In re J.B.

2019 Ohio 1929
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided May 20, 2019·No. 18CA011424·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )

IN RE: J.B. C.A. No. 18CA011424

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO

CASE No. 18JC53984

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: May 20, 2019

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that adjudicated her child J.B. abused, neglected, and dependent. This Court affirms I.

{¶2} Mother is the biological mother of J.B. (d.o.b. 4/26/13). Father appeared in the juvenile court and asserted that he did not wish to participate in any proceedings regarding the child.

{¶3} Based on injuries discovered on the child’s body, Lorain County Children Services (“LCCS” or “the agency”) filed a complaint alleging that J.B. was an abused, neglected, and dependent child. After an adjudicatory hearing, the magistrate issued a decision finding the child to be abused, neglected, and dependent. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision the same day. Mother filed timely objections. The juvenile court heard the arguments

of counsel at a hearing on the objections. Subsequently, the juvenile court issued a judgment overruling Mother’s objections and adhering to its prior judgment adjudicating J.B. an abused, neglected, and dependent child. Mother filed a timely appeal in which she raises three assignments of error for review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE, UH ELYRIA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OUTPATIENT SUMMARY, REGISTRATION HISTORY, AND CLINICAL CHART, WHEN SUCH RECORD CONTAINED HEARSAY.

{¶4} Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting the child’s medical records into evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. Mother’s argument is not well taken.

{¶5} A review of the record indicates that the magistrate declined to admit the child’s medical records as evidence after Mother’s objection to their admission during the adjudicatory hearing. Instead, the magistrate merely allowed the agency to proffer the medical records. In addition, the magistrate expressly asserted that he did not need to consider the medical records to make his decision. Rather, he found J.B. to be abused, neglected, and dependent based on the remaining “overwhelming evidence” adduced at the hearing. Moreover, at the hearing on Mother’s objections, Mother’s attorney admitted that the magistrate had not considered the medical records in his decision. The juvenile court further did not indicate that it would consider the medical records when ruling on the objections. The juvenile court’s judgment in which it overruled Mother’s objections and adhered to its prior judgment of adjudication does not reference any consideration of the child’s medical records. As there is nothing to indicate that the juvenile court admitted or considered J.B.’s medical records, Mother’s argument fails. Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT PERMITTED THE CHILD’S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS TO BE ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.

{¶6} Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by considering testimony by the agency caseworker and the child’s school nurse regarding statements made by the child that Mother’s boyfriend had caused the child’s injuries, because those statements contained inadmissible hearsay. This Court disagrees.

{¶7} While this Court generally reviews the trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion, we do so with reference to the nature of the underlying matter. In re I.R., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27775, 2016-Ohio-2919, ¶ 8, citing Fields v. Cloyd, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24150, 2008-Ohio-5232, ¶ 9, and Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 18. Given the broad discretion accorded to trial courts to admit or exclude evidence, this Court “will not disturb evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion ‘that produced a material prejudice’ to the aggrieved party.” In re I.W., 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 07CA0056 and 07CA0057, 2008-Ohio-2492, ¶8, quoting State v. Roberts, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21532, 2004-Ohio-962, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

{¶8} It is well established that the juvenile court must strictly adhere to the rules of evidence during the adjudicatory hearing. In re E.R., 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0108-M, 2006- Ohio-4816, ¶ 41, citing In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 233 (1985). Evid.R. 802

proscribes the admission of hearsay. Accordingly, hearsay is not admissible for purposes of adjudication. In re E.R. at ¶ 41.

{¶9} Evid.R. 803 sets forth multiple exceptions to the hearsay rule. Mother argued below and on appeal that this case involves the application of Evid.R. 803(4) which permits the admission of

[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in determining that the child’s statements were made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, rather than for some other purpose.

{¶10} The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that a child-declarant’s competency is not an issue that must be determined in these cases. Instead, the only issue relevant to the admission of a child’s statements pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4) is whether the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007- Ohio-5267, ¶ 46. The high court set out a nonexhaustive list of considerations to determine the purpose of the child’s statements, including (1) whether the child’s statements were elicited in a leading or suggestive manner; (2) whether a motive to lie exists, e.g., in relation to a “bitter custody battle[;]” and (3) whether the child understood the need to be truthful to the medical provider. Id. at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401, 410 (1992). Other contextual considerations include the child’s age, the consistency of the child’s assertions, and whether the interview of the child was conducted pursuant to proper protocol. Id.

{¶11} The school nurse testified that she receives ongoing training relevant to her duties at the school, some of which has addressed the identification of abuse in children. She explained that she routinely conducts a head-to-toe assessment of a child who comes to her with an issue.

In addition, she questions the child about how he feels and the reason for his visit to determine what medical treatment is required. If the nurse is concerned about what she learns following her exam and questioning, she then calls in the principal to assess the need for further action. But the nurse was clear that she conducts her evaluation of the children in her clinic to determine whether and what kind of medical treatment is necessary.

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In re J.B., 2019 Ohio 1929 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).

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