In re J. L. M.

1979 OK CR 72, 598 P.2d 243, 1979 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 295
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 17, 1979
DocketNo. J-79-151
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1979 OK CR 72 (In re J. L. M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re J. L. M., 1979 OK CR 72, 598 P.2d 243, 1979 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 295 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION

CORNISH, Presiding Judge:

The resolution of this appeal turns on the distinction between an adjudication and a disposition. A verified petition which listed witnesses and complied with all the requirements of 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1103,1 was [245]*245filed on March 14, 1978, in Case No. JFJ-78-45 in Comanche County, Oklahoma, seeking to declare J. L. M. a juvenile delinquent. On April 7, 1978, the juvenile was adjudicated a delinquent and made a ward of the court as a result of an automobile theft. A dispositional hearing was held and the juvenile was placed in the custody of his grandparents, ordered to make restitution and further ordered to perform 60 hours of community services.

On November 20, 1978, the District Attorney filed a “Motion for Further Disposition,” alleging that the juvenile had committed the subsequent acts of concealing stolen property on April 8, 1978, and larceny of an automobile on November 14, 1978. After the juvenile’s demand for a jury trial was denied, a further hearing was held on January 12 and 16, 1979. The court found that the juvenile had committed the act of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and committed him to the custody of DISRS.

The juvenile urges on appeal that because the “Motion for Further Disposition” requested a hearing and new findings of fact, it should have been required to comply with 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1103, and that his demand for a jury trial should have been granted in accordance with 10 O.S.Supp. 1978, § 1110.2 The District Attorney argues that the pleading was merely a motion seeking a change in disposition, and not a petition for adjudication, so that neither Section 1103 nor Section 1110 was applicable.

The problem arises out of the procedural provisions of the Juvenile Code. In adult prosecutions, the jurisdiction of the District Court extends only to the imposition of a judgment and sentence for the offense committed (excluding for the moment such extended proceedings as suspended sentences and deferred judgments). But the jurisdiction over a delinquent child, once obtained, may be retained by the court until the child reaches the age of 19. Title 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1102. Thus, if the Juvenile Division of the District Court refrains from terminating its jurisdiction after disposition and the juvenile commits a subsequent offense, the District Attorney desiring to prosecute the juvenile will find that the court already has personal jurisdiction over him.

In this case, the pleading filed by the District Attorney alleged that the juvenile had committed the subsequent offense of larceny of an automobile, but the pleading was not verified and did not have the names of witnesses endorsed thereon. In arguing against the juvenile’s demurrer, the District Attorney took the position that since the juvenile had previously been adjudicated a delinquent child, only a disposi-tional hearing was required:

[246]*246“MRS. TERRILL: O.K. I was looking at the wrong motion. I still say, Your Hon- or, that this motion is a continuing motion of the original petition, which contains the elements to comply with the statute.
“THE COURT: Would you care to comment as to the witnesses being endorsed or not endorsed that Mr. Prince raised?
“MRS. TERRILL: I have no comment, Your Honor. Your Honor, again on the petition, the witness list is on the second page. On the motion, it’s not needed.
“THE COURT: Now, where is the witness list, Mrs. Terrill?
“MRS. TERRILL: Second page of the petition, designated JFJ-78-45.
“MR. PRINCE: Could I inquire as to when that petition was filed?
“THE COURT: That appears to be—
“MRS. TERRILL: Wait just a minute, Your Honor. I have the wrong paper.
“THE COURT: It appears to be the original one.
“MRS. TERRILL: JFJ-78-45. The witness list is on the second page.
“MR. PRINCE: Was that filed back in March?
“MRS. TERRILL: Yes. Every — everything was March 14. Everything else.
“MR. PRINCE: Are the witnesses that are on that petition, have they been called here today?
“MRS. TERRILL: Not those witnesses, Your Honor. Is — is the statute clear, Your Honor, as to which witnesses must be endorsed on what motions or petitions?
“THE COURT: Well, you’ll have to tell me.
“MRS. TERRILL: I would say no.”

The Juvenile Code provides distinct types of hearings, the character of which varies as the object of the hearing varies. The function of the adjudicatory hearing is to determine whether the allegations of the Section 1108 petition are true and whether the juvenile should be made a ward of the court. After a juvenile is adjudged delinquent, the court proceeds to determine what disposition should be made in accordance with 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1116, et seq. The court is guided in the conduct of dispo-sitional hearings by the provisions of 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1115.

The situation which has arisen in the case at bar was apparently not contemplated by the Oklahoma Statutes. The reference to a “Petition” (see 10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1103), and to an “adjudicatory hearing” (see 10 O.S.1978, § 1101, ¶ [f]), clearly relate to the initiating of a juvenile proceeding against a juvenile who is not already subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court. On the other hand, the hearing which was held on January 12 and 16, 1979, in the instant case was clearly of an adjudicatory nature, even though the State entitled its pleading a motion rather than a petition. The State presented a number of new witnesses, and the judge found that the juvenile had committed the act of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle.

When an adult who has been convicted of a crime commits a subsequent crime, the State must initiate a new proceeding. There is more involved than the question of personal jurisdiction. Additionally, there is the consideration of adequate and timely notice, which is the cornerstone of due process.

We, therefore, hold that when a juvenile has been accused of committing an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, and a hearing of an adjudicatory nature is to be held to determine the merits of the accusation, then the State must comply with all the statutes pertaining to adjudicatory hearings. This includes the filing of a verified petition, with the witnesses endorsed thereon (Section 1103, supra), the issuance and service of summons (10 O.S. Supp.1978, §§ 1104 and 1105), the right to a jury trial (Section 1110, supra), the use of the rules of evidence (10 O.S.Supp.1978, § 1111), and all other applicable provisions of the Statutes.

Since the juvenile in this case was not accorded these due process safeguards, the ruling of the Juvenile Division of the [247]*247District Court must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.

BRETT and BUSSEY, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

MLS v. State
805 P.2d 665 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1991)
C.D.H. v. State
1988 OK CR 171 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1988)
M.L.R. v. State
1987 OK CR 163 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1987)
Matter of JLM
1979 OK CR 72 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1979 OK CR 72, 598 P.2d 243, 1979 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-j-l-m-oklacrimapp-1979.