In re: Iraida Hernandez Perez

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 31, 2013
Docket11-04973
StatusUnknown

This text of In re: Iraida Hernandez Perez (In re: Iraida Hernandez Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Iraida Hernandez Perez, (prb 2013).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO IN RE: * CASE NO. 11-04973 EAG * IRAIDA HERNANDEZ PEREZ, * CHAPTER 7 * * DEBTOR. * FILED & ENTERED ON 07/31/2013 ____________________________________________________* OPINION AND ORDER The trustee’s Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order Dismissing this Case, at docket number 63, is hereby granted. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), made applicable in this contested matter by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9023, the court reconsiders its order dismissing the captioned case at docket number 62 as a manifest error of law. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World University, Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (“Motions under Rule 59(e) must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered evidence.”). The debtor’s motion for voluntary dismissal, at docket number 61, failed to show cause for voluntary dismissal as required by section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Although section 707(a) does not specifically provide for a voluntary dismissal filed by a debtor, “courts have routinely held that section 707(a) applies to such cases.” Smith v. Geltzer, 507 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Moreover, “a chapter 7 debtor has no absolute right to dismiss his petition but must instead show cause.” Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 13 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009). In determining whether to grant a voluntary dismissal of a chapter 7, “cause exists by looking at ‘whether the dismissal would be in the best interest of all parties in interest.” Smith, 507 F.3d at 72 (quoting Dinova v. Harris (In re Dinova), 212 B.R. 437, 442 (B.A.P. 2d. Cir. 1997)); see also 6 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy J 707.03[3] (16" ed. 2013) (“Debtors are not generally permitted to dismiss cases over the objections of creditors or the trustee in order to refile to gain the benefit of exemptions that had been improperly claimed in the first case.”). In this case, the debtor admits that the purpose of the dismissal is to request the protection of the Puerto Rico Homestead Act. In seeking dismissal, the debtor is trying to circumvent the fact that her petition under chapter 7 was filed prior to the enactment of Puerto Rico Homestead Act. This court finds that the dismissal is prejudicial to creditors since allowing the debtor to refile and claim the homestead exemption would reduce the proceeds from the sale of the residence that would otherwise be available for distribution to creditors. Therefore, the debtor failed to establish cause under section 707(a). The trustee’s urgent motion for reconsideration at docket number 63 is granted and the court vacates the dismissal order at docket number 62. SO ORDERED. In Ponce, Puerto Rico, this 31* day of July, 2013.

Edward nln U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

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Related

Schwartz v. Geltzer (In Re Smith)
507 F.3d 64 (Second Circuit, 2007)
In Re Dinova
212 B.R. 437 (Second Circuit, 1997)

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In re: Iraida Hernandez Perez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-iraida-hernandez-perez-prb-2013.