In Re Jackson

446 B.R. 608, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 747, 2011 WL 837799
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedJanuary 6, 2011
Docket19-51738
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 446 B.R. 608 (In Re Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Jackson, 446 B.R. 608, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 747, 2011 WL 837799 (Ga. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER WITH REGARD TO PLAN PROVISIONS DEALING WITH CLAIMS SECURED BY PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE

PAUL W. BONAPFEL, Bankruptcy Judge.

Each of these Chapter 13 eases involves a claim arising from a long-term debt secured only by a deed to secure debt on a principal residence, sometimes re *609 ferred to colloquially as a “mortgage.” 1 Each plan proposes, as 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) permits, to cure defaults and to maintain regular monthly payments on the claim while the case is pending. In accordance with the usual practice in this District, the plans provide for the Chapter 13 trustee to make payments to cure defaults from plan payments that the debtors make to the trustee and for the debtors to pay the regular postpetition payments to the lenders directly. The purpose of such provisions is to permit a debtor to retain her residence, bring her mortgage debt current during the course of the Chapter 13 case, and exit Chapter 13 with a mortgage debt whose maturity is reinstated and on which no defaults exist.

In addition to the “cure and maintenance” provisions that are in the form plan, each plan in these cases includes nonstandard provisions that impose “an affirmative duty on the holder and/or ser-vicer of a claim secured by Debtor’s principal residence” with regard to several matters. 2 Specifically, the nonstandard provisions:

(1) require the lender to apply payments received from the Trustee to the prepetition arrearage;
(2) prohibit the lender from imposing late payment charges based solely on prepetition defaults;
(3) require the lender to apply postpe-tition monthly payments made by the debtor to the next postpetition payment due;
(4) require the lender to notify the debtor and the debtor’s attorney of any changes in the interest rate not less than 60 days in advance;
(5) require the lender to notify the debtor and the debtor’s attorney in writing of any change in property taxes or insurance premiums that would change the escrow portion of monthly mortgage payments not less than 60 days in advance;
(6) permit the debtor to file, and serve on the lender, a “Request for Annual Statement” and require the lender to respond to it by filing with the Court, and serving on the debtor, the debtor’s attorney, and the trustee, an Annual Statement that (i) itemizes in detail the amounts paid by the debtor during the preceding year that were applied to the principal balance, interest, the debtor’s escrow account, and the prepetition ar-rearage claim, (ii) states the remaining balance of the prepetition arrearage claim; and (iii) states and explains all fees and charges alleged to have accrued postpetition;
(7) permit the debtor to file a motion for contempt, and for the Court to impose sanctions, if the lender fails to file and serve an Annual Statement in response to the debtor’s request; and
(8) state that, if the debtor pays the cure amount specified in the plan or in the lender’s allowed proof of claim, while timely making all required postpetition *610 payments, the mortgage claim will, at the conclusion of the plan, be reinstated according to its original terms, “extinguishing any rights of lender to recover any amount alleged to have arisen prior to the petition date.”

Counsel for the debtors in these cases has explained that the nonstandard provisions are necessary in order to insure that the debtors know what they must pay to complete the plan so that they can exit their Chapter 13 cases with a fully cured and reinstated mortgage and so that they do not face demands from a mortgage lender for fees or charges that the lender did not assert or disclose while the case was pending or that arise from a lender’s erroneous accounting for or improper application of payments.

The problem is a legitimate one. Reported cases and legal commentary provide numerous examples of debtors who have encountered such difficulties, as the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”) and the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules (the “Advisory Committee”) recognized in proposing an amendment to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to address the problem. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 12-13 (September 2010); Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules 12-14 (May 27, 2010, revised June 14, 2010). 3

Proposed Rule 3002.1 requires a mortgage lender to notify a debtor of changes in the amount of the mortgage payment and provides a mechanism for the determination of whether a debtor has cured mortgage defaults and is otherwise current on the mortgage when the chapter 13 case is closed. 4 The Judicial Conference has approved proposed Rule 3002.1. If the Supreme Court of the United States approves it and Congressional review does not result in any changes, the new rule may become effective on December 1, 2011.

In the meantime, some courts have addressed the problem with local rules or generally applicable orders that have the effect of imposing requirements similar to some of those the debtors propose in their plans or by confirming plans that include such provisions; the rationale is that the provisions are procedural in nature and do not effect an impermissible modification of a mortgage lender’s claim in violation of § 1322(b)(2). 5 This District has not adopted any such requirements, and the form plan does not contain such provisions.

The inclusion of nonstandard provisions in a Chapter 13 plan raises two primary concerns. First, the Court has the obligation to deny confirmation of a plan that does not comply with the confirmation requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), regardless of whether a creditor objects to its treatment or even appears in the case. *611 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espi nosa, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1380-81,176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010). Consequently, the Court must determine that plan provisions dealing with a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence do not im-permissibly modify the claim in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). See Universal American Mortgage Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir.2003).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
446 B.R. 608, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 747, 2011 WL 837799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jackson-ganb-2011.