In re Isaac C.

54 Misc. 3d 710, 42 N.Y.S.3d 585
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedNovember 30, 2016
StatusPublished

This text of 54 Misc. 3d 710 (In re Isaac C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Isaac C., 54 Misc. 3d 710, 42 N.Y.S.3d 585 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Douglas E. Hoffman, J.

Introduction and Procedural History

Following fact-finding in this abuse proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act § 1012 (e), the court sets forth below its [712]*712findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) filed the instant petition on December 30, 2015, alleging that respondents Cristina C. (mother), Isom C. (father), Anthony C. (paternal grandfather) and Carla C. (paternal grandmother), abused the subject child, Isaac C., born July 9, 2015.

During the pertinent time period respondents lived together in the home of the paternal grandparents. On December 23, 2015, the parents brought Isaac to Mount Sinai Hospital after noticing swelling in the child’s leg. Examination and tests at Mount Sinai revealed a transverse femur fracture and, according to Mount Sinai physicians, a classic metaphyseal fracture (CML) and a distal radial buckle fracture. Mount Sinai’s attending child abuse physician, Dr. Katherine Grimm, who was covering for the hospital’s full-time child abuse specialist, Dr. Mandy O’Hara, was greatly concerned about possible child abuse. Dr. Grimm interviewed the parents, reviewed the child’s medical records, and recommended further testing, including a full skeletal survey.

On December 28, 2015, Dr. O’Hara returned to the hospital and became the primary attending physician. Tests revealed multiple rib fractures and swelling in the area of the femur. Within 48 hours, Dr. O’Hara wrote a letter to ACS asserting that the child’s injuries were indicative of child abuse, with no other reasonable explanation for the child’s injuries. Dr. Grimm refused to cosign the letter to ACS and took the extraordinary step of writing her own letter to ACS stating that: Mount Sinai tests revealed that the child may have rickets superimposed on a vitamin D level of zero, an extremely rare occurrence; any conclusion of child abuse was premature as further investigation was warranted as to possible metabolic causes of the child’s injuries; and those injuries may have occurred by regular handling of the child. Dr. Grimm noted that her interviews with the parents revealed loving, caring parents and that the parents did not appear to be of the type who would commit child abuse. On her own, Dr. Grimm consulted with Dr. Jack Levenbrown, an expert radiologist who did not work for Mount Sinai Hospital, and who for many years had served as a leading expert witness for ACS in numerous child abuse cases. Dr. Levenbrown ultimately testified as an expert witness for respondents at trial.

On December 30, 2015, ACS filed the instant abuse petition, asserting in pertinent part that the four respondents inflicted [713]*713or allowed to be inflicted upon Isaac physical injury, by other than accidental means, which caused or created a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, within the meaning of Family Court Act § 1012 (e). Petitioner claimed that the grandparents were individuals who were legally responsible for Isaac within the contemplation of Family Court Act § 1012 (g) and that respondents offered no reasonable explanation for Isaac’s injuries.

At the initial hearing before another judge, ACS sought removal and remand of the child to the Commissioner of Social Services. When the parents demanded a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1028 challenging removal of the child, the initial judge recused herself and the matter was referred to the undersigned. Following that hearing, this court released Isaac to the maternal grandmother, permitted the parents to reside in her home with the child and to spend unlimited time with the baby, provided that the maternal grandmother or any other adult cleared by ACS supervise the parents.

The trial upon the petition encompassed nine days from May to August 2016. Dr. O’Hara and Dr. Henrietta Rosenberg, radiologist-in-chief at Kravis Children’s Hospital at Mount Sinai Hospital, testified for petitioner as expert witnesses. All respondents testified on their own behalf and Dr. Grimm (via subpoena), Dr. Levenbrown and Dr. Michael Holick, who was qualified as an expert in endocrinology, vitamin D and metabolic bone disease, testified as experts for respondents. Dr. O’Hara presented brief rebuttal testimony. The primary issue at trial was whether or not ACS carried its burden of proving abuse in light of expert testimony proffered by respondents asserting that Isaac’s injuries resulted from the conflation of extreme vitamin D deficiency and metabolic bone disease. The parties and the attorneys for the child submitted extensive posttrial memoranda and the court reserved decision. This decision and order follows.

Applicable Law

Family Court Act § 1012 (e) defines an abused child in pertinent part as:

“a [person] less than [18] years of age whose parent . . . inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon [the] child physical injury by other than accidental means [714]*714which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or . . . creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or serious protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.”

ACS posits that the paternal grandparents are people who were legally responsible for Isaac at the time of his injuries within the meaning of Family Court Act § 1012 (g), which states:

“ ‘Person legally responsible’ includes the child’s custodian, guardian, any other person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant time. Custodian may include any person continually or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or neglect of the child.”

The Court of Appeals, in Matter of Yolanda D. (88 NY2d 790, 795-796 [1996]), explained that the phrase “person legally responsible” within the meaning of this statute focuses upon any person having parental responsibility for a child or serving as the functional equivalent of a parent in a household or family setting. This is a fact-intensive inquiry. (Id. at 796.) The court must consider at least the following factors: frequency, nature and duration of contact; nature and extent of respondent’s control over the child’s environment; and respondent’s relationship to the child’s parents. (Matter of Keniya G. [Avery P.], 144 AD3d 532 [1st Dept 2016], citing Matter of Trenasia J. [Frank J.], 25 NY3d 1001, 1004 [2015].) In Yolanda D., the Court of Appeals stated that Family Court Act article 10 should not be construed to extend to a person who assumes fleeting or temporary care of the child. (88 NY2d at 796.)

Relying upon the logic underlying the negligence law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (ii) declares that

“proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent... of

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
54 Misc. 3d 710, 42 N.Y.S.3d 585, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-isaac-c-nycfamct-2016.