[Cite as In re J.L., 2026-Ohio-807.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: J.L. Case No. 2025 CA 00131
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 2024 JCV 01163
Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry:March 10, 2026
BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., ROBERT G. MONTGOMERY, J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: JAMES B. PHILLIPS, for Appellee; KATHALEEN S. O’BRIEN, for Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Father appeals the September 10, 2025, judgment entry of the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating his parental rights and granting
permanent custody of J.L. to Stark County Job and Family Services (“SCJFS”). For the
reasons below, we affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} B.C. is the mother (“Mother”) of J.L., who was born on September 29, 2024.
J.S.L. is the father (“Father”) of J.L. {¶3} Mother was convicted of felony child endangering for causing physical
injuries to J.L.’s sibling. While Mother was serving her sentence, she gave birth to J.L.
On October 1, 2024, SCJFS initially filed a complaint. At that point in time, paternity had
not been established for Father. On October 2, 2024, the trial court held an emergency
shelter care hearing and placed J.L. into the temporary custody of SCJFS. On October
11, 2024, SCJFS filed a first amended complaint.
{¶4} The amended complaint alleged, in part, as follows: Mother was convicted
of felony child endangering after J.L.’s sibling had multiple fractures of her arms and legs
that were determined to be abusive; Mother’s release date from prison is not until March
23, 2027; Father has a criminal history that includes assault, aggravated menacing, theft,
criminal damaging, disorderly conduct, and arson; and Father has a history with SCJFS
and previous concerns included drug abuse and homelessness.
{¶5} On October 30, 2024, the magistrate held a hearing – at which Father
appeared. On December 2024, the magistrate held an adjudicatory hearing – at which
Father appeared and stipulated to a finding of dependency.
{¶6} On January 30, 2025, SCJFS notified the trial court that genetic testing had
been completed and confirmed that Father was the biological father of J.L. Accordingly,
Father was added as a case plan participant. Father’s case plan required him to
complete a parenting assessment at Lighthouse Family Center and follow all
recommendations from the service providers; to attend all required appointments and
participate in the required appointments; to complete a drug and alcohol assessment at
CommQuest Recovery Services and follow all recommendations from the service
providers; and to submit to random drug screens as requested by SCJFS. SCJFS proposed that Father would have twice monthly supervised visits with J.L. However,
those visits never began because Father was arrested.
{¶7} On April 30, 2025, a dispositional hearing was held - at which the trial court
adopted and approved the amended case plan and ordered J.L. to remain in the
temporary custody of SCJFS. At both the December 20, 2024, adjudicatory hearing and
the April 30, 2025, dispositional hearing, the trial court found SCJFS made reasonable
efforts to prevent removal, eliminate continued removal, or make it possible for the child
to return safely to the home.
{¶8} On May 29, 2025, SCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of J.L. The
motion outlined the issues remaining with Mother and Father, including - Mother is
currently serving a three-year prison sentence for child endangering after physically
abusing J.L.’s sibling; J.L.’s sibling was placed in the permanent custody of SCJFS;
Father was sentenced to three years in prison for burglary and obstruction of official
business; Father’s scheduled release date is February of 2027; and Father has never
visited the child.
{¶9} Prior to the hearing on SCJFS’ motion for permanent custody, Father filed
a motion to extend temporary custody.
{¶10} On September 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a trial on SCJFS’ motion
for permanent custody. The following testimony was adduced at the September 9th trial.
{¶11} Hannah Thomas (“Thomas”) is the caseworker assigned to J.L. Thomas
testified that J.L. has been in the temporary custody of the agency since October 1, 2024.
Thomas confirmed that the court conducted regular review hearings and found the
agency made reasonable efforts to finalize permanency planning for the child. {¶12} Thomas testified to Father’s case plan and his progress on the plan. Father
is currently incarcerated at Richland Correctional Institution after being convicted of
burglary and obstruction of justice. His earliest release date is February of 2027. Father’s
case plan objectives included completing a Lighthouse Parenting Assessment, and a drug
and alcohol assessment through an agency provider. However, since Father was
arrested in February of 2025, he has been unable to complete any case plan services.
Thomas testified that Father has a history with the agency, as another child was removed
from Father’s care in 2014 due to drug use and homelessness. Father was unable to
complete the case plan with that child because he was arrested for arson and sentenced
to four years in prison.
{¶13} Thomas testified that, even if Father were to be released from prison
tomorrow, he would still have to complete extensive case plan services. Thomas stated
there would not be time for Father to complete those services. Thomas concluded that
Father cannot safely provide care and support for J.L., and Father has not done anything
to reduce the risk he poses to J.L.
{¶14} Father has never visited the child. When Father established paternity of the
child in January, the agency was attempting to set up visits with him; however, Father
was arrested and was unable to start visitation. Thomas confirmed that Father has not
seen, or had any contact with, J.L. for a period in excess of ninety days.
{¶15} On cross-examination, Thomas testified that she sent at least three letters
in the last six months to Father while he has been in Richland County Correctional
Institution. These letters contained case plan updates, case review information, and her
contact information. Father never contacted Thomas after she sent the letters. Thomas visited Father while he was in the Stark County Jail prior to being convicted and discussed
case plan services with him. Thomas testified Father never informed her of any parenting
classes available in prison. However, the agency requires parents, especially parents
who have a history with the agency, to have a parenting assessment completed locally at
Lighthouse. Thomas understood that Father was able to apply for judicial release in one
month from the date of the permanent custody hearing. Despite this timing, Thomas does
not believe Father would have sufficient time to complete case plan services.
{¶16} Father testified that he is eligible to file a motion for judicial release in one
month. If the sentencing court grants his motion for judicial release, Father would engage
in case plan services and visit with J.L. He believes it would be in the best interest of J.L.
for him to engage in case plan services after his release from prison.
{¶17} Thomas testified during the best interest portion of the trial. J.L. is
developmentally on target. J.L. has some medical issues from a dislocated hip with which
she was born. The foster parents are taking care of these medical issues. J.L. has been
in her current foster home since removal and is placed with her biological sibling. Thomas
stated J.L. is very bonded to her foster parents and her sibling. The foster parents seek
to adopt J.L. Thomas testified there is no bond between J.L. and Father, because Father
has never met J.L. Thomas testified it is in the best interest of J.L. for permanent custody
to be granted to SCJFS.
{¶18} Father testified that he believes it is in J.L.’s best interest to build a bond
with him and his family. {¶19} The GAL testified that J.L. is extremely bonded to the foster parents and to
her sibling and, further, that is in the best interest of J.L. for permanent custody to be
granted to SCJFS.
{¶20} On September 10, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Father abandoned the child,
and, notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist
Father with remedying the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the
home, Father failed continuously and repeatedly to remedy the conditions causing the
child to be placed outside the home.
{¶21} Accordingly, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
J.L. cannot be placed with Father within a reasonable time and should not be placed with
Father within a reasonable time. Further, the trial court found it is in the best interest of
J.L. for permanent custody to be granted to SCJFS.
{¶22} Father appeals the September 10, 2025, judgment entry of the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and assigns the following as error:
{¶23} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY
TO THE STARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES (SCDJFS) AS
SCDJFS FAILED TO SHOW BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
GROUNDS EXISTED FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY AND SUCH DECISION WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶24} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY
TO STARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES (SCDJFS) AS
SCDJFS FAILED TO SHOW BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILD TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY
AND SUCH DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
Permanent Custody
{¶25} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re
Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
An award of permanent custody must be based on clear and convincing evidence. R.C.
2151.414(B)(1).
{¶26} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.”
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). “Where the degree of proof required to
sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record
to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the
requisite degree of proof.” Id. If some competent and credible evidence going to all the
essential elements of the case supports the trial court’s judgment, an appellate court must
affirm the judgment and not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. C.E. Morris
Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978).
{¶27} Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal Co., Inc., v. Cleveland, 10
Ohio St.3d 77 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is “crucial in a
child custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and
attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415,
419 (1997). {¶28} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth guidelines a trial court must follow when deciding
a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court schedule
a hearing and provide notice of the filing of a motion for permanent custody of a child by
a public children services agency.
{¶29} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the court to grant
permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by
clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent
custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply:
(a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody
of the children services agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two month period, and the child cannot be placed either of the child’s
parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents;
(b) the child is abandoned;
(c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take
permanent custody;
(d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or more months
of a consecutive twenty-two month period; or
(e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose
custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected,
or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another
state. {¶30} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial
court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, a trial court
will usually determine whether one of the circumstances delineated in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding
the best interest of the child. In this case, as to Father, the trial court made a finding
pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) (reasonable time) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b)
(abandonment).
Manifest Weight
{¶31} In both of his assignments of error, Father argues the trial court’s decision
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The standard of review for manifest
weight in a civil case is identical to the standard in a criminal case - a reviewing court is
to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine “whether in resolving conflicts in evidence, the
jury [or finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction [or decision] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶32} Because the finder of fact is in the best position to weigh the credibility of
the witnesses and observe their demeanor, a reviewing court will always be mindful of
the presumption in favor of the trial court’s factual findings. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-
Ohio-2179. I.
Reasonable Time
{¶33} In his first assignment of error, Father contends the trial court’s
determination that J.L. could not or should not be placed with him in a reasonable time to
be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶34} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant
evidence before determining the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. The statute also specifically
provides that if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing
that one or more of the factors listed in (1)-(15) exist, the court shall enter a finding that
the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the
child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. See In re William S., 75
Ohio St.3d 95 (1996). The trial judge in this case relied on two of these factors: R.C.
2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(10).
{¶35} R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) applies when “notwithstanding reasonable case
planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems
that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to
be placed outside the child’s home.” In making such a determination, “the court shall
consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social
rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental
duties.” Id.
R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) – Failure to Remedy
{¶36} We find clear and convincing evidence in the record that R.C.
2151.414(E)(1) applies because Father failed to substantially remedy the conditions that
caused J.L. to be placed into the custody of SCJFS, and that Father is unable to provide
an adequate permanent home for J.L.
{¶37} As soon as paternity was established for Father, SCJFS provided Father
with a case plan that outlined the steps he needed to complete to be reunited with J.L.
However, Father was quickly arrested. Thomas discussed the potential ways in which
Father could complete his case plan while he was locally incarcerated. However, once
Father was transferred to prison, SCJFS letters sent to Father went unanswered.
{¶38} Father contends that since his counsel will soon be able to file a motion for
judicial release and because he would immediately be willing to work on case plan
services, the trial court’s finding that J.L. cannot or should not be placed with him within
a reasonable time is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶39} The first date that Father is eligible to file a motion for judicial release is a
month after the permanent custody hearing. The trial court judge in the underlying
criminal case has discretion to deny or grant the motion. To be sure, judicial release is
certainly not guaranteed. Further, Thomas testified that, even if Father were to be
judicially released, Father would not have sufficient time to complete his case plan
services, particularly given his criminal history and his history with SCJFS. {¶40} Father was unable to make any progress on his case plan due to his
incarceration, and will be unable to do so until his release date. Father’s own actions led
to his incarceration, thus demonstrating Father’s unwillingness to provide an adequate
permanent home for J.L. Father’s incarceration has prevented him from caring for J.L.
and from learning how to care for J.L. Thomas’ testimony established that Father will not
be able to care for J.L. within a reasonable time, if ever, and, further, that Father has no
bond with J.L. because he has never met her or had any contact with her. Thomas
concluded that Father cannot provide safe care and support for J.L., and Father has not
done anything to reduce the risks he poses to J.L.
{¶41} While Father advocated for an extension of time, waiting for Father to be
released from prison to begin and substantially complete a case plan, learn how to care
for J.L., and reunify with J.L., would take this matter past its sunset date. In re O.S., 2025-
Ohio-4867, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.). As noted above, even if Father is judicially released from
prison when first eligible, he would still not be able to substantially complete a case plan
given the extensive services required on his case plan due to his criminal history and
given the fact that he previously had a child removed from his care by SCJFS.
{¶42} We find that clear and convincing evidence was presented to the trial court
that J.L. could not be placed with Father within a reasonable period of time because he
did not remedy the conditions that caused J.L.’s initial removal, and Father could not
provide a permanent home for J.L.
R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) - Abandonment
{¶43} We also find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s determination that Father abandoned J.L. A child is presumed abandoned when the child’s parent “ha[s] failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than
ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that
period of ninety days.” R.C. 2151.011(C).
{¶44} The evidence shows that Father never met J.L. Father was added to the
case plan after paternity was established. However, very quickly after his case plan was
established, Father was arrested and was ultimately sent to prison. Father was locally
incarcerated from February of 2025 to May of 2025, and has been in prison since May of
2025. He did not have any contact with J.L. while he was locally incarcerated or since he
has been imprisoned, in total a period of more than ninety days. Father was therefore
presumed to have abandoned J.L., and it became his burden to rebut that presumption
pursuant to R.C. 2151.011(C).
{¶45} Father argues he rebutted the abandonment presumption because his
incarceration prevented him from having contact with J.L. “Incarceration, however, does
not rebut the presumption of abandonment.” In re M.A., 2024-Ohio-3432, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.),
citing Matter of M.G., 2023-Ohio-696, ¶ 48 (5th Dist.).
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) - Abandonment
{¶46} Father also challenges the trial court’s finding pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(b) that he abandoned J.L. As detailed above, there is clear and
convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Father abandoned J.L.
{¶47} Father’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶48} In his second assignment of error, Father contends the trial court’s
determination that the best interest of the child would be served by granting permanent custody to SCJFS is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. Father
points to the fact that he desires to complete case plan services, and his testimony that
he believes it is in the best interest of the child to be placed with family.
{¶49} We have frequently noted, “[t]he discretion which the juvenile court enjoys
in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child
should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact
that court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” In re Mauzy
Children, 2000 WL 1700073, * 3 (5th Dist. November 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 95
Ohio App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994).
{¶50} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing,
R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and out-of-home providers, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as
expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard
for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child’s need for a
legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
grant of permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11)
of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶51} The court must consider all of the elements in R.C. 2151.414(D), as well as
other relevant factors. There is not one element that is given greater weight than the
others pursuant to the statute. In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513. In re Schaefer made it
clear that a trial court’s statutory duty, when determining whether it is in the best interest of a child to grant permanent custody to an agency, does not include finding by clear and
convincing evidence that no suitable relative was available for placement. Id. R.C.
2151.414 “requires the court to find the best option for the child once a determination has
been made pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d). The statute does not make
the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an
all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor
more heavily than others.” Id. at ¶ 64.
{¶52} The focus on the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the
parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a
grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d
309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994).
{¶53} We find the trial court did not commit error in finding that granting permanent
custody to SCJFS is in the best interest of the child.
{¶54} Thomas testified it is in the best interest of J.L. for permanent custody to be
granted to SCJFS. J.L. is happy at her current foster home and is bonded with the family.
J.L. is living with her biological sibling, who she is also bonded with. The GAL testified
that J.L. is extremely bonded to her foster family and sibling, and that it is in the best
interest of J.L. for permanent custody to be granted to SCJFS.
{¶55} We find the trial court properly considered and weighed the factors in R.C.
2151.414(D) and the trial court’s conclusion that the granting of permanent custody to
SCJFS is in the best interest of the child is supported by competent and credible evidence.
Further, the trial court did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice such that the decision must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Father’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶56} Based on the foregoing, Father’s assignments of error are overruled.
For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Costs to Appellant/Father, J.S.L.
By: Popham, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Montgomery, J., concur