In re Jared J.P.

42 Misc. 3d 954, 979 N.Y.S.2d 768
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedDecember 17, 2013
StatusPublished

This text of 42 Misc. 3d 954 (In re Jared J.P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Jared J.P., 42 Misc. 3d 954, 979 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2013).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Joan S. Posner, J.

On February 19, 2013, the presentment agency filed a petition against the respondent (date of birth: June 7, 1997), pursuant to article 3 of the Family Court Act, alleging that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of attempted assault in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 (1), a class B misdemeanor, and menacing in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law § 120.15, also a class B misdemeanor. The petition alleges that on October 22, 2012 the respondent attempted to cause physical injury to his mother and other members of his family and menaced them. The agency seeks an adjudication that he is a juvenile delinquent.

At the initial appearance on February 28, 2013, the court (Sammarco, J.)1 appointed a guardian ad litem, based upon the representation by respondent’s attorney that respondent was diagnosed with autism and did not understand what was occurring. Respondent was released under the supervision of the Probation Department. The court also issued a limited temporary order of protection on behalf of Rebecca P (his mother), Judith M. (his grandmother), Alexis P, Brianna E and Jillian E (his siblings).

In June 2013, respondent’s local school district referred him for an intake interview with the S. School, a residential therapeutic educational institution located in Rockland County. He was accepted and placed there by the school district and has had periodic home visits with his mother, grandmother and siblings since that time.

[956]*956On August 23, 2013, the agency filed a motion pursuant to Family Court Act § 322.1 (1) for an order directing that respondent be examined by two psychiatrists as defined in CPL 730.10 to determine whether he is an incapacitated person (motion No. 1). The application is based upon his medical and educational records; his diagnosis of autism and “various other problems related to his brain”; and the fact that, at his attorney’s request, a guardian ad litem had been appointed for him.

The guardian ad litem opposes the agency’s motion and filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding in furtherance of justice (Family Ct Act § 315.2). In support of dismissal, she asserts that the agency did not commence this juvenile delinquency proceeding until February 19, 2013, almost four months after the alleged incident; since February 2013 respondent has been receiving necessary services and is doing well at the S. School. She also argues that there is no need for further court intervention. The respondent’s mother has clearly indicated on the record that she does not wish to pursue the juvenile delinquency proceeding and that to do so would be detrimental to him and other family members.

The guardian ad litem argues that the information presented to the court indicates that various professionals have, over many years, recommended that respondent be placed in a residential therapeutic school setting. However, until recently the school district instead had respondent in a BOCES day program. He is now currently in an appropriate therapeutic residential school, where he is thriving. She argues that a consideration of the factors under Family Court Act § 315.2 supports dismissal of the proceeding in the interest of justice.

The agency opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the allegations are serious and asserts that the police responded to nine domestic calls at respondent’s home between December 19, 2009 and January 28, 2013.2 The agency alleges that respondent has significant mental health needs and requires specialized educational services and mental health treatment. As a result, the agency asserts that if the juvenile delinquency matter proceeded to final disposition the court would have to find that respondent requires supervision, treatment or confinement.

[957]*957The agency concedes that the complainants are unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution of the juvenile delinquency proceeding but argues that, regardless, they need to be protected. The agency argues that if respondent is discharged from his current educational facility he may reside with the family at some point in the future and could act out aggressively.

The respondent’s attorney did not submit any papers with respect to either motion but repeatedly stated on the record that he supported dismissal of the proceeding in furtherance of justice and that its continuation would serve no useful purpose and result in an injustice.

Pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.2 (1), a court may dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition in the interest of justice at any time if it finds that

“even though there may be no basis for dismissal as a matter of law, such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling further consideration or circumstances clearly demonstrating that a finding of delinquency or continued proceedings would constitute or result in injustice.”

In making such a determination the court must consider the following factors:

“(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the crime;
“(b) the extent of harm caused by the crime;
“(c) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation and arrest of the respondent or in the presentment of the petition;
“(d) the history, character and condition of the respondent;
“(e) the needs and best interest of the respondent;
“(f) the need for protection of the community; and “(g) any other relevant fact indicating that a finding would serve no useful purpose” (Family Ct Act § 315.2 [1]).

At least one of the factors must be readily identifiable and sufficiently compelling to support the dismissal (People v Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 128 [1983]; Matter of Chris H., 197 AD2d 689 [2d Dept 1993]).

The court takes judicial notice of its own records and file in this matter (see Matter of Khatibi v Weill, 8 AD3d 485 [2d Dept [958]*9582004]). The medical records and correspondence from respondent’s treating physicians from 2006 reflect that he was diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD)/ Autism, ADHD, OCD and static encephalopathy. He was placed on medication to help ameliorate his behavioral symptoms but changes in his school placement caused a deterioration in respondent’s performance on such medications. As early as 2006, respondent’s pediatrician and neurologist recommended that he be placed in an academic setting with smaller classes and summer classes which would allow for a 12-month-per-year treatment period. In his April 14, 2006 correspondence, Dr. Z., respondent’s pediatrician, states that “continued management in a larger class setting will cause prolonged and worsening regressive behavior.” In a letter dated February 13, 2007, the respondent’s neurologist indicated that he was diagnosed with Asperger’s with a rage disorder and that “he is somewhat holding it together on medication at school but by the time he goes home the medication is not working well enough and he becomes extremely violent.” At that time the neurologist recommended that respondent be placed in a residential program where these issues could be addressed.

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Related

Matter of Robert J.
811 N.E.2d 25 (New York Court of Appeals, 2004)
In re Quinton A.
402 N.E.2d 126 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Rickert
446 N.E.2d 419 (New York Court of Appeals, 1983)
Khatibi v. Weill
8 A.D.3d 485 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2004)
In re Kwane M.
121 A.D.2d 635 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1986)
In re Carlief V.
121 A.D.2d 640 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1986)
In re Chris H.
197 A.D.2d 689 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)
In re Tristan C.
156 Misc. 2d 1007 (NYC Family Court, 1993)
Matter of P.C.
2005 NY Slip Op 52232(U) (Nassau Family Court, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
42 Misc. 3d 954, 979 N.Y.S.2d 768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jared-jp-nycfamct-2013.