In re J.B.

2013 Ohio 5727
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in In re J.B.. Read the opinion of the Court — 2013 Ohio 1704
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided December 26, 2013·No. 27037·Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-5727.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: J.B. C.A. No. 27037

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN11-02-0109

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 26, 2013

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Angela B. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights to her minor child,

J.B., and placed him in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services (“CSB”).

This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mother is the parent of J.B., born September 25, 2002, whose custody is the

subject of this appeal. No man claiming to be the father of J.B. has appealed. Mother’s two

other children, F.B., born August 2, 2005, and J.G., born February 29, 2008, are not parties to

this appeal. In a separate action and with the agreement of Mother, those two children were

placed in the legal custody of their biological father, S.G., with an order of protective supervision

to CSB. 2

{¶3} When the present action began, all three children resided with Mother. When

CSB received a report that F.B. had been physically abused, they sent investigators to the home.

While CSB did not find evidence of abuse, Mother purportedly told them that J.B. had harmed

F.B. and further reported that J.B. had engaged in other aggressive behaviors. Mother later

testified that she asked the agency to keep the case open for services.

{¶4} On February 16, 2011, CSB filed a complaint in juvenile court, alleging that the

children were dependent and seeking protective supervision by the agency. At the ensuing

hearings, Mother stipulated to dependency and agreed to the dispositional order of protective

supervision.

{¶5} Over the next few months, Mother reportedly made some progress on her case

plan and, on December 29, 2011, CSB moved to terminate protective supervision in anticipation

that the case might soon be closed. Approximately one month later, however, the guardian ad

litem filed a motion to remove the children from the home and place them in the emergency

temporary custody of the agency. CSB joined in the motion. The motion alleged that the house

was in disarray. There were clothes thrown everywhere, dog feces in the upstairs bedrooms, and

no beds for the children. It also alleged that the two older children had poor school attendance

and often wore inappropriate or dirty clothing. The guardian ad litem later explained that the

younger children were wearing Mother’s or J.B.’s clothing. She added that Mother had not been

submitting the drug screens required by her case plan and she was attending only half of her

counseling appointments. There was no refrigerator in the home; the family was using a cooler.

Essentially, the movants determined that the same issues that existed prior to the case being

opened, still existed, plus a dog was added to the household. The court granted emergency

temporary custody of the children to the agency on February 2, 2012. 3

{¶6} Mother’s reunification case plan required her to obtain and maintain safe, stable

housing; address her mental health, substance abuse, and medical needs; ensure that children

attend school or daycare regularly; demonstrate an ability to access and utilize services; and

provide for the basic needs of her family.

{¶7} On October 9, 2012, CSB moved for permanent custody. Following a hearing in

June 2013, the trial court granted the motion. Mother appeals and assigns one error for review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF J.B. AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶8} Mother contends the weight of the evidence does not support the trial court

finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. Before a juvenile court may

terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency it

must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that

the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12

months of a consecutive 22-month period, or that the child cannot be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under

R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest

of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D). See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and

2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 99 (1996).

{¶9} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was

satisfied because J.B.’s father had abandoned him and J.B. could not or should not be returned to

Mother’s care. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). In making the latter 4

determination, the court found that Mother had failed to remedy the conditions that brought J.B.

into care. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Specifically, the court found that Mother failed to engage in

meaningful substance abuse and mental health treatment. As a result, Mother has difficulty

caring for herself, let alone a young child. On appeal, Mother does not contest the first prong

finding, but rather challenges the finding that permanent custody is in the best interest of the

child.

{¶10} When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in a child’s best

interest, the juvenile court must consider all the relevant factors, including those enumerated in

R.C. 2151.414(D): the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the

custodial history of the child, and the child’s need for permanence in his life. See In re R.G., 9th

Dist. Summit Nos. 24834 & 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. “Although the trial court is not

precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to

consider all of the enumerated factors.” In re Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20711, 2002 WL

5178, *3 (Jan. 2, 2002); see also In re Palladino, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2002-G-2445, 2002-

Ohio-5606, ¶ 24.

1. Interaction and interrelationships of the child.

{¶11} Consideration of the first best interest factor focuses attention on the interactions

and relationships of J.B. with his siblings and Mother. At the start of this case, J.B. was

displaying behavioral problems both at home and at school. He was refusing to participate in

school activities, being aggressive with his siblings, exposing himself to neighbors, and setting

fires. J.B.’s therapist, Carrie Schnirring, explained that J.B. had been diagnosed with a mood

disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder based on

adverse childhood experiences. Those experiences affected his ability to relate to others socially 5

and emotionally. Because of the trauma and stress he had confronted in his life, she believed

J.B. might need trauma-based counseling.

{¶12} For her part, Mother was diagnosed with mood disorder, anxiety, substance abuse,

depression, bi-polar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Her treatment goals were to

attempt to decrease depression and anxiety, improve communication and memory issues, and

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In re J.B., 2013 Ohio 5727 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

2013 Ohio 5727 (In re J.B.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In re William S.
661 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)