NOTICE This Order was filed under 2024 IL App (4th) 231484-U FILED April 30, 2024 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the Carla Bender NOS. 4-23-1484, 4-23-1486 cons. 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re J.B. and S.B., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 20JA302 v. ) 20JA303 Jamie B., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Karen S. Tharp, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s findings respondent was an unfit parent and it was in the minors’ best interest to terminate her parental rights were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 The State filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Jamie B.,
to her minor children, J.B. (born February 2012) and S.B. (born January 2014). The trial court
found respondent unfit and determined it was in the minors’ best interest to terminate her
parental rights. Respondent argues the court’s unfitness and best interest determinations were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In October 2020, the State filed petitions seeking to adjudicate the minors
neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The State alleged the minors were neglected due to not receiving the proper care
necessary for their well-being as their father, Sam B., was arrested for sexually abusing an
unrelated minor and respondent intended to allow him back into the home with her and the
minors (id. § 2-3(1)(a)). (We note Sam’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.) The State
also alleged the minors’ environment was injurious to their welfare due to (1) their parents’ drug
use, (2) their parents’ domestic violence issues, and (3) respondent’s mental disabilities (id. § 2-
3(1)(b)).
¶5 In January 2021, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding the minors
neglected. In February 2021, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit,
unable, or unwilling for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for the minors,
made them wards of the court, and placed their custody and guardianship with the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶6 In March 2023, the State filed its initial petition to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. In June 2023, the State filed its supplemental petition. The supplemental petition alleged
respondent was an unfit parent because she failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022));
(2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions forming the basis for the removal of the
minors within three nine-month periods following adjudication of neglect, namely (i) from
January 14, 2021, to October 14, 2021, (ii) from October 14, 2021, to July 14, 2022, and
(iii) from July 14, 2022, to April 14, 2023 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) make reasonable progress
toward the minors’ return during each of these periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).
¶7 A. Fitness Hearing
¶8 The fitness hearing was held over two days in December 2023.
-2- ¶9 1. The State’s Evidence
¶ 10 a. Tawnya Hackler
¶ 11 Tawnya Hackler was the caseworker from November 2, 2020, to August 21,
2021. Respondent was required to engage in domestic violence and mental health services, as
well as to undergo a substance abuse assessment and engage in any recommended treatment.
Respondent provided random drug drops in April, May, and July 2021, but two of those drops
were deemed “adulterated,” possibly due to drinking a lot of water to dilute the samples. Hackler
could not recall respondent missing any visits with the minors or any concerns with the visits.
However, there was never a time when Hackler was close to returning the minors to respondent.
Hackler was concerned with the safety of returning the minors because a report was made of
respondent allegedly engaging in sexual conduct together with Sam and the unrelated minor he
allegedly sexually abused.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, Hackler acknowledged respondent did everything asked of
her and “was making honest efforts” in doing so. However, respondent had not completed her
services during this time, and “[s]ervices [would] need to be completed for the [minors] to return
home.” Hackler also testified respondent “would need a great deal of support to be able to parent
[the minors] by herself” due to her mental health issues. Hackler stated respondent “needs years
of therapy to enable her to do something as daunting as raising children on her own.”
¶ 13 b. Pandora Grey
¶ 14 Pandora Grey was Hackler’s supervisor between November 2, 2020, and August
31, 2021. Grey testified, “[t]he main concern was about how [respondent] would protect the
[minors] if [Sam] re-entered the picture. Would she be willing and able to protect them? And that
was based on her self-disclosed continued communication with [him] while he was in the
-3- Sangamon County Jail.” Respondent’s visits with the minors were never unsupervised. Grey was
never in a position where she could return the minors to respondent.
¶ 15 c. Kelly Johnston
¶ 16 Kelly Johnston had been the caseworker since April 15, 2022. Johnston testified
respondent completed both domestic violence and mental health services. Respondent was
required to engage in substance abuse treatment due to being arrested for driving under the
influence in November 2021. Respondent completed treatment and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings. Respondent provided random drug drops, but “[a]ll of them” came back
“adulterated.” (According to respondent, this was because she drank a lot of water.) Respondent
underwent a psychological evaluation in October 2022 and was diagnosed with generalized
anxiety disorder, alcohol use disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and a dependent personality
disorder. The last of these was manifested by respondent “continu[ing] to engage in the
relationship with [Sam] due to being very dependent on him,” so much so that Johnston felt
respondent “solely relies on [him] to tell her what decisions she needs to be making.”
¶ 17 Respondent attended all her visits with the minors. Respondent requested
unsupervised visits. However, Johnston had concerns about Sam’s presence after respondent
bailed Sam out of jail. Johnston did an unannounced visit at respondent’s home and respondent
disclosed Sam was there. DCFS made a “critical decision” to reduce her visits from twice a week
for three hours to once a week for two hours.
¶ 18 On cross-examination, Johnston acknowledged respondent made efforts and
progress in her services. Johnston explained respondent and Sam residing together after she
bailed him out, and not the mere fact she bailed him out, was the reason the agency
recommended a goal change. Nevertheless, “[b]efore [Sam] was bailed out we were looking at
-4- the children being returned home.” Johnston told respondent if she bailed Sam out, it was “not
likely” the minors would be returned to her. When Johnston asked her “what would happen” if
“we return the [minors] home and [Sam] does something” to them, respondent’s answer was “I
would hate him.” While respondent eventually completed all her services, the “continued
concern” for Johnston was “she bailed out [Sam] and it pose[d] a risk for the inability to protect.”
¶ 19 2. Respondent’s Evidence
¶ 20 Respondent testified she continued to engage in counseling and to take
medication for schizophrenia. Respondent had been sober for two years. When asked why she
bailed Sam out of jail, respondent replied he was not getting appropriate medical care and she
was worried he was going to die. Respondent filed for an order of protection but did not follow
through with it because she “was afraid [she] was giving an incorrect date.” Respondent also
filed a divorce case but did not follow through with it, both because it would be “going against
[her] vows” and because she “wasn’t going to divorce [her] best friend.” Respondent and Sam
were still living together and were “a team.” Respondent denied knowing Sam had been charged
with eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and one count of indecent solicitation of a
child stemming from the sexual abuse of a 12-year-old girl. Respondent testified Sam would not
be allowed to live in the home with her, her father, and the minors if they were returned to her.
¶ 21 3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
¶ 22 The trial court found respondent unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable degree
of responsibility as to the minors’ welfare, explicitly acknowledging she remained interested and
concerned. The court also found respondent unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward
the return of the minors between January 14, 2021, and October 14, 2021, and failing to make
-5- both reasonable efforts to correct the conditions resulting in the removal of the minors and
reasonable progress toward their return between July 14, 2022, and April 14, 2023.
¶ 23 In finding respondent unfit, the trial court stated:
“I’ve heard much about will she protect the children? Valid question. Not
just would she protect the children from potentially if [Sam] is convicted, if
he really did have sex with a child, would she protect her children from
Sam’s potential sexual activity.
*** Would she protect herself? Clearly not. She didn’t follow
through with the [order of protection]. Would she protect her children in
that situation? It becomes clear that she would not.
***
*** Has she done services? Yes. Has she made progress? Part of
progress is looking to see whether or not they have complied with the
directives on a service plan or addressed other issues that have come to light
throughout the case. But really, the determination on whether or not
someone has made progress is [whether] the progress [is] of such a nature,
of such a quality, that the Court could in the near future place a child or
children back in a parent’s care. *** Her progress is not of such a quality
that I could be able to say, ‘I am close to being able to place these children
in her care in the near future.’ ”
¶ 24 B. Best Interest Hearing
¶ 25 1. The State’s Evidence
-6- ¶ 26 Kelly Johnston testified the minors have been living in a licensed foster home
with their foster mother, Kristy G., her husband, and their biological children since October
2020. The minors “get along really well” with their foster parents and their biological children.
The minors have been doing “really well” in their foster home and have not expressed any
concerns about being there. The minors see a doctor regularly, do well in school, and participate
in extracurricular activities. S.B. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
had begun taking medication for it. Johnston observed a bond between the minors and foster
parents during her monthly visits and believed this home served the minors’ best interest. The
minors “really like the placement and they have told [Johnston] that they want to stay there,” and
the foster parents wanted to adopt them. Johnston believed it was in the minors’ best interest for
respondent’s parental rights to be terminated.
¶ 27 2. Respondent’s Evidence
¶ 28 a. Respondent’s Father
¶ 29 Respondent’s father, Michael G., testified respondent has a “good, loving
relationship” with the minors. There was a visit between him, respondent, and the minors the
previous evening, where they had dinner and exchanged Christmas presents. The minors were
“happy” to see respondent and had “lots of smiles.” Michael testified the minors are “always
happy” and “excited” to see respondent at visits. Michael felt it would be detrimental to the
minors if respondent’s parental rights were terminated because of the “close bond” they have
with each other. Michael and respondent were financially capable of providing for the minors,
and there was adequate space in his home for them.
¶ 30 b. Respondent
-7- ¶ 31 Respondent testified termination of her parental rights would not be in the minors’
best interest. According to respondent, at the end of a recent visit, the minors “said they wished
that they could come home.” Respondent was willing to continue in services to demonstrate to
the trial court she was making efforts and progress toward the minors’ return and said Sam
would not be allowed to live with her and the minors.
¶ 32 3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
¶ 33 The trial court explained it was “considering all the best interest factors” and
noted the minors had been in their foster home for three years, were being cared for there, and
wanted to stay there. The court stated:
“Also, very troubling to the Court is that [respondent] says, ‘If the
kids come home, Sam won’t be around.’ But, that tells me nothing about
her ability to protect herself. The fact that she only sees this as being an
issue of Sam can’t be around the children, I still don’t think she understands
why this case was adjudicated. The impact that Sam has on her, and I still
don’t think she gets that.”
¶ 34 The trial court found “giving [respondent] more time would [not] make a
difference. It would take too long. These children need permanence before that could ever
happen, if it would ever happen.” The court concluded it was in the minors’ best interest to
terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 The Juvenile Court Act provides a two-step process for involuntary termination of
parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022). First, the State must prove by clear and
-8- convincing evidence the parent is an “unfit person,” as defined by section 1(D) of the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354, 830 N.E.2d 508,
516 (2005). Second, if the trial court finds a parent unfit, the State must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest. In re
D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 353, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (2004).
¶ 38 A. Unfitness Finding
¶ 39 Respondent argues the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 40 The trial court found respondent unfit because she failed to (1) maintain a
reasonable degree of responsibility as to the minors’ welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2022)); (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during the nine-month
period of January 14, 2021, to October 14, 2021 (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and (3) make reasonable
efforts to correct the conditions which resulted in the removal of the minors or to make
reasonable progress toward their return during the nine-month period of July 14, 2022, to April
14, 2023 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i), (ii)). “A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged
ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d at
349.
¶ 41 Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides a parent may be found unfit if
she fails “to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-
month period following the adjudication” of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022).
“ ‘Reasonable progress’ is an objective standard which exists when the trial
court, based on the evidence before it, can conclude that the progress being
made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child
-9- is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near
future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court
will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future
because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives
previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child.”
(Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d
1375, 1387 (1991).
¶ 42 A trial court’s finding a parent is unfit will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29, 115 N.E.3d 102. A decision
is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident.
¶ 43 Between July 14, 2022, and April 14, 2023, respondent completed mental health
and domestic violence services. Respondent also completed substance abuse treatment and
attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, though all her drug drops were “adulterated.” While
respondent attended all her visits with the minors, she never progressed to unsupervised visits.
After respondent requested unsupervised visits, and even after engaging in mental health and
domestic violence services, she bailed Sam, who was charged with sexually abusing an unrelated
minor, out of jail, and they resumed living together. Johnston testified regarding her concern
over respondent being able to protect the minors if Sam was back in the home. In fact, Sam was
in the home during one of the unannounced visits. When asked what would happen if the minors
were returned to her and Sam abused them, respondent merely said she “would hate him.”
¶ 44 This court has observed “there [is] a significant difference between going through
the motions, checking off the boxes, and mechanically doing what is asked of the parent and
- 10 - actually changing the circumstances that brought the children into care.” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL
App (4th) 200658, ¶ 56, 187 N.E.3d 763. “The point of requiring parents to attend classes and
engage in services *** is so parents apply what they learn *** such that the court can be
confident that the children will be safe in their care.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Here, despite
engagement in and completion of services, respondent, through bailing Sam out of jail and
resuming living together despite him being charged with sexually abusing a child, was not able
to apply the skills learned to justify the trial court’s confidence of the minors being safe in her
care. Id. It is not clearly evident respondent made sufficiently demonstrable progress toward the
minors’ return during this period. Accordingly, the court’s finding respondent was unfit for
failure to make reasonable progress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 45 B. Best Interest Determination
¶ 46 Respondent also argues the trial court’s best interest determination was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 47 Following a finding of unfitness, the parent’s interest in maintaining a parent-
child relationship must yield to the best interest of the child. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. At the best
interest hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Id. at 366. In making its finding, the
trial court considers the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS
405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). The statutory factors include: (1) the child’s physical safety and
welfare; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties,
including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including where
the child feels love, security, and familiarity; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community
ties, including church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the
- 11 - need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; and (8) the
uniqueness of every family and child. Id.
¶ 48 “A court may also consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship with
his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon his emotional
and psychological well-being.” In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 893, 819 N.E.2d 813, 822
(2004). “The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each
of these factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in
affirming its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19, 8 N.E.3d 1258. On
review, “[w]e will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the child[ ]’s best interest
unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961,
835 N.E.2d 908, 914 (2005). “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that no reasonable person could
arrive at the circuit court’s finding on the basis of the evidence in the record [citation].” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68, 162 N.E.3d 454.
¶ 49 Here, the evidence established the minors had been residing and getting along
with their foster family since October 2020. The minors’ foster parents were providing for their
medical and educational needs, they were all bonded with one another, the minors liked living
there and wanted to stay, and the foster parents wanted to adopt them. Respondent’s father
testified about the loving and bonded relationship respondent and the minors have. However,
while a genuine bond of love between the minors and respondent may exist, “[f]ollowing a
finding of unfitness *** the focus shifts to the child. The issue is no longer whether parental
rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should
be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The law is clear the existence of
- 12 - a parent-child bond “does not automatically insure that *** the child’s best interests will be
served by that parent.” In re J.B., 198 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499, 555 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (1990).
¶ 50 The record does not clearly demonstrate the trial court should have reached the
opposite result. Accordingly, the court’s best interest determination was not against the manifest
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
- 13 -