FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #054
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 8th day of December, 2023 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2023-B-00592 IN RE: J ANTONIO FLORENCE
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2023-B-0592
IN RE: J. ANTONIO FLORENCE
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, J. Antonio Florence, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana. 1
UNDERLYING FACTS
In January 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. 2 The
formal charges alleged the following:
The Kennon Matter
On April 23, 2014, Beverly Kennon hired respondent to represent her son,
Keddrick Kennon, in a criminal matter in Webster Parish. Respondent agreed to
handle the matter for a $5,000 fixed fee, but he and Ms. Kennon did not execute a
written fee agreement. Ms. Kennon paid respondent a total of $4,100. Respondent
applied $2,100 of this amount to outstanding fees owed for a 2013 representation of
Mr. Kennon.
1 Respondent is also licensed to practice law in New Jersey. 2 Initially, the ODC filed six counts of formal charges, but the hearing committee and the disciplinary board found no misconduct in one of the counts. The ODC accepted these findings without objection. Accordingly, this opinion does not address the misconduct in that particular count. Respondent did not want to publicly enroll as Mr. Kennon’s counsel of record
because he did not have a good relationship with the district attorney. Therefore, he
paid attorney Ernest Gilliam $2,000 to enroll as counsel of record during the plea
negotiation stage of the case. Respondent assured Mr. Kennon and Mr. Gilliam that
he would, nevertheless, appear and represent Mr. Kennon if the case proceeded to a
trial. Mr. Gilliam filed and handled all pre-trial motions and court appearances in
the case.
At an April 15, 2015 status conference, the judge scheduled the case for an
April 27, 2015 trial. Mr. Kennon was present with only Mr. Gilliam and complained
to the judge that he had hired respondent to represent him at trial. Mr. Gilliam
confirmed this and advised that he expected respondent to appear at the trial to
represent Mr. Kennon.
Following the status conference, Ms. Kennon sent respondent a text message
asking if he intended to represent her son at the April 27, 2015 trial. In response,
respondent claimed he did not represent Mr. Kennon and would not be representing
him at the trial. In a follow-up text message, Ms. Kennon reminded respondent that
she had already paid him to represent her son at his trial.
Respondent did not appear at Mr. Kennon’s April 27, 2015 trial. However,
Mr. Gilliam was present to represent Mr. Kennon. Over Mr. Kennon’s objection,
the judge proceeded with the trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict and a thirty-five
year sentence for Mr. Kennon.
Thereafter, Mr. Kennon filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent,
seeking a refund of the fees his mother paid. During the ODC’s investigation, Mr.
Gilliam informed the ODC that respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit, in
which he would falsely state that respondent never agreed to represent Mr. Kennon.
Mr. Gilliam refused to sign such an affidavit.
2 Respondent acknowledged accepting the $4,100 fee from Ms. Kennon but
refused to refund any portion thereof. He also refused to refer the matter to the
Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”) fee dispute resolution program, claiming
he had earned the fee. Furthermore, respondent insisted that he never agreed to
represent Mr. Kennon but simply referred the case to Mr. Gilliam.
Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating
Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Davis Matter
In 2016, Burney Davis was charged with a felony in Caddo Parish. Mr. Davis
hired attorney Jacqueline Scott to represent him and paid her agreed-upon $8,500
fixed fee. Later, Ms. Scott was required to withdraw from the representation and
asked respondent if he would take over. Both Mr. Davis and respondent agreed that
respondent would represent Mr. Davis for the same $8,500 fixed fee. Ms. Scott
refunded the $8,500 to Mr. Davis, who in turn used it to pay respondent.
Respondent enrolled as Mr. Davis’ counsel of record on November 9, 2016.
On December 8, 2016, Mr. Davis fired respondent because he could not get
respondent to communicate with him. Mr. Davis then hired attorney Peter Flowers
to represent him. Respondent did not refund the $8,500 fee.
Later, Mr. Davis filed a claim with the LSBA fee dispute resolution program.
Respondent did not respond to the LSBA’s letter requesting that he participate in the
program and made no other efforts to resolve the fee dispute.
3 Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule
1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Harris Matter
On August 16, 2016, Orya Harris hired respondent to represent her brother,
Rodriqus Harris, in a criminal matter in Caddo Parish. Respondent quoted a $5,000
fixed fee to handle the representation, but no written fee agreement was executed.
Ms. Harris made an initial $1,500 payment, and respondent provided her with a
written invoice/receipt for the payment. Over the next several months, Ms. Harris
made various payments totaling $3,100.
During 2017, respondent failed to appear at several pre-trial hearings on Mr.
Harris’ behalf. Consequently, Mr. Harris fired respondent and later filed a
disciplinary complaint against him. In his complaint, Mr. Harris demanded that
respondent withdraw from the representation and refund the fee. Respondent
withdrew from the representation prior to the August 9, 2017 trial, and Mr. Harris
was provided court-appointed counsel. However, respondent failed to refund the fee
or otherwise attempt to resolve the fee dispute.
During his July 26, 2018 sworn statement to the ODC, respondent claimed the
fixed fee was $10,000. In support of this contention, respondent provided the ODC
with copies of two separate invoices, both dated January 12, 2017 and reflecting a
$10,000 fixed fee, which he purportedly sent to Ms. Harris. The ODC showed
respondent the November 1, 2016 invoice that indicated the fixed fee was $5,000,
and he acknowledged it was genuine. However, he could provide no credible
explanation for the difference in the two sets of invoices. Ms. Harris informed the
ODC that she had never seen the two January 12, 2017 invoices and reiterated that
the fixed fee was $5,000.
4 Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating
Rules 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(a) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of
material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
The James Matter
On February 3, 2017, Cordero James hired respondent to represent him in a
criminal matter in Caddo Parish. Pursuant to a written fee agreement, respondent
charged a $6,000 fixed fee. Mr. James’ family paid respondent $2,000 towards the
fee.
Simultaneously, respondent agreed to represent Mr. James’ co-defendant in
the case. However, the co-defendant’s statement to the police incriminated Mr.
James, and the judge advised respondent in open court that he could not represent
them both. Later, during a hearing on April 6, 2017, the judge removed respondent
from both representations due to the conflict of interest. Respondent filed a motion
to withdraw, which the judge granted, and Mr. James had to retain new counsel.
Nevertheless, respondent did not address the issue of the unearned fee.
Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule
The Contempt of Court Matter
During a September 12, 2017 hearing in a criminal case pending in Caddo
Parish, Judge Erin Garrett repeatedly admonished respondent for making abusive
and insulting comments in open court directed at the court and the assistant district
attorney and for repeatedly interrupting them. During a recess in the case, Judge
Garrett instructed respondent to remain outside the courtroom. Nevertheless,
5 respondent left the courthouse, and court personnel were unable to locate him at his
office.
The following day, Judge Garrett conducted a hearing in which she charged
respondent with direct contempt for (1) “contumacious” refusal to comply with her
order to remain and (2) deliberately making insulting, openly contemptuous, and
derogatory remarks that challenged her authority and dignity. Respondent was
found guilty of direct contempt and fined $100.
Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule
8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
As stated above, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent in January
2021. Through counsel, respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, wherein
he denied engaging in any misconduct. Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a
formal hearing on the merits.
Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on June 14 and 15, 2021.
Both respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence and called
witnesses to testify before the committee. Respondent also testified on his own
behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.
Hearing Committee Report
After consideration, the hearing committee provided an analysis of the
evidence and testimony presented for each count of alleged misconduct. Based upon
this analysis, the committee made factual findings and determinations of rule
6 violations. The committee’s analysis, findings, and determinations in each count are
as follows:
Ms. Kennon testified that respondent had successfully represented her son
previously. Therefore, she contacted him about the 2014 criminal matter.
Respondent said he would take the new case for a $5,000 fee, with a $2,000 deposit,
if she paid the balance due from the previous representation. In support, the ODC
submitted evidence in the form of two checks representing the balance owed for the
previous representation and the $2,000 deposit for the new representation. Ms.
Kennon further testified that respondent never appeared in court on her son’s behalf.
Mr. Gilliam informed her that respondent had sent him to represent her son on
preliminary matters because the district attorney did not like respondent. In support,
the ODC submitted text messages between Ms. Kennon and respondent. The
committee found Ms. Kennon’s testimony credible.
Mr. Gilliam testified that respondent associated him to handle Mr. Kennon’s
pre-trial matters, and respondent would be present if the case went to trial. This
testimony is supported by the transcript of an April 15, 2015 status conference in
Mr. Kennon’s case as well as by a motion to continue the trial filed on April 27,
2015. Mr. Gilliam also explained why he did not sign the affidavit respondent
drafted. 3 Finally, he stated that, as Mr. Kennon’s trial was approaching, he and
respondent had a falling out regarding another matter and were not speaking on a
daily basis.
Mr. Kennon testified that he believed he had hired respondent to represent
him and had one or two telephone calls with respondent wherein respondent agreed
3 Mr. Gilliam indicated that he did not want to sign the affidavit because he had no knowledge of some of the information stated therein. He also did not want to sign the affidavit because he thought his live testimony would be more appropriate.
7 to represent him in court. Nevertheless, respondent never appeared in court with
Mr. Kennon. This testimony is supported by the transcript of an April 15, 2015
status conference in Mr. Kennon’s case.
Respondent acknowledged speaking with both Ms. Kennon and Mr. Kennon
but denied agreeing to represent Mr. Kennon. The committee found respondent’s
denials not credible, noting that he could not explain why he had written two receipts
for the money Ms. Kennon paid him – one for the $2,000 deposit on the $5,000 fee
that showed a balance due of $3,000 and one for the $2,100 payment for the previous
representation that showed a balance due of zero.4
Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that respondent
accepted the fee and agreed to represent Mr. Kennon. Whether in response to Ms.
Kennon’s threats or to his falling out with Mr. Gilliam, respondent failed to appear
in court on Mr. Kennon’s behalf. Respondent knowingly and intentionally neglected
Mr. Kennon’s representation, leaving Mr. Gilliam to try Mr. Kennon’s case.
Although the outcome of the trial may not have been any different, Mr. Kennon was
not represented by the attorney of his choice. Furthermore, respondent refused to
refund any portion of the fee or refer the matter to the fee dispute resolution program.
Respondent attempted to get Mr. Gilliam to sign an affidavit that contained facts
contrary to the committee’s factual findings.
Based upon these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules
1.3 and 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee further
determined there was not clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct by seeking Mr. Gilliam’s signature on the affidavit.
4 Respondent testified that Mr. Gilliam had already agreed to handle Mr. Kennon’s case for $5,000. Therefore, respondent cashed the $2,000 check and gave the cash to Mr. Gilliam. Then he wrote a receipt showing a balance due of $3,000.
8 The Davis Matter
Mr. Davis testified that he originally hired Ms. Scott to represent him.
However, when she had to withdraw because of a conflict, she refunded the
remaining $7,650 of the $8,500, and he paid respondent $7,650. Minute entries
show respondent enrolled as counsel of record but was discharged less than a month
later, which Mr. Davis attributed to respondent’s failure to communicate. Mr. Davis
also testified that, when he fired respondent, respondent told him, “You’re not
getting your money back” and “I’m not giving you a dime back.” Mr. Davis then
tried to initiate fee dispute arbitration but was unsuccessful.
Respondent lacked credibility when he inconsistently testified that he did not
remember receiving an arbitration request from Mr. Davis but also called in response
to said arbitration request. Respondent also admitted that he had not earned the
entire fee Mr. Davis had paid him. However, he claimed that Mr. Davis asked him
to apply the remaining balance to another client, which Mr. Davis denied. The
committee determined respondent’s credibility was further damaged by his failure
to include this claim in his answer to the formal charges.
Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that respondent
was hired on a fixed-fee basis. When he was discharged a month later, he took no
action to address the fee dispute even after Mr. Davis filed a claim with the LSBA
fee dispute resolution program. The committee also found that respondent acted
knowingly and intentionally. Based upon these facts, the committee determined
respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
During his sworn statement, respondent produced an invoice reflecting that
the fee was $10,000. When confronted with the invoice reflecting a $5,000 fee that
Ms. Harris produced, respondent admitted that the $5,000 invoice was real. He
9 claimed that the fee agreement was $5,000 for each criminal charge and that there
were actually two invoices for $5,000. However, respondent could not explain why
the second $5,000 invoice was lost and could not explain why there would be two
$5,000 invoices and also one $10,000 invoice. Respondent further testified that he
sent Ms. Harris the $10,000 invoice along with a letter via certified mail. He claimed
to have hand-delivered same to Mr. Harris. However, respondent could provide no
proof of the certified mailing. Respondent also did not know if he took any action
regarding the fee dispute in this matter.
Ms. Harris’ testimony was very credible and supported by documentary
evidence. She testified that she hired respondent to defend her brother against
serious criminal charges. According to Ms. Harris, respondent agreed to represent
her brother for $5,000, and she paid him a $1,500 deposit. Eventually, she paid him
an additional $3,100. Respondent was reluctant to provide Ms. Harris with receipts
and only wanted cash payments. When respondent failed to appear for several
hearings, Mr. Harris fired him and filed a disciplinary complaint against him. Mr.
Harris also testified that the fee agreement was $5,000 with a payment plan. Both
of them denied the fee was $10,000 and denied ever seeing the letter and $10,000
invoice respondent claimed to have delivered to them.
Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found respondent was
hired to represent Mr. Harris for a $5,000 fixed fee for all criminal charges. Upon
being discharged, respondent knowingly and intentionally made no effort to return
any portion of the unearned fee or to initiate fee dispute arbitration. Furthermore,
respondent created a false $10,000 invoice and letter and presented same to the ODC
and the committee. Based upon these facts, the committee determined respondent
violated Rules 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
10 The James Matter
Mr. James testified that he and his co-defendant each hired respondent to
represent them for a $6,000 fixed fee. He further testified that $2,000 of the $6,000
was paid upfront on his behalf. Documentary evidence showed that respondent
enrolled as Mr. James’ counsel on March 13, 2017 and withdrew as his counsel on
April 6, 2017 due to a conflict of interest. In his disciplinary complaint against
respondent, Mr. James requested a refund.
Respondent admitted that he did not complete Mr. James’ case but fixated on
his assertion that he had worked between sixty to eighty hours on the case despite
filing no other pleadings or making no other court appearances on Mr. James’ behalf.
In response to Mr. James’ complaint, respondent indicated that Mr. James’ aunt or
grandmother had contacted him about a refund. However, during his testimony at
the hearing, respondent testified that Mr. James’ family never contacted him about
a refund.
Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that Mr. James
hired respondent on a fixed-fee basis. Within a month of being hired, respondent
had to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. Thereafter, respondent knowingly and
intentionally did not take any action to resolve the fee dispute. Based upon these
facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of
Judge Garrett testified that she was uncomfortable testifying against
respondent because they now have a professional rapport after having started off
“slightly rocky.” During the September 12, 2017 hearing, Judge Garrett was irritated
with respondent for saying he had not had time to read the amended motion.
Respondent then told her that he was not going to read the motion in court but would
11 instead read it at his office where he could conduct research, which she felt was
contemptuous. Therefore, she ejected him from the courtroom. The transcript of
the hearing at issue indicates that Judge Garrett stated, “Get out. Get out before I
put you in jail. Get out. I will pass it temporarily.”5 She felt that her ejection of
respondent diffused the situation and gave respondent an opportunity to address the
issues in the motion. After reviewing the transcript of the hearing at issue, Judge
Garrett also admitted that respondent did not call the prosecutor “crazy.” However,
when she heard the word during the hearing, she felt her reaction was predictable,
and she held respondent in contempt of court the next day.
Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office Captain Sharon Piggs testified that, when Judge
Garrett asked that respondent return to the courtroom, she sent a deputy to
respondent’s office, but respondent’s office location had recently changed, and the
deputy could not find him. Captain Piggs then sent respondent a text, to which he
replied, and she told him that Judge Garrett was looking for him. Respondent
indicated that he thought the hearing was finished. However, he did return to the
courtroom only to learn that Judge Garrett had adjourned for the day.
Respondent testified that he was not referring to Judge Garrett or the
prosecutor as crazy. He also stated that he was not talking to Judge Garrett when he
declined to borrow the Code book.6
Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that
respondent’s words, actions, and demeanor during the September 12, 2017 hearing
5 The transcript further reveals that respondent interrupted Judge Garrett several times. Her next statement to respondent after saying, “I will pass it temporarily” was “Do not interrupt me.” Judge Garrett further testified that she meant for him to wait outside the courtroom, not leave the courthouse and return to his office. She believed he understood that he should wait outside because she had previously told him to take a moment outside the courtroom to review the motion. Respondent’s client, Kenrick Wilson, testified that Judge Garrett told him to sit down after she told respondent to get out of the courtroom. Mr. Wilson indicated that he sat in the courtroom until she recalled the case, but Judge Garrett reset the hearing for the next day because respondent did not return. 6 Respondent specified during his testimony that he was talking to the prosecutor, who had previously offered to let him use her Code book.
12 were reckless and challenged Judge Garrett’s authority and dignity. Therefore,
Judge Garrett found respondent guilty of direct contempt and fined him. Judge
Garrett and respondent have not had any problems since. Based upon these facts,
the committee determined that respondent negligently committed a technical
violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Because Judge Garrett
had already satisfactorily addressed respondent’s negligent lapse, the committee
declined to consider this matter in determining an appropriate sanction.
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients,
the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct was negligent, knowing, and
intentional, which caused actual harm to his clients and potential harm to the public,
the legal system, and the legal profession. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found the following: a dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false evidence,
false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, a
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the
victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 2008), and
indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the committee found the absence
of a prior disciplinary record and imposition of other penalties or sanctions (the
contempt of court matter only).
After considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two years, with all but six months deferred, followed by one year
of probation with conditions.
Both respondent and the ODC objected to the committee’s report and
recommendation.
13 Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are supported by the record and adopted same. Based on these facts,
the board agreed with the committee’s determination of rule violations, with one
exception. In the Kennon matter, the board found an additional violation of Rule
8.4(a) due to respondent’s violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of
The board then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the
public, and the legal profession. His failure to address the multiple fee disputes was
knowing, if not intentional. His submission of a fabricated invoice and letter and
fabricated testimony with respect to the Harris matter was knowing and intentional.
Respondent caused harm to several clients by failing to address the fee
disputes or to return the unearned fees. Notably, subsequent to the formal hearing,
the fee dispute in the Davis matter was submitted to the LSBA fee dispute resolution
program, and the arbitrator determined respondent owed Mr. Davis a $4,150 refund.
Respondent also harmed Mr. Kennon by failing to perform any services on his
behalf. Finally, respondent’s fabrication of documents and testimony harmed the
integrity of the legal profession and caused potential harm to the disciplinary system.
The board agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension
based upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The board also
agreed with the committee’s determination of aggravating and mitigating factors.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, a majority of the board recommended respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years, with all but one year deferred, followed by one
year of probation with conditions. One board member dissented and would
recommend that no portion of the two-year suspension be deferred.
14 Both respondent and the ODC objected to the board’s recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected a legal
matter, failed to address fee disputes in four matters, made false statements and
provided false evidence to the ODC during an investigation, and was found in
contempt of court for challenging a judge’s authority during a hearing. The board’s
determinations regarding rule violations based upon these facts is supported by the
record.
The committee and the board both determined there was not clear and
convincing evidence that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by
seeking Mr. Gilliam’s signature on the affidavit relating to the representation of Mr.
Kennon. However, we find that respondent attempted to persuade Mr. Gilliam to
sign the affidavit even though he knew it contained false statements. The committee
specifically found that respondent accepted the fee and agreed to represent Mr.
Kennon. The affidavit that respondent drafted for Mr. Gilliam’s signature
15 specifically stated, “Based on my knowledge, information and belief, Mr. Florence
never agreed that he would represent Mr. Kennon in his new criminal charge,” which
is contrary to Mr. Gilliam’s remarks in open court while representing Mr. Kennon,
his statements in a motion to continue, and his testimony at the disciplinary hearing.
Respondent’s attempt to get Mr. Gilliam to sign the affidavit even though he knew
it contained this false statement is dishonest conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c).
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal
profession. At times, he acted negligently, knowingly, and/or intentionally, and his
conduct caused actual and potential harm. The applicable baseline sanction is
suspension. We agree with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
committee and adopted by the board. In additional mitigation, we agree with
respondent that there has been a delay in the disciplinary proceedings.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find that the heartland of
respondent’s misconduct consists of his numerous failures to address fee disputes
and his submission of false statements and false evidence to the ODC. Respondent
has never addressed the fee disputes with Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and Mr. James.
While he did participate in fee dispute arbitration with Mr. Davis, he did so belatedly
and has never provided evidence of the ordered refund to Mr. Davis despite claiming
16 to have made said refund. With respect to his submission of false evidence and false
statements during the disciplinary proceeding, the record is clear that respondent
submitted a false invoice and made false statements to the ODC regarding the Harris
matter. In the Kennon matter, respondent attempted to submit a false affidavit to the
ODC.
Considering all of respondent’s misconduct, we will suspend him from the
practice of law for one year and one day, thereby necessitating a formal application
for reinstatement. Respondent shall make full restitution to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris,
and Mr. James or participate in the LSBA fee dispute resolution program and pay
any amounts awarded to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and Mr. James in decisions
rendered by the fee dispute resolution program. In addition, if he has not already
done so, respondent shall pay $4,150 to Mr. Davis, which amount was awarded to
Mr. Davis by the LSBA fee dispute resolution program.
DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it
is ordered that J. Antonio Florence, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32037, be and he
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day.
Respondent shall make full restitution to Keddrick Kennon, Rodriqus Harris, and
Cordero James or participate in the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Fee Dispute
Resolution Program and pay any amounts awarded to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and
Mr. James in decisions rendered by the Fee Dispute Resolution Program.
Respondent shall also pay $4,150 to Burney Davis if he has not already done so. All
costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from
the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.