Filed 8/28/26 In re J.G. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re J.G., a Person Coming B349097 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP02967A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
I. INTRODUCTION
V.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s September 16, 2025, order at the Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.21, subdivision (f), 12-month review hearing regarding J.G. (the child, born 2009). She challenges the finding that the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) provided her with reasonable reunification services as not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
This is mother’s second challenge to the juvenile court’s finding that the Department has provided her with reasonable services. (See In re J.G. (Mar. 17, 2026, B346038) (J.G. I).) As in her previous appeal, mother’s challenge is based on the Department’s failure to provide conjoint therapy with the child.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3
In our prior unpublished opinion, we affirmed the juvenile court’s order at the six-month status review hearing finding the Department had provided mother with reasonable services and continuing family reunification services. The following factual and procedural summary is taken from the opinion in J.G. I, supra, B346038:
“A. Jurisdiction
“On September 19, 2024, the Department filed a section 300 petition that alleged, as later sustained by the juvenile court, the following counts:
“a-1 and b-1: ‘[Mother] has a history of engaging in violent and assaultive behavior in the presence of the child. On 01/25/2023, ... mother repeatedly struck adult sibling, [sister] on [her] back and shoulder with a pair of headphones. ... [M]other used both hands to pull [sister’s] hair. The child intervened and separated ... mother and [sister]. On prior occasions, ... mother threw clothing and items at maternal grandmother ... . Such violent conduct on the part of ... mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.’
“b-2: ‘[Mother] has mental and emotional problems, including paranoia, which renders ... mother unable to provide regular care of the child. Such mental and emotional problems on the part of ... mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.’[(Fn. omitted.)]
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“On October 15, 2024, the Department filed its jurisdiction/disposition report. The child reported that in September 2024, mother struck him on the chest, and that ‘“[mother] says she is okay, but clearly she is not. We tried to get her help, but she said no. If I was ever going to live with my mom again, she would need to get help. Otherwise, it will be a living hell.”’ Sister reported that she and the child are scared because they ‘“don't know what [mother]’s going to do or what she’s capable of.”’
“On September 6, 2024, the social worker spoke with an employee at the child’s school who explained that mother had come to the school numerous times to demand that the school take away the child’s phone because the child had done something to mother’s phone.
“The dependency investigator reported that on October 2, 2024, mother waited in the parking lot instead of coming into the building for her scheduled interview or otherwise informing the investigator she had arrived. She fidgeted with her arms and hands, walked at an angle, and frequently went off topic. Mother told the investigator that someone was tampering with her phone; she suspected it was sister and the child. She denied paranoia or any other mental health problems except anxiety. She refused treatment and stated that she was ‘“not going to do the mental health appointments.”’
“At the October 29, 2024, adjudication and disposition hearing, mother denied having any mental health issues other than anxiety around small spaces. She provided proof that she had attended a physical examination on October 21, 2024, and claimed to have scheduled an appointment with a psychiatrist for November 1, 2024, to assuage concerns about her mental health.
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“The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, declared the child a dependent of the court, removed him from mother’s custody, and ordered him suitably placed with sister. It granted a temporary restraining order protecting sister from mother.[2]
“The juvenile court ordered the Department to provide mother with reunification services, housing and transportation assistance, and to refer mother for a neurological assessment. The court ordered that mother be provided a minimum of two hours a week of monitored visitation with the child. Finally, the court ordered, as part of the case plan, that mother participate in ‘[c]onjoint counseling with [the child] when recommended by [the child’s] therapist, individual counseling to address the case issues, including anger management and mental health. Mother is to submit to a psychological assessment, psychiatric evaluation, and take all prescribed psychotropic medications.’ The court ordered mother to follow the standing orders of the case plan, including that she ‘sign any form necessary to release information to [the Department] with regard to all court-ordered counseling (HIPAA).’
“The juvenile court ordered that the child participate in age-appropriate counseling and conjoint therapy with mother if the child’s therapist recommended it.
2 On November 18, 2024, the juvenile court issued a threeyear restraining order protecting sister from mother. On October 2, 2024, another superior court issued a one-year restraining order protecting maternal grandmother from mother.
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“B. Reunification Period ([Six Month] Status Review Report)
“On April 21, 2025, the Department filed a status review report. The Department reported that the child was ‘thriving’ in the care of sister. He had gained weight, improved academically, formed friendships at school, and become a confident and happy teenager.
“The social worker supervised family visits between mother and the child and reported that although mother was caring and loving during the visits, she spent most of her time ‘venting’ to the child about her difficult economic situation, which caused the child to worry. On one occasion, the child asked the social worker to end the visit early ‘because of how uncomfortable and sick to his stomach he felt.’ The child canceled most of his visits because of anxiety. The child wrote to the social worker in a text message: ‘“I am so sorry but I can’t see my mom t[o]m[o]r[row.] I just can’t it’s so hard for me to see her i[n] that position and just bring[s] me a lot of anxiety I am so sorry.”’
“In compliance with the juvenile court’s order, on November 12, 2024, the child began to receive regular age- appropriate therapy. The therapist reported that the child avoided discussing his trauma and required ‘“more time, gradual steps, and the development of effective coping skills to feel prepared to discuss his experiences.”’ The therapist also reported that the child had begun to express feelings of ‘“severe anxiety” before and during family time.’ The child’s high anxiety levels negatively affected his emotional well-being, daily functioning, and relationships at school and home. The therapist recommended that the child’s ‘“emotional well-being be prioritized by allowing him to decide when he feels emotionall[y]
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ready to visit his mother.”’ The therapist opined that the child was not ready to have conjoint therapy sessions with mother.
“The child expressed that he had not felt safe or loved when he lived with mother. He said he had not yet healed from the traumatic experiences he endured in mother’s care and wanted sister to adopt him.
“Mother continued to exhibit signs of paranoia by, among other things, accusing sister of deleting items from mother’s phone when the phone was never in sister’s possession. She did not provide any confirmation that she attended a neurological or psychiatric evaluation.[(Fn. omitted.)] She self-reported that she attended nine individual therapy sessions between November 21, 2024, and April 16, 2025, but the Department could not verify mother’s report because she refused to provide a HIPAA release for the Department to obtain her medical records and review her compliance with an assessment, diagnosis and treatment plan.
“The Department recommended that the juvenile court continue reunification services for another six months to allow mother more time to comply with the court orders and seek treatment.
“C. [Six-Month] Status Review Hearing
“On April 29, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a section 366.21, subdivision (e) status review hearing. The court admitted into evidence the Department’s reports and two documents that mother submitted. Mother’s first document was an after visit summary indicating mother had a video visit with a licensed marriage and family therapist on April 16, 2025, and scheduled another visit for April 23, 2025. The second document indicated
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that mother saw the therapist again on April 23, 2025, and had another video visit with him scheduled for that same day.
“The Department asked the juvenile court to again order mother to sign release of information forms so the Department could assess her progress.
“The child’s counsel requested that the child remain suitably placed, that mother continue to receive reunification services, and that the juvenile court modify its visitation order to reduce visitation to twice a month based on the recommendation of the child’s therapist.
“Mother’s counsel requested that the child be returned to mother’s custody and argued that mother had complied with the Department’s requests. Alternatively, counsel asked for a finding of no reasonable services ‘due to the lack of visitation and lack of conjoint counseling taking place between this mother and child.’ Counsel further requested that the court modify mother’s case plan to state that conjoint counseling was to begin forthwith, and to order the Department to ensure mother received her court- ordered visits.
“Following argument by counsel, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department had provided the family with reasonable services. The court found that it would be detrimental to return the child to mother’s custody at that time but ordered that mother continue to receive reunification services. The court opined that conjoint counseling was ‘probably the best way in which they[ would] be able to reunify,’ but agreed with the child’s therapist’s view that the child ‘needs some more time to be able to properly process what has happened to him’ before he would be ready for conjoint counseling; it thus denied mother’s request to modify the case
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plan. The court ordered the current visitation schedule of two hours per week would ‘remain in full force and effect’ and the Department must ‘[e]nsure that the [child] is making full weekly visits with mother’ and then set a three-month progress report hearing to address visitation and counseling.” (J.G, I, supra, B346038.)
D. Prior Appeal
In J.G., I, mother challenged the juvenile court’s finding at the six-month review hearing that the Department had provided her with reasonable services. She argued then, as she does now, that the services were not reasonable because conjoint counseling for mother and child had not yet commenced. We referenced that “the disposition order included a case plan that included conjoint counseling when recommended by the child’s therapist.” (J.G. I, supra, B346038; italics added.) We explained that it was the opinion of the child’s therapist that the child, who experienced feelings of anxiety regarding visitation with mother, was not yet ready to commence conjoint counseling. (Id.) The therapist’s opinion “was supported by the child’s statements to the social worker that he was experiencing anxiety before visits as well as his statement that he felt sick to his stomach in anticipation of a visit with mother. Further, mother continued to exhibit signs of paranoia, had not provided proof of a neurological or psychological evaluation, and had not signed a HIPAA release which would have enabled the Department to verify her statements about her participation in therapy.” (Id.)
We affirmed the juvenile court’s order.
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E. Continued Reunification Period
1. July 29, 2025, Progress Review
On July 29, 2025, the juvenile court held a progress review hearing. The court acknowledged its receipt of a last minute information filed by the Department on July 17, 2025.
In the information, the social worker reported that the child had requested a younger therapist and that since June 12, 2025, he had completed three sessions with the new therapist. Although it was too early in the patient relationship for a progress report, the therapist reported the child did not wish to engage with mother and did so only because it was court-ordered. The therapist recommended against commencing conjoint therapy at that time due to the risk of retraumatizing the child and disrupting the progress he had made in sister’s home.
The social worker observed that the child was resisting the duration and frequency of his visits with mother. When told his visits were scheduled for two hours, he responded, “‘Absolutely not. One hour is enough.’” He canceled visits to study or to attend a function or for no reason. While mother greeted him warmly with affection, the child gave her limited responses and watched videos on his phone.
During a monitored visit, mother expressed that she would like daily visits during the child’s summer break. The child became upset and explained to mother why past experiences with her made it hard for him to see her. He told mother he did not want to live with her or continue to see her weekly. The social worker reported that the remainder of the visit went well as the two “were more engaged and able to communicate after [the
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child] expressed how he felt;” mother agreed to reduce her visits to every other week.
At the progress review hearing, counsel for mother argued to the juvenile court that mother’s concession showed her progress in her individual therapy. Counsel requested that the child be released to mother or, in the alternative, that the court order conjoint counseling to begin forthwith, suggesting that the counseling sessions occur during the alternating weeks mother did not visit with the child. Alternatively, she asked the court to “set a time parameter for when these counseling sessions [could] begin.”
The child’s counsel requested that he remain suitably placed with sister and stated that the child was not ready to begin conjoint counseling with mother.
The juvenile court noted that mother was enrolled in regular therapy and had signed a medical release form so that the Department could receive updates on her attendance and progress. The court maintained all prior orders including that “conjoint counseling is to occur once deemed appropriate by the child’s individual therapist.” The court also ordered the Department to provide an update from the therapist on conjoint counseling.
2. August 26, 2025, Status Review Report
In the August 26, 2025, status review report, the Department reported that mother was renting a room in an apartment with three roommates. Mother claimed her roommates looked through her personal belongings, opened her mail, stole her paychecks, and broke her prescription eyeglasses.
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Mother’s medical records documented that mother experienced brief, involuntary, and irregular movements of her head, neck, and right shoulder that she did not acknowledge. She also appeared to have “mild difficulty with comprehend[ing] … the social world” and communicating with others. She began but did not complete the neurological assessment ordered by the court.3 The social worker added that mother completed a psychiatric evaluation on December 30, 2024, at which time she was prescribed a medication for mood and anxiety.
The social worker reported mother did engage in some therapy to manage her mood and anxiety and build “healthy coping skills.” She attended 11 sessions between January and August 2025, five of which occurred after the April 29, 2025, six- month review hearing. The social worker advised that mother “minimally demonstrate[d] new skills and behaviors consistent with [her] case plan objectives[,]” and although she was participating in mental health services, she did not take responsibility for her actions or understand why the Department was involved with her family. She appeared confused about the social worker’s role, had difficulty remembering to whom she had spoken, reported not having contact with the social worker despite speaking with him numerous times, and randomly appeared in the Department’s lobby and created issues with the
3 When the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, it ordered mother to undergo a neurological evaluation. At the six-month review hearing held on April 29, 2025, mother had not completed the neurological evaluation. As of the time the section 366.21, subdivision (f) report was drafted in August 2025, mother had seen a neurologist and completed the blood work but not the 24-hour urine sample and refused the MRI the neurologist ordered for her.
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staff. The social worker also observed that mother had mental health needs and possible cognitive and/or neurological issues that were contributing to her lack of insight and progress.
According to the social worker, the child was thriving in sister’s care. He did not want to return to mother’s care and claimed he would run away if returned to her. He wanted sister to adopt him.
Mother and the child continued to visit on a monitored basis every other week. The child believed the juvenile court was forcing him to visit mother and described the visits as “‘okay.’” He reported that conversations with mother overwhelmed him because she talked about her financial problems and he felt stressed and helpless. And he continued to have difficulty overcoming the trauma he suffered in mother’s care. He also disclosed that he suffered from alcohol addiction between July 2023 and September 2024, while living with mother, but had remained sober in sister’s care.
Initially, the child was not receptive to individual therapy but came to believe he was benefiting from it. The child reported not wanting to participate in conjoint counseling with mother because it would disrupt the progress he had made with his mental health. His therapist told the social worker that she agreed starting conjoint therapy at that point could retraumatize the child. The social worker acknowledged mother’s efforts in visiting the child and engaging in mental health services and recommended additional reunification services.
3. September 15, 2025, Last Minute Information
In a September 15, 2025, last minute information, the social worker reported that the Department continued to assist
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mother with housing and mental health care.4 Mother’s new therapist, who had been treating mother since July 2025, reported mother had difficulty following boundaries, was not oriented to time, mixed up the appointment dates, and showed up in the office to complain despite being informed that the office was not available for walk-in services. The therapist believed mother should be referred to county therapeutic health services to obtain more intensive care through Medi-Cal coverage. The social worker coordinated with mother’s case manager at Kaiser to oversee the transfer of mother’s care. (See supra, fn. 4.)
Mother continued to demonstrate severe mental health issues during the period of supervision. She exhibited symptoms of paranoia, including reporting that someone was tampering with her cell phone, following her, and “watching her every move,” including spying on her during visits with the child. She reported having gone to the police regarding her roommates and the people allegedly following her. Mother threatened to sue the Department for wrongfully detaining the child. She continued to be confused by his removal from her custody and the restraining orders preventing her from contacting sister or the maternal grandmother.
Mother and the child continued to visit every other week.
The child said mother’s mental health was a barrier to them forming a bond or attachment and he would not feel safe if he were returned to her care. He was frustrated that he was forced
4 Mother’s specialty mental health care services were transferred from Kaiser to the county in September 2025. The new facility attempted to contact mother, but she did not answer the phone. The social worker contacted mother and advised her to contact the facility.
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to converse with mother when she was unable to comprehend reality. He said any questions about or references to his past traumatic experiences living with mother were “triggering” and caused him anger and anxiety. He was adamant that he would not return to mother’s custody even if the juvenile court ordered him to do so.
F. Twelve-Month Status Review Hearing
At the September 16, 2025, 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court acknowledged that the child was doing well in the care of sister. It also noted that the child’s therapist remained unable to recommend conjoint counseling with mother.
Mother requested that the child be returned to her care.
Alternatively, she requested unmonitored visits with the child and a “no reasonable services finding due to [mother] and [the child] still not participating in conjoint counseling.”
The child requested that reunification services be terminated immediately. His counsel argued that mother’s mental health issues would not be resolved in the near future and that it was “difficult to see how [the child could] be safely returned to her care.” He asked that visits with mother be limited to twice a month.
The juvenile court found that it would be detrimental to return the child to mother’s custody but continued reunification services. It found mother was in substantial compliance with the case plan because she consistently visited the child, made significant progress in resolving her mental health issues, and demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan. The court also found that there was “a
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substantial probability” that the child would be returned to her custody and care within the next six months.
The juvenile court declined to make a no reasonable services finding. It found that it was not in the child’s best interest to force him to participate in conjoint counseling against the recommendation of his therapist. The court ordered the Department to actively assist mother with housing, employment, and mental health services enrollment. And it set a progress review hearing in three months to address the possibility of starting conjoint counseling and liberalizing mother’s visits to unmonitored status.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence according to the circumstances of the particular case. (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.)5 For services to be deemed adequate,
5 The remedy for a failure to provide reasonable reunification services is not reunification but an order for the continued provision of services, which is the order the juvenile court made in this case. (In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) As in mother’s last appeal, we will assume that mother was aggrieved by the reasonable services finding because an erroneous reasonable services finding could impair any section 352 request that she may make for further services at the 18- month review hearing or lead to the erroneous termination of parental rights. (See In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061.) Even if she were not aggrieved, we explain, for mother’s
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“[t]he [D]epartment must make a ‘“‘good faith effort’”’ to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 (Mark N.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.) “We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [D]epartment and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the order.” (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010; accord, In re Monica C. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)
Mother contends that because conjoint therapy had not commenced during the 12-month period of family supervision, the juvenile court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. Relying on In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962 and Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397 (Patricia W.), mother contends that the Department and the court should have modified the case plan so that conjoint therapy could commence without the approval of the child’s therapist or found “an alternative therapeutic pathway” to facilitate reunification. According to mother, “the Department and juvenile court maintained an order that was impossible to perform.”6
benefit, why her challenge to the finding is without merit. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
6 To the extent mother contends the juvenile court should have modified the dispositional order to remove the approval of the child’s therapist as a prerequisite to conjoint therapy, we addressed that argument in the prior appeal. (J.G. I, supra, B346038 [explaining mother abandoned her appeal from the
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In In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962, the child was reluctant to visit his parent. (Id. at p. 972.) Family therapy was deemed essential to promote visitation and thus enable reunification. (Ibid.) The juvenile court ordered conjoint counseling but a five-month period elapsed without any type of therapy for the child. (Ibid.) The delay was attributed to obstacles faced by the child’s guardian in arranging his attendance. (Id. at p. 973.) Further, the child was unwilling to visit with father until conjoint counseling began. (Id. at pp. 967– 968.) The court of appeal found that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to overcome the logistical obstacles and ensure the child received therapy, e.g., by finding a therapist closer to the child’s home or arranging transportation for the child and therefore reversed the court’s reasonable reunification services finding. (Ibid.) The court explained that “[c]onjoint therapy was surely critical here. [The child] had refused visitation for four months, and both the court and the social worker recognized that visitation would probably not take place without conjoint therapy.” (Id. at p. 972.)
In Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th 397, mother suffered from mental illness and lost custody of her child, in part, because of her inability to stay properly medicated. (Id. at p. 422.) The reviewing court found the Department did not meet its burden to show that it identified mother’s mental health issues, provided services designed to enable her to obtain appropriate medication and treatment and stay medicated so she could safely parent. (Ibid.)
dispositional order and did not file a request for a modification of the order under section 388].)
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In re Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962, and Patricia W.
supra, 244 Cal.App.4th 397, are distinguishable because the obstacles to the therapy treatment were logistical and the juvenile court in those cases found the Department failed to work to eliminate the obstacles. Here, where the child has suffered significant trauma from years of living with mother’s mental illness, the obstacle was the child’s emotional readiness, an intangible factor beyond the Department’s control.
The Department assisted the family by providing mental health resources to mother and child as well as monitored visitation. The Department referred mother for psychiatric evaluation and neurological evaluation, but the latter mother refused to complete. The Department also referred mother to therapy, which she attended inconsistently. Social workers stayed in regular contact with mother and assisted her with mental health services. The child consistently attended therapy sessions since November 2024, and the Department provided him with a younger therapist when requested.
As we described in our prior opinion, the disposition order included a case plan that included conjoint counseling when recommended by the child’s therapist. Like the prior therapist, the child’s new therapist recommended against conjoint counseling. Her opinion is supported by the child’s aversion to spending time with mother as shown by his behavior during visits and his propensity to cancel visits, and by the child’s statements to the social worker that spending time with mother caused him emotional trauma and that he would run away if returned to mother’s custody. Both the therapist and the social worker opined that returning the child to mother would have an adverse effect on his mental health. By the time of the 12-month
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review hearing, the child was 16 years old and well able to articulate his feelings about his relationship with mother.
Further, mother continued to exhibit symptoms of psychiatric and neurological illness. She showed signs of paranoia, delusions, confusion, and a failure to understand why the child had been removed from her care.
Mother complains that conjoint therapy had not commenced because the child’s therapist did not believe the child was ready, but there was “no consideration of a plan to commence conjoint therapy between mother and [the child that] included [mother].” She offers that “[c]onsideration of alternatives, such as an expert assessment that included both [mother] and [the child], could have addressed any obstacles with initiating conjoint counseling, and looked toward a path to overcoming obstacles in commencing conjoint counseling.” Mother, however, did not propose an alternative case plan to the Department or the juvenile court. She has therefore forfeited her claim that the Department should have provided an “expert assessment.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.)
On this record, the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that the initiation of conjoint therapy against professional advice was not appropriate. The evidence was substantial that contact between mother and the child distressed the child and that forcing the child to participate in conjoint counseling with mother could cause his mental health to deteriorate and reverse the progress he had made. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department and indulging all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of
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upholding the juvenile court’s order as we must, we find that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the Department provided reasonable reunification services despite its refusal to order the child to participate in conjoint therapy with mother. (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
In re J.G. B349097
BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting
During a disposition hearing held in October 2024, the juvenile dependency court removed minor J.G. (Minor) from mother V.G.’s (Mother’s) custody, ordered reunification services for Mother, and directed that Mother and Minor participate in conjoint counseling when deemed appropriate by Minor’s therapist. Monitored visits between Mother and Minor were also ordered.
The juvenile court held a six-month review hearing in April 2025 and rejected an argument that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had by then failed to provide reasonable services because it had not facilitated commencement of the conjoint counseling the court ordered at disposition. We rejected a challenge to that ruling on appeal, reasoning the juvenile court reasonably concluded Minor was not then ready to begin conjoint counseling.
This appeal is taken from the juvenile court’s ruling at the 12-month review hearing finding DCFS had provided reasonable services even though DCFS by then still had not facilitated even one conjoint counseling session. The juvenile court deferred to the opinion of Minor’s therapist—though not the same therapist Minor had at disposition because in the interim Minor had requested and been given a new therapist—that Mother and Minor should not engage in a joint therapy session.
In my view, the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding finds no adequate support in the record. (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 624; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012 [discussing the substantial evidence review when a finding is required to be made by clear and convincing evidence].) Minor undoubtedly suffered trauma when previously in Mother’s custody, and conjoint counseling was ordered as an important component of attempting to mediate that trauma and facilitate some prospect of reunification. That conjoint counseling had not even commenced precludes a finding that the services DCFS provided were reasonable.
Insofar as DCFS contends its efforts were reasonable because Minor’s therapist still was not recommending conjoint counseling at that time, there are two responses. First, it had by then been a year since disposition, Minor’s new therapist offered no time by which it was anticipated that conjoint counseling could begin, and the therapist explained that further delaying conjoint counseling was in part necessary for her own reasons— she had been recently assigned to Minor and “there needs to be an increased time frame to conduct a thorough assessment to decide whether or not joint counseling with [M]other is appropriate.” Deferring to the therapist’s opinion under these circumstances was unsound. Second, and relatedly, throughout the year when conjoint counseling was not occurring, monitored visitation between Minor and Mother was. I see no reasoned basis to conclude that conjoint counseling with Mother, Minor, and a trained counseling professional should not be attempted because it would be too traumatic while at the same time enforcing visitation between Mother and Minor that was overseen by a monitor without such professional training. In
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other words, if visitation was not too traumatizing to forgo it entirely, the same is necessarily true for conjoint counseling. Indeed, the available evidence suggests conjoint counseling, had it been facilitated, may well have been productive: as the majority recounts, at one visit when Minor expressed his feelings and told Mother that he did not want to live with her or see her weekly, “the remainder of the visit went well as the two ‘were more engaged and able to communicate after [Minor] expressed how he felt.’”
I therefore respectfully dissent from affirmance of the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding.
BAKER, Acting P. J.