J-S22040-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.L.R., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: G.M.G., FATHER : : : : : : No. 13 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 25, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 86634
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JUNE 26, 2020
Appellant, G.M.G. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered
November 25, 2019 that involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his
daughter, J.L.R., born 2009 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act.1
Additionally, Father’s counsel, Emily Cherniack, Esquire, seeks to withdraw
her representation of Father pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and In re
V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders briefing
criteria to appeals by indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel
in involuntary termination matters). We affirm and grant counsel’s application
to withdraw.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. J-S22040-20
The orphans’ court summarized the procedural history of this matter as
follows:
[The Berks County Children and Youth Services (“BCCYS”)] first became involved with [Father and Child] in January 2017 due to concerns of Father’s drug and alcohol abuse, criminal history, mental health, lack of appropriate parenting and [the] lack of involvement [of T.A.R., Child’s mother (“Mother”),] with [C]hild. The family was then opened for In Home Services and Father engaged in treatment with the support of Veteran’s affairs. After continued monitoring, the basic needs of the child were being met and the case was then closed by BCCYS in November 2017. On March 16, 2018, BCCYS was notified that [C]hild was participating in a forensic interview during which Father appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Law enforcement took protective custody of the child pending BCCYS response. An emergency petition was filed and the [court] ordered legal custody be transferred to BCCYS. On March 28, 2018, an Adjudication and Dispositional hearing was held in front of this court and legal custody was transferred to BCCYS for placement purposes. Father was present for the hearing. Mother did not attend.
[C]hild was placed with a non-related resource parent as parental grandparents are over age 80 and were not an available option. The primary established goal for Father was reunification. Father was ordered to cooperate with the following: (1) parenting education, (2) mental health evaluation and any additional recommendations, (3) drug and alcohol evaluation and any recommendations, (4) random urinalysis, (5) establishing and maintaining stable housing and income, (6) notify[ing] BCCYS [of] any changes in income or residence, (7) casework services through BCCY[S] and any recommendations, (8) signing releases for all providers and (9) visitation as scheduled and act[ing] in an appropriate manner [during visits].
Permanency review hearings were held on August 28, 2018 and January 29, 2019. At the Permanency Review hearings, it was found that Father was moderately compliant but had made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
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the original placement. On March 19, 2019, the petition for termination of parental rights was filed.[2]
For reunification, the main requirement was for father to obtain and maintain sobriety. During [C]hild’s placement, [F]ather had twelve residences including incarceration and four inpatient drug and alcohol treatment programs. He had inconsistent attendance with visits through Open Door International as [a] result of his drug use and incarceration. He was not able to obtain and maintain sobriety. At the time of the termination hearing[, Father] was incarcerated in a state correctional institute, specifically participating in the State Intermediate Punishment Program (SIP) after failing to complete the local Veteran’s Court program due to relapse (K2, cocaine and methamphetamine).
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/17/20, at 4-6 (footnote omitted).
The termination hearing took place on November 18, 2019. Because
Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, he participated via video
conference. Attorney Cherniack represented Father and was present in the
court room. Child was represented by Barbara Beringer, Esquire, who served
as her guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal interests counsel.3
2 BCCYS filed a petition for termination of parental rights against Mother on that same date. Following a hearing, the orphans’ court issued a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child on November 7, 2019. Mother did not appeal from that ruling. 3 In In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that “during contested termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, where there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best interests can also represent the child’s legal interests.” Id. at 1092. At the termination hearing, Attorney Beringer stated that she was able to serve as Child’s GAL and legal counsel because no conflict existed between Child’s legal interests and her best interests as Child had clearly expressed her preference that Father’s parental rights be terminated. N.T., 11/18/19, at 63-64. Father did not argue that there was a conflict between the Child’s interests in the orphans’ court. Cf. In re Adoption of
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Father testified that he began using marijuana when he was twenty
years old in the military. N.T., 11/18/19, at 6, 40-41. Father later began
using crack cocaine and his “addiction progressed pretty seriously to the point
that” he was involved in a robbery in 1995, receiving a 9-to-36-month
sentence for that conviction. Id. at 6-7. Father participated in his first rehab
program and was paroled after three months, but then he was recommitted
to serve his full sentence after he began using again. Id. at 7-8. Father
entered into three more rehab programs in the next several years related to
cocaine and marijuana use and eventually maintained a period of sobriety
from 2002 to 2004. Id. at 8-10. Father participated in more rehab programs
in 2004 and 2008 and also was incarcerated several times during this period.
Id. at 10-11.
Father was sober from 2009, the year Child was born, through 2012.
Id. at 11. During that period, Father and Mother, who were no longer dating,
co-parented Child and split physical custody. Id. In 2012, Father relapsed
on cocaine and served a six-month probation violation term of incarceration.
Id. at 12. After his release, Father resumed co-parenting responsibilities until
2014 when he assumed sole custody of Child as a result of an incident in which
Child was sexually abused by a member of Mother’s family. Id. at 11-12.
K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 669-70 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (holding that the Superior Court does not have the authority to review whether a GAL can also serve as a child’s legal interests counsel in an involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding if the issue was not raised in the lower court).
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In 2014, Father moved with Child to Florida where they remained until
2017. Id. at 13. During this period, Father again suffered a drug relapse.
Id. at 13, 21. After moving back to his parents’ house in Pennsylvania with
Child, Father cut part of his finger off while working in food service and began
receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Id. at 13-14. During treatment
for the injury, Father was prescribed pain killers and he then “started using
[illegal drugs] heavily again.” Id. at 14. Father was arrested twice in the fall
of 2017 for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and was placed in a Veterans
Treatment Court program. Id. On March 16, 2018, Father went to a forensic
examination interview as part of his participating in that program; as a result
of the fact that he was under the influence of K2, a type of synthetic
marijuana, during the interview, Child was immediately removed from
Father’s care and placed in BCCYS’s protective custody. Id. at 14-15.
Father remained in the Veterans’ Treatment Court program after Child’s
removal; in May 2018, he was incarcerated and placed in a 21-day treatment
program at a VA hospital. Id. at 16. He relapsed ten days after he completed
that rehab program and returned to the program for one month, followed by
two more months at an outpatient recovery house. Id. He relapsed while in
the recovery house, was re-incarcerated, and returned to treatment in
December 2018. Id. He was removed from the treatment program in March
2019 as a result of a positive drug test for K2, cocaine, and methamphetamine
and then taken into custody for violating the terms of his probation related to
his 2017 DUI convictions. Id. at 5-6, 16.
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As of the date of the termination hearing in November 2019, Father was
incarcerated in a state correctional boot camp program and he anticipated
being released from the program by March 2020. Id. at 6, 16. Father planned
to move back in with his parents after his release, and he anticipated being
able to support Child on a settlement from his workers’ compensation claim
as well as any income from working. Id. at 42-44.
Aimee Halpin, the case worker at Open Door International, the
organization that oversaw Child’s foster family placement, testified that there
were long gaps between Father’s visits with Child as a result of his in-patient
treatment and incarceration. Id. at 25. Halpin stated that, during the visits,
Father and Child would joke around and not discuss the serious concerns Child
had about their situation, including her concerns related to the long gaps
between their visits. Id. at 25, 27.
Halpin testified that Father engaged in inappropriate behavior during
visits, including discussion of topics that were too adult for Child and
“inappropriate touching.” Id. at 25-27. Several of the visits had to be
terminated prematurely as a result of the fact that Father exhibited signs that
he was inebriated, such as staring off into space and being non-responsive.
Id. at 24, 28-29. Father acknowledged that he was under the influence at
several of his scheduled visits, but denied that he had engaged in any other
inappropriate conduct during the visits. Id. at 17, 48-49.
Lauren Howard, Child’s BCCYS caseworker, testified that Father had not
met his reunification goals, the principal issue being his inability to maintain
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sobriety. Id. at 30-31. Howard stated that Child is “very bonded” with her
foster mother, with whom she has been living since April 2019. Id. at 31, 33.
The foster mother meets all of Child’s needs, and Child has expressed her
desire to be adopted by the foster mother. Id. at 31-33. Howard described
Child’s bond with Father as “very unhealthy” as Child is excessively worried
about him and has trouble sleeping because of her concerns about him. Id.
at 31. The foster mother has stated that she would be open to allowing
visitation with Father after termination as long as he maintains his sobriety.
Id. at 32. Howard therefore believed that the termination of Father’s parental
rights would be in Child’s best interests. Id. at 32.
Howard testified that Father sent Child many letters enclosing
newspaper clippings, photos, and drawings. Id. at 36. Father was informed,
however, that some of this content was not appropriate for someone of Child’s
age, including drawings he had made of his body indicating all of the injuries
he had suffered over the years. Id. at 36-37. Howard also testified that
Father had once sent Child a used, dirty sock and asked her to wear it at night
so “they could connect to each other.” Id. at 36. Father acknowledged that
he sent the drawing of his body and stated that the sock was intended as a
joke, but he testified that he was only informed on one occasion that a letter
he sent to Child was inappropriate. Id. at 49-50, 54-56.
Attorney Beringer, Child’s GAL and legal interests counsel, stated at the
hearing that she had met with Child in person and “spoken with her
extensively” on the telephone. Id. at 64. Child clearly informed Attorney
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Beringer that she wanted to be adopted by her foster mother. Id. Child
understood that Father loves her and she also loves him, but also that he is
not in a position to take care of her and instead needs to care for himself. Id.
Attorney Beringer opined that termination of Father’s parental rights was also
in Child’s best interests because she desperately needs permanency and to be
relieved of the burden of worrying about Father and her current foster mother
is willing and able to offer permanency to Child. Id. at 64-65.
Following the hearing, the orphans’ court entered a decree terminating
Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)
of the Adoption Act. Father filed a timely appeal of the decree.4
Before this Court can consider the merits of this appeal, we must first
determine whether Attorney Cherniack has satisfied the requirements for
withdrawal. Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1195 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc); In Interest of J.J.L., 150 A.3d 475, 479 (Pa. Super. 2016).
To withdraw, counsel must (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating
that she has made a conscientious examination of the record and has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) provide a copy of the
Anders brief to the appellant; and (3) advise the appellant of his right to
retain new counsel or proceed pro se and to raise any additional points that
4 Father filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal concurrently with his notice of appeal on December 24, 2019. The orphans’ court filed an opinion on January 17, 2020.
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he deems worthy of the court’s attention. Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1195-96;
J.J.L., 150 A.3d at 479-80.
In the Anders brief, counsel must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009); J.J.L., 150
A.3d at 480. If counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this
Court’s duty to conduct its own review of proceedings before the trial court
and render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is wholly
frivolous. Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1196; J.J.L., 150 A.3d at 480.
In this case, Attorney Cherniack filed an application to withdraw,
wherein she asserts that she has made a conscientious review of the record
and determined that Father’s appeal from the involuntary termination of his
parental rights to Child would be frivolous. Counsel appended to the
application a copy of a February 21, 2020 letter in which she provided Father
with a copy of her Anders brief and advised him of his right either to retain
new counsel or to proceed pro se on appeal and raise any points he deems
worthy of this Court’s attention.5 In her Anders brief, Attorney Cherniack ____________________________________________
5Father did not file a pro se response to the application to withdraw or retain counsel to argue on his behalf.
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summarized the procedural and factual background of this case, stated that
there were no non-frivolous appellate issues, and explained the reasons for
this determination. We therefore conclude that Attorney Cherniack has
complied with Anders and Santiago and proceed to a review of the merits of
this appeal.
In her Anders brief, Attorney Cherniack addressed whether there was
clear and convincing evidence to support the orphans’ court’s involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a) and (b)
of the Adoption Act. Our standard of review of a decree terminating parental
rights is limited to determining whether the orphans’ court abused its
discretion, committed an error of law, and whether its decision is supported
by competent evidence. In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019).
The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, which “is defined as testimony that is so clear,
direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Under Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, a court must engage in a
bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
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needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
Id. (citation omitted). We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that
which is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc)
(citation omitted).
In the present case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm
a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to
any one of the grounds for termination identified in Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b). B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 922. Here, we analyze the court’s
termination decree pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide
as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
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environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. . . .
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), the following
three elements must be met:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 922 (citation omitted). “The grounds for termination due
to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).
In finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2), the orphans’ court stated:
Father has been unable to care for [C]hild primarily as a result of his own decades long struggle with addiction with short periods of sobriety followed by relapse. During the pendency of BCCYS supervision, Father arrived at visitation on more than one occasion admittedly under the influence of a controlled substance; a fact that was physically noticeable to, and commented about, by [C]hild.
Counsel argued that Father loves [C]hild, wants to maintain sobriety for her and has additional supports in place that were not available on prior attempts at sobriety. Father’s current incarceration and participation in the State Intermediate Punishment drug treatment program was highlighted as the longest treatment program provided to him. While Father did not take parenting class and is expecting a worker[s’] compensation
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settlement upon his release from incarceration, there was absolutely no testimony that Father would eventually be able to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities as Father’s future success is solely based upon Father’s assertion that he can maintain sobriety ‘this time’ despite being unable to succeed in the past. . . .
For all the reasons stated above, this [c]ourt finds that Father is unable to remedy the causes of incapacity due to his inability to maintain his sobriety during the 19 month time period Child has been in placement and his repeated relapse history in his twenty year drug addiction. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds that termination is warranted under [Section 2511(a)(2)].
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/17/20, at 7-8.
Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude the orphans’ court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was
warranted. Child was initially removed from Father and placed into care in
March 2018 when Father showed up with Child, inebriated, to a Veteran’s
Treatment Court interview. The main goal established by BCCYS for Father’s
reunification with Child was for Father to achieve and maintain sobriety and
also to maintain stable housing and income. From the time that Child was
placed into BCCYS’s care, Father has been unable to maintain sobriety and
consequently has been in and out of prison and rehab facilities. In May 2018,
Father was incarcerated and placed in a 21-day treatment program at a VA
hospital based on his continued drug use. Father relapsed ten days after
completing the program and went back into treatment for three additional
months, but relapsed and was incarcerated again. Father entered another
treatment program in December 2018, but he was removed in March 2019
based upon another relapse leading to his incarceration in the State
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Intermediate Punishment program at the time of the November 2019
termination hearing. Father admitted at the termination hearing that,
although he had not given up hope of one day maintaining his sobriety, “[t]o
this point” he had not been able to do so. N.T., 11/18/19, at 18.
Accordingly, we discern no error of law nor abuse of discretion in the
orphans’ court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence supported the
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Father’s “repeated and continued incapacity” to maintain sobriety left Child
without essential care from Father necessary for Child’s well-being, and the
cause of Father’s incapacity – his addiction – “cannot or will not be remedied
by him.” 23 Pa.C.S. 2511(a)(2); see also B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 922.
Having resolved that grounds for termination existed under Section
2511(a)(2), we now proceed to the second part of the analysis under
subsection (b).
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. . . . Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of
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continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 401 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and brackets
omitted). “The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. Rather, the orphans’ court must examine the
status of the bond to determine whether its termination would destroy an
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95,
103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately,
the concern is the needs and welfare of a child.” In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976,
983 (Pa. Super. 2019).
In making its determination that termination of parental rights was
appropriate under Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court engaged in the
following discussion:
Father certainly has a strong bond with [C]hild and the court has no doubt he is loved in return by [C]hild. Father should be commended for his attempts to maintain his relationship with [C]hild despite his incarceration by sending letters and drawings to her. However, despite parenting classes and guidance by various caseworkers, Father struggles with good judgment in determining what information is appropriate or communicated in an age appropriate manner to [C]hild, as evidenced by his sending her his sock to be used as a comfort object (described by Father as a ‘sock puppet’) or his letter in which he described his crying or a skeleton illustration with his various maladies marked. While he intended for them in a positive manner and to soothe [C]hild and her worries about him, it had the opposite effect. Unfortunately, his contact, and that with his parents, have resulted in anxiety for [C]hild exhibited by bed wetting and nightmares as [C]hild continues to worry about [F]ather’s health and shouldering his emotional burden. This court has taken into account the natural parental bond existing between [C]hild and Father. Since the resources mother would be open to contact with Father and paternal grandparents, if Father does in fact maintain
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his sobriety, the termination of Father’s parental rights would not destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship. The testimony and evidence demonstrated that [C]hild has bonded strongly with the foster mother and [C]hild’s need for stability, love, security and comfort are amply provided in the foster home. [C]hild has verbalized her desire to be adopted by her resource parent to her [GAL]. [C]hild has been described as feeling caught in the middle as she loves both her [F]ather and her resource parent but wants to stay with her resource parent. The court gave adequate consideration to the needs and welfare of [C]hild and prioritizes her need for stability over Father’s desire to parent by allowing the termination of Father’s parental rights and allowing [Child] to be available for adoption by foster mother with whom she has bonded and looks to for her needs to be met. The testimony credibly establishes a strong bond with a resource who would continue to act with the best interests of the child in mind.
After reviewing the testimony and considering the exhibits, this [c]ourt finds that [C]hild is in a safe and suitable environment and that termination will not be detrimental to [C]hild. . . .
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/17/20, at 9-10 (citation omitted).
Having comprehensively reviewed the record, we conclude that the
orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that the termination
of Father’s parental rights best served the needs and welfare of Child. While
Father had a strong bond with Child, this fact alone does not preclude the
termination of Father’s parental rights. N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103. Testimony
at the hearing showed that the bond between Father and Child was “very
unhealthy,” N.T., 11/18/19, at 31, as demonstrated by Father’s inappropriate
communications with Child and Child’s excessive concern for Father’s well-
being and negative behavioral changes following visits with Father. Father
himself recognized that Child is “more worried about me than she should be.
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She’s being an adult. She doesn’t need to be. She needs to be a kid.” Id. at
17.
By contrast, Child’s BCCYS caseworker testified that Child is “very
bonded” with her foster mother and the foster mother meets all of Child’s
needs. Id. at 31.6 As the orphans’ court explained, the foster mother was
also amenable to visitation with Father following adoption if Father maintains
his sobriety. Furthermore, Child expressed to her GAL and counsel her
preference for termination of Father’s parental rights to allow for her adoption
by the foster mother, even though she loves Father and has great concern for
him.
At the termination hearing, Father cited the “unbreakable” bond
between him and Child and requested that the orphans’ court provide him with
more time to address his issues and allow him to “be the person I was when
I first had custody of her.” Id. at 53. The orphans’ court, however, was not
required to prolong the instability for Child merely based upon the hope that
Father may potentially rectify his substance abuse issues at some point in the
future. As our Supreme Court has observed, when conducting a needs and
welfare analysis under Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock
of childhood ever in mind” and remain cognizant of the fact that “[c]hildren ____________________________________________
6 The agency petitioning for the termination of parental rights is not required to retain an expert to perform a formal bonding analysis, and the orphans’ court is “free to rely upon the assessments of social workers and caseworkers” to assess the bond between a child and her parents or caregivers. In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944-45 (Pa. Super. 2018).
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are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to
their healthy development quickly.” See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa.
2019).
In sum, we agree with Attorney Cherniack that Father’s appeal from the
denial of his termination of parental rights to Child are frivolous. We have
independently reviewed the record and find no other issues of arguable merit
that Father could pursue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court
decree and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.
Decree affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 06/26/2020
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