NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 230433-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is October 5, 2023 NO. 4-23-0433 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re J.L., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Rock Island County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 19JA93 v. ) Julien S., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Theodore G. Kutsunis, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights where the court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 The trial court found respondent, Julien S., to be an unfit parent and determined
that it was in the best interest of respondent’s minor daughter, J.L., to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing that the court’s findings were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 11, 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship and
for temporary custody, alleging that J.L. was neglected and that J.L.’s environment was injurious
to her welfare. The State asserted that J.L.’s mother, K.L., suffered from untreated mental health
and anger issues and had been involved in multiple relationships with men involving domestic abuse. (We note that K.L.’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal, as K.L. agreed to
surrender her parental rights and consented to J.L.’s adoption.) As it relates to respondent, the
petition asserted that he was a registered sex offender and that, at one point, K.L. had given
respondent “access” to one of her children. The petition asserted that respondent was under house
arrest, wearing an ankle monitor, and police located him hiding under a bed in K.L.’s home with
a large sum of cash and baggies of marijuana.
¶5 Also on September 11, 2019, respondent appeared and entered his appearance
pro se. Respondent and K.L. stipulated to granting temporary custody of J.L. to the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for appropriate placement. The trial court
awarded temporary custody of J.L. to DCFS. The court then appointed counsel for respondent and
K.L.
¶6 On December 26, 2019, DCFS filed (1) a dispositional report prepared by a
caseworker with Bethany for Children & Families (Bethany) and (2) an integrated assessment. In
the dispositional report, DCFS indicated that there were “significant concerns” regarding
respondent’s ability and willingness to meet the needs of J.L. The report stated that respondent
“failed to attend court hearings regarding his daughter, failed to participate in an [integrated
assessment] interview, and has failed to coordinate parent/child visits with the case worker.” DCFS
thus recommended that respondent participate in an integrated assessment interview to assess his
strengths, needs, parenting, mental health, substance abuse, criminal history, and relationship
history. The report further noted that respondent was a sexual predator with a victim under the age
of 18, but there was not a “complete picture” of respondent’s sexual offense history. Thus, DCFS
recommended that respondent participate in a psychosexual assessment to determine his
recidivism risk.
-2- ¶7 The integrated assessment indicated that while respondent did not participate in an
integrated assessment interview, K.L. did. K.L. reported that she had been involved in eight or
nine relationships involving verbal or physical violence. K.L. further explained that she was
involved in an intermittent relationship with respondent for approximately four years and did not
learn that he was a registered sex offender until after an argument between them led to a neighbor
calling the police. K.L. denied any physical violence in her relationship with respondent.
¶8 The integrated assessment reported that the prognosis for reunification between
respondent and J.L. was poor. This prognosis was based on the following. Respondent failed to
show for his scheduled integrated assessment interview. Additionally, while respondent inquired
as to the wellbeing and safety of J.L., he failed to make efforts to engage in services. Further,
respondent had been minimally involved in J.L.’s life. Moreover, respondent was a registered sex
offender, and the nature of respondent’s conviction, participation in treatment, and risk of
recidivism remained unknown.
¶9 Respondent failed to appear for the next hearing, which was held on January 10,
2020, but his counsel was present. Respondent’s counsel explained that he was unable to establish
contact with respondent by phone. The trial court adjudicated J.L. neglected and found respondent
to be unfit for failing to participate in services or involve himself in J.L.’s life. The permanency
goal was set for return home within 12 months. In a supplemental order, the court required
respondent to complete an integrated assessment and a psychosexual assessment. The court further
ordered respondent to comply with any recommendations.
¶ 10 Over the next approximately three years, the trial court held several permanency
review hearings. For the hearings, DCFS filed (1) permanency hearing reports prepared with the
-3- assistance of Bethany caseworkers and (2) service plans identifying tasks respondent needed to
complete to achieve reunification with J.L.
¶ 11 On March 11, 2022, the goal of reunification was changed to substitute care
pending termination of parental rights.
¶ 12 On May 6, 2022, the State filed a “Supplemental Petition to Terminate Parental
Rights.” The State alleged that respondent was unfit as follows: (1) respondent failed to maintain
a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); (2) respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of
J.L. during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, i.e., January 11, 2020,
through October 11, 2020; October 12, 2020, through July 12, 2021; and July 13, 2021, through
April 13, 2022 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)); and (3) respondent evidenced an intent to
forgo his parental rights (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West 2020)). The petition further alleged that it
was in J.L.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 13 On September 26, 2022, respondent submitted a letter to the trial court in which he
indicated that he was incarcerated. In the letter, respondent also purported to give his parental
rights over J.L. to his mother while he was incarcerated.
¶ 14 At a hearing on January 20, 2023, K.L. confirmed her intent to surrender her
parental rights over J.L. During the hearing, the State noted that “before we convened, [respondent]
was on Zoom video conference” having a discussion with his counsel. The State explained that it
was informed that respondent “also intends to sign [a consent] and surrender” his parental rights.
¶ 15 A fitness hearing was scheduled for April 28, 2023. On that date, respondent’s
counsel was present, but respondent failed to appear. Respondent’s counsel requested a
continuance. Counsel asserted that respondent had informed him “he was going to sign consents.”
-4- However, counsel explained that he had since had difficulty communicating with respondent,
because respondent had been released from custody and was living with his mother, who was
“making it very difficult to communicate” with respondent. Counsel asserted that respondent’s
mother was failing to tell respondent that counsel was calling, and he did not know if respondent
was receiving his letters. The trial court denied the request for a continuance, explaining that
respondent “had opportunities to get involved” and “had ways to contact” counsel if he desired.
¶ 16 Accordingly, the trial court proceeded with the fitness hearing. The State called
Katelynn Ramirez as a witness, who testified to the following. Ramirez was a child welfare
specialist with Bethany and became the assigned caseworker for J.L. in January 2022. Ramirez
explained that J.L. came into care after DCFS received a hotline call regarding a domestic dispute
between K.L. and one of K.L.’s paramours in the presence of J.L. K.L. had since consented to
J.L.’s adoption. As to respondent, Ramirez explained that his paternity had been established
through court proceedings in Iowa. She noted that a caseworker who was previously assigned to
the case had been in contact with respondent, so respondent “absolutely” knew that the case was
ongoing. However, Ramirez herself had never been in contact with respondent, and respondent
had never reached out to her. Respondent’s last known location was the Clarinda Correctional
Facility in Iowa, where he was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. Ramirez
confirmed that respondent was no longer incarcerated at that facility, but she did not know where
he was currently. Ramirez explained that, after J.L. was adjudicated neglected, respondent was
ordered to undergo an integrated assessment and a sexual offender evaluation. Ramirez testified
that respondent had completed neither assessment. Additionally, respondent had not (1) provided
support or gifts to J.L., (2) visited with J.L., (3) expressed any interest in J.L., (4) maintained
contact with J.L., or (5) planned for the future of J.L. Ramirez was aware of nothing that prevented
-5- respondent from doing any of the foregoing for J.L. Ramirez testified that she reviewed the court
reports and other documents in the case and did not think respondent had made progress during
the nine-month periods of (1) January 11, 2020, through October 11, 2020; (2) October 12, 2020,
through July 12, 2021; and (3) July 13, 2021, through April 13, 2022.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Ramirez discussed her efforts to contact respondent.
Ramirez explained that she conducted a “diligent search” and sent confirmation letters via certified
mail and regular mail to the addresses at which respondent might have resided. Some addresses
were for residences, while one was for a prison. Ramirez explained that no signed certifications
were returned to her, and some of the certifications were returned as “not deliverable.” Ramirez
acknowledged it was possible that respondent did not know she was his new caseworker.
¶ 18 On redirect examination, Ramirez testified that when respondent appeared via
video call in the proceedings, he was incarcerated.
¶ 19 Following this testimony, the State argued that respondent should be found unfit.
The State explained that respondent “clearly was aware that [the case] existed,” as he entered his
appearance and appeared by video call on one occasion. However, respondent chose to “absent
himself from the child’s life,” completed no services, and failed to reach out to the caseworker.
¶ 20 Respondent’s counsel argued that the State failed to meet its burden to show that
respondent was unfit, because there was no evidence confirming that respondent had received any
communication from the caseworker informing respondent of his responsibilities.
¶ 21 The trial court found that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility as to J.L.’s welfare, (2) failed to make reasonable progress
toward J.L.’s return during the specified nine-month periods, and (3) evidenced an intent to forgo
his parental rights. In support of these findings, the court explained that respondent knew about
-6- the case but failed to participate in an integrated assessment and a psychosexual assessment.
Additionally, the court noted that respondent never contacted J.L., provided J.L. with gifts or
support, visited J.L., or expressed any interest as to J.L.’s welfare or well-being. Further,
respondent failed to communicate with the caseworker despite being able to do so. Accordingly,
the court found that respondent was an unfit parent.
¶ 22 During a recess, the State filed a best interest report prepared by Bethany. The
report indicated the following. J.L. and her two siblings entered their current placement on May 3,
2021, and this placement was willing to provide permanency. J.L.’s foster parents were providing
for J.L.’s safety, educational, developmental, well-being, and medical needs. J.L. viewed her foster
parents as her mother and father, displayed a significant attachment to them, and was “very
bonded” to them. J.L. was thankful to live with her siblings and sought out her foster parents for
support and comfort. J.L.’s foster parents were involved in J.L.’s education as well as her health
and psychiatric treatment. J.L. loved her foster parents who, in turn, loved her. J.L.’s foster parents
resided in a five-bedroom home and were employed full-time. Additionally, they had friends and
family who were willing to provide assistance and support as needed. The report recommended
that respondent’s parental rights over J.L. should be terminated, J.L. should remain with her foster
parents, and the goal should be changed to adoption.
¶ 23 Following the recess, the trial court proceeded to a best interest hearing. The State
requested the court to take judicial notice of the best interest report and indicated that it would rest
on that report. The State argued that respondent’s parental rights should be terminated and
requested that the goal be changed to adoption. Respondent presented no witnesses, and his
counsel argued that J.L. should be placed with respondent’s mother, per his wishes in his letter to
the court. The court stated that it accepted the best interest report as evidence. The court found that
-7- J.L.’s safety, educational, developmental well-being, and medical needs were being met by the
foster parents, whom she considered her mother and father. The court further found that J.L.
displayed a significant attachment to her foster parents and was bonded to them. Accordingly, the
court found that it was in J.L.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated, that
J.L. remain in her current placement, and that the goal be changed to adoption.
¶ 24 This appeal followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Respondent argues that the trial court’s findings as to both parental unfitness and
J.L.’s best interest were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 27 Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) is a two-step process. In re D.D., 2022 IL App (4th)
220257, ¶ 27. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit
under any ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)).
D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 27. If the trial court finds that a parent is unfit, the State must
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the minor’s best interest that parental
rights be terminated. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 27.
¶ 28 We accord great deference to the trial court’s findings in matters involving minors
because the court is in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses’
testimony, having observed the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses. D.D., 2022 IL
App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. We will not disturb the court’s unfitness and best-interest findings unless
they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28. A
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is clearly
apparent. D.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 220257, ¶ 28.
-8- ¶ 29 A. Unfitness
¶ 30 Respondent first argues that the trial court’s finding that he is unfit is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, respondent claims that the court erred in determining
that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for J.L.
¶ 31 Initially, the State argues that because respondent challenges only the trial court’s
finding that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for J.L.,
respondent concedes unfitness on the remaining two grounds upon which the court found he was
unfit, i.e., that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward J.L.’s return during any nine-
month period following the adjudication of neglect and that respondent evidenced an intent to
forgo his parental rights. Respondent does not address the State’s argument. Instead, he asserts in
his reply brief that he stands on the arguments in his initial brief to show that he “maintained a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility” as to J.L. Because respondent does not
contest that he conceded unfitness on the unchallenged grounds, we accept respondent’s
concession. See In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 268 (2001) (concluding that the respondents
conceded unfitness where they challenged only one ground upon which the trial court based its
unfitness finding and remaining unchallenged grounds could independently support the finding of
unfitness).
¶ 32 Respondent’s concession alone establishes his unfitness. We nevertheless reject
respondent’s argument that the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit for failing to maintain
a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 33 The Adoption Act provides that a parent may be found unfit, inter alia, for
“[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s
-9- welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022). “In determining whether a parent has shown a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for a minor’s welfare, a court considers
the parent’s efforts to visit and maintain contact with the child as well as other indicia, such as
inquiries into the child’s welfare.” In re B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. The
completion of service plans is also considered evidence of a parent’s interest, concern, or
responsibility. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. The court should focus on the parent’s
efforts, not his or her success. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. Thus, the court
examines the parent’s conduct concerning the child in the context of the circumstances in which
that conduct occurred. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. Accordingly, circumstances
such as a parent’s difficulty in obtaining transportation, poverty, actions and statements of others
that hinder visitation, and the need to resolve other life issues are relevant considerations. B’yata I.,
2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. If personal visits with the child are impractical, other methods
of communication including letters, telephone calls, and gifts may demonstrate a reasonable degree
of interest, concern, or responsibility, depending on the content, tone, and frequency of those
contacts. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. A parent is not fit simply because he or she
demonstrates some interest or affection toward the child. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B,
¶ 31. Instead, the interest, concern, or responsibility must be objectively reasonable. B’yata I.,
2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31.
¶ 34 Respondent claims that the trial court’s unfitness finding failed to account for his
lack of contact, notice, or opportunity to engage in the case due to his incarceration. Respondent
further claims that, although he was not present for many court hearings or appointments, the
record evidenced his interest in J.L., as he was present at the first appearance hearing, spoke with
- 10 - a Bethany caseworker, mailed a letter to the court, and spoke with his attorney via Zoom prior to
a hearing.
¶ 35 This argument is unavailing. Respondent’s claims that he lacked contact, notice, or
an opportunity to engage in the case due to his incarceration are belied by the record. On September
11, 2019, at the outset of the proceedings, respondent was present at an initial hearing, and counsel
was appointed for him that day. Accordingly, respondent was aware that these proceedings were
occurring. The record also establishes that respondent was able to communicate with Bethany
caseworkers, as he had been in contact with one prior to Ramirez’s assignment to the case.
Likewise, when respondent was incarcerated, he was able to contact his counsel, as he spoke with
his attorney via a video call prior to the January 20, 2023, hearing to express his intent to surrender
his parental rights. Respondent also sent a letter directly to the trial court regarding his wishes
pertaining to J.L.’s custody. Given respondent’s knowledge of the case and his ability to
communicate with caseworkers, his attorney, and the court itself—even while incarcerated—we
reject respondent’s claim that he was unable to engage in the proceedings.
¶ 36 Respondent also contends that, given his incarceration, it is “unreasonable to think”
he could attend any hearings, assessments, or visits with J.L., because he was “likely” unable to
attend “due to matters beyond his control.” This argument misses the mark. Nothing in the record
indicates that respondent was incarcerated for the entirety of the proceedings, and respondent could
have involved himself in the case and J.L.’s life during the period in which he was not incarcerated.
Further, even for that period during which visits might have been impractical due to respondent’s
incarceration, respondent could have shown an interest in J.L. through letters, telephone calls, and
gifts. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. However, the record establishes that respondent
largely absented himself from the proceedings and made little effort to maintain contact with J.L.
- 11 - ¶ 37 Ramirez’s testimony supports that conclusion. Ramirez testified that a previous
caseworker assigned to the case had contacted respondent, but she herself had not been able to
contact him despite her diligent attempts to do so. Respondent, in turn, had never reached out to
Ramirez, even though he was “absolutely” aware of the ongoing proceeding. Ramirez explained
that respondent completed neither the integrated assessment nor the psychosexual assessment,
despite being ordered to do so. Moreover, respondent did not visit J.L., provide her support,
express any interest in her, or plan for her future. While respondent may have expressed some
interest or affection toward J.L. by, for example, his letter to the trial court, this alone was not
enough for respondent to be deemed fit. See B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31.
Respondent was required to show interest, concern, or responsibility toward J.L. that was
objectively reasonable. B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. Respondent’s failure to visit
with, maintain contact with, or provide support to J.L. did not meet that standard.
¶ 38 Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s finding that respondent
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to J.L.’s welfare
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 B. Best Interest
¶ 40 Next, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that the termination of his
parental rights was in J.L.’s best interest is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 41 Following an unfitness finding, the focus shifts to the child. In re C.P., 2019 IL
App (4th) 190420, ¶ 69. At a best interest hearing, the issue is no longer whether parental rights
can be terminated; instead, the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should
be terminated. C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 69. In determining whether termination is in the
- 12 - child’s best interest, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child’s age and
developmental needs, the following factors:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s
identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;
(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity
of affection, and the least[-]disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes
and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for
permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the
risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to
care for the child.” C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 70 (quoting In re Dal. D.,
2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 52).
¶ 42 Respondent contends that the trial court’s rationale for terminating his parental
rights to J.L. “was based upon the fact that J.L. had apparently adjusted well to life with the foster
family and needed permanence” without considering J.L.’s relationship with respondent.
Respondent asserts that the “best interests of J.L. cannot accurately be determined” without
considering the relationship between J.L. and respondent. This argument is unavailing. Respondent
points to nothing in the record establishing the state of the relationship between him and J.L.
Indeed, respondent acknowledges that the “record is devoid of any reference to the time that [he]
and J.L. spent together.” Respondent merely speculates that “presumably there was at least some
contact that allowed J.L. the ability to bond with her father.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 43 In any event, respondent disregards that the focus of the hearing is the child, not
the interests of the parent. At a best-interest hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining a
- 13 - relationship with the child must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life. C.P., 2019
IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 69. In finding that it was in J.L.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights, the trial court noted that J.L.’s foster parents consistently met J.L.’s safety,
educational, developmental well-being, and medical needs. The court further stated that J.L.
viewed her foster parents as her mother and father, displayed a significant attachment to them, and
was bonded to them.
¶ 44 The evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The best interest report established
that J.L. and her siblings were placed with J.L.’s foster parents in May 2021. The report further
indicated that J.L.’s foster parents provided for J.L.’s safety, educational, developmental,
well-being, and medical needs. Additionally, J.L. was “very bonded” to her foster parents, whom
she viewed as her mother and father. The report explained that J.L. sought out her foster parents
for support and comfort and that her foster parents were involved in her education and health
treatments. Further, the report indicated that J.L. loved her foster parents, who in turn, loved her.
Finally, the report indicated that J.L.’s foster parents lived in a five-bedroom home, were employed
full-time, and had friends and family who could provide support as needed. From this evidence,
the court could reasonably conclude that the termination of respondent’s parental rights and the
placement of J.L. with her foster parents facilitated J.L.’s interest in a stable, loving home life.
¶ 45 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s finding that it was in J.L.’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
- 14 -