In Re James Robert Lawson, IV v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 03-25-00670-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00670-CV

In re James Robert Lawson, IV

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM BELL COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus complaining of the trial

court’s August 29, 2025 order for capias issued on the real party in interest’s (RPI’s) Motion for

Enforcement of Child Support Order, signed during the pendency of relator’s removal of the

underlying matter to federal district court. Having reviewed the petition and the record provided,

we agree that relator is entitled the relief sought and conditionally grant the writ of habeas

corpus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

Relator James Lawson and RPI Brittney Williams were married in January 2014

and have one child together. They were divorced pursuant to an agreed decree in

Coryell County, Texas, in March 2017. The initial divorce appears to have been amicable:

James waived service and the parties agreed to split possession and access roughly equally with

neither paying the other support. Conflicts arose shortly thereafter, however, and Britteny filed

the underlying suit affecting the parent-child relationship in 2017, eventually securing a

still-in-force temporary injunction against James, as well as temporary orders limiting his possession to four-hour supervised visits on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Saturdays of each month and

requiring him to pay $735 per month in support.

Following transfer of the case to Bell County, Texas, Brittney filed the

enforcement motion on August 4, 2025, complaining of a missed support payment and

noncompliance with orders requiring production of medical and therapy records, and expressly

seeking contempt with confinement. A hearing on the motions was set for August 27, 2025, but,

two days before the hearing, on August 25, 2025, James filed a notice of removal to federal

court. At the hearing, James did not appear, and counsel for Brittney requested a capias, which

was granted by the complained-of order, with bond set at $2,000. This original proceeding

followed on August 31, 2025. We stayed the underlying proceedings on September 10, 2025,

and Brittney filed her response on September 22, 2025. On March 2, 2026, the federal district

court remanded the case back to the trial court.

Federal removal is governed by Section 1446 of the Judiciary Act, which provides

in relevant part that, after filing notice of removal, the removing defendant “shall file a copy of

the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court

shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). The

requirement that a state court “proceed no further” has long been held to be a jurisdictional

limitation. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Acevedo

Feliciano, 589 U.S. 57, 63–64, (2020) (holding that “[o]nce a notice of removal is filed, . . . [t]he

state court ‘loses all jurisdiction over the case, and, being without jurisdiction, its subsequent

proceedings and judgment are not simply erroneous, but absolutely void.’” (quoting Kern

v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 (1880) (internal modifications to quoted text omitted)));

2 accord Meyerland Co. v. F.D.I.C., 848 S.W.2d 82, 83 (Tex. 1993) (holding order of dismissal

“void because it occurred after the cause had been removed to federal court”).

The Texas Supreme Court has long held and frequently reaffirmed that mandamus

is proper if a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel.

Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570,

571 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding); Board of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471,

472 (Tex.1994) (orig. proceeding)). An order issued without jurisdiction is void, and relator

need not show that he lacks an adequate appellate remedy to obtain extraordinary relief. Id.

(citing In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d at 571); see also In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261

(Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding).

In view of the authorities cited above, we conclude that the capias order, issued

after removal and prior to remand, was and is void, and that habeas relief is therefore

appropriate. Accordingly, we conditionally grant relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and,

in accordance with this opinion, order the district court to vacate its August 29, 2025 capias order

and any related orders. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c). The writ will issue only if the court fails to

do so. The stay issued September 10, 2025, is lifted. See id. R. 52.10(b).

__________________________________________ Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Theofanis

Filed: April 23, 2026