In Re J & R Trucking, Inc.

431 B.R. 818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2148, 2010 WL 2838543
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJune 18, 2010
Docket19-30216
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 431 B.R. 818 (In Re J & R Trucking, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re J & R Trucking, Inc., 431 B.R. 818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2148, 2010 WL 2838543 (Ind. 2010).

Opinion

DECISION ON MOTION FOR 2004 EXAMINATION

ROBERT E. GRANT, Chief Judge.

These cases are both pending under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. They also present a common issue, raised by similar parties seeking the court’s permission to conduct 2004 examinations. As a result, they are being decided together.

In J & R Trucking, the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund and the Indiana Teamsters Health Benefits Fund have filed a joint motion asking the court to authorize them to examine representatives of the debtor and another entity, Montgomery Trucking, Inc., pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Their purpose is threefold. First, they want to determine whether there are any other trades or businesses which were under common control with the debtor on the date it withdrew from the pension fund *820 and, therefore, which might be liable for the debtor’s obligations to that fund. Second, they want to determine if Montgomery Trucking might be liable, as a successor to the debtor, for the debtor’s obligations to both movants. Finally, they want information concerning transfers made prior to the petition, which might be recoverable by the trustee.

In Weiss Trucking, the pension fund has filed a similar motion, seeking to examine representatives of that debtor. As in J & R Trucking, it wants to determine whether there are any other trades or businesses which were under common control with the debtor on the date it withdrew from the pension fund and, therefore, which might be liable for the debtor’s obligations to it. It also wants information concerning transfers made prior to the petition, which might be recoverable by the trustee.

In each case, movants argue that, if third parties are identified who may be liable to them for either debtor’s obligations, collecting from those other entities would reduce their own claims against the estate, yielding more money for other creditors, as would the recovery of avoidable transfers. This, movants contend, makes the requested inquires relate to the conduct and financial condition of the debtors, and to matters which might affect the administration of their estates; thus, Rule 2004 permits the requested examinations.

Although requests for a 2004 examination are usually considered ex parte, see e.g., In re Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932, 943 (E.D.Cal.1993), these motions struck the court as unusual. As a result, it scheduled them for hearings. In doing so, the court also indicated that it wanted to address “the propriety of using a Rule 2004 exam to identify third parties who may also be liable to the movant” and invited the parties to file briefs directed to that issue prior to each hearing. The matter is before the court following the arguments presented to it at those hearings and in the briefs which counsel filed.

The briefs filed in response to the court’s invitation do not specifically address the particular issue the court identified or direct the court’s attention to any authority supporting the use of a 2004 examination in that fashion. That issue was “the propriety of using a Rule 2004 exam to identify third parties who may also be liable to the movant.” Rather than facing the issue head on, movants’ briefs speak to the broad scope of a 2004 examination — anything that relates to the actions or finances of the debtor or to the administration of the bankruptcy estate— and then embark upon an explanation for why there might be third parties who may also be liable for the debtors’ obligations to them. In a Rube Goldberg-like fashion, movants argue that if they are able to identify such third parties, and then successfully collect from them, doing so will reduce their claims against the bankruptcy estate, thereby enhancing the distribution to other creditors. That potential impact on the rest of the creditor body 1 supposedly serves as a bankruptcy purpose for the requested examinations, as does the desire to identify potentially avoidable transfers.

While movants have advanced a creative argument in support of their requests, the argument ignores the true, underlying purpose for a 2004 examination. *821 If accepted, it would transform the rule from an investigatory device, designed to expedite the administration of the bankruptcy estate, into something not unlike a proceeding supplemental, which creditors could use in an effort to collect the amounts due them outside the bankruptcy proceeding. Such an expansion is not something the court is inclined to embrace.

Rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allows the court to authorize the examination of any entity as to “the acts, conduct, or property, or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate or to the debtor’s right to a discharge.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. Rule 2004(b). The opportunity for such an examination is available to “any party in interest,” Fed. R. Bankr.P. Rule 2004(a), but whether or not the court allows the examination is a matter committed to its discretion, In re Rosenberg, 303 B.R. 172, 175 (8th Cir. BAP 2004); Dinubilo, 177 B.R. at 939, and requires a sufficient cause. Dinubilo, 177 B.R. at 943; In re Symington, 209 B.R. 678, 687 (Bankr.D.Md.1997); Matter of Wilcher, 56 B.R. 428, 434 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985). See also, Norton Bankruptcy Rules, 2009-10 ed., Rule 2004 ed. comment (c), pp. 136-37 (Creditors do not have an absolute right to conduct examinations under rule 2004 “which provides that the court ‘may order’ an examination. One can readily visualize a situation where creditors may want to use this section to deal with their special problems and use the section as a substitute for discovery.”).

Although a Rule 2004 examination is obviously an investigatory device and it is conducted under oath, it should not be confused with discovery or a discovery deposition. See generally, Dinubilo, 177 B.R. at 939-40; Symington, 209 B.R. at 683-85; Wilcher, 56 B.R. at 433-34; Norton, Rule 2004 comment (c), p. 137. The two are different, both in terms of the context in which they occur and the scope of the requested examination. Discovery can only take place in the context of some type of dispute — be it an adversary proceeding or a contested matter — and the scope of the inquiry is limited to issues which are relevant to that dispute. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 26(b)(1). A 2004 examination, on the other hand, not only does not require the existence of litigation to justify the inquiry, but, such a dispute prevents recourse to it. A 2004 examination is not a substitute for discovery; if the traditional discovery tools are available the potential examiner is required to use them and may not take advantage of Rule 2004.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
431 B.R. 818, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2148, 2010 WL 2838543, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-j-r-trucking-inc-innb-2010.