NO. 4-10-0260 Filed 12/23/10
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: JAMES H., a Person Found Subject ) Appeal from to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 10MH262 v. ) JAMES H., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant. ) Esteban F. Sanchez, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, James H., appeals from the trial court's
order of involuntary admission pursuant to section 3-600 of the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405
ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2008)). Respondent seeks reversal because the
petition to involuntarily admit him failed to strictly comply
with section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code and the court violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to treatment in the least-
restrictive environment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 29, 2010, the State filed a petition for the
involuntary admission of respondent under section 3-600 of the
Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2008)). The petition alleged
respondent was mentally ill and by reason of the mental illness
(1) was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm on
himself or another in the near future and (2) was unable to
provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from
serious harm. In support of those allegations, the petition provided the following factual basis:
"Schizophrenia, paranoid type with delusions.
Client believes he is the son of God and is
on earth to save us from evil."
The following portion of the petition was left blank:
"Listed below are the names and addresses of
the spouse, parent, guardian, or substitute
decision maker, if any, and close relative
or, if none, a friend of the respondent whom
I have reason to believe may know or have any
of the other names and addresses. If names
and addresses are not listed below, I made a
diligent inquiry to identify and locate these
individuals and the following describes the
specific steps taken by me in making this
inquiry ***."
The petition was accompanied by the certificates of one psychia-
trist, one physician, and one qualified examiner as well as a
lengthy written statement by the respondent describing himself as
the son of God sent to do his Father's bidding. This includes
battling with and killing demons. He specifically identifies
President Obama as one of the demons.
The trial court set a hearing on the petition for April
2, 2010. At the hearing, psychiatrist Kasturi Kripakaran testi-
fied as an expert witness in psychiatry. Dr. Kripakaran was
currently treating respondent at McFarland Health Center. She
- 2 - testified respondent suffered from schizophrenia due to fixed
delusions he was the son of God named King James 777 and was
"here to protect us from all evil." He believed President Obama
comes from the clone hierarchy and is evil. Dr. Kripakaran
recounted that respondent believes he "needs to protect us from
the evil," would like to speak to President Obama face to face as
Obama is Cain and respondent is Abel, and would like to prove to
us Obama is cloned. Respondent's medical chart reflects he told
a clinical director in Iroquois County he thinks President Obama
is the "beast" and respondent and Obama will battle with respon-
dent winning the battle.
Respondent approached the Watseka police department to
let them know of his beliefs and the need for him to meet the
President. This information was then sent to the United States
Secret Service. From the medical records, Dr. Kripakaran be-
lieved the Secret Service interviewed respondent and respondent
signed a release for the Service to be able to talk to
Kripakaran.
It was the opinion of Dr. Kripakaran respondent can
become agitated and threatening because of his delusions. As an
example, Dr. Kripakaran noted she spent a great deal of time with
respondent as he expressed his beliefs to her. When she opined
he was delusional, respondent became agitated and stated "I will
kick your ass down there to hell." Dr. Kripakaran felt threat-
ened and intimidated. She concluded respondent would reasonably
be expected to threaten people who did not believe his delusions.
- 3 - Dr. Kripakaran believed respondent was in need of
hospitalization to prevent harm to others, although she admitted
on cross-examination there have been no other incidents of
threatening behavior by respondent nor had he physically harmed
any of his peers. A treatment plan had been formulated and was
admitted into evidence along with the social investigation and
psychiatric history of respondent. Dr. Kripakaran stated a 90-
day hospitalization was the least-restrictive treatment for
respondent at the present time.
Respondent testified he was originally from California
but had lived in Illinois most of his life. When asked where he
would live if not hospitalized, he stated "maybe in Tennessee,
wherever. I'm kind of free-wheeling." Respondent stated he
could support himself by giving guitar lessons.
Respondent admitted a previous hospitalization in
Madden psychiatric facility after being "attacked by a knife."
He was not aware of any diagnosis at the time of his previous
hospitalization. He did not think he had any mental illness, let
alone schizophrenia. Respondent claimed he would not become
threatening if his beliefs were challenged. He stated Dr.
Kripakaran caught him on a bad day when he threatened her. When
asked if he told the doctor he would kick her ass, respondent
admitted he did although he denied a desire to cause her physical
harm or pain.
During his testimony, respondent referred to President
Obama's "body chip" in his forehead but stated he had no plan
- 4 - formulated to cause him physical harm. He had been contacting
sheriff's departments all across the country to have the police
approach the president on this subject. Respondent also shared
with the court his beliefs as the law of God and an explanation
of symbols on the back of the dollar bill.
The trial court found respondent was mentally ill and
as a result of his illness was reasonably expected to inflict
physical harm upon himself or others in the near future. The
court found he needed to be hospitalized at a Department of Human
Services facility for a period not to exceed 90 days. The court
specifically found as a result of a challenge to his personal
beliefs, respondent's threatening conduct placed others in a
reasonable expectation of being harmed despite his denial of an
intent to harm. The court found respondent should be hospital-
ized because he thinks the President poses a threat as a result
of a "chip" implanted in him. Throughout the court's summary of
his findings, respondent interrupted him, exclaiming he was King
James and a prophet.
Respondent appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent argues the trial court's order
should be reversed because (1) the petition to involuntarily
admit him failed to strictly comply with section 3-601(b)(2) of
the Code, requiring a petition to set forth the names and ad-
dresses of a respondent's family members or guardian or explain
why this information could not be obtained; and (2) the court
- 5 - violated his constitutional and statutory rights to treatment in
the least-restrictive environment.
A. Mootness
Both parties agree the issues raised by respondent on
appeal are moot. Respondent's commitment order, entered April 2,
2010, was limited in duration to 90 days. In this case as in In
re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 490, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998),
respondent could be held involuntarily only if a new petition
were filed and a new hearing conducted. Irrespective of whether
the commitment order was valid, it no longer can serve as the
basis for adverse action against respondent. Barbara H., 183
Ill. 2d at 490, 702 N.E.2d at 559. Any decision on the merits
would result in an advisory opinion. We do not render advisory
opinions or decide moot questions. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at
490-91, 702 N.E.2d at 559. Respondent argues any or all of
three exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: (1) capable of
repetition but avoiding review; (2) collateral consequences; and
(3) public interest.
1. Capable of Repetition but Avoiding Review
Where a case involves an event of short duration
capable of repetition, yet evading review, Illinois courts have
held it may qualify for review even if otherwise moot. In re A
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258, 537 N.E.2d 292, 296-97 (1989). Two
criteria must be met in order to receive the benefit of this
exception: "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there
- 6 - is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would
be subjected to the same action again." Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d
at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559.
The order was limited to 90 days, and there is no
question it could not have been fully litigated prior to its
expiration. The only question to be determined with regard to
this exception is whether there is a reasonable expectation
respondent will be subject personally to the same action again.
In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 358-59, 910 N.E.2d 74, 82
(2009).
Respondent acknowledges our supreme court has found
where a claim on appeal raises the issue of sufficient evidence
to order involuntary commitment, it does not meet the requirement
of "same action" where a respondent disputes whether the specific
facts established at his hearing were sufficient to find he was a
danger to himself or to others and, thus, subject to involuntary
commitment. The court stated "[t]here is no clear indication of
how a resolution of this issue could be of use to respondent in
future litigation." Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360, 910 N.E.2d
at 83.
Respondent argues he has raised constitutional and
statutory interpretation arguments, which he contends the court
in Alfred H.H. intimates would be sufficient to overcome the
mootness doctrine as "capable of repetition yet avoiding review."
See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360, 910 N.E.2d at 83. Respon-
dent argues he has raised issues that challenge the State's and
- 7 - the trial court's compliance with his due-process rights to both
proper pleadings and treatment in the least-restrictive environ-
ment. He contends the court is likely to again commit the same
errors in any future mental-health-commitment cases he might
face.
As noted in Alfred H.H., the respondent's burden when
arguing the exception of capable of repetition but avoiding
review is to show there is a substantial likelihood the issue
presented by him, and resolution thereof, would have some bearing
on a similar issue in a later case. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at
360, 910 N.E.2d at 83. Respondent has not met that burden. The
issue of whether hospitalization was the proper treatment alter-
native for respondent is clearly a fact-based determination by
the trial court even though he has tried to argue it as a consti-
tutional issue. The order entered in this case was based on
respondent's condition at the time of the order and any future
proceedings would entail a fresh evaluation of his particular
condition existing at that time. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at
358, 910 N.E.2d at 82. Any determination as to the sufficiency
of the evidence would not be likely to have any impact on future
litigation.
There was a failure to strictly comply with the Code
requiring a petition to set forth the names and addresses of a
respondent's family members or guardian. The interpretation of
the statute and the constitutional requirements where such a
failure occurs have already been clearly determined by prior
- 8 - courts. See In re Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d 677, 684, 867
N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (2007); In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 763,
768, 838 N.E.2d 218, 222 (2005); In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d
1088, 1095, 679 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1997). No further clarification
of what the statute requires is necessary. Though the petition
lacks strict adherence to the statute, prior case law has estab-
lished this error is harmless.
2. Collateral Consequences
This exception applies where the respondent could be
plagued in the future by the adjudication at issue. Alfred H.H.,
233 Ill. 2d at 361, 910 N.E.2d at 83. Respondent argues if faced
with civil commitment again, having once been judged mentally ill
and in need of commitment, he would now have a history of mental
illness which would work against him. He notes the supreme court
recognized in Alfred H.H. "a host of potential legal benefits"
accrue if his commitment is reversed. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d
at 362, 910 N.E.2d at 84. "For instance, a reversal could
provide a basis for a motion in limine that would prohibit any
mention of the hospitalization during the course of another
proceeding." Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362, 910 N.E.2d at 84.
However, if a respondent had previous involuntary commitments or
felony convictions, collateral consequences would have already
attached and are not attributable to the commitment at issue.
Thus, the collateral-consequences exception would not apply. See
Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 362-63, 910 N.E.2d at 84.
Respondent and the State argue over whether the testi-
- 9 - mony by respondent he was previously hospitalized in a mental-
health facility constitutes a situation where collateral conse-
quences have already attached. The record does not indicate
whether this hospitalization was voluntary or involuntary and
what diagnosis of respondent may have been made. However, the
fact the Secret Service was notified and interviewed respondent
prior to the beginning of these commitment proceedings means
collateral consequences have already attached. The Secret
Service will likely continue to monitor respondent's whereabouts.
In fact, in the comprehensive psychiatric report admitted into
evidence, it is noted the Secret Service asked to be notified
when respondent is discharged. Even if the commitment order is
reversed, respondent will remain of interest to the Secret
Service. The descriptions of his behavior in this case, his
earlier hospitalization, and the scrutiny of the Secret Service
are now part of respondent's history.
3. Public Interest
This exception applies where otherwise moot cases
present questions of public importance likely to recur. Under
this exception, a court may consider a moot case where "(1) the
question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for
an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public
officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of
the question." Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 355, 910 N.E.2d at
80. The exception is to be "'narrowly construed and requires a
clear showing of each criterion.' [Citation.]" Alfred H.H., 233
- 10 - Ill. 2d at 355-56, 910 N.E.2d at 80.
Involuntary mental-health commitment proceedings are
matters of public interest as provisions of the Code provide
safeguards to minimize the possibility of confinement and its
attendant consequences for individuals whose confinement is
unnecessary for anyone's protection. In re Stephenson, 67 Ill.
2d 544, 550, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 1274-75 (1977). Questions of
strict compliance with the Code's statutory procedures have been
found to involve matters of public importance to which the
public-interest mootness exception applies. In re Andrew B., 386
Ill. App. 3d 337, 340, 896 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (2008), citing In re
A.W., 381 Ill. App. 3d 950, 955, 887 N.E.2d 831, 836 (2008).
Respondent argues there is a need for a determination
for future guidance of public officials on the issues of the
propriety of his commitment petition and whether he was ordered
to the least-restrictive appropriate treatment. Analysis of
these issues would guide future courts and parties in case in-
volving sections 3-601 and 3-811 of the Code. 405 ILCS 5/3-601
(West 2008); 405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West Supp. 2009).
The challenge in the underlying appeal of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence as to the least-restrictive treatment
alternative does not meet the public-interest exception. See
Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 356-57, 910 N.E.2d at 81. The facts
in regard to respondent's case are specific to him and do not
involve anyone else; thus, they are not of a public nature re-
quiring guidance be given to public officials dealing with those
- 11 - facts. Additionally, there is no substantial likelihood the
facts giving rise to respondent's claims were likely to recur
either as to him in future proceedings or to anyone else. See
Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358, 910 N.E.2d at 82. Any future
commitment proceedings would be based on then-current conditions.
In regard to the failure to strictly comply with the
petition pleading requirement of section 3-601 of the Code (405
ILCS 5/3-601 (West 2008)), as we have previously noted, this
issue already has been determined by other courts and, therefore,
there is no need for an additional determination for the future
guidance of public officials.
We have found respondent's appeal is moot and none of
the exceptions he cites to the mootness doctrine apply. We need
not address the substantive issues he has raised but choose to
briefly note no reversible errors occurred.
B. Strict Compliance With Section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code
A respondent subject to involuntary commitment should
not be allowed to participate in a hearing on the merits only to
obtain a new hearing by complaining of a procedural defect. Such
a respondent forfeits any objection when not made at trial. See
In re Phillip E., 385 Ill. App. 3d 278, 283, 895 N.E.2d 33, 39-40
(2008); In re Luker, 255 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370, 627 N.E.2d 1166,
1168 (1993).
Second, although strict compliance is generally re-
quired in involuntary-commitment proceedings, reversal is not
required for failure to strictly comply with statutory procedures
- 12 - unless respondent suffered prejudice. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d
at 768, 838 N.E.2d at 222. Specifically, failure to strictly
comply with section 3-601(b)(2) does not warrant reversal unless
respondent suffered prejudice. Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at
684, 867 N.E.2d at 1219. In addition, failure to strictly comply
with section 3-601(b)(2) does not require reversal where a re-
spondent fails to object to alleged errors in the trial court and
was not prejudiced. Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1095, 679
N.E.2d at 823.
Respondent failed to establish both he objected to the
error at trial and he suffered prejudice. The comprehensive
report indicated respondent knew nothing about his family other
than his mother lived in Costa Rica and he had a sister with whom
he no longer spoke. Respondent does not suggest how he might
have been prejudiced or what the State could have done to contact
these vaguely referenced family members.
C. Least-Restrictive Treatment Alternative
Once an individual has been found subject to involun-
tary admission, the trial court must decide the individual's
disposition, i.e., the specific setting to which he will be
committed. 405 ILCS 5/3-810 (West 2008); 405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West
Supp. 2009). Respondent attempts to couch his objections to the
court's ordering him to involuntary hospitalization as a consti-
tutional issue. He argues, to comply with substantive due-pro-
cess requirements, courts must order committed individuals to be
placed in the least-restrictive setting for treatment. Covington
- 13 - v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Respondent argues
more than just the treating physician's opinion is necessary to
commit someone to the most- restrictive setting. The opinion
must be supported by evidence. In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d
221, 227, 633 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1994).
Here, the evidence indicated respondent's threatening
behavior would reasonably place another in fear for his personal
safety. Respondent told Dr. Kripakaran he would "kick [her] ass
down to hell." Although respondent claims he did not mean it,
his words put Dr. Kripakaran in fear for her personal safety.
Where a trial court is justified in finding a respon-
dent in need of hospitalization, it is not error for the court to
fail to give consideration to other placements. People v.
Sharkey, 60 Ill. App. 3d 257, 265, 376 N.E.2d 464, 469 (1978).
The Code does not state a court must make a specific finding a
certain treatment is the least-restrictive alternative. In re
Friberg, 249 Ill. App. 3d 86, 93, 617 N.E.2d 1327, 1332 (1993).
A court's ruling is proper if the record provides the basis for
the court to determine involuntary hospitalization is the least-
restrictive alternative. See Friberg, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 93,
617 N.E.2d at 1332.
Although he denied being mentally ill at trial, on
appeal respondent does not argue he was not mentally ill. His
comprehensive evaluation shows respondent was held in the Iro-
quois County jail because of threats he made against President
Obama. He was interviewed by the Secret Service and because of
- 14 - his strong delusional beliefs referred for psychiatric evalua-
tion. He is homeless and unemployed. Although he testified at
trial he lived most of his life in Illinois, during his evalua-
tion, respondent told Dr. Kripakaran he is a wanderer and was
trying to get to Minnesota from California when he stopped in
Watseka. He does not believe he has a mental illness and has no
support group. Respondent has never been married or had any
children. He has no income. This record supports the trial
court's finding respondent required hospitalization and no rea-
sonable alternative existed.
We choose to comment on the responsibility of the
participants in respondent's hearing. The State filed a petition
with a portion of the petition left blank. Respondent's counsel
failed to comment on the blank section of the petition. The
trial judge did not point out the failure to fill in that sec-
tion. We are mindful of busy court calendars, overburdened
counsel and judge, and increased mental-health filings. We also
understand these are difficult cases. That cannot be an excuse.
All the participants bear a responsibility, perhaps a special
responsibility, in a mental-health case, to do their best to
provide a process that will guarantee a respondent is treated
fairly.
Everyone in the courtroom may have known the likely
result of the hearing, and knew in advance there were no family
members to be contacted or to speak for respondent. That is not
a criticism--it is a comment on human nature. After dealing with
- 15 - respondent, listening to respondent, and understanding the lim-
ited options available, it is understandable the participants
might decide everyone wanted what was best for respondent and
procedural niceties need not be observed.
That is a fatal flaw in mental-health cases. The
participants sometimes act as if such cases do not involve "real"
law. Pleadings should be filled out in compliance with the
statute because such cases are quite real. We lock up delu-
sional, societal outcasts because we do not want them to harm
themselves or others.
If we are to take away liberty, label individuals, and
place them in institutions, we must improve the process. The
blank could have been filled in quickly with the information
respondent provided--his mother lives in Costa Rica and he has no
contact with her or a sister. That information would not assist
in deciding the case, but by providing it, the State would be
acknowledging that requirement of the statute.
In a similar vein, asking Dr. Kripakaran why hospital-
ization was the least-restrictive alternative would show an
understanding that hospitalization is the last resort, not the
first, even if it seems to be a forgone conclusion. The record
supports the trial court's finding, but a neutral court watcher
who carefully examined the pleadings and observed the hearing
would conclude everyone involved took shortcuts--not because they
are wicked or uncaring, but because all they see is just another
mental-health case, the usual respondent in the usual place. The
- 16 - system can and must do better.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
TURNER, and POPE, JJ., concur.
- 17 -