In Re Interest of McDonell

427 N.W.2d 779, 229 Neb. 496, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 294
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 12, 1988
Docket88-012
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 427 N.W.2d 779 (In Re Interest of McDonell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Interest of McDonell, 427 N.W.2d 779, 229 Neb. 496, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 294 (Neb. 1988).

Opinion

Boslaugh, J.

On August 12, 1987, a petition was filed alleging that the appellant, Kenneth McDonell, was a mentally ill dangerous person. After a hearing before the mental health board of Lancaster County, Nebraska, the appellant was, on August 20, 1987, committed to the Department of Public Institutions. On December 7,1987, the order was affirmed by the district court. McDonell has now appealed from that order to this court.

The appellant contends that the mental health board and the district court erred when they found there was clear and convincing evidence that the appellant was mentally ill and dangerous as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1009(1) (Reissue 1987).

Section 83-1009 defines a mentally ill dangerous person as any “mentally ill person... who presents [a] substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by placing others in reasonable fear of such harm 99

Furthermore, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1035 (Reissue 1987) provides in part:

A hearing shall be held by the mental health board to determine whether there is clear and convincing proof that the subject of a petition is a mentally ill dangerous person and that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other alternatives less restrictive of his or her liberty than a mental health board-ordered treatment disposition are *498 available or would suffice to prevent the harm described in section 83-1009.

In reviewing a final order made by the district court in mental health commitment proceedings, this court must affirm the order of the district court unless, as a matter of law, the order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re Interest of Kinnebrew, 224 Neb. 885, 402 N.W.2d 264 (1987); State v. Steele, 224 Neb. 476, 399 N.W.2d 267 (1987). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1043 (Reissue 1987).

The appellant has admitted in his brief that “[t]hdre is no dispute that the appellant is mentally ill,” but contests the findings below that the appellant is “dangerous.” Brief for appellant at 8.

This court, in In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 302 N.W.2d 666 (1981), provided a detailed analysis of the issue of “dangerousness.” We there said:

For there to be compliance with the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause, there must be an independent finding of dangerousness____
The key to confinement of one who is mentally ill lies in the finding that he is dangerous, i.e., that absent confinement, he is likely to engage in particular acts which will result in substantial harm to himself or others. Indefinite preventive detention cannot be authorized for those “who have a propensity to behave in a way that is merely offensive or obnoxious to others; the threatened harm must be substantial.” ...
To comply with due process, there must be a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that dangerous behavior will be engaged in unless restraints are applied. “While the actual assessment of the likelihood of danger calls for an exercise of medical judgment, the sufficiency of the evidence to support such a determination is fundamentally a legal question. ... To confine a citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, it must be shown that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger was *499 manifested by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to himself or to another.” ...
In determining whether a person is dangerous, the focus must be on the subject’s condition at the time of the hearing. Actions and statements of a person alleged to be mentally ill and dangerous which occur prior to the hearing are probative of the subject’s present mental condition. “But a mere recitation of past acts, in the absence of a showing that such clearly forms the foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness, cannot serve as the basis for a finding that one is a mentally ill person____” ...
In order for a past act to have any evidentiary value it must form some foundation for a prediction of future dangerousness and be therefore probative of that issue.

(Citations omitted.) Id. at 55-58, 302 N.W.2d at 670-71.

The record shows that at the hearing before the mental health board, the State called three witnesses, the first of whom was Nancy Johnson, a former high school classmate of the appellant’s. Johnson testified that the subject began contacting her in 1968, asking her for dates despite the fact that she was engaged to be married. The appellant’s contact with Johnson ceased after her marriage in 1968, but resumed in 1971. Over the course of that year, the appellant had eight contacts with Johnson in the form of letters and phone calls, one call being described by Johnson as threatening in nature. Following these occurrences, Johnson filed a mental health warrant in Cass County against the appellant. According to Johnson, the appellant was then “committed” for treatment. Johnson noted six contacts with the appellant in 1972, which included an appearance at her home, driving repeatedly up and down the street in front of her home, and appearances at the school where she was employed. Similarly, in 1973, Johnson had “several” contacts with the appellant, including letters au Ving followed by him as she drove her car to and from worK. No contacts occurred in 1974, but at least three took place in 1975, most of which involved the appellant’s following Johnson. Again, no contacts occurred in 1976 and 1977; three contacts occurred in 1978, comprised of a letter, a phone call, and *500 following Johnson. No contacts were noted in 1979; numerous telephone calls were made by appellant to Johnson at her school in 1980; several contacts took place in 1981; no contacts were made in 1982 and 1983; six contacts happened in 1984; and several incidents took place in 1985, one of which included her witnessing of the appellant’s assault on a police officer at Southeast High School, where she was coaching track. As a result of that incident, the appellant was incarcerated for 22 months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in this case.

Despite the frequency of her contacts with the appellant, Johnson denies ever having been physically assaulted by him, nor did he make physical threats to her person.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
427 N.W.2d 779, 229 Neb. 496, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-interest-of-mcdonell-neb-1988.