In re Jemar J.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re Jemar J.

307 A.D.2d 929, 762 N.Y.S.2d 894

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 4, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 307 A.D.2d 929 (In re Jemar J.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re Jemar J., 307 A.D.2d 929, 762 N.Y.S.2d 894 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated September 20, 2001, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 7, 2001, made upon the appellant’s admission, finding that he [930]*930had committed ah act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, as the period of placement has expired (see Matter of Sam G., 294 AD2d 363 [2002]; Matter of Jacqueline S., 284 AD2d 398 [2001]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

There is no merit to appellant’s contention that he was in custody at the time he made various statements to the police. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable person of the appellant’s age, who was innocent of any crime, would not have believed that his freedom was significantly restricted (see Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 [1977]; Matter of Robert H., 194 AD2d 790 [1993]; Matter of Valerie J., 147 AD2d 699 [1989]; Matter of Chad L., 131 AD2d 760 [1987]). Consequently, Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were not required, and suppression of the statements was properly denied. In any event, the exigency of the situation justified police inquiry concerning the location of the gun without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Melvin, 188 AD2d 555 [1992]; cf. Matter of John C., 130 AD2d 246 [1987]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Smith, J.P., Luciano, H. Miller and Adams, JJ., concur.

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In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated September 20, 2001, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 7, 2001, made upon the appellant’s admission, finding that he [930]*930had committed ah act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, as the period of placement has expired (see Matter of Sam G., 294 AD2d 363 [2002]; Matter of Jacqueline S., 284 AD2d 398 [2001]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

There is no merit to appellant’s contention that he was in custody at the time he made various statements to the police. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable person of the appellant’s age, who was innocent of any crime, would not have believed that his freedom was significantly restricted (see Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 [1977]; Matter of Robert H., 194 AD2d 790 [1993]; Matter of Valerie J., 147 AD2d 699 [1989]; Matter of Chad L., 131 AD2d 760 [1987]). Consequently, Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were not required, and suppression of the statements was properly denied. In any event, the exigency of the situation justified police inquiry concerning the location of the gun without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see New York v Quarles, 467 US 649 [1984]; People v Melvin, 188 AD2d 555 [1992]; cf. Matter of John C., 130 AD2d 246 [1987]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Smith, J.P., Luciano, H. Miller and Adams, JJ., concur.

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307 A.D.2d 929, 762 N.Y.S.2d 894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jemar-j-nyappdiv-2003.

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