V., JR. & S.M.Z.
Appeal by respondent-parents from orders entered 30 August 2023 by Judge
Gretchen Hollar Kirkman in Surry County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 11 October 2024.
R. Blake Cheek for petitioner-appellee Surry County Department of Social Services.
James N. Freeman, Jr. for Guardian ad Litem.
Anné C. Wright for respondent-appellant father.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant mother.
TYSON, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her
parental rights to her minor children J.M.V. (“James”) and S.M.Z (“Stephen”) on the
grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and dependency.
Respondent-father, the biological father of James, appeals from the trial court’s
orders terminating his parental rights upon the same grounds. See N.C. R. App. P.
42(b) (pseudonyms used to protect the identity of minors).
I. Background
The Surry County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed juvenile IN RE J.M.V., JR & S.M.Z.
Opinion of the Court
petitions on 16 April 2021, alleging then seven-year-old Stephen and three-year-old
James were neglected and dependent juveniles due to improper care, supervision,
discipline, and remedial care; and both were living in an injurious environment. DSS
had become involved with the family on 31 March 2021 on alleged improper
supervision when James was allegedly left unattended and fell down at least five
stairs. Respondent-mother thought James may have a concussion, but she did not
seek medical attention.
DSS met with the family on 15 April 2021 at The Shepherd’s House, where the
family was residing at the time, to conduct a child and family team meeting and to
identify an alternative safety plan for the children. DSS learned the children had not
eaten or drank fluids that day as of 11:30 a.m., and they had not been allowed to
drink the night prior because they failed to consume all of their food for supper.
Respondent-father admitted he suffered from bi-polar disorder, depression,
panic attacks, and ADHD, but he was not receiving treatment. Respondent-mother
admitted she had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety, but she also was not
receiving treatment. Respondent-mother also reported she had been recently having
seizures, which had gotten worse with stress, and respondent-father would not allow
her to get medical treatment because of their inability to pay the medical bills.
The petitions also alleged Stephen had been previously placed in foster care in
Iredell County in 2016 and was adjudicated neglected, due to respondent-mother’s
untreated mental health issues, chronic homelessness, and her inability to meet
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Stephen’s basic needs. Following Stephen’s return to respondents’ care, the family
resided in multiple states and in several shelters without staying involved with
services put in place. Based upon these allegations, DSS obtained nonsecure custody
of the children on 16 April 2021.
On 19 April 2021, respondents entered into case plans to address issues of
mental health needs, parenting capacity/skills, lack of housing, and employment.
Respondent-father’s plan also addressed anger management.
Due to a conflict of interest with Surry County DSS, the case was transferred
to Yadkin County on or about 5 May 2021. The Yadkin County District Court held a
hearing on the petitions on 7 October 2021. On 3 November 2021, the court entered
an order adjudicating the children as neglected and dependent juveniles. The court
found both children had unaddressed speech delays and respondent-mother suffered
from cognitive impairment.
Respondent-mother also had physical health issues causing her “hands [to]
shake uncontrollably and she [was] very limited (sic) in the care she can provide the
children. [Respondent-father] ha[d] to focus on providing care for the mother which
thereby diminishe[d] his ability to provide adequate care to the children.”
Respondents were given one hour of supervised visitation every two weeks,
contingent upon them appearing sober and not being incarcerated.
In a separate disposition order entered the same day, the court transferred the
matter to Surry County, after having determined that the conflict of interest no
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longer existed and continued custody of the children with Surry County DSS.
The Surry County District Court held a permanency planning hearing on 20
January 2022. The court set the permanent plan as reunification with respondents
with a secondary plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. The court also
ordered respondents to obtain mental health assessments and comply with the
necessary and recommended treatment and to comply with the components of their
case plans in an order entered 31 January 2022.
Following a 15 September 2022 review hearing, the trial court entered a
permanency planning order on 17 October 2022 changing the primary permanent
plan to termination of parental rights and adoption with a secondary plan of
reunification. The court found since the last hearing, Stephen had alleged
respondents’ had sexually abused him while he was in their care. DSS investigated
the allegations and internally substantiated sexual abuse by both respondents.
Respondents were placed on the responsible individuals list (“RIL”) and did not
petition for judicial review. The court also found DSS noted some concerns regarding
respondent-mother’s decline in health. She requires assistance getting in and out of
chairs, to maintain her balance, and to get down and up from the floor during visits.
The court found respondents had not actively engaged in or cooperated with the
plans, DSS, or the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and had acted inconsistently with the
health or safety of their children. The court ordered no visitation for respondents due
to Stephen’s allegations and the internal DSS substantiation of the sexual abuse.
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DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights, on 2 March 2023,
based upon the grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress to
correct the conditions which led to the children’s removal from the home, and
dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (6) (2023).
The trial court heard the motion on 18 April and 7 June 2023. In an order
entered 30 August 2023, the trial court found all three grounds existed to terminate
respondents’ parental rights as alleged in the petitions. In a separate disposition
order, the court concluded termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the
children’s best interests and terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to
James and Stephen, and respondent-father’s parental rights to James. Respondents
timely filed notices of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(7)
(2023).
III. Analysis
Respondent-father and respondent-mother challenge several of the trial court’s
findings of fact as lacking sufficient evidentiary support and challenge the trial
court’s adjudication concluding grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental
rights to their children.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s adjudication concluding grounds exist to terminate
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parental rights “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence and [whether] the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re
E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311
N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)). “A trial court’s finding of fact that is
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed conclusive even if the
record contains evidence that would support a contrary finding.” In re R.G.L., 379
N.C. 452, 456, 866 S.E.2d 401, 408 (2021) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379,
831 S.E.2d 305 (2019)).
“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed [to be] supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831
S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (citation omitted). “Moreover, we review only those findings
necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.” Id. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59. “The trial court’s
conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19,
832 S.E.2d 692, 695 (2019) (citation omitted).
B. Respondent-Father’s Appeal
1. Challenged Findings
Respondent-father challenges findings of fact referencing Stephen’s
allegations of sexual abuse against respondents and DSS’ purported substantiation
of those allegations. Respondent-father challenges findings of fact 24, 71, 74, 75, 91,
94, 95, and 96, and asserts they are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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He argues the testimony from the social worker and the social worker supervisor was
inadmissible hearsay. Respondent-father argues the trial court erred in admitting
the hearsay and cumulative testimonies over respondents’ preserved objections.
a. Hearsay
Although respondent-father initially objected to the social worker’s testimony
on hearsay grounds, he failed to lodge a continuing objection or renew his objections
to the same testimony by the social worker later in her direct examination.
Respondent-father also elicited similar testimony during his cross-examination of
her. Respondent-father has lost the benefit of his prior objection. State v. Davis, 239
N.C. App. 522, 537, 768 S.E.2d 903, 912 (2015) (“When, as here, evidence is admitted
over objection, but the same or similar evidence has been previously admitted or is
later admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection is lost.”) (citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
During her direct examination, the social worker testified:
Q. Now, likewise with [respondent-father], Ms. - - I’m sorry, [respondent-mother], [Stephen] made allegations of sexual abuse against [respondent-father]?
A. He did.
Q. And as you testified to, those allegations were substantiated?
A. Correct.
Q. And was [respondent-father] placed on the RIL – the responsible individuals list?
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A. Yes, he was.
Q. As we sit here today, is he still on that list?
A. He is.
Q. Has [respondent-father] ever made any statements to the Department regarding his role or any type of culpability regarding those sexual abuse allegations?
A. He has.
Q. What are those statements?
A. He has stated that the Department has lied and made [Stephen] say those things.
Q. How many times has he made that statement to the Department?
A. I couldn’t count on one hand. Many times. Multiple times.
Q. Has he ever made any admission to the Department that he accepts responsibility for these allegations that were made against him?
A. No, he has not.
Q. To the Department’s knowledge, has [respondent- father] received any type of treatment or – mental health treatment regarding these sexual abuse allegations that were made against him?
A. I have no record of any treatment.
No objections were made to this testimony.
Respondent-father also failed to object to similar cumulative evidence by the
social worker supervisor later in her testimony. Respondent-father testified during
his direct examination regarding DSS’ purported substantiation of the sexual abuse
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allegations in September 2021, claiming Stephen’s foster parents had made them up
and had coached Stephen.
Respondent-father has waived his objections on hearsay grounds on appeal,
“and the social worker’s testimony must be considered to be competent evidence.” In
re J.C.L., 374 N.C. 772, 775, 845 S.E.2d 44, 49 (2020). The testimony of the social
worker and supervisor, as well as respondent-father’s own testimony, support the
trial court’s findings of fact, and they are “deemed conclusive for appellate review
purposes.” Id.
Respondent-father did not challenge other findings of fact referencing the
sexual abuse allegations, which are binding on appeal. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at
407, 831 S.E.2d at 58. The court found:
40. Respondent Father completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. Chris Shaeffer with TriCare, P.A. on March 10, 2022. . . . However, when asked about the sexual abuse allegations Respondent Father reported that the accusations were false.
41. Respondent Father continues to deny the accusations regarding the minor children’s allegations that he sexually assaulted the juveniles.
....
43. On multiple occasions, the Respondent Father accused the Department of directing the juveniles to lie about the sexual abuse allegations towards Respondent Father and Respondent Mother.
46. Respondent Father has not discussed the sexual abuse
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allegations with his counselor throughout the life of the underlying case.
Respondent-father’s challenges to findings of fact 24,71, 74, 75, 91, 94, 95, and 96
regarding the sexual abuse allegations are waived and overruled.
b. Finding of Fact 33
Respondent-father challenges the portion of finding of fact 33 stating that he
had “planned to reduce services with Easter[s]eals if the children were returned to
his custody and care.” He argues his testimony “was that he believed the need for
services would be somewhat reduced when the stress of family separation was no
longer present” and intensive in-home services would be “a must” if the children were
returned to their home.
During his cross examination, respondent-father testified:
Q. And at this point, [respondent-father], do you plan to continue to receive services for the foreseeable future?
A. Until everything dies down.
Q. What is everything dies down, [ ]?
A. Court, DHS, and getting our boys back, so.
Q. . . . So my understanding from what you just said is that if – that you – your plan would be, once all the court stuff dies down, to basically stop utilizing the – community support services for Easterseals?
A. As much. It still needs to be done right there, because for the – because I end up having in-home thing. They work with the family. Kids and the family, and they work
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with them. Because that’s a must anyway to have that.
During redirect, respondent-father testified he was going to try to use Easterseals
less after the children returned home “because there will be less stress, and the only
thing possibly do right there is, if needed, it will be the transportation be what’s
needed.”
Respondent-father further explained he believed he would need less
counseling, if the children were returned to his care, because the majority of the
reason he needed counseling at the time was for his depression from having his
children removed. He stated that he would not “be refusing support. It’s just I won’t
be needing them as much.” While ambiguous and viewed in another light the family
may need less care at home, the court’s finding respondent-father had planned to
reduce his services with Easterseals after the children were returned to his care is
supported. This finding, standing alone, would not support a conclusion to terminate
their parental rights.
c. Finding of Facts 36 and 86
Respondent-father challenges findings of fact 36 and 86 to the extent they find
he failed to display any improvements in his parenting skills during visitations after
completing the DSS plan’s mandated parenting course. He argues, although the
social worker testified she did not observe improvements in respondent-father’s
parenting before and after parenting classes, no evidence tends to shows she had
observed any visits prior to respondent-father completing his parenting class because
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supervision was still with Yadkin County DSS at that time.
The social worker testified that she did not see a discernible difference in the
visits after completion of the parenting classes, she did not see either respondent
implement any skills from the parenting course on a consistent basis, and
respondent-father showed “the same behavior before the completion of it to after the
end of the visits that we had.”
The social worker testified respondent-father had spent most of his attention
during visits on respondent-mother and making sure her needs were met. While
social worker testified he did engage in more play with the children, “[t]here were
still multiple bathroom breaks during the [two-hour] visits.” The social worker
supervisor also cumulatively testified she had not observed respondents demonstrate
additional skills or show any improvement in their parenting abilities after
completing the DSS’s mandated plan parenting classes. This testimony supports the
trial court’s findings. Respondent-father’s challenge is overruled.
d. Finding of Fact 42
Respondent-father next challenges finding of fact 42 in which the court found
that he “shows no comprehension of the juveniles’ needs as he continues to deny that
either of the juveniles are developmentally delayed or in need of any services.”
Respondent-father asserts he acknowledged both children had speech delays, needed
services, and had discussed the delays with the parenting educator. We agree.
Respondent-father testified that he knew James needed speech therapy and
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had worked with him until they could get him into speech therapy and Stephen “had
to start school to get him in speech[.]” The parenting teacher also testified both
respondents had informed her of the developmental delays the children had,
including speech. We agree with respondents this finding is not supported, does not
meet any of DSS’ burdens, and fails to support any conclusion. We disregard it. In
re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 901, 845 S.E.2d 16, 24 (2020) (disregarding findings of fact not
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence).
e. Finding of Fact 47
Respondent-father challenges the portion of finding of fact 47 stating that he
“lacks insight into how his actions affect the minor children” as unsupported by the
evidence. Respondent-father asserts he was both “involved and engaged” when
participating in his parenting class, and the parenting educator’s own assessments of
him showed improvement in his parenting skills at the end of the program.
At the termination hearing, respondent-father continued to challenge the
reasons the children were initially removed from the home, or the children were ever
abused or neglected. He asserted DSS, the foster parents, and the staff at The
Shephard’s House made up the allegations, because it is the fastest way to terminate
respondents’ parental rights and to get the children adopted. Substantial evidence
in the record supports the trial court’s finding. Respondent-father’s challenge is
overruled.
f. Findings of Fact 49 and 90
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Respondent-father also challenges findings of fact 49 and 90 in which the court
found that respondent-father continued to not take responsibility for his actions.
Respondent-father asserts he did not deny that the circumstances that led to the
children being removed from the home existed, but “[r]ather he denied that the
children were left alone[,]” or that he had abused the children, or that the children
were neglected in general.
He asserts his parental rights to challenge the accusations and “[t]hese denials
do not equate to a failure to take responsibility for his actions when the alleged
actions he denies were not properly found by the trial court to have happened.”
Respondent-father continued to challenge the reasons the children were
initially removed from their care and were neglected, despite the trial court having
previously adjudicated the children as neglected. In the initial adjudication order,
the court had found that the children were neglected based in part on them being “left
unattended” while at “The Shepherd’s House” where the family was residing at the
time, and James had purportedly fallen down the stairs.
During the termination hearing, respondent-father challenged the
adjudication finding he had left the children “alone unsupervised at the Shepherd’s
House.” Respondent-father also testified the foster parents had coached Stephen into
making the purported sexual abuse allegations to undermine their parental rights to
facilitate adoption. He asserts DSS did not work with them to meet the statutory and
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ordered goal of reunification, did not want anything to have to do with the truth
because truth did not “fit their narrative.”
The trial court found:
43. On multiple occasions, the Respondent Father accused [DSS] of directing the juveniles to lie about the sexual abuse allegations towards Respondent Father and Respondent Mother.
44. Respondent Father also accused staff at The Shepherd’s House of making false reports that the children were unsupervised and not being appropriately fed.
45. Respondent Father accused staff at The Shepherd’s House, DSS, the juveniles, and the juveniles’ foster parents of lying in order to keep the children away from him and Respondent Mother.
Even if findings of fact 49 and 90 are unsupported and untrue, Respondent-father did
not challenge findings of fact 43, 44 and 45, which are binding on appeal. These
findings support the trial court’s conclusions.
2. Grounds for Termination
Respondent-father challenges the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed
to terminate his parental rights based upon neglect. “[A] fit
parent is presumed to act in the child's best interest and that there is normally . . .
no reason for the [S]tate to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent’s children.” Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 60, 550 S.E.2d 499, 501
(2001) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 58 (2000)).
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Our Supreme Court has long and consistently held “natural parents have a
constitutionally protected interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control
of their children.” Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 72, 484 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1997); see
also David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 305, 608 S.E.2d 751, 752-53 (2005).
“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children ( i.e., is fit), there
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 147
L.Ed.2d at 58 (emphasis supplied).
“[A] natural parent may lose his constitutionally protected right to the control
of his children in one of two ways: (1) by a finding of unfitness of the natural parent,
or (2) where the natural parent’s conduct is inconsistent with his or her
constitutionally protected status.” David N., 359 N.C. at 307, 608 S.E.2d at 753.
“[W]hile a fit and suitable parent is entitled to the [care,] custody [and control] of his
child, it is equally true that where fitness and suitability are absent[,] he loses this
right,” subject to DSS supporting statutory reunification to preserve to family and aid
the parents to reunite with their children. Id. at 305, 608 S.E.2d at 753 citation and
quotation marks omitted); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 58;
Adams, 354 N.C. at 61, 550 S.E.2d at 502.
By statutory definition, a juvenile may only be found to be “neglected” when
their parent “[d]oes not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “[c]reates
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or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (a), (e) (2023). A trial court may terminate parental
rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) only upon a finding that the parent has
neglected their child such that the child meets the statutory definition of being a
“neglected juvenile” and DSS has proven the presence of the likelihood of future
neglect by the parent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2023).
“When a child has been out of the parent’s custody for a significant period of
time by the point at which the termination proceeding occurs, neglect may be
established by a showing that the child was neglected on a previous occasion and the
presence of the likelihood of future neglect by the parent if the child were to be
returned to the parent’s care.” In re J.D.O., 381 N.C. 799, 810, 874 S.E.2d 507, 517
(2022) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
“When determining whether such future neglect is likely, the [trial] court must
consider evidence of changed circumstances occurring between the period of past
neglect and the time of the termination hearing.” In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841,
851 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2020) (citation omitted). “Relevant to the determination of
probability of repetition of neglect is whether the parent has made any meaningful
progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the removal of the children.” In re
O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 654, 849 S.E.2d 824, 831 (2020) (citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has held:
We hold that evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing
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custody of a child . . . is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights. The trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect. The determinative factors must be the best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time of the termination proceeding.
In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (internal citation
omitted) (first two emphasis supplied).
Respondent-father does not challenge the trial court’s determination the
children were previously neglected, but he argues findings of fact are insufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that there was a likelihood of repetition of
neglect if James were returned home. Respondent-father argues he had complied
with his case plan and asserts his and respondent-mother’s circumstances had
significantly improved at the time of the termination hearing from the time when the
children were removed from their care. In re Ballard mandates the trial court must
“consider any evidence of changed conditions” and compliance with the case plan and
completion of portions thereof is evidence of and creates a presumption of “changed
conditions.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Although respondent-father did engage and participate in the services and
completed portions of DSS’ case plan, “a case plan is not just a checklist,” and parents
are “required to demonstrate acknowledgment and understanding of why the juvenile
entered DSS custody as well as changed behaviors.” In re R.L.R., 381 N.C. 863, 875,
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874 S.E.2d 579, 589 (2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
In re M.T., 285 N.C. App. 305, 332, 877 S.E.2d 732, 751 (2022) (“Parental compliance
with a case plan alone is not always sufficient to preserve parental rights.”).
The evidence and supported findings demonstrate respondent-father
completed most aspects of his case plan. He denied the children were ever neglected,
and blamed The Shepherd’s House and DSS for the children being removed from their
care. The court found respondent-father had completed the parenting class, and the
social worker and supervisor had opined he did not display improved parenting
capacity or demonstrate any skills learned during his visitations with the children.
Respondent-father continued to challenge the sexual abuse allegations,
accused the foster parents of making up the allegations, to facilitate their adoption of
his children and failed to discuss the allegations with his counselor throughout the
life of the case.
The court also found respondent-father “is solely reliant upon Easter[s]eals for
his day-to-day maintenance” and that “[i]t is expected” he “will continue to require
peer support services from Easter[s]eals for the foreseeable future[;]” however
respondent-father “planned to reduce his services with Easter[s]eals if the children
were returned to his custody and care.”
In arguing that the neglect ground should be reversed, respondent-father cites
this Court’s decision in In re C.N., 266 N.C. App. 463, 831 S.E.2d 878 (2019). In that
case, the children had been removed from the respondent-mother’s care after the
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youngest child had spilled Mr. Clean liquid detergent onto herself and the
respondent-mother had promptly sought medical assistance. Id. at 469, 831 S.E.2d
at 883. In reversing the ground of neglect, this Court determined that “[n]o evidence
shows and the trial court made no findings indicating such actions were likely to be
repeated.” Id. The Court also reversed the ground under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(2) for failing to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that
led to the children’s removal from the home. Although the respondent-mother had
not addressed all of the concerns from her case plan, this Court noted the uncontested
progress she had made and held that “[t]he evidence presented and the trial court’s
findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that ‘neglect is ongoing, and there
is a probability of repetition of neglect.’” Id.
This Court’s decision in In re C.N. was later reviewed by and remanded to this
Court from our Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in light of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 831 S.E.2d 305 (2019) and In re
D.W.P., 373 N.C. 327, 838 S.E.2d 396 (2020). In re C.N., 373 N.C. 568 (2020).
In the case of In re D.W.P., our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order
terminating the respondent-mother’s parental rights on the ground of neglect. In re
D.W.P., 373 N.C. at 340, 838 S.E.2d at 406. The respondent-mother’s eleven-month-
old son was treated for a broken femur and had numerous other fractures that were
in the process of healing. Id. at 328, 838 S.E.2d at 399.
In affirming the trial court’s conclusion that neglect was likely to reoccur if the
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children were returned to the respondent-mother’s care, our Supreme Court
recognized the respondent-mother had made some progress on her case plan, but it
noted the troublesome nature of the respondent-mother’s “continued failure to
acknowledge the likely cause of [her son’s] injuries.” Id. at 339, 838 S.E.2d at 406.
The Court further noted that despite the mother’s recognition that her fiancé
could have caused her son’s injuries, she had re-established a relationship with him
that resulted in domestic violence and had “refuse[d] to make a realistic attempt to
understand how [her son] was injured or to acknowledge how her relationships affect
her children’s wellbeing.” Id. at 340, 838 S.E.2d at 406
Upon remand in In re C.N., this Court again reversed the trial court’s
termination of the mother’s parental rights on the ground of neglect, determining
that “[n]o evidence shows and the trial court made no finding indicating either [the]
Respondent-mother had denied responsibility or a probability that her actions were
likely to be repeated.” In re C.N., 271 N.C. App. 20, 26, 842 S.E.2d 627, 630 (2020)
(emphasis supplied). In contrast to In re D.W.P., this Court determined that
“[n]othing indicates [the] Respondent-mother has continued to place her children at
risk or failed to acknowledge her neglect was the cause of the initial injury to [the
child] and the instance of lack of supervision of [another child].” Id.
Here, the trial court found respondent-father’s continued actions and how they
impacted the children, he continued to challenge the adjudication he had previously
neglected the children, and, a likelihood existed the children would be neglected again
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if returned to his home. The trial court’s findings sufficiently support its conclusion
grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to James based
upon neglect. See In re L.G.G., 379 N.C. 258, 271, 864 S.E.2d 302, 310 (2021). The
trial court did not err in terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to James
based on neglect.
Because only one ground is needed to support a trial court’s order terminating
parental rights, it is unnecessary to address respondent-father’s arguments
regarding the other two grounds of willful failure to make reasonable progress and
dependency. See In re C.K.I., 379 N.C. 207, 210, 864 S.E.2d 323, 326 (2021).
C. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal
Similar to respondent-father, respondent-mother challenges several findings
of fact referring to the purported sexual abuse allegations made by Stephen as
unsupported because they rely upon inadmissible hearsay. Like respondent-father,
respondent-mother initially objected to the challenged testimony, but later failed to
make a standing objection or renew her objections to similar evidence during the
testimony of the social worker and the cumulative evidence of her supervisor, and she
also elicited some of the same evidence during her cross examination of the social
worker.
As with respondent-father, respondent-mother lost the benefit of her prior
preserved objections and waived any challenge to the admission of the hearsay.
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Davis, 239 N.C. App. at 537, 768 S.E.2d at 912. We overrule respondent-mother’s
challenges to findings 24, 71, 74, 91, 94, and 96.
Respondent-mother also challenges findings of fact 90, 101, 105, 106, 108, 111,
and 113 to the extent they state that she had failed to comply with her case plan or
to make reasonable progress. She contends she fully engaged in her case plan with
DSS, noting that she has consistently engaged in therapy since March 2022,
successfully completed a psychological evaluation in March 2022, has obtained and
maintained independent housing, and has attended to her medical needs and has
improved her physical health.
The findings show respondent-mother made progress on her case plan, but the
conditions that led to the children’s removal from her care continued to exist.
Respondent-mother completed the parenting class; however, DSS staff opined she
demonstrated no changed parenting behaviors during her every two-week visitations
with the children. She purportedly sat on a bench during the visits and did “not
engage with the juveniles.”
Respondent-mother continued to suffer issues with economic and domestic
instability, had not obtained employment or disability benefits, and was reliant upon
Easterseals to maintain her day-to-day needs. While respondent-mother “made
significant improvements in her physical health,” she continued to suffer from
ongoing medical issues of anxiety, depression, and partial complex seizures, which
were exacerbated by stress and anxiety. Respondent-mother also continued to deny
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the children were neglected and she agreed with respondent-father regarding the
purported false, contrived and unproven sexual abuse allegations. The trial court
found respondent-mother has failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the
conditions which led to the children’s removal.
Respondent-mother argues the trial court’s proper findings of fact do not
support its conclusion there is a likelihood of repetition of future neglect. She
contends she substantially completed and complied with the components of her DSS
case plan, and, the court’s conclusion is not supported.
Although respondent-mother made progress on her case plan, she failed to
demonstrate an “acknowledgment and understanding of why the juvenile[s] entered
DSS custody as well as changed behaviors.” In re R.L.R., 381 N.C. at 875, 874 S.E.2d
at 589.
The findings show respondent-mother had failed to demonstrate
understanding of her role in the children being removed from her and respondent-
father’s care, continued to deny the children were neglected, lacked the capacity to
protect the children from respondent-father, and had failed to demonstrate
significant improvement in her parenting capability.
While respondent-mother clearly made some improvement in her physical
health, the court found her psychological evaluation indicated she displayed “clear
impairment in her short-term memory and attention” and that “[h]er cognitive
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challenges are significant and are sufficient to create substantial challenges to
parenting.”
Respondent-mother also had not secured economic or domestic stability. This
finding alone cannot support termination of her parental rights. N. C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(2) includes the “poverty exception,” which provides “No parental rights,
however, shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable to care
for the juvenile on account of their poverty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2023).
Our Supreme Court has recently held: “The poverty exception in N.C.G.S. §
7B-1111(a)(2) does not define the ‘elements’ of this statutory ground for terminating
parental rights. The exception instead establishes what is not a willful failure to
make reasonable progress under the circumstances for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2).” In re T.M.L., 377 N.C. 369, 382, 856 S.E.2d 785, 794 (2021). We
disregard this finding as unsupported and irrelevant. In re N.G., 374 N.C. at 901, 845
S.E.2d at 24 (disregarding findings of fact not supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence).
The trial court did not err in concluding grounds existed to terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights based upon failure to make reasonable progress.
Because we conclude the trial court properly found grounds existed based upon
failure to make reasonable progress, we do not address respondent-mother’s
challenges to the trial court’s other grounds. See In re C.K.I., 379 N.C. at 210, 864
S.E.2d at 326.
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IV. Conclusion
The trial court did not err in determining grounds existed to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights on the ground of neglect and respondent-mother’s
parental rights on the ground of failure to make reasonable progress. Respondents
do not challenge the trial court’s determination that termination of their parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court’s orders are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges WOOD and GORE concur.
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