In Re Jaden Alexandra Riley v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00150-CV
In re Jaden Alexandra Riley
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator has filed a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the probate
court’s alleged failure to rule on: (i) her request for accommodation that was submitted on
December 30, 2025; (ii) motions that were filed on January 12, 2026, requesting the appointment
of an attorney ad litem and the disqualification of counsel for real party in interest; and
(iii) motion filed on January 26, 2026, requesting written rulings on her pending motions.
To establish an abuse of discretion for failure to rule, a relator must show that:
(1) the trial court had a legal duty to rule on the motion, (2) she made a demand for the trial court
to rule, and (3) the trial court failed or refused to rule within a reasonable time. See In re
Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (citing O’Connor
v. First Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. 1992)). Here, the record does not reflect that
Relator’s request for accommodation or motions have been pending for an unreasonable length
of time. See, e.g., In re Halley, No. 03-15-00310-CV, 2015 WL 4448831, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin July 14, 2015) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that delay of less than six months did not constitute unreasonable length of time under “failure to rule” analysis); In re
Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) (determining
that six-month delay in ruling would not be unreasonable).
In her petition, Relator also asks this Court to order the probate judge to “refrain
from issuing any ruling that is dispositive of property rights or title interests,” but she has not
established that she is entitled to mandamus relief on this ground. The record reflects that real
party in interest filed a motion to expunge notices of lis pendens and requested a hearing on the
motion but that no hearing has been held on this motion. See In re Rescue Concepts, Inc.,
498 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, org. proceeding) (addressing when
mandamus relief is appropriate in context of issues arising from issuance of notice of lis
pendens); Smith v. Schwartz, No. 02-15-00146-CV, 2015 WL 3645862, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
Having reviewed the petition and the record provided, we cannot conclude that
Relator is entitled to the extraordinary relief requested and deny the petition for writ of
mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). We further dismiss Relator’s pending motions with
this Court as moot.
__________________________________________ Gisela Triana, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Ellis
Filed: March 4, 2026
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