In re: Isabell Norton Altamira v. Waterville USA, Inc.

Opinion

Rel: July 17, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________

CL-2026-0390 _________________________

Ex parte Waterville USA, Inc.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Isabell Norton Altamira

v.

Waterville USA, Inc.)

(Baldwin Circuit Court: CV-25-900772)

HANSON, Judge.

This mandamus petition arises from a civil action originally

brought in February 2025 in the Mobile Circuit Court by Isabell Norton

Altamira ("the employee") against Waterville USA, Inc. ("the employer"), CL-2026-0390

in which she sought compensation payable under the Alabama Workers'

Compensation Act ("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq., on the

basis of a claimed June 2021 workplace accident and resulting injury to

her head, left shoulder, and back. The action was subsequently

transferred, on the motion of the employer, to the Baldwin Circuit Court.

In its June 2025 answer, the employer, among other things, denied that

it was "liable … for medical benefits" under the Act; disputed that the

employee had "suffered any permanent injury as a result of the alleged

accident"; and averred that any disability on the part of the employee was

"not proximately caused by the accident made the basis of the instant

action, but by some other prior, intervening or subsequent cause."

In February 2026, during the pendency of the underlying action in

the Baldwin Circuit Court, the employee filed a "motion to compel

medical treatment," averring that her authorized treating physician had

sought to refer her to another physician for "a second opinion

consultation" but that the employer had not scheduled any appointment

with that other physician; the employee sought an order compelling the

employer "to set a consultation appointment" with the other physician.

The employer filed an immediate objection to the employee's motion in

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which it contended that its previous provision of medical benefits to the

employee had been "without admission of liability" and that, as a result,

it could not be properly compelled to provide medical treatment without

a judicial determination of compensability, pursuant to this court's

holding in Ex parte Publix Super Markets, Inc., 963 So. 2d 654 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2007); the employer filed a more detailed response in opposition to

the employee's motion on April 1, 2026, noting that the treating physician

it authorized had placed the employee at maximum medical

improvement in March 2023 and again positing that no order compelling

further medical treatment would be proper absent proof that the

employee's alleged injury "arose out of and in the course of her

employment and that the medical treatment suggested is 'reasonable and

necessary' " adduced "at a trial on the merits of the case." On April 8,

2026, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered an order summarily granting

the employee's motion to compel, and, after the employer had filed a

motion seeking reconsideration of that interlocutory order, it entered a

subsequent order on May 5, 2026, declining to disturb its April 8, 2026,

order granting the employee's motion to compel.

On May 15, 2026, less than 42 days after the entry of the April 8,

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2026, order, the employer filed in this court a petition for the writ of

mandamus seeking review of that order. That petition was filed within

the presumptively reasonable time for seeking such review, see Rule

21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., and no contention has been made that the writ

of mandamus was not timely sought. This court called for an answer

from the employee, which has been filed, and now turns to the merits of

the employer's petition.

In Ex parte Publix Super Markets, supra, this court considered a

mandamus petition arising out of a civil action in which a grocery-store

worker had sought benefits under the Act after purportedly injuring

herself while lifting a case of bottled water in the line and scope of her

employment; after the grocery-store operator had filed an answer

denying the material allegations made in the worker's complaint, the

worker filed a "motion to compel medical treatment," which the trial

court granted after a hearing at which no evidence was adduced. 963 So.

2d at 656-57. In issuing a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to

vacate that order, this court (a) reasoned that, under the Act, "an

employer would not be financially responsible for medical and surgical

treatment obtained by an employee for conditions unrelated to an

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accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment";

(b) confirmed that no mechanism authorized "a circuit court … to decide,

on a motion of [an] employee filed before a trial and a determination on

the merits, that [an] employer is compelled to provide medical or surgical

treatment to [that] employee," except on motion for a judgment on the

pleadings under Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., or a summary-judgment

motion under Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; and (c) ruled, based upon the

content of the pleadings and the worker's motion, that neither

permissible mechanism had been employed in that case. 963 So. 2d at

658-61. We concluded:

"[I]t appears that the trial court deviated from the procedure established in the Act and the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure by deciding a disputed issue of coverage based on a motion filed by the [worker] containing only a mere allegation that she had sustained a work-related accident that caused injuries requiring medical and surgical treatment. While the law encourages employers to provide medical benefits voluntarily, see Rule 409, Ala. R. Evid., nothing in the law requires employers to furnish medical benefits to an employee based on the mere allegation that [that] employee requires medical treatment because of a work-related injury. [A worker] bears the burden of proving each and every fact prerequisite to a recovery of medical expenses, including the essential threshold fact that he or she sustained a work- related injury that necessitated the medical or surgical treatment obtained. … Section 25-5-88, Ala. Code 1975, requires circuit courts to expedite the trial and determination of workers' compensation cases, but the legislature has not

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endorsed any procedure that would abrogate [a worker's] burden of proof for the sake of expediency."

963 So. 2d at 660-61.

In the intervening 19 years, we have adhered to the principles set

forth in Ex parte Publix Super Markets regarding the unavailability of

alternate summary procedures with respect to claims of entitlement to

medical or surgical benefits under the Act. Nonetheless, the Baldwin

Circuit Court, for all that appears from the employer's petition and the

employee's answer, held no hearing at which evidence was adduced

supporting or refuting "the essential threshold fact that [the employee]

sustained a work-related injury that necessitated the medical or surgical

treatment obtained," Id. at 661, but summarily directed the employer to

grant the relief sought by the employee in her motion, i.e., requiring the

employer "to set a consultation appointment with" the "second-opinion"

orthopedic practitioner identified by the physician selected by the

employer in the prelitigation stage. The employee admits in her answer

that the order under review was entered "in the pre-trial litigation phase"

and that "there has been no testimony taken and no record other than

the pleadings" made. Moreover, as was true in Ex parte Publix Super

Markets, we can perceive neither an admission in the employer's answer

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in this case that might have warranted a partial judgment on the

pleadings warranting such relief nor any attempt by the employee in this

case to comply with the rules governing summary judgments by

submitting a suitable motion containing, among other things, a

" 'narrative summary of what the [employee] contends to be the

undisputed material facts.' " 963 So. 2d at 660 (quoting Rule 56(c)(1)).

In seeking to distinguish this case from Ex parte Publix Super

Markets, the employee relies upon the doctrine that an employer may not

refuse to honor a referral by an authorized treating physician under the

Act, citing Ex parte City of Prattville, 56 So. 3d 684 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).

However, the employee overlooks that the pertinent municipal employer

in Ex parte City of Prattville was held to have expressly waived its denial

of compensability of the injury to the worker in question in that case; we

noted that "[t]he [c]ity did not assert to the trial court that the court could

not rule on the [motion to compel medical treatment] because of the

dispute as to compensability" even though, under Ex parte Publix Super

Markets, the municipal employer could have made that defensive

assertion. Ex parte City of Prattville, 56 So. 3d at 689 (emphasis added).

If anything, Ex parte City of Prattville provides additional support for

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the employer's position in this case, i.e., that, notwithstanding its

voluntary prejudgment provision of medical care administered at its

expense by an authorized treating physician, it cannot be compelled

without an evidentiary basis to pay for the "second opinion" sought by

the employee pursuant to that treating physician's referral as long as it

insists upon its right to a resolution of the compensability dispute "via

due process, which ordinarily entails an evidentiary hearing." 56 So. 3d

at 689.

The employee also asserts that the employer is estopped to deny

authorization for the "second-opinion" consultation; she says that the

employer "treated [her claim] as an accepted claim" from the outset and

should not be permitted to "defeat[] the overall beneficent purposes" of

the Act. Employee's answer at 20-21, 26. However, the claimed conduct

relied upon by the employee -- voluntarily providing temporary-total-

disability benefits and medical benefits -- is not, both by rule and statute,

to be construed as prejudicing the employer's right to contest coverage

under the Act. See Rule 409, Ala. R. Evid. ("Evidence of furnishing or

offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses

occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury"),

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and Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-56 ("Moneys voluntarily paid by the employer

or insurance carrier to an injured employee in advance of agreement or

award shall be treated as advance payments on account of the

compensation" and "shall not be construed as an admission of liability

but shall be without prejudice."); see also Ex parte Sunbelt Transp., Inc.,

23 So. 3d 1138, 1142 (granting mandamus petition to set aside order

compelling medical treatment, noting that, "[a]lthough Sunbelt paid Paul

temporary-total-disability benefits under Florida law, Sunbelt has not

admitted or conceded that Paul's injury is compensable under the Act").

Further, to the extent that the employee relies upon the statement in the

parties' joint status report to the Baldwin Circuit Court to the effect that

"[a]rrangements [we]re being made to schedule an appointment for the"

employee with the "second-opinion" physician, we perceive no basis upon

which this court could conclude that the employer thereby made a

binding judicial admission "expressly for the purpose of relieving the

employee of proving compensability under Alabama law" so as to obviate

the employee's ultimate burden of proof. See Ex parte Sunbelt Transp.,

Inc., 23 So. 3d at 1145 (Moore, J., concurring specially).

9 CL-2026-0390

Based upon the foregoing facts and authorities, we conclude that

the April 8, 2026, order of the Baldwin Circuit Court granting the

employee's "motion to compel medical treatment" was entered outside the

discretion of that court. We thus grant the employer's petition and direct

that that order be vacated.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.