In Re Investors Center, Inc.

129 B.R. 339, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 952, 1991 WL 129763
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJune 11, 1991
Docket1-19-40711
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 129 B.R. 339 (In Re Investors Center, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Investors Center, Inc., 129 B.R. 339, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 952, 1991 WL 129763 (N.Y. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

CECELIA H. GOETZ, Bankruptcy Judge:

Before the Court are objections by a number of customers of Investors Center, Inc. (“Investors Center” or “ICI”) to the determinations made by Irving H. Picard, Esq. as Trustee for the liquidation of the business of Investors Center pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, as amended (15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, et. seq.) (“SIPA”). 1 Also before the Court are motions by the Trustee to confirm his determinations.

The critical facts as to each of the objecting customers, or claimants, are virtually the same. In each case the claimant received a written confirmation, dated February 22, 1989, from Wall Street Clearing Company (“Wall Street”), the clearing agency for Investors Center, that certain stock belonging to the claimant had been sold. In each case the Trustee has, nevertheless, held that each claimant only has a “claim for securities” not a “claim for cash” under SIPC Rule 500, 17 C.F.R. § 300.500-300.503. The securities are either worthless, or nearly worthless, and each claimant is asking that his claim be recognized as one for cash in the amount of the confirmed sale. Some claimants also placed sell orders for which they never received written confirmation and which *341 they also want to have recognized as entitling them to cash.

Insofar as each claimant has a written confirmation of sale, the Court is sustaining his objection to the Trustee’s determination and denying the Trustee’s motion to confirm that determination. The Court deems this result compelled by Rule 501(a)(1) of the Rules adopted by the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) in March 1988. 17 CFR §§ 300.-501(a)(1). SIPC’s rules lay down a “bright line” for determining in a liquidation proceeding whether a securities transaction gives rise to a “claim for cash” or a “claim for securities.” Under those rules each of the objecting claimants, because of the receipt of written confirmation of a sale prior to the filing of SIPC’s application to liquidate Investors Center, has a claim for cash and not for securities and the Trustee’s determination otherwise is incorrect.

I

SIPA was passed by Congress in 1970 after a wave of brokerage house failures in the late 1970’s. It was extensively amended in 1978. In SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 95 S.Ct. 1733, 44 L.Ed.2d 263 (1975), the Supreme Court explained SIPA’s origins as follows:

Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities industry experienced a business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number of brokerage firms. Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disastrous effects on customer assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a “domino effect” involving otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed. Congress enacted SIPA to arrest this process, restore investor confidence in the capital markets, and to upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers.

421 U.S. at 415, 95 S.Ct. at 1736

See also, In re Bell & Beckwith, 821 F.2d 333, 335 (6th Cir.1987); In re Brentwood Securities, Inc., 925 F.2d 325, 326-327 (9th Cir.1991).

The Senate Report which accompanied the legislation explained its purposes as follows:

... to protect individual investors from financial hardship; to insulate the economy from the disruption which can follow the failure of major financial institutions; and to achieve a general upgrading of financial responsibility requirements of brokers and dealers to eliminate, to the maximum extent possible, the risks which lead to customer loss.

S.Rep. No. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1970); see also, H.R.Rep. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).

Broadly speaking, SIPA is designed to accomplish two things. One is to prevent and detect broker-dealers’ insolvency through financial controls and oversight. In furtherance of this objective, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) is given power to establish financial responsibility rules for brokers and dealers and to impose on the self-regulatory organizations requirements for the financial examination of their members. One of the self-regulatory organizations is the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). Two, SIPA protects the customers of brokers and dealers if insolvency occurs. Through the Securities Investment Protection Corp. (SIPC), a nonprofit organization composed of most registered brokers and dealers, investors who deposit cash or securities with a broker are intended to be insured against the risk of broker insolvency. SIPC maintains a fund for such investor protection supported by mandatory assessments against its members based on their gross revenues (§ 78ddd), out of which it makes payments up to certain limits to investors who have deposited cash or securities with a failed broker-dealer (§ 78fff-3(a). If SIPC’s funds should be inadequate to carry out its purposes SIPA authorizes a loan of up to one billion dollars from the United States Treasury (§§ 78ddd(f), (g) and (h)).

*342 SIPC has no authority to examine its members. It depends for its information on the self-regulatory organizations and the Commission. If the Commission or any self-regulatory organization believes that a broker or dealer subject to its regulation is in, or is approaching, financial difficulty, it must immediately notify SIPC. (§ 78eee(a)(l)). If SIPC determines that a member has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers and that one or more of certain statutory conditions exist, it may apply to the appropriate federal district court for a “protective decree,” adjudicating that the customers of such member are in need of the protection provided by SIPA. (§ 78eee(a)(3); § 78III (13)). This initiates a liquidation proceeding similar to, but not identical with, a bankruptcy proceeding. (§ 78eee(a)(3); 78ZZZ (13)).

The purposes of a liquidation proceeding are: (1) to deliver to the debtor’s customers the securities to which they are entitled and (2) to “satisfy net equity claims of customers.” (78fff(a)(l)).

SIPA calls for the appointment in a liquidation proceeding of a trustee with the same rights and powers as a trustee in bankruptcy. (§ 78eee(b)(3); § 78fff — 1(a)).

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129 B.R. 339, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 952, 1991 WL 129763, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-investors-center-inc-nyeb-1991.