2026 IL App (1st) 252146-U No. 1-25-2146
Order filed August 28, 2026 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re J.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Cook County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 24 JA 596 )
v. )
)
D.H., ) Honorable ) Lisa M. Taylor,
Respondent-Appellant.) ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Martin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Respondent failed to show that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s complained-of conduct, as required to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶2 After a hearing on the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship, the trial court found that the child was abused by being placed at a substantial risk of physical injury and neglected because she was exposed to an injurious environment. After a dispositional hearing, the court
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found that the respondent mother, D.H. (mother), was unable and unwilling to care for the child, adjudged the child a ward of the court, and placed her in the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶3 On appeal, 1 the mother argues that she was denied her statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel because counsel’s performance was deficient. Specifically, the mother argues that counsel undermined the mother’s standing before the court by characterizing her as difficult and failed to address the mother’s absence, conduct meaningful cross-examination, or present any defense.
¶4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 The mother is the parent of J.H., a minor, who was born in February 2008. J.H.’s father, D.A., is not a party to this appeal.
¶7 On August 16, 2024, when J.H. was 16 years old, the State filed a petition for adjudication of her wardship and a motion to place her in the temporary custody of the DCFS guardianship
1 This appeal is subject to expedited procedures under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a) (eff.
July 1, 2018). Paragraph (a)(5) of Rule 311 requires us to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, except where good cause is shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). Here, the notice of appeal was filed on October 21, 2025. Consequently, we would have been required to issue our decision by March 20, 2026.
However, we extended the deadlines for respondent to file a supplement to the record and for the parties to file their briefs with this court. Specifically, a supplement to the record was allowed on March 20, 2026, and respondent sought and received four extensions of time to file the appellant’s brief, which was filed on April 17, 2026. Thereafter, the petitioner sought and received three extensions of time to file the appellee’s briefs. Specifically, the Office of the Cook County State’s Attorney filed its brief on June 25, 2026, and the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian filed its brief on August 3, 2026. Respondent has not filed a reply brief, which was due August 10, 2026.
Under these circumstances, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day deadline contemplated by Rule 311(a)(5).
2 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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administrator. The petition alleged that J.H. was abused because she was placed at a substantial risk of physical injury and neglected because her environment was injurious to her welfare. Specifically, the petition alleged that (1) the mother, who had a prior indicated report with DCFS, threatened J.H. with a gun on July 25, 2024, while accusing J.H. of stealing the mother’s marijuana; (2) the mother engaged in a physical altercation with J.H. three days later, wherein the mother sat on J.H., put her in a headlock, and choked her, causing her to feel like she “could not breathe”; (3) J.H. expressed suicidal ideations after the incident and was psychiatrically hospitalized, where she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); (4) during her hospitalization, J.H. informed medical staff that she was scared to return to the mother’s care; and (5) the mother subsequently withdrew her consent for medical providers to provide J.H. with her prescribed psychotropic medications.
¶8 The trial court appointed counsel for the mother during the initial hearing on the State’s petition and motion. After admonishing the mother about her rights, the court stated, “But here’s the most important thing for me to tell you *** if you want [J.H.] returned to your care, then you’ve got to cooperate with DCFS.” The mother acknowledged the court’s admonishments and agreed to allow DCFS to take temporary custody of J.H. The court accordingly found probable cause and urgent and immediate necessity to remove J.H. from the mother’s care and placed J.H. in the temporary custody of DCFS.
¶9 Prior to trial, the mother identified D.A. as J.H.’s father. The caseworker informed the court that J.H. had identified a different man, Terrance Jackson, as her father. The mother, however, stated that Jackson was not J.H.’s father. The caseworker explained that J.H. had lived with Jackson and his family in Minnesota from July 2022 until August 2024, when J.H. reported that
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Jackson sexually abused her. The mother told the court that she learned of J.H.’s abuse after child protective services in Minnesota asked the mother to retrieve J.H. from Minnesota because she had missed 20 out of 30 days of school. The mother consequently called J.H., who informed her that Jackson had been abusing her. The caseworker testified that a child protective services investigation in Minnesota had a DNA test administered and confirmed that Jackson was not J.H.’s father. The caseworker told the court that Jackson and his family contacted J.H. while she was in the hospital. The caseworker stated that J.H. informed hospital staff that Jackson is “the only father she knows.” The mother requested that Jackson and his family have no contact with J.H. The court entered an order prohibiting Jackson and his relatives from having contact with J.H.
¶ 10 On November 20, 2024, counsel for the mother informed the court that the mother “may need a new attorney.” Counsel explained that the mother had accused counsel of being in “collusion” with DCFS. Counsel said that when she “attempted to continue talking to [the mother], she started yelling and ultimately hung up the phone.” Counsel stated that the mother also transferred 21 attachments to counsel immediately before the court hearing, demanding that counsel address the information contained in those documents during that day’s proceeding. Counsel explained that the mother’s “behavior and most disturbingly the accusation of being in some sort of conspiracy or collusion with DCFS has made it merely impossible to work with her in any productive way.”
¶ 11 The mother acknowledged that she had accused her counsel of being in collusion with DCFS, explaining that she was “paranoid” after looking at e-mails and had been “triggered.” The mother also admitted that she had yelled at her counsel, hung up the phone on her, and acted “inappropriately.” The court interrupted the mother, informing her that her conversations with her
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attorney must remain between them. When the court asked the mother if she believed that she could get her triggers under control such that she could aid in the defense of this case, the mother responded affirmatively. When the court then asked the mother if she believed that she could work with defense counsel in a respectful and productive way, the mother responded affirmatively. The court stated, “Should something change, this court is on notice. And I would ask for a written motion to withdraw if [the mother] is unable to keep her statement that she just made to this Court regarding respectful and productive collaboration.”
¶ 12 Thereafter, the mother informed the court that the person who had transported J.H. to a specialized foster home that month was Jackson’s mother. The court admonished the case management team that this violated the court’s order concerning no contact between J.H. and any of Jackson’s family members. On December 20, 2024, the mother’s counsel moved the court for a report of the guardian, alleging that the court’s order prohibiting Jackson and his relatives from having contact with J.H. had been violated. During the hearing on this motion, the mother’s counsel informed the court that the mother had screenshots from social media demonstrating that J.H. had been in contact with the individuals in the court’s no-contact order. The mother’s counsel asked the court to order DCFS, as J.H.’s guardian, to investigate the alleged violation and file a report with the court summarizing its findings. The court granted the mother’s motion.
¶ 13 Pursuant to this order, DCFS provided a report to the court on January 8, 2025, admitting that DCFS had permitted J.H. to go on a 20-day long visit with Jackson’s mother because J.H. had identified this woman as “her grandmother.” The attorney and guardian ad litem for J.H. informed the court that J.H. wished to continue having contact with Jackson’s mother because “these are people she has known as her family until most recently.” An attorney for DCFS requested
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modification of the no-contact order, asking that J.H. be allowed to speak to Jackson’s mother via telephone. The mother’s counsel objected, arguing, “We don’t know what part, if any, these other relatives have played in terms of either facilitating [the abuse] or ignoring that or in general not responding appropriately to the allegations made regarding Mr. Jackson.” The court agreed with the mother’s counsel and denied DCFS’s request.
¶ 14 On March 6, 2025, the Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) announced that the parties had selected a trial date of May 12, 2025, at 1:30 p.m. The mother, who was present in court, subsequently informed the court that she was concerned that J.H. was still having contact with Jackson’s mother. The court ordered DCFS to discuss the no-contact order with J.H. and to conduct a family meeting so that the mother’s concerns could be addressed. The court concluded the hearing by stating, “I’ll see you good people on May 12, 2025—hold on—at 1:30 for adjudication, disposition, permanency.”
¶ 15 On May 12, 2025, the court conducted an adjudicatory hearing on the State’s petition by way of a videoconference proceeding. The mother and D.A. did not appear for this hearing but were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings.
¶ 16 The State admitted photographic and documentary exhibits into evidence during the trial, including J.H.’s certified and delegated medical records from Riveredge Hospital. These records showed that J.H. was admitted to the Riveredge Hospital on July 29, 2024, when she was 16 years old, for “suicidal thoughts.” J.H. participated in a psychiatric evaluation on the day of her admission, wherein she provided her social history to her medical providers. During this evaluation, J.H. told her treating physician that she first left the mother’s care when J.H. was 11 months old, after the mother was convicted of robbery. J.H. was cared for by her cousin during
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the mother’s seven-year incarceration and remained in this cousin’s care until J.H. was in the sixth grade. After sixth grade, J.H. lived with her cousin’s mother “for a few months” and then moved in with her cousin’s mother’s sister, whom J.H. referred to as her “aunt.” J.H. reported that the mother would “take her for the weekends” while she lived with her aunt and that “it was horrible.” J.H. said that she and her mother slept in cars, in other people’s homes, or in and out of hotels. During that time, the mother told J.H.’s aunt that J.H. was “with a grown man,” so the aunt tried to whip J.H. with an extension cord. J.H. ran away from her aunt’s home to avoid the abuse. J.H. eventually telephoned the mother and returned to her care while in the seventh and eighth grades. In May 2022, after J.H. finished eighth grade, the mother was incarcerated for a firearm offense. J.H. lived with other members of her family, including her maternal grandmother, during the mother’s 2022 incarceration.
¶ 17 According to the records, J.H. returned home when the mother was released from custody on “house arrest.” The mother asked J.H. “to sell weed for her” while the mother was on house arrest. J.H. reported this to the police. DCFS investigated the matter and allowed J.H. to move to Minnesota to live with her alleged father, Jackson. J.H. remained in Jackson’s care until April 2024, when J.H. reported that Jackson sexually abused her. The mother told J.H.’s medical providers that Jackson did not sexually abuse J.H., but that she was raped by her cousins in April 2024.
¶ 18 The records showed that when Riveredge Hospital staff spoke to the mother on the day of J.H.’s admission on July 29, 2024, the mother told J.H.’s medical providers that Jackson and his mother “made allegations” against J.H.’s maternal grandmother shortly after the mother was incarcerated in May 2022, causing J.H. to get “kicked out” of her maternal grandmother’s home.
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The mother said that Jackson “lied and said he was [J.H.]’s father,” and “also lied and said [J.H.] was selling drugs for [the mother].” The mother told J.H.’s medical providers that Jackson sexually assaulted J.H. while J.H. lived with him.
¶ 19 According to the records, J.H. told her treating physicians that things were “terrible” when she returned home to the mother in April 2024. J.H. stated that the mother became “physically aggressive” with her and that their house was “unfit,” explaining that J.H. had “no bed.” J.H. said that the mother also “smoked weed” daily and allowed J.H. to smoke marijuana with her. J.H. told hospital staff that the events leading up to her admission to Riveredge Hospital began on July 25, 2024, when the mother threw J.H. against a wall and threatened her “with a gun” while accusing her of stealing the mother’s money and “weed.” J.H. ran away from home after this incident and went to the train station at 95th Street and the Dan Ryan Expressway, where she slept for three days. On July 28, 2024, J.H. went to the police station and told officers how the mother had threatened her with a gun. The police called the mother to the station but ultimately sent J.H. home with the mother because they did not have enough “proof.”
¶ 20 Per the records, when J.H. returned home, her 17-year-old sister began “making fun of” her, accusing her “of selling her privates to make money.” J.H. opened the back door of their home to leave, but her sister “grabbed” her, pulled her back into the house, and “slung [her] around.” A physical altercation between J.H. and her sister ensued. After their altercation, J.H. stepped outside. The mother then went outside and began punching J.H., calling for J.H.’s sister to “come help.” J.H. stated that their Rottweiler also attacked her during the altercation, biting her in the face as the mother punched her in the face. Her sister then sat on J.H.’s legs while the mother put her knee on J.H.’s neck and pushed her face into the pavement. J.H. said that she was “trying to
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get them off” because she “couldn’t breathe,” but that the mother put J.H. in a “choke hold” and continued to punch her in the head. After the altercation, the mother called the police, falsely stating that J.H. “tried to attack her” and that J.H. “had a knife.” The police arrived and transported J.H. to Riveredge Hospital.
¶ 21 According to the records, J.H. told her medical providers, “I’ve had suicidal thoughts since moving back with my mom. *** I cannot go back to the house. I do not feel safe in that house.” J.H. reported having decreased sleep, low concentration, low energy, low motivation, decreased appetite, anhedonia, and feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness. J.H.’s treating physician diagnosed her with major “depressive disorder, single episode, severe without psychotic features” and “acute stress reaction.” Doctors also conducted a CT scan and physical examination of J.H. and found that she had a fractured nose; a dog bite on her chin; multiple abrasions on her back, left shoulder, upper neck, and both forearms; pain and limited range of motion in her left shoulder; and swelling behind her left ear. The State also admitted into evidence several photos of J.H. taken on July 31, 2024, depicting her physical injuries.
¶ 22 The Riveredge Hospital records showed that J.H. was prescribed antidepressants for her psychiatric symptoms and admitted for inpatient treatment. During her hospitalization, J.H. reported having difficulty sleeping, explaining that she had nightmares about the mother “holding a gun on her” and fears that she would be discharged from the hospital back to the mother’s care. On August 8, 2024, a nurse contacted the mother to obtain her consent to provide J.H. with medication to help her sleep and alleviate her nightmares. The mother denied consent, stating that she believed J.H. was “exaggerating her symptoms.” On August 13, 2024, DCFS informed the
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parties that it intended to take J.H. into its custody. The mother subsequently revoked consent to all J.H.’s prescribed medications.
¶ 23 DCFS investigator Stephanie Rangel testified that she was assigned to investigate the welfare of J.H. at 4 a.m. on July 28, 2024, after DCFS received a G-sequence report 3 alleging that the mother “swung a gun” at J.H. Pursuant to the report, Rangel went to a Chicago police station, where she spoke to J.H. J.H. informed Rangel that J.H. ran away from home on July 25, 2024, because the mother accused her of stealing the mother’s marijuana, pushed her into a wall, attempted to beat her, and “swung a gun at her.” Rangel also spoke to the mother at the police station, who stated that J.H. “had a history of running away.” On cross-examination by the mother’s counsel, Rangel testified that the mother told her that J.H. previously ran away with a man who had an open sexual assault investigation involving J.H.
¶ 24 Chicago Police Officer Antonio Brand testified that, on July 28, 2024, at 8 a.m., he was assigned to investigate a domestic battery involving J.H. and the mother. When Officer Brand arrived at their home, he found J.H., her sister, and the mother. The mother told him that J.H. engaged in a physical altercation with her sister shortly after arriving home from the police station that morning, and that J.H. “pulled a knife” on her sister during the fight. Officer Brand testified that the mother had difficulty recounting the details of what happened and that her story was “all over the place.” The mother did not show a knife to Officer Brand, and he did not observe a knife in the area where the mother reported that the fight had occurred. The mother admitted that she
3 DCFS’s first investigation into a family is identified as an A-sequence investigation, and subsequent investigations are designated with the next letter of the alphabet. A report for a G- sequence investigation indicates that this was the seventh DCFS investigation of J.H.’s family. See In re J.T., 2024 IL App (1st) 232041, fn 4.
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restrained J.H. during the altercation, informing Officer Brand that she pulled J.H. “by the arm.” Officer Brand did not observe any injuries on the mother but saw that J.H. had a bite mark on her face. The mother refused Officer Brand’s offer of medical assistance and instead asked him to transport J.H. to a hospital for a mental health evaluation. Officer Brand testified that the mother never indicated that she felt unsafe with J.H. in her home.
¶ 25 DCFS child protection investigator Dana Nolton testified that she was assigned on July 31, 2024, to follow up on the investigation of J.H. Nolton went to Riveredge Hospital and spoke to J.H., who had recently been admitted for inpatient treatment. J.H. told Nolton that the mother threatened her with a gun on July 25, 2024, because the mother thought J.H. had stolen the mother’s money and “weed.” J.H. said that she ran away to the 95th Street train station and did not return home until July 28, 2024. J.H. said that she and her sister had a physical altercation shortly after J.H. returned home and then the mother joined the attack against J.H. J.H. reported that the mother “put her knee on [J.H.]’s neck” during the altercation, and that the mother “kept putting more and more pressure” every time J.H. moved. J.H. stated that she was also attacked by the family dog during the fight. Nolton observed marks, in their healing stages, on J.H.’s face and body and photographed her injuries. J.H. told Nolton that she was “scared to go back home.”
¶ 26 DCFS child welfare specialist Jennifer Johnson testified that she was assigned to investigate the safety and well-being of J.H. on July 28 or 29, 2024. Upon her assignment, Johnson learned that the mother had been the subject of prior indicated DCFS reports for substantial risk of injury and environmental neglect. Johnson spoke to the mother on the phone on July 29, 2024, and was informed that J.H. was at Riveredge Hospital. The mother reported that J.H. did not have a diagnosis but the mother believed J.H. needed “some help.” During this phone call, the mother
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did not speak about the physical altercation that occurred on July 28, 2024, and did not report feeling threatened by J.H., unsafe with her, or unable to care for her in the mother’s home.
¶ 27 Johnson testified that when she met with the mother at her home on August 8, 2024, the mother stated that she did not witness any altercation between J.H. and her sister on July 28, 2024. The mother said that she had simply been trying to prevent J.H. from leaving home and “held her down” until the police arrived. The mother did not explain why she did not report this incident to Johnson during their initial conversation on July 29, 2024. The mother said that she “did not recall” J.H. sustaining any injuries during the incident. The mother also denied any substance use. The mother never reported feeling fearful of J.H. or unsafe around her.
¶ 28 Johnson testified that she attended a meeting at Riveredge Hospital on August 13, 2024, with J.H., the mother, and J.H.’s medical providers. During this meeting, J.H. recounted how the mother “dragged her across the floor,” sat on her neck, and choked her while the family dog attacked her on July 28, 2024. In response to J.H.’s description of the incident, the mother said that she sat on J.H. to prevent her from leaving home. The mother did not report that she felt unsafe around J.H. On August 19, 2024, J.H. informed Johnson during a telephone conversation that the mother had withdrawn her consent to J.H.’s prescribed medication. J.H. said that the mother would discipline J.H. and her sister by taking things away or punching them.
¶ 29 All parties rested at the conclusion of this evidence. In its ruling, the court found that all four of the State’s witnesses were credible. The court stated that it reviewed the exhibits and found that the photographs of J.H.’s injuries “speak for themselves.” The court determined that the State met its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that J.H. was abused because
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she was placed at a substantial risk of physical injury and neglected because she was subjected to an environment that was injurious to her welfare.
¶ 30 On June 3, 2025, the mother’s counsel filed a motion requesting leave to withdraw as the mother’s counsel. In the motion, counsel stated that she attempted to comply with the court’s orders, fulfill her obligations under the Code of Civil Procedure and Illinois Supreme Court Rules, and “enlist [the mother’s] cooperation in doing the same.” Citing Rule 1.16 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 (Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2010) R. 1.16 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)), counsel asserted that the mother’s “course of conduct has rendered it unreasonably difficult for [counsel] to carry out the employment effectively.” The mother was present for the videoconference hearing on the motion. During the hearing, counsel informed the court that it was “very difficult” to work with the mother, explaining that each of their conversations turned “caustic.” Counsel noted that this “was an issue at the very beginning of the case,” it had continued, and made it “unreasonable to be working on [the mother’s] behalf.” Counsel stated that the mother wished to appeal the adjudication findings and that counsel was willing to continue representing the mother through the disposition hearing, which was set to take place that day, if the mother was “okay with holding on long enough to get through the disposition hearing.”
¶ 31 The court then addressed the mother, stating, “So on the May 12th date, when you chose not to come to court, I entered findings related to your daughter.” The court explained that the disposition hearing would determine whether J.H. should be made a ward of the court and the mother could not appeal until entry of the disposition order. The court then asked the mother how she wished to proceed. The mother asked the court to appoint a new attorney. The court appointed new counsel for the mother and continued the disposition hearing.
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¶ 32 On October 8, 2025, the court conducted J.H.’s disposition hearing by way of a videoconference proceeding. The mother did not appear for this hearing.
¶ 33 During the hearing, the State entered into evidence an April 2025 integrated report, a May 2025 service report, an October 2025 court report, and therapy reports for J.H. The agency caseworker Jia Noelle testified that she had been assigned to J.H.’s case since March 2025. Noelle stated that 17-year-old J.H. was placed in a nonrelative foster home and was on track to graduate from high school. Noelle said that J.H. was diagnosed with depression and PTSD, but that she had not been taking her prescribed medication because she believed that the dosage was “too high” and the medication made her feel sick. J.H. also needed, but was not receiving, individual therapy because her therapist left the caseworker’s agency. Noelle testified that J.H. had no contact with the mother, was declining all visits with the mother, and expressed that she did not wish to return to the mother’s care. Noelle testified that the mother did not participate in DCFS’s integrated assessment to identify the services she needed to complete to safely reunify with J.H. Noelle stated that she was not in contact with the mother, who had not reached out to anyone at Noelle’s agency to inquire about J.H. or her well-being.
¶ 34 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found, inter alia, that the mother was unable and unwilling to parent J.H. The court then placed J.H. in the guardianship of DCFS and set the permanency goal of independence for J.H.
¶ 35 The mother timely appealed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 The mother argues that she was denied her statutory right to effective assistance of counsel during J.H.’s adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. Specifically, the mother argues that
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counsel’s characterization of the mother in open court as “difficult,” “uncooperative,” and “impossible to work with” constituted deficient performance because it “undermined her standing before the court.” The mother also argues that counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to address the mother’s absence from the hearings, request a continuance, conduct meaningful cross-examination, and present evidence on her behalf. Regarding any prejudice to the mother as a result of counsel’s alleged deficient representation, the mother stated that “[t]his is not a case where we can point to specific evidence that should have been presented and argue it would have changed the result. *** We do not know what the other side of the story looks like.”
¶ 38 In response, the State argues that the mother fails to point to anything in the record to support her claims or demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s conduct. The State argues that the mother has conceded that she cannot show prejudice and this court should reject her request to presume that she was prejudiced by her counsel’s performance. The State also argues that the mother cannot establish that counsel’s complained-of conduct was deficient where nothing in the record shows that counsel had good cause to request a trial continuance, relevant information to elicit on cross-examination, or evidence to present during the trial.
¶ 39 “Proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act [(Act)] are civil, nonadversarial proceedings where the court determines whether the child has been abused or neglected.” Julie Q. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2013 IL 113783, ¶ 39. The purpose of the Act is to “secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance *** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2022). The Act sets forth the procedures the court must follow in determining whether a minor should be removed from the parents’ custody and made a
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ward of the court. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 462-63 (2004). The process is initiated when the State files a petition for the adjudication of the minor’s wardship. Id. at 462. Thereafter, the court conducts an adjudicatory hearing, where “the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2022). If the court determines that the minor was abused, neglected, or dependent, the court must proceed to a dispositional hearing, where the court determines “whether it is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the public that [the minor] be made a ward of the court.” Id. § 2-21(2).
¶ 40 Here, the court found that J.H. was abused as defined in subsection 2-3(2)(ii) of the Act because she was placed at a substantial risk of physical injury, and neglected as defined in subsection 2-3(1)(b) of the Act because she was exposed to an environment injurious to her welfare. Id. §§ 2-3(2)(ii), 2-3(1)(b). The court then determined that the mother was unable and unwilling to parent J.H. and adjudicated her a ward of the court. The mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings. The mother asserts only that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the adjudication and disposition proceedings.
¶ 41 “While the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution [citation] and article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 [citation] guarantee the right to counsel in criminal proceedings, the right to counsel in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act is provided by statute.” In re Br.M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 41; see In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d 448, 461 (2002) (explaining that an indigent parent in a child protection proceeding “is entitled to court-appointed counsel, not because the due process clause of the Illinois or United States Constitutions mandates it, but because the legislature has chosen to guarantee the assistance of
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counsel to indigent parents.”) The Act states that parents of a minor who is the subject of proceedings under the Act “have the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and also, although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character, the right to be represented by counsel.” 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2022).
¶ 42 While the “statutory right to counsel in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act lacks constitutional footing [citations], that right is closely linked to its constitutional counterpart [citations].” In re Br.M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 42. Accordingly, the rubric used in evaluating ineffective assistance claims in criminal cases—the two-prong standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)—guides the determination of whether counsel was effective in proceedings under the Act. Br.M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43 (“We recognize that there are differences between criminal law proceedings and proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, but the Strickland standard, because of its familiarity and simplicity, offers a helpful structure to guide our analysis.”).
¶ 43 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, one must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and resulted in prejudice. Id. Specifically, one “must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79. A “reasonable probability” means a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 55 (a party alleging ineffective assistance must “affirmatively prove” that prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged
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errors); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 481 (1994) (proof of prejudice cannot be based on “mere conjecture or speculation”). “The failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard “precludes a finding of ineffective assistance.” In re A.U., 2024 IL App (1st) 231727, ¶ 44. Thus, “when a party cannot establish prejudice under Strickland, we may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis and need not consider whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” In re Charles W., 2014 IL App (1st) 131281, ¶ 37; see People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 338 (2000) (“A court may resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by reaching only the prejudice prong, as a lack of prejudice renders irrelevant the issue of counsel’s alleged deficient performance.”). In general, the standard of review for determining if an individual’s constitutional rights, like effective assistance of counsel, have been violated is de novo. People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15. Moreover, this court’s review of legal issues is de novo. See Br.M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 37.
¶ 44 The mother contends her counsel provided deficient representation because counsel undermined the mother’s standing before the court by characterizing the mother as difficult. The mother also contends that counsel failed to secure the mother’s testimony by requesting a continuance when the mother did not attend the adjudication and disposition hearings, cross- examine witnesses, and admit evidence during the trial. While the mother contends that this alleged deficient performance prejudiced her, she states that she cannot show prejudice under the Strickland standard because “we do not know what the other side of the story looks like.” Essentially, the mother asks this court, without citation to any relevant authority, to presume that prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged errors because counsel’s performance was so deficient.
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¶ 45 It is a long-established principle that the appellate court “is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented, and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 32. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant to adequately develop his or her argument with citation to relevant authority. An argument raised on appeal but not supported by citation to relevant authority is forfeited under Rule 341(h)(7). In re Addison R., 2013 IL App (2d) 121318, ¶ 31. Thus, the mother has forfeited her claim that this court should presume prejudice in deviation from the applicable Strickland standard.
¶ 46 Forfeiture aside, this court has rejected similar claims where respondents in child protection proceedings asked this court to dispense with the prejudice requirement under Strickland and instead hold that counsel’s performance was so deficient that prejudice should be presumed under the analysis and rationale delineated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-61 (1984), which applies to criminal cases. See, e.g., In re D.M., 2020 IL App (1st) 200103, ¶ 31 (rejecting the respondent’s argument that the court should dispense with the prejudice requirement under Strickland in a child protection proceeding and instead hold that counsel’s performance was so deficient that prejudice should be presumed); In re C.C., 368 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748 (2006) (refusing to presume prejudice under Strickland in a child protection proceeding despite the respondent’s claim that counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing). In declining to presume prejudice in child protection proceedings, this court emphasized that a parent’s right to counsel in child protection proceedings is statutory—not constitutional—in nature. D.M., 2020 IL App (1st) 200103, ¶ 32; C.C., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 748. This court explained
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that “[i]t seems counterintuitive to apply a test that depends upon a determination of whether the proceeding was sufficiently adversarial in nature when the legislature has specified that proceedings under the Act are not meant to be adversarial in nature.” C.C., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 748. As a result, “the sixth-amendment analysis and rationale delineated by Cronic and its progeny, stating that ‘[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,’ does not apply [in a child protection proceeding commenced under the Act].” Id. (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656); see D.M., 2020 IL App (1st) 200103, ¶ 32 (because the rationale for applying Cronic in the criminal case context under the sixth amendment is not present in a child protection case, there is no reason to relieve the respondent of the burden of showing prejudice).
¶ 47 Furthermore, the mother’s claim of prejudice is speculative and legally insufficient pursuant to Strickland. First, the mother argues that she was prejudiced because her counsel damaged the mother’s “standing” before the trial court by informing it that she was difficult and counsel found it impossible to work with her. The mother, however, fails to cite any facts in the record to demonstrate that counsel’s representation influenced the judge’s findings at the adjudication and disposition hearings or biased the judge against the mother. Instead, the mother asks this court to presume, without evidence, that counsel’s statements were damaging and prejudicial. We decline to do so because reviewing courts presume that a trial judge knows and follows the law and considers only admissible evidence unless the record indicates otherwise. See People v. Robinson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 963, 976 (2006). Moreover, “[a] trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party challenging the judge’s impartiality bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” People v. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96 (internal quotation marks
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omitted) (“to show bias, [a party] must demonstrate that the judge displayed active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust towards [that party]”). The trial court here indicated in its adjudication order that the findings of abuse and neglect were based on credible testimony and exhibits about the mother’s conduct pertaining to J.H. Accordingly, we reject the mother’s assertion that she suffered prejudice from counsel’s representations to the court about the mother’s lack of cooperation with counsel.
¶ 48 Next, the mother argues that counsel’s failure to obtain a continuance of the adjudication hearing due to the mother’s absence prevented her from providing the trial court with her account of the July 28, 2024, incident. This argument lacks merit. A trial court is not obligated to delay the proceedings and wait for a parent who received notice and voluntarily chooses not to participate in the child protection proceedings. In re A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724-25 (2010). Moreover, the court heard evidence concerning the mother’s account of the July 28, 2024, incident through DCFS child welfare specialist Johnson, who testified that the mother said she was trying to prevent J.H. from leaving home, so the mother held J.H. down until the police arrived, and that the mother did not recall J.H. sustaining any injuries during the incident. The mother also argues that she did not have the chance to explain that she brought J.H. to Riveredge Hospital when the situation became unmanageable. However, the mother fails to show what impact that testimony would have had on the outcome of the trial, which was centered on the mother threatening J.H. at gunpoint for stealing the mother’s “weed” and then violently punching and choking J.H. during a physical altercation three days later—evidence that was corroborated by J.H.’s physical injuries and subsequent trauma-related symptoms. Moreover, the record shows that the police—not the mother—transported J.H. to Riveredge Hospital. The record also shows that the mother never
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expressed to the police, DCFS investigators, or hospital staff that J.H. was unmanageable or that the mother felt unsafe with J.H. in her home. The mother identifies no other relevant facts regarding the July 28, 2024, incident that were omitted from the trial.
¶ 49 Regarding any prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged failure to meaningfully cross- examine witnesses at the adjudication hearing, the mother fails to identify who counsel failed to properly cross-examine or what testimony counsel failed to elicit. The mother likewise claims that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to cross-examine caseworker Noelle during the disposition hearing. The mother, however, does not identify what testimony counsel failed to elicit from Noelle. Instead, the mother asks this court to presume, from her presence at prior court proceedings, that evidence may have existed to counter Noelle’s testimony that the mother did not participate in DCFS’s integrated assessment, remain in contact with J.H.’s caseworker, or contact DCFS to check on J.H.’s well-being during the pendency of the case.
¶ 50 Regarding any prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged failure to admit evidence on the mother’s behalf, the record establishes—contrary to the mother’s assertion on appeal—that the trial court considered evidence admitted at the adjudication hearing that J.H. had a history of running away and was sexually abused by Jackson after moving to Minnesota during the mother’s incarceration. The mother fails to identify any other evidence counsel failed to admit on the mother’s behalf.
¶ 51 Regarding any prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged failure to pursue a finding of no- fault dependency, the mother fails to explain, given the facts in evidence, how no-fault dependency could have been a viable claim. In addition, nothing in the record indicates that counsel could or should have raised “a possible defense of dependency.” As set forth in the Act, a dependent minor
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is a minor “who is without proper medical or other remedial care recognized under State law or other care necessary for the minor’s well-being through no fault, neglect or lack of concern by the minor’s parents, guardian or custodian.” 705 ILCS 405/2-4(1)(c) (West 2022). The mother fails to explain how any of the circumstances that brought J.H. to the attention of DCFS fit within the no- fault dependency framework.
¶ 52 Given the absence of support for her claims, the mother’s assertion of prejudice is entirely speculative. “Strickland requires actual prejudice be shown, not mere speculation as to prejudice.” People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008); see People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 363 (1997) (“pure speculation falls far short of the demonstration of actual prejudice required by Strickland”). Because we conclude that the mother failed to show prejudice under the Strickland standard, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. See A.U., 2024 IL App (1st) 231727, ¶ 44.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 55 Affirmed.