In Re Jed Margolin

244 F. App'x 329
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJune 15, 2007
Docket2007-1056
StatusUnpublished

This text of 244 F. App'x 329 (In Re Jed Margolin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Jed Margolin, 244 F. App'x 329 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Opinion

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Mr. Jed Margolin appeals the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5, all of the claims of United States Patent Application No. 09/947,801 (“the '801 application”) as being anticipated by subject matter set forth in U.S. Patent No. 6,167,428 to Ellis. 1 The finding of anticipation is supported by substantial evidence, and the rejection based thereon is affirmed.

DISCUSSION

The '801 application was filed on September 6, 2001, with priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/249,830 filed on November 17, 2000. The claims are directed to an Internet-based, distributed computing system and method permitting an exchange of a home network server’s resources for something of value. Claim 1 is representative (with emphases added to the disputed claim terms):

1. A distributed computing system comprising:
(a) a home network server in a subscriber’s home;
(b) one or more home network client devices;
(c) an Internet connection;
whereby the subscriber receives something of value in return for access to the resources of said home network server that would otherwise be unused.

Whether a claim is anticipated and what a reference teaches are questions of fact, whose findings by an expert administrative agency receive deferential review on the “substantial evidence” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (Fed.Cir.2000). This court must uphold the Board’s factual findings of ultimate fact and evidentiary fact, if the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record before the Board.

A claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 when the same invention, including all of the claimed limitations, appear in a single reference. The determination generally involves a two-step analysis, wherein the Board first construes the claims for purposes of examination, applying to the *331 proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the terms thereof as they would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.1997). The purpose of this examination practice is to facilitate precision in claiming by imposing rigor during prosecution, because claims are readily modified before patent issuance. Id.

The examiner then compares the construed claims to the asserted anticipating reference, to determine whether “each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in [that] single prior art reference.” In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed.Cir.2004) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.Cir.1998)). During this procedure the applicant may amend the claims in light of cited references, or for any other reason.

The examiner found that the claims are anticipated by the Ellis patent, entitled “Personal Computer Microprocessor Firewalls for Internet Distributed Processing.” Ellis describes “computer networks having computers like personal computers or network servers” utilizing distributed processing, thereby enabling a computer user to exchange access to the Internet for use of the computer’s processing power when the computer is idle. Ellis patent, col. 11:55-61. Mr. Margolin argues that Ellis does not anticipate the claims because Ellis does not describe a “home network server” or a “subscriber” within the meaning of the claims presented in the '801 application.

The Board observed that the '801 application did not provide a specific definition for the terms “server” and “home network server,” but concluded that the Examiner’s definition of “server” as “a computer or program, on the Internet or another network, that responds to commands from a client” was consistent with the '801 specification as well as the use of the term by ordinary skilled artisans. The Board also found that the “home network” term limited only the location of the server and not its function.

In light of the evidence before the Board, the Board’s claim interpretation is reasonable. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055. Specifically, the '801 specification broadly described the “home network server” of the claimed invention, stating:

A Home Network Server is used in a home to network various clients such as PCs, sensors, actuators and other devices. * * * Home Network Server 101 is of conventional design and includes a CPU, memory, mass storage (typically a hard disk drive for operations and a CD-ROM or DVD-ROM Drive for software installation), video display capabilities, and a keyboard.

'801 application, 111114, 23. This description is broad enough to encompass any apparatus, including conventional personal computers, having a CPU, memory, monitor, and keyboard that can perform a networking function for various other subservient devices. The Board’s definition is further supported by evidence in the Examiner’s Answer before the Board, wherein the Examiner cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary 430 (3d ed.1997) for the definition of “network” relied on by the Board.

Applying these definitions, the Board found that the applicant’s “home network server” is met by the personal computers shown by Ellis. The Board found that the Ellis patent broadly described PCs as including “network computers,” and that network computers could include both conventional servers and client computers, that may reside at either home or business network systems. We agree that *332 substantial evidence supports this finding. Ellis defined personal computers “as any computer, digital dr analog or neural, particularly including microprocessor-based personal computers having one or more microprocessors ... in their general current form (hardware and/or software and/or firmware and/or any other component) ... such as workstations, network computers ... [and] other household electronic devices.” Ellis patent, col. 8:61 to col. 9:8.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dickinson v. Zurko
527 U.S. 150 (Supreme Court, 1999)
In Re Gilbert P. Hyatt
211 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2000)
Dickinson v. Zurko
527 U.S. 150 (Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
244 F. App'x 329, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jed-margolin-cafc-2007.